After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not? — Art48

Even if it were an activity:
1. Aren't activities ''things"?
2. Do activities exist?
3. If they exist, are they fundamental or emergent?
4. If they aren't neither fundamental nor emergent, how could we explain them?

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/

1. The point is, weak vs. strong is a conceptual distinction, not an objective "fact" about reality. If you treat it as something which can't be further elaborated and debated, you have completely denuded the value of the meaning of "emergence."

2. The typical philosophical interpretation of materialism is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. So it doesn't necessarily avoid emergence, per se, but rather obviates the question. Which was my problem with the topic. It is either question-begging or self-contradictory. If you accept emergence, then consciousness probably is emergent. If you want a non-emergent theory of consciousness, you are left with epiphenomenalism (as a corollary of material reductionism).

1.

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/ — Pantagruel

I'll read it. Still... the definition is irrelevant to my OP.

2. Define epiphenomenon in your own terms please.

3.

(as a corollary of material reductionism). — Pantagruel

- it seems to me you don't understand that reduction entails emergence. You cannot reduce something that wasn't priorly emergent.
It's like saying you can deconstruct something that has never been constructed.

it seems to me you don't understand that reduction entails emergence. You cannot reduce something that wasn't priorly emergent. — Eugen

In which case you have reduced the concept of emergence to simple analyticity. That is discussed in the article regarding the weaking of the concept of weak emergence.

Can you just clarify why you feel that emergence is a problem of some kind?

1.

In which case you have reduced the concept of emergence to simple analyticity. That is discussed in the article regarding the weaking of the concept of weak emergence. — Pantagruel

I don't care about the definition! Define it as you like. The difference between me and you is that you don't accept that there is a concept of strong emergence as it is defined by most of philosophers. I don't care! Define it as you like! Ok... there is only emergence in the sense you described it. This makes no difference to this OP.

2.

Can you just clarify why you feel that emergence is a problem of some kind? — Pantagruel

When did I say emergence was a problem? Do you even understand my question?

It is either question-begging or self-contradictory. — Pantagruel

For the last time, no, it is not! I am not embracing or dismissing emergence.

I’m not familiar with Joscha Bach but I’m looking at some web pages about him now. What I’ve read so far reminds me of Bernardo Kastrup’s theories. — Art48

The two are actually kind of enemies, they had a rough dispute some time ago.

I understand the problems of all the theories you mentioned, but that is not what I'm about here.
All I want to know is if there is a way in which we can build a theory of consciousness starting from non-conscious, without emergence being involved or implicit. I'm looking for a way to get around emergence completely. Or maybe some other theory has already done this. Maybe functionalism, maybe Bach's theory. I don't care about theories where the mind is fundamental, i.e. idealism or panpsychism.

So far, 180 Proof says that all I need to do is to consider consciousness a process rather than a thing, so in this way I can explain consciousness without appealing to emergence, because activities are not emergent. I didn't say it can't be a process, I'm saying I personally don't see how this could make any difference. So...
1. Do you think a process is fundamentally different from ''a thing"?
2.Do you think processes are so distinct from the rest of reality that they are neither fundamental nor emergent?
3. Do you think ''emergent process" would be a non-sense concept?

For the last time, no, it is not! I am not embracing or dismissing emergence. — Eugen

Which makes it very strange that you are concerned whether or not there are theories of consciousness which "manage to bypass emergence" then.

Oh, and things are processes. "Thinghood" is just an artefact of the spatio-temporal limitations of cognitive processing. Acorns are trees and trees acorns. That's the beauty of thought: it allows for the overlay of present awareness with systematized protentions and retentions that enable us to "see" things that are otherwise only processes.

Whitehead is a great process metaphysician.

Which makes it very strange that you are concerned whether or not there are theories of consciousness which "manage to bypass emergence" then. — Pantagruel

- so irrelevant.

Oh, and things are processes. — Pantagruel

Actually, I can, in principle, agree with that. Still... I personally don't see how this affects emergence.

Actually, I can, in principle, agree with that. Still... I personally don't see how this affects emergence. — Eugen

I'm not sure about "affecting" emergence. But systems theory is all about the reality and nature of processes, and one concept of central concern is emergence. So there's that.

So it is inevitable after all in your view.

Emergence is not well understood in all its varieties.

In Wikipedia Mark A. Bedau observes:

Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities?

At its simplest level it is characterized as an automobile, which involves a pattern or arrangement of parts. Under downward causation in Wikipedia:

Downward causation does not occur by direct causal effects from higher to lower levels of system organisation. Instead, downward causation occurs indirectly because the mechanisms at higher levels of organisation fail to accomplish the tasks dictated by the lower levels of organisation. As a result, inputs from the environment signal to the mechanisms at lower levels of organisation that something is wrong and therefore, to act.

Downward causation might be a key to understanding consciousness, but mathematically it is not well understood. The explorations I have done in infinite compositions of functions might eventually play a minor role, especially inner compositions which relate mathematically to the convergence of continued fractions. Don't worry, I won't get started. :nerd: — jgill

This reminded me of a discussion that @apokrisis participated in. Here is his discussion about downward constraint. It's long:

That’s where the hierarchy of scale comes in. It represents an artificial division of the universe into manageable pieces.
— T Clark

Reductionists and holists mean different things when they talk about hierarchical order.

Reductionists think only in terms of upwards construction. You start with an ultimately simple and stable foundation, then build upwards towards increasing scales of complexity. As high as you like.

But a holist thinks dualistically in terms of upwards construction working in organic interaction with downwards constraint. So you have causality working both ways at once, synergistically, to produce the functioning whole.

The hierarchy thus becomes not a tower of ascending complexity (and arbitrariness or specificity) but it itself reduces to a "basic triadic relation" (as hierarchy theorist, Stan Salthe, dubs it). The holist account reduces all organisation to the interaction between an upward constructionist flow and a downward constraining history or context, plus then the third thing which is the relation that those two causal actions develop in a stable and persistent fashion.

So many key differences to reductionist metaphysics follow from this connected causality.

For example, it makes everything historically or developmentally emergent - the upward construction and the downward constraint. There is no fundamental atomistic grain - a collection of particles - that gets everything started. Instead, that grain is what gets produced by the top-down constraints. The higher order organisation stabilises its own ground of being in bootstrap fashion. It gives shape to the very stuff that composes it.

A simple analogy. If you want an army, you must produce soldiers. You must take average humans with many degrees of freedom (all the random and unstable variety of 18 year olds) and mould them in a boot camp environment which strictly limits those freedoms to the behaviours found to be useful for "an army". You must simplify and standardise a draft of individuals so that they can fit together in a collective and interchangeable fashion that then acts in concert to express the mind and identity of a "military force".

So in the holist view, there is no foundational stability to a functioning system. The stability of the parts comes from the top-down constraints that shape up the kind of parts that are historically best suited to the task of constituting the system as a whole. The parts are emergent and produced by a web of limitation.

When it comes to the metaphysics of science, this is why we see thermodynamics becoming the most general perspective. The broad constraint on all nature is that it must be able to self-organise its way into stable and persistent complexity. And thermodynamics or statistical mechanics offers the basic maths for dealing with systems that develop negentropic organisation by exporting entropy.

From particle physics to neuroscience, thermodynamics explains both simplicity and complexity.

Well, it does if you let it. — apokrisis

That emergence and consciousness are related? It seems to line up nicely both factually and coherently. That it is impossible to concoct a plausible counter-theory? Well, to be scientifically legitimate, an hypothesis must be falsifiable, if you take Popper's view, so I'm sure there is some plausible theory of non-emergent consciousness.

And in his view, consciousness is fundamental or it is neither fundamental nor emergent?

I think Popper subscribed to identity theorism; and he had a "three-worlds" theory that seemed to describe a privileged and real status to psychologistic entities. But I was referring specifically to his view on the criterion of falsifiability, which he formalized.

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/popper/natural_selection_and_the_emergence_of_mind.html
It seems to me he didn't avoid emergence after all.

Identity theory is emergence. Consciousness is a certain material arrangement. That material arrangement must come into existance somehow, it mist emerge.
Viceversa, consciousness is reducible to a certain material arrangement.
I don't see how that's not emergence.

1. Do you think a process is fundamentally different from ''a thing"?
2.Do you think processes are so distinct from the rest of reality that they are neither fundamental nor emergent?
3. Do you think ''emergent process" would be a non-sense concept? — Eugen

1. Normally, we consider processes and things as different. A whirlpool is a process of water spinning. The water is the thing that is spinning. But if everything is a manifestation of universal mind or Brahman or The One, then everything could be considered a process. Analogy: every thing we see on a computer monitor is the result of the monitor's light. The action of the light forming a thing can be considered a process. In a monist ontology, there is only one "thing" and everything else is a process, an action of The One.

2. Hm. If we consider matter as a thing, then any material process is merely the thing in motion. Is the whirlpool fundamentally different than the water molecules? Is the whirlpool an emergent process of the water. I think both questions can be argued different ways depending on someone's ontology. If everything is a manifestation of The One, then processes are not fundamental but might be considered emergent.

3. Again, I think it depends on someone's ontology. Taking water as matter, then I'd say the whirlpool is an emergent process because a whirlpool fundamentally differs from water. For instance, if the flowing water were gradually replaced with alcohol or a thin oil, then the whirlpool would continue existing but no longer as water spinning.

But if everything is a manifestation of universal mind or Brahman or The One, then everything could be considered a process. — Art48

No, there is The One and there's its manifestation. Two things.

In a monist ontology, there is only one "thing" and everything else is a process, an action of The One. — Art48

It seems you agree with me that The One and the process are different.

If everything is a manifestation of The One, then processes are not fundamental but might be considered emergent. — Art48

Agree and I would actually add that emergence itself is a process.

then I'd say the whirlpool is an emergent process because a whirlpool fundamentally differs from water. — Art48

That's strong emergence. I don't think water is fundamentally different from its molecules. Water is its molecules.

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? Isn't that the basis of the reification criticism? After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree? — Art48

It seems to me he doesn't have logical arguments, but rather he's driven by psychological biases. He's against the idea that consciousness is somehow fundamental. He doesn't arrive to this conclusion by logical reasoning, he simply doesn't want this to be the case. At the same time, he seems to acknowledge the problems of materialism, so the only way is simply to re-define consciousness. Hey, consciousness is a process, there is nothing like to be X. He's basically moving the same problem to another level. If tomorrow he were convinced processes don't do the job anymore, he'd find another escape: consciousness is not a process, it's a mambo-jambo. Mambo-jambos escape all problems, so think about consciousness as being mambo-jambos.

But that's just my opinion, and I might be wrong about him.
But even if I accept his view of ''consciousness being a process", he still hasn't convinced me why processes cannot be emergent and most importantly, how come there is something like to be a process.
The latter is not connected to the topic, so I don't need an answer for that.

consciousness is not a process — Eugen

I am sure you would agree that everything neuroscientists currently know about the workings of the human brain are processes, yes?
So the best evidence we have, supports the proposal that consciousness 'emerged' as the result of earlier processes. These processes emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible.
What's the alternative's on offer?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree? — Art48

Consciousness the entity!!! What entity? ..... god? aliens ( is consciousness panspermic?), are we all holograms? or in a matrix? I think consciousness did 'emerge,' from previous processes, leading all the way back to the big bang singularity, style placeholder. I give far far more credence to that, than to any of the alternative offerings.

You quoted me "consciousness is not a process". Could you please give me more content of that post where I said that?

It seems to me ↪180 Proof he doesn't have logical arguments, but rather he's driven by psychological biases. He's against the idea that consciousness is somehow fundamental. He doesn't arrive to this conclusion by logical reasoning, he simply doesn't want this to be the case. At the same time, he seems to acknowledge the problems of materialism, so the only way is simply to re-define consciousness. Hey, consciousness is a process, there is nothing like to be X. He's basically moving the same problem to another level. If tomorrow he were convinced processes don't do the job anymore, he'd find another escape: consciousness is not a process, it's a mambo-jambo. Mambo-jambos escape all problems, so think about consciousness as being mambo-jambos. — Eugen

I hope the above quote satisfies your request. I find @180 Proof's arguments quite logical.
He has described himself as a naturalist in previous posts and in general, he tends to reject woo woo proposals that don't have very strong supporting evidence that can survive scientific scrutiny. I support such standards of evidence. I assume you do to.
The increased quote above, does not, in my opinion, require any editing of my post containing the shorter quote.

So the best evidence we have, supports the proposal that consciousness 'emerged' as the result of earlier processes. These processes emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible.
What's the alternative's on offer?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree? — Art48

Consciousness the entity!!! What entity? ..... god? aliens ( is consciousness panspermic?), are we all holograms? or in a matrix? I think consciousness did 'emerge,' from previous processes, leading all the way back to the big bang singularity, style placeholder. I give far far more credence to that, than to any of the alternative offerings. — universeness

Not entity as in a person (god, aliens) but entity as in substance, i.e., something which exists independently, in its own right. In contrast, a process supervenes on its components. For instance, the whirlpool process supervenes on water. The claim is that consciousness supervenes on the brain. "Consciousness is what the brain does."

Our own consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain exists. We know the external world only through consciousness. I don't seriously say the external world does not exist, but it is a fact that there is some epistemic uncertainty about the existence of the external world, however small. We could be brains in a vat, or victims of Descartes' demon. So, maybe the hard problem of consciousness exists because it tries to explain the absolutely certain, i.e., our own consciousness, in terms of the, however slightly uncertain, i.e., exterior world. It’s Bss Aackwards. (If you don't understand the last sentence, switch the bold letters.)

I hope the above quote satisfies your request. — universeness

By the contrary. That was pure crap from your side to quote me with something I never said. I don't care if consciousness is a process or a unicorn and I have never said consciousness is not a process.

Consciousness the entity!!! What entity? — universeness

I can imagine the following:
1. An entity that's doing absolutely nothing - a static reality;
2. An entity whose one of its properties is to change - process.

What I cannot imagine is a process without the thing. The process is what the thing does.
AGAIN: I'm not saying consciousness cannot be a process. It just seems to me you're prioritizing processes over things.

Not entity as in a person (god, aliens) but entity as in substance, i.e., something which exists independently, in its own right. — Art48

Excellent answer!

But I guess that would be woo in 's view, so he wouldn't take it seriously. It's a non-starter for him.

This reminded me of a discussion that apokrisis participated in — T Clark

Yes. He seemed very trustworthy on technical subjects like this. I miss his participation.

Not entity as in a person (god, aliens) but entity as in substance, i.e., something which exists independently, in its own right. In contrast, a process supervenes on its components. For instance, the whirlpool process supervenes on water. The claim is that consciousness supervenes on the brain. "Consciousness is what the brain does." — Art48

Can you envisage the properties of such a 'substance'?
Do you propose that the source of consciousness is currently undetectable in the same way dark matter/energy is undetectable?
A whirlpool is a direct consequence of underlying processes, that causes an overall 'change' to the system. Just like the concept of melting points etc. I am sure there is a 'build up,' of activity to a 'critical moment' in the brain that we label a thought. I am sure there are microtubules, dendrites, synapses, neurons etc involved, as part of the build up to experiencing a thought. As I am not a neuroscientist, I don't know the full currently known details involved in the process, but it sure seems like a definite process to me!
I also think consciousness is what the brain does, no entity as a god, aliens or independent substance involved. Unless there is some evidence that such a 'substance' with such properties exists, even to the same level as the proposed existence of dark matter/energy.

Our own consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain exists. We know the external world only through consciousness. I don't seriously say the external world does not exist, but it is a fact that there is some epistemic uncertainty about the existence of the external world, however small. We could be brains in a vat, or victims of Descartes' demon. So, maybe the hard problem of consciousness exists because it tries to explain the absolutely certain, i.e., our own consciousness, in terms of the, however slightly uncertain, i.e., exterior world. — Art48

No one can disprove hard solipsism, I agree, but notions of god, infinity and nothing, also cannot be disproved. God, infinity, nothing, solipsism are mere placeholders, they serve no other purpose and have no other value than that.

It’s Bss Aackwards. (If you don't understand the last sentence, switch the bold letters.) — Art48

In what way is your 'consciousness = an independent substance' any more likely or more worthy than the simple god posit for the source of consciousness? There seems to me to be about the same level of evidence for both.

But I guess that would be woo in ↪universeness's view, so he wouldn't take it seriously. It's a non-starter for him. — Eugen

You have to type it twice to get the required effect. it's woo woo!

By the contrary. That was pure crap from your side to quote me with something I never said. I don't care if consciousness is a process or a unicorn and I have never said consciousness is not a process.

Consciousness the entity!!! What entity?
— universeness
I can imagine the following:
1. An entity that's doing absolutely nothing - a static reality;
2. An entity whose one of its properties is to change - process.

What I cannot imagine is a process without the thing. The process is what the thing does.
AGAIN: I'm not saying consciousness cannot be a process. It just seems to me you're prioritizing processes over things. — Eugen

I was not using 'consciousness is not a process,' as a direct quote that I assigned to you. I used it as a presupposition, to the point I wanted to make. I did not intend for it to annoy you.
Would you not question the rationality of a 'static reality' being the source of human consciousness?
Do you propose this static reality entity, is concentrated somewhere in the universe, or omnipresent?
If you are musing about the source of consciousness, as an 'entity,' then in what sense do you suggest this entity can experience or cause change? Do you muse that it can grow/become more concentrated/learn/alter the mechanism of its connection to lifeforms such as humans, etc?
Without offering far more detail, regarding what you propose this 'entity' IS and how it functions, it will reduce inevitably to woo woo. This is only my opinion, again, I am not trying to deliberately annoy you. I only do that when that's what I think I am getting from the person I am exchanging views with. I am sure, based on your last couple of responses to me, that you do the same.

I don't recall Bakker rejecting emergence vis-á-vis consciousness, he just rejects "spooky emergence," (and I don't recall ever seeing a satisfactory explanation of what constitutes "spooky").

When it comes to subjective experience, the burning issue is really just one of what *science* will make of it and what kinds of implications this will hold for traditional, intuition-based accounts. The life sciences are mechanistic, so if subjective experience can be explained without some kind of ‘spooky emergence,’ as I fear it can, then all intentional philosophy, be it pragmatic or otherwise, is in for quite a bit of pain. So on BBT, for instance, it’s just brain and more brain, and all the peculiarities dogging the ‘mental’ – all the circles that have philosophers attempt to square (by positing special metaphysical ‘fixes’ like supervenience or functionalism or anomalous monism and so on) – can be explained away as low-dimensional illusions: the fact that introspective metacognition is overmatched by the complexities of what its attempting to track.

The main thrust of BBT is to explain why consciousness is not what it appears to be, and why folk definitions of the phenomena are wrong. Consideration of emergence is somewhat conspicuous by its absence. But I would assume that what we mistake for "consciousness," does indeed "emerge" from physical interactions given the rest of theory. I take from his other positions that the status of emergence is a question where he would grant the philosophy of physics and physics itself primacy, subjects he doesn't explore much in his writing (interestingly, since it seems relevant to what he is exploring).

Likewise, presence, unity, and selfhood are informatic
magic tricks. The corollary, of course, is that intentionality is also a kind of illusion.

I think the problem with eliminitivist narratives, Bakker's effort being no exception, is that they attempt to answer a different set of questions then the ones people are looking to see answered.

It's sort of like, if the origins of life were more contested than they are today, and someone tried to answer the question by saying "life doesn't really exist, it's a folk concept that doesn't reflect reality." They might have a point. Life is hazily defined Computer viruses check a lot of boxes for criteria for life, but are they alive? Memes? Biological viruses? Silicone crystals that self replicate and undergo natural selection? Other far from equilibrium self organizing systems?

And they could go on to show how life often doesn't have all the traits we think it does and is not clearly defined in nature the way other phenomena are. Which might be a good set of points; it is certainly a set of questions biology does take very seriously, but it also doesn't answer the main question, i.e. "then why does what we mistake for life/consciousness exist for a very small set of observable phenomena in the universe?"

On a related note, I wonder if Bakker still subscribes to BBT. His follow up quadrilogy seems to move in a quite different direction, but that could just be because he didn't want to beat a dead horse and the ideas had been fully explored already.

Can you envisage the properties of such a 'substance'? — universeness

Let's suppose I can't. Then what is your point? That lack of a full and complete explanation proves a hypothesis invalid? Careful. Can you solve the hard problem of consciousness? If not, then you lack a full and complete explanation of how consciousness arises from brain activity, correct? So, is "consciousness is what the brain does" is an invalid hypothesis?

One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. For example, imagine a mousetrap of the old kind: a wooden base, a spring connected to a hammer, cheese bait that triggers the hammer. Also imagine the mouse trap is conscious. It experiences anticipation when triggered, and peace after catching a mouse. There are physical correlates: the spring has more potential energy when set (anticipation) and less potential energy (peace) after it’s been triggered. Spring potential energy might perfectly correlate with feelings of anticipation and peace, but would not explain how a mouse trap could experience those feelings.

Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla.