The point here might well be, the youth are as dependent upon others (parents and community - not only in terms of economic and physical dependency, but also for education) and we are only speculating there is a potential of productivity. — Mayor of Simpleton

I also find this conversation interesting.

When I speak of dependency in the society in which we live, it is of two orders: economic dependency and physical-psychological dependency.

Both converge in the inability to carry out productive, paid jobs.
Naturally, the limits of dependency are imprecise and conventional. It cannot be otherwise. Like so many other things in our lives. For example, in the society in which we live, household work is productive but unpaid. This includes domestic work - usually covered by women even in 'advanced' societies such as France or Germany - and grandparents caring for grandchildren (it is very common in certain societies and in times of pandemic).

Young people have a special status (they are useful even if they are not in paid work) because they represent a medium-term investment. In the same way that a company can pay for some advanced English courses for its executives to improve their performance. Naturally, investing in young people is an overall investment that starts with compulsory education. There is no guarantee that it will be profitable in all cases, but in general.

As you say, this is a utilitarian vision of social values. But not just any kind of utilitarianism, but a neo-capitalist (or capitalist, just like that) utilitarianism. We can call it mercantilism.

Its main consequence is that it is favouring an exacerbated individualism which goes very well for business - for some - but provokes fractures and social violence against those who are considered "parasites" of society. And this is where the perspectives differ. For capital investors in a society, the workers who do not produce what they want are left over. For young sharks, grandparents are out of place. For the fathers of large families, single mothers are a hindrance. Etc.

Compassion and solidarity are banished to new normality. The triumph of the will of power sounds more than with fascism. Maybe we could talk about a new democratic fascism. Reality is full of such oxymorons.

It didn't end well. — Ciceronianus the White

No. He underestimated Mark Antony's brutality or preferred to defy death.

On what basis can you accept Xenophon's word over Plato's? — magritte

Because Plato builds a Socrates to suit him. He is a fictional character, more than the real Socrates. The difference between Plato and Xenophon is usually settled by reproaching Xenophon for his "coarseness". A philosopher always has an advantage over a military man... among philosophers. But lately voices have appeared in favour of Xenophon. Perhaps it was not so simple. Perhaps he was not as biased as Plato.

In any case, the vision that Xenophon gives of Socrates seems coherent to me. Plato is not. He is much more intelligent. But that doesn't mean that he is much more faithful to his master. (Was he really his disciple? He doesn't seem to be among the favourites).

On what basis can you accept Xenophon's word over Plato's? — magritte

Jenophon does not say that he was a "decrepit buzzard" but that he was alarmed to see the first signs of decline in old age in himself and did not want to go that far. That is why he provoked his judges until he was sentenced to death.

No. He was not condemned for being old. I did not say that.

Does age imply wisdom?
Does youth imply innovation? — Mayor of Simpleton

I don't think so. Old age means a stiffening of neural connections. How can it mean "wisdom"? It seems contradictory. The myth of the "wisdom" of the elderly rests on a strict patriarchal society that has not existed for a long time. The value of the elderly has plummeted in societies with dismembered families. Including the new Chinese or Korean societies.

I believe that those of us who still value the elderly do so in the name of emotional values. But this kind of value is in disuse in our society of advanced capitalism. We should look at why.

I don't think "rational selfishness", Ayn Rand, etc. are the causes, but the ultimate symptoms of a social illness.

how do we get to a modern day standard of measure for 'old age' then subsequently figure out is it a blessing or a curse? — Mayor of Simpleton

I would say that the criteria for considering a man old is more flexible today. But if ancient Greece was a set of cities at continuous war with each other and with the Persians, our dominant culture rates men and women according to their economic value. We have seen this perfectly when in the current pandemic crisis measures to prevent deaths (of mostly old people) were confronted with the "economy".
Therefore, we could say that the date set to consider someone an old man - with all the indetermination you want - starts around the end of their productive activity. And he is definitely considered old when he needs to become physically dependent on others. In between there are different degrees of old age.

My daemon, Cicero, insists that old age is "the crown of life." I — Ciceronianus the White

What your daimon was doing was defending the senatorial power against imperial attacks. This is why he stresses that old age is only desirable for rich men with an active (political) life. But that is putting conditions that very few old men meet. I am talking about the common old man.

Or with the the self of say ´87. coolest thing is memory. — Ansiktsburk

There is a lot of talk about the problem of memory in the elderly. It is not just memory. There is a general loss of mental abilities. Especially that of handling abstract concepts, which is decisive for solving problems. For me it was a trauma when I saw my father confused because he didn't know how to solve a simple everyday problem like hooking up various electrical connections. My father was a philosopher and had written several books on very abstract subjects - phenomenology, Kant, analysis of language - which made me dizzy even when I was younger than I am now.

There came a time when, due to some brain problem, he was able to write his last book, although he had reading difficulties. But he had the great wisdom of old age: he understood that his capacities were diminishing and he lowered the level of complexity of what he was writing by several degrees. This is the worst defect of the elders: they don't realise that they are no longer the young or adult man that they were.

This is due to an inability to self-evaluate: the old man knows he is old, but he feels young. Here comes the old coquette (Goya) and the old man full of make-up (Aschenbach). Intellectually the problem arises because the old man, whose days are numbered, undertakes tasks for which he no longer has the time or the ability.

as speaking generally from experience isn't quite an empirical investigation or is it? — Mayor of Simpleton

It is empirical, though not scientific. Scientific inquiries that I know limit themselves to particular aspects of the problem. I am trying an overview.

What exactly is the standard of measure for this shield criterion? — Mayor of Simpleton

The ability to participate in the war. Hellenistic culture was a culture of war. Every citizen had placed in a preferential place in his house the weapons that served to defend his city. Weapons and citizenship were almost synonymous. Therefore, when one could not hold his coat of arms, he passed to a new state of citizenship: the old man.Then, he received an ambivalent consideration. Praised for his wisdom and ability to be an advisor on matters of justice and war, he was blamed for his decadence and uselessness in defending the community that equated him with a child. See both aspects in Homer. Nestor in Iliad and Laertes in Odyssey.

In societies that exalt youth, like ours, the elderly fall mostly into the second category. They are dispensable, if not a nuisance that is relegated to mortuaries such as nursing homes. A highly visible role in the current pandemic crisis.

Even perhaps too explicit I recommend "Torching the Dusties" in Margaret Atwood's Nine Wicked Tales.

OK... they lived until about 71, but still at what point in time do they reach the status of 'old age'? — Mayor of Simpleton

Why isn't the shield criterion useful?

As Plato is speaking 'generally', it could be in some cases justifiable and in other not so much. — Mayor of Simpleton

Doesn't this depend on who you ask, when ask and in what context you ask? — Mayor of Simpleton

There are always exceptions to the rule. But that does not invalidate it.

Of course, you have to pay attention to the circumstances. A very obvious one: it is not the same to be an old man as an old woman. And that difference is overwhelming in many societies. In all of them, if we give credit to feminists.

But perhaps there are characteristics of old age that end up being imposed on classes and genders. With all the nuances you want.

So is that age of 71 the standard or just a single case example?

Since that's the age of death... what is considered to be old age? — Mayor of Simpleton

This is not an isolated case. It is the age Plato attributes to the rulers of his republic. If I remember correctly.

I think I already said that. The shield decides.

How old was 'old age' in the age of Plato? — Mayor of Simpleton

From the moment he could not handle the Hoplite shield, which was quite heavy. Anyway, Plato does not defend the superiority of the old only, but of the very old especially. Well past 65, if I remember correctly. Socrates, who is the paradigm, dies at 70 aprox. .

An old man's eagle mind. — tim wood

Few old people have the mind of an eagle. More like a plover. And then the moment comes when you pee yourself.
Probably the solution is in the Socrates that Xenophon paints. Letting yourself be carried away by the river.

Or maybe not. May be Socrates was fighting for his own old man pride.

Speculating about old age when young is an entertaining diversion, but not very productive. — jgill

Well, I haven't been a young man for a long time, but I believe that the real problems of old age must be considered at every stage of our lives. After all, it is everyone's natural destiny, except if an accident occurs. And everyone should bear in mind that a man cannot say whether he is happy until the last day of his life. Before death, aging is the ultimate test of a man's happiness - and perhaps of his virtue.

The curious thing - so to speak - is how society hides the real problems of the old men. Young people love grandparents, but they create a myth about them that makes them what they are not: "collective memory", familiar totem or nice impertinent. When grandpa starts to complain about his condition everyone looks the other way. Whether out of misunderstood compassion, shame or fear.

Then, the old man becomes something to be cared for or to be disturbing. Like a plant. You water it from time to time, you put fertilizer or pesticide on it, you find a place where there is light... or you throw it into the dunghill.

This explains the ease with which, in these times of the plague, grandparents are those "little old men" who have to die in exchange for "the economy". "Economy" means that I don't miss the disco or don't stop me from going on holiday on a Caribbean cruise. Leaving aside those who think in terms of millions that are in other level of understanding.

And what can the old man do?

This draws attention to an increase in wisdom that is commensurate (and perhaps linked with) a decrease in physical and mental powers. — Olivier5

But it is important in old age to have ongoing projects. — jgill

How can there be a growth of wisdom when the mental capacity decreases on the run?

The study of famous cases of old men who were once great sages does not give cause to speak of "wisdom". I think of Kant, of whom there remains a frightening chronicle that E. T. A. Hoffmann collected: The Last Days of Immanuel Kant. A stammering and confused Kant who had to be tied to the leg of his bed so that he would not get lost in his room.
What is most disconcerting is that these great people, like almost all the more modest ones, do not recognize their own mental decadence and are engaged in grandiose projects to reformulate their own theories or lifestyle. It is as if they want to deny their own aging process with an intellectual renaissance for which, unfortunately, they are no longer qualified. Now I am thinking of Sartre, for example.

I don't believe that old age is the age of wisdom, but a progressive advance towards stupidity. This is was Socrates' feeling -despite Plato's version- according Xenophon. This is why he provoked is own death in his famous trial. It is an heterodox consistent version.

No, they aren't. To take "wrong" as being "incorrect" is absurd, and this is not what he says. Ever.

If to be "hidden" is to be "wrong," that's your own business. — Xtrix

According to you, a proposition that is false is not wrong or incorrect. (???)
You speak very strange English.

You don't know what Heidegger assumes, because you don't understand Heidegger. — Xtrix

No. You don't understand Heidegger because you speak "privative" English.

Concealment does not mean "wrong." If aletheia means un-concealment, and this often gets translated as "truth," then this is what was meant by "truth" to the early Greeks. Later on, truth comes to mean "correct assertion," and "wrong" (as "incorrect") becomes its opposite. That does not mean "concealed," in Heidegger or in the Greeks, means "wrong" in the sense of incorrect or in any other sense. Being "concealed" does not mean "wrong" in any way. It simply means it's hidden. This is a mistake you continually make. — Xtrix

"Wrong" either means incorrect or morally "bad." That's the ordinary usage. We'll discount the latter, because we're not discussing morality. The former refers to logic, in the sense of assertions and propositions and laws of thought. All that is perfectly fine with me. (And Heidegger.)

They just happen not to apply to Heidegger's analysis of the Greeks, as you claim they do. — Xtrix

This is called juggling with words on the tightrope.

To say that an assertion Being towards Real entities, and a Being "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' in its uncoveredness. (B&T: 218/261)

The most primordial 'truth' is the 'locus' of assertion ; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false--that they may uncover or cover things up. (B&T: 226/269)

Similarly, 'Being false' amounts to deceivingin the sense of covering up [verdecken] : putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not. (B&T: 33/56)

The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. (B&T: 233/265)

But for the most part this phenomenon has been explained in a way which is basically wrong, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate manner. (B&T: 58/85)

Sorry, it's not that "aletheia" “may be translated” as "truth". Heidegger's very concept of truth is "not covered" or "uncovered" and is opposed to the false or hidden. You can see this in the underlined words (by me) of Heidegger himself. Sometimes he also uses "wrong" or "inadequate". "Incorrect" is less usual.
To say that what is is not is false. Keeping some truth hidden is false, wrong or inadequate. All these words are synonymous used more or less by Heidegger.

Therefore, when he says that the concealment of Being begins with Plato and Aristotle he is saying that the metaphysical path that follows them is wrong, inadequate, incorrect or whatever you want to say. These are similar words to express the same idea of failure.

Of course, this does not mean that all traditional metaphysics have to be discarded. Heidegger expressly rejects this conclusion. He speaks of Aristotle or Kant with respect in some relevant points. But his metaphysics needs to be "destroyed" in the sense of reformulated in a very different sense with important corrections in a phenomenological sense. This is the role he assigns himself.

But none of this applies to Heidegger's analysis. If it did, it would essentially mean that science is "wrong," since science's "founding fathers" held assumptions and beliefs which were rooted in Aristotelian philosophy and emphasize the present-at-hand objectification of nature. — Xtrix

Firstly, science no longer follows Aristotle. Since the modern age. Heidegger did not know much about contemporary physics. The mere concept of cause has not been Aristotelian for a long time. Of course, some similarities can be established between modern science and Aristotle. But not the concept or the structure of science. This is one of Heidegger's false assumptions.

Secondly, Heidegger does not say that science is absolutely wrong. Positivism is wrong when it takes science as a model for metaphysical knowledge. Science has its foundation in the ontic (natural) perspective. That is, it has its limits. When someone tries to go beyond them, he is wrong.

Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences. (B&T: 11/31)

Purpose? Many. But what philosophical purposes are based on reasonable means? Not many.

The main (only?) use of philosophy is that it helps to question the unquestionable. That is why its tool is analysis.

Other purposes are illusory and disproportionate to its real powers. When philosophy offers itself to be a guide for humanity it becomes a religion in disguise or falls flat on its face. It is the same thing.

Philosophy can also be useful in rationalizing the life project that we have semi-consciously chosen. But this path can become an illusory one if we are not able to apply analytical criticism to ourselves. This is the main illusory use of philosophy: to convince us that if we are not Superman it is due to accessory circumstances.

But ask yourself: what is it that has become explicit in an Aristotle's interpretation?

Answer: The ordinary conception. — Xtrix

If you had not mutilated the phrase you would have realized that the ordinary interpretation is "in" Aristotle already. It is part of the Aristotelian conception of time that last . As you can see in this other quote:

...the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if preontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. (Being and Time: 225/268)

I call your attention, in case you get lost in trtanslation :joke: , to the fact that the accusation against Aristotle is not banal, it is of "concealment". Which implies that it is contrary to the truth, according to Heidegger's definition of truth, not a simple divergence.

In essence, that Aristotelian definition of time, contrary to the temporality defended by Heidegger, consists of this:

Ever since Aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definitions (...)Time is what is 'counted' ;(...) The "nows" are what get counted. And these show themselves 'in every "now'" as "nows" which will 'forthwith be no-longer-now' and "nows" which have 'just been not-yet-now'.(Ibid: 422/477)

In other words, a quantitative and homogeneous concept of time in terms of "present". Elsewhere I have already put a quote summarising Heidegger's (alternative) position.

Yes, but as I've grown tired of saying: translations of terms is a different topic, — Xtrix

What German word does Heidegger use that is not equivalent to "error"? If you know it, say so. If you don't know, don't try to hide your ignorance with undefined statements that say nothing.

Is viewing things as present-at-hand "wrong"?

Of course not. — Xtrix

It depends on the use you want to make of it. As merely natural knowledge of "things" there is no problem. But when the ontology claims to be based on them, they are a serious impediment.

Like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real. In this way "Being in general" acquires the meaning of "Reality". Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted, and so too does our very view of the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. It finally forces the general problematic of Being into a direction that lies off the course.(B&T: 201/45)

Such procedures are facilitated by the unexpressed but ontologically dogmatic guiding thesis that what is (in other words, anything so factual as the call) must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let
itself be Objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all. (B&T: 275/320)

Is it not clear for you?

I don't see this in Heidegger and he's given me no reason to. I think a claim like "Aristotle is wrong" is so childish I'd be embarrassed to say it. — Xtrix

Well, I have already given you a good number of quotations in which Heidegger explains the error that Aristotle begins and continues throughout metaphysics. Until Heidegger arrives and puts things in their place, according to him, by destroying all previous metaphysics (as we saw a few months ago).

What seems childish to me is that you pretend to seek how to understand the world and its history and do not want to accept that there are explanations that are correct and others that are incorrect. Is there no true or false? Anything goes? Then why do you call what you don't agree with you childish? Or why do you say that it is based on pre-judgements? That childishness or prejudiced views are correct too?

In ordinary language right and wrong are words that match many of the adjectives Heidegger uses against his rivals. But you don't want them to be wrong.

One fundamental question you must answer: What does "wrong" mean to you? If you don't answer, I'm afraid this conversation is definitely blocked.

There are no pure emotions. Emotions are not isolated processes, separate from the rest of mental activity. Their dynamics are intertwined with those of other psychological processes, among which those of a cognitive nature stand out.

All right. Emotions are evolutionarily beneficial. They provide some mechanisms for survival and adaptation to the environment. But they can also be harmful anthropologically or socially.
Emotions are the source of certain dysfunctions:

Wishful thinking.
Anxiety.
Unresolved fear (procastrination).
Aggression (sadism).
Addiction
.................

What about this ambiguity? How can we explain it? A failure of evolution?

The ordinary conception of time and Aristotle's interpretation of time are two different things — Xtrix

And this?

This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be ditinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later. (18/39)

I put this quotation some days ago. You have a poor memory. (Underlining is mine).

In the meantime I have learned to realise that precisely those terms had to lead irremediably and directly to error.

To lead irremediably and directly to error means to be wrong ( defective, faulty, flawed, inadequate, insufficient, lacking and so). Is it not?
This (like many other quotes I have included) dismantles your theory that Heidegger presents his theory as simply different from that of Aristotle. No. It is about truth versus error.

By the way:

But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy for the moment it was only possible to speak from the horizon of what exists today and from the use of the terms or names that are most common in that framework.
In the meantime I have learned to realise that precisely those terms had to lead irremediably and directly to error. (Carta sobre el humanismo: 358/80; my translation)

How do you deal with this "error"?

What's left out is a more phenomenological way of treating time. — Xtrix

"More" phenomenological? Is Aristotle phenomenology?
Heidegger explicitly says that the ordinary interpretation of time derived from Aristotle does not go beyond the ontic level. Please read Heidegger again.

And of course not. Aristotle is not "less" phenomenology, whatever you understand by more and less.

It's not a play on words. It's Heidegger's words. — Xtrix

Where Heidegger says insufficiency is not wrong?

It prevents metaphysics from asking the question. He never says anything about solving a problem — Xtrix

It is a truism, which Heidegger also uses, that if a question is not asked properly you cannot give a correct answer. Do you think that a correct answer can be done to a wrong question?
This is what produces the fundamental flaw in Western metaphysics: the obscuring of the question of being, to the point of denying meaning to the question and the concept of Being.
Heidegger says that the right approach to a question is the condition of the right answer.

...it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been
clarified and answered and taken as a clue-at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. (3/22)

Heidegger does not often use the term "to solve", but uses others with the same meaning. In the previous fragment he speaks of "clarifying". The term "demonstrate" and "appropriate and complete" are used also. Throughout his work other terms are equivalent, such as "unveiling". Or more metaphorical-mythical terms like "shepherd". All of them imply that, although the problem of the sense of Being is not totally solved -this is expressly recognized by him-, the path that Heidegger advocates is the right one and allows to take adequate steps in the right direction. Other ways are insufficient or occlusive. That is to say, the wrong paths.

to phrase it this way gets us right back into the tradition. — Xtrix

This phrase has no meaning to me. Clarify it, please.

It's not equivalent to his phenomenological analysis, so I can't provide a quotation because he never says that. This would also undermine his entire thesis. — Xtrix

OK. In what way is it not equivalent? Why would this undermine your whole thesis?

If we interpret "time" as something present-at-hand, as Aristotle did, it doesn't mean it's wrong, it means it's "privative" -- it's leaving something out. — Xtrix

What is left out is the level of ontology, Being, the understanding of Dasein's main constituents: temporality, care, anticipatory resolution, history, etc. That is to say, the primordial, authentic and true (unveiled). Without this, you remain at a lower ontical level of understanding of the philosophical tradition that Heidegger qualifies in a thousand ways, including the concept of right.

This is the main sense of Heidegger's work that you will find on every page of his books. I have given a sufficient number of quotations that imply his opposition to traditional metaphysics on this basic point. If you want to say that it is not because this tradition is wrong, but because it is insufficient, this is a simple play on words. Because that insufficiency is primordial, according to Heidegger, and prevents traditional metaphysics from solving the basic problem on which all others depend: the question of Being - and of Dasein, consequently.

And how you like to demand quotations - without understand those I am giving you - I would like you to give one where Heidegger says that the traditional metaphysics that is maintained at the ontic level (present-to-hand) is "privative" and equivalent to his own phenomenological analysis. I await with genuine interest.

Do we really get older each day? — Gregory

Some more than others.

This is why Heidegger repeatedly says this isn't the case. — Xtrix

You have no idea what you're talking about. — Xtrix

You're right: I don't know what you're talking about. Not Heidegger, of course.

"There is no worse blind person than the one who does not want to see". (Chinese proverb.).

The existence of a correct ("rightly explained") explanation of X implies the existence of a wrong explanation of X in all the languages of the world... except in your personal language (1). If you say that you have the "correct" interpretation of Heidegger you are saying that my alternative interpretation is wrong. In the quotations I have put Heidegger identifies this erroneous explanation as the "ordinary interpretation" of time. He points directly to Aristotle as the source of it ("persisted from"). Finally, he points out some essential differences between his correct interpretation and the ordinary one: finite versus infinite; priority of the future versus the succession of identical "nows". This is what serves him to confront his "authentic" interpretation with the "inauthentic" one. Which are two ways of talking about right and wrong.

All this is clearly explained in sections 65-71, if I remember the numbers correctly.

(1) I advise you to go to any synonym dictionary where you can see (if you want) this simple consequence.

If his thesis stands or falls, it does so on how well he describes the phenomena and, in my view, he does so brilliantly. — Xtrix

As you will understand if Heidegger's entire defense consists of his brilliance, according to Xtrix, the thing does not impress too much. Would you have something that looks like a piece of evidence or a favorable argument?

He's not blaming Aristotle. It's not that Aristotle has it "wrong" and he has it "right." He's not saying that. — Xtrix

Some quotes from Being and Time.

Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. (B&T:18/40; Cursive by Heidegger)

As you can see, there is a " right" explanation of time. What is the wrong one?

This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be ditinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later. (18/39)

Here it is clear, that which starts from Aristotle. What does it consist of? Here it is:

What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nows", without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. (329/377)

And what is Heidegger's alternative?

Our analysis of primordial temporality up to this point may be summarized in the following theses. Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite. (331/380)

There are many confusing and contradictory things in Heidegger. But that he accuses Aristotle of being the founding father of a concept of time that is incapable of expressing authentic-primoridal temporality, is an item so repeated that only a myopic eye can fail to see it.

Heidegger has ever -- not once -- claimed the opposite. Neither have I. — Xtrix

Nor have I seen any words from Heidegger about the influence of cultural background on phenomenal perception. You have spent many years reading Heidegger, so you could provide me with a wealth of references. One would be enough for me.

In the meantime, the fact that Heidegger blames the Aristotelian conception of time because it was "theoretical" suggests that he considered his own interpretation free of these theoretical elements. Is that so?

A Heidegger text on this would be interesting...

Heidegger never says his CONCEPT of temporality is "authentic." Never. Apparently he talked about authentic and inauthentic temporality, which in my view doesn't mean much -- but that's not the same thing. — Xtrix

Absurd. Heidegger constantly talks about two opposing concepts of time (and others issues). One is inauthentic. The other is authentic. This is repeated ad nauseam. These words appear almost a hundred times in Being and Time
. You can't dismiss Heidegger's words by saying that "it doesn't mean much" to you. That meant a lot to Heidegger. And everyone understands what choice he had between authentic and inauthentic.
We're talking about Heidegger, aren't we?

In the sense that you're taking "theory," how could it be otherwise? Of course interpretation and description is involved. Language is involved. Thinking is involved. — Xtrix

If you agree with me, what are you discussing with me?

He does have an argument for this, consisting of many pages of words in a book called "Being and Time," — Xtrix

No kidding! I thought we were discussing the sex of angels! Thanks for warning us. Now, be nice, and explain to us one of those reasons the book is full of. One is enough for me. Because I have a malevolent suspicion that you can't do it. But I already say it's malevolent. You can easily disprove it. Sure.

Except children, apparently. — Isaac

It is assumed that children have no use of reason. The age of reason, you know.

What poses a sharp problem: In what age begins the age of reason? Everybody knows many teen that have very more reason that their fathers, syndrome Down people smarter that "normal" people, and gaga old men absolutely stupid...
I suppose a rule about this is not easy. So we cut by eye.

I'm sorry I'm late, but I can think of something that could unlock the debate.

The first thing to do in the face of a morally complex case is to make the assumptions (if possible common ones) explicit. I would say that the first moral assumption of a free society is that every person has the right to decide freely and rationally about his actions as long as he does not inflict on others a greater evil than he is trying to avoid for himself.

According to this principle, euthanasia should be authorized in any country that presumes to respect the freedom of its citizens.

The rest will be casuistry.

NOTE: It seems to me that a society that causes the death of people based on the indemonstrable benefits that these deaths can produce for all citizens and that forbids these citizens to end their own life when it is evidently unbearable for them is a morally ill society.
No, I'm not just thinking about death penalty. Look for other examples. There are.

I should be clear about what I mean by consciousness, since people tend to talk past one another on this topic. — petrichor

Your concept of consciousness is too strange and not very useful. Psychology usually only includes thoughts and experiences that are explicit to the subject in the consciousness. It is synonymous with awareness. For example: Some people are playing with a ball on a screen. An individual disguised as a gorilla passes by in the background for a few seconds. Many observers do not refer to the gorilla when asked to describe the scene. They did not notice it.

The classic distinction between conscious and unconscious is useful to analyze some relevant questions about perception and memory. It is a key concept in the debate about psychoanalysis and dreams. I see no advantage in blurring this distinction. Rather I see confusion.
For example, forgetting is very different from unconsciousness. In oblivion you cannot remember something that you were aware of a few days before. In the unconsciousness you are not aware of a process present in your mind.

It is not necessary to think about strange things when talking about the unconsciousness. Your abilities to drive a car are largely unconscious. It is not a mystery.

Perception is not theory. Perceiving shapes and colors is very different indeed from theory. — Xtrix

You turn the discussion upside down so much that one ends up not knowing what one is talking about.

First of all, in contemporary psychology and philosophy you don't perceive colours, as you say. You perceive objects, that is structured sets with a form that is not a mere clustering of sensations (colours, sounds, etc.). The description of these objects is influenced by pre-concepts and categories, that have theoretical components. Theory is not the same that perception, but it does influence it.

Therefore, the pure description of phenomena that Heidegger and other phenomenologists pretend is impossible. We describe phenomena in a culture mediated background.

Heidegger suggest repetitively -if not claims- that Aristotelian-Cartesian concept of time is "theoretical" against his "authentic" concept of "temporality". This is false. His concept is as theoretical as Aristotelian. In the fact he himself recognizes it. He affirms that his interpretation has to "violate" the common sense of time. ("When violences are done in this field of investiga­tion..." B&T: 326/374). It wouldn't be so grave if he were able to give some reason of this "violence" as he pretends. He is not.

One of the things Heidegger must justify theoretically is why the future is the primary mode within temporality, in preference to the past and present. (If you agreed with this, why did you argue? Why on earth did you add the superfluous consideration that temporality is "also" primary? It's just a desire to tangle things!). Heidegger's reason is purely theoretical. It depends on his concept of the priority of the anticipatory resolution of life before death. This is a Heidegger's very subjective theory that, as in others, is influenced by his Christian education. And it is rationally unjustifiable.

No one is making any claims like this about his interpretation. — Xtrix

Heidegger rejects as inauthentic the Aristotelian concept of time and what he considers its derivation in the vision of time lived by common sense. It is a continuous leitmotif of his work. If you pretend that Heidegger's interpretation of temporality is not an interpretation, you will tell me what it is. The real truth? No. Heidegger's interpretation is opposed to other interpretations, such as those of other phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty or Sartre. Whether it is the authentic or the true, is what he never demonstrates. (Among other things because he shows an Olympic and explicit contempt for all that is evidence. His must be divine inspiration, that is, of Being).
And how do I grasp or think about time if not through perception or theory? Divine inspiration?
Heidegger himself repeatedly calls his theory an analysis. If I remember correctly, he also calls it an interpretation. Analyzing and interpreting are ways of theorizing. Here and in China.
Of course, you can resort to intuition. I have included it in the concept of "perception" so as not to complicate the debate.

The question pertained to time, not theory or perception. — Xtrix

Perception is not theory. — Xtrix

True, but according to epistemology and psychology mere perception is influenced by theoretical conceptions. If you describe a perception you will include those theoretical elements. And this is true for Aristotle or Heidegger.

Heidegger says that the future is the primordial existential ecstasis. — David Mo

Temporality is primordial, not just the future. — Xtrix — Xtrix

Here it is. Underlined by Heidegger himself.

Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The priority of the future will vary according to the ways in which the temporalizing of inauthentic temporality itself is modified, but it will still come to the fore even in the derivative kind of 'time'. (B&T, #65, 330/378: cursive by Heidegger)

Hey, are you sure that what you have read with so much effort is Being and Time?

The exaltation of selfishness is in sight. It is called "neoliberalism". Consequence: the destruction of the social bonds that allow to resist the factual powers. Atomization. Anti-cooperation. Criminalization of empathy. Weakening of real individuals in the name of the abstract idea of the individual.
What can "natural egoism" do against this?

In my opinion, Heidegger does not pretend that time forms an undifferentiated unit. The three ecstasies cannot be con-fused. What he affirms is their continuous interaction in lived time (temporality). This is a triviality. What seems more radical is to say that his interpretation of temporality is the authentic and original temporal mode. I have not seen Heidegger present any evidence of this. Nor have I seen it in the books and articles about him that I have consulted. Nor have you presented any evidence on his behalf. So we are talking about a dogma.

"In describing something, there is thinking and concepts involved. To argue this is "theory" is misleading. It is simply a common way of understanding and talking about the world -- as a sequence".

"When does the memory of the death of your mother occur? In the past?"

If all perception includes theory, the pre-discursive knowledge that is the basis of Heidegger's theory and his critique of metaphysics and science is also theory. Everything is relative or subjective.
You do not distinguish between talking about a person's death and that the person is dead. When did my mother's death occur? In my memory? Is my mother's death "theoretical"?

Heidegger says that the future is the primordial existential ecstasis. I suggest you review your readings.
The main reason is that the authenticity of the human being resides in the anticipatory resolution of being for death. But the mere concept of project already anticipates that priority of the future that gives meaning to the past.
I'm surprised you don't know this.

Note: I mean with theory a system of ideas intended to explain something.

Heidegger's work is a complex and confusing theory about being, time and the human being. He claims to be based on a pre-discursive knowledge, but even that is not evident, as I have just shown. The perception of time does not agree with essential points of Heidegger's theoretical analysis.