If his thesis stands or falls, it does so on how well he describes the phenomena and, in my view, he does so brilliantly. — Xtrix

As you will understand if Heidegger's entire defense consists of his brilliance, according to Xtrix, the thing does not impress too much. Would you have something that looks like a piece of evidence or a favorable argument?

"Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future" Heidegger

As I've said above, there are theories of time in physics that may have use of this theory. We may ordinarily experience time running backwards for example

Some quotes from Being and Time.

Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. (B&T:18/40; Cursive by Heidegger)

As you can see, there is a " right" explanation of time. What is the wrong one? — David Mo

"Rightly seen and rightly explained" refers to the phenomenon of time. There's no "blaming" there and no indication of being "wrong." This is why Heidegger repeatedly says this isn't the case.

As you can see, there is a " right" explanation of time. What is the wrong one?

This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be ditinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later. (18/39)

Here it is clear, that which starts from Aristotle. What does it consist of? Here it is:

What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nows", without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. (329/377) — David Mo

I see nothing about being "wrong." What a shocker. We've been through this before, and I've already shown you how you're misinterpreting it.

Aristotle's wrong and Heidegger's right. Put it in your simplistic terms if you need to. This is boring, and apparently the only thing you know how to discuss at length, while ignoring everything else. But have it your way -- I'm not interested.

But that he accuses Aristotle of being the founding father of a concept of time that is incapable of expressing authentic-primoridal temporality, is an item so repeated that only a myopic eye can fail to see it. — David Mo

You have no idea what you're talking about. :yawn:

This is why Heidegger repeatedly says this isn't the case. — Xtrix

You have no idea what you're talking about. — Xtrix

You're right: I don't know what you're talking about. Not Heidegger, of course.

"There is no worse blind person than the one who does not want to see". (Chinese proverb.).

The existence of a correct ("rightly explained") explanation of X implies the existence of a wrong explanation of X in all the languages of the world... except in your personal language (1). If you say that you have the "correct" interpretation of Heidegger you are saying that my alternative interpretation is wrong. In the quotations I have put Heidegger identifies this erroneous explanation as the "ordinary interpretation" of time. He points directly to Aristotle as the source of it ("persisted from"). Finally, he points out some essential differences between his correct interpretation and the ordinary one: finite versus infinite; priority of the future versus the succession of identical "nows". This is what serves him to confront his "authentic" interpretation with the "inauthentic" one. Which are two ways of talking about right and wrong.

All this is clearly explained in sections 65-71, if I remember the numbers correctly.

(1) I advise you to go to any synonym dictionary where you can see (if you want) this simple consequence.

Do we really get older each day?

Do we really get older each day? — Gregory

Some more than others.

The existence of a correct ("rightly explained") explanation of X implies the existence of a wrong explanation of X in all the languages of the world.. — David Mo

You're not talking about Heidegger. What Heidegger says, repeatedly and explicitly, is that the concepts handed down to us -- many of which have been incorrectly (wrongly) translated (this is especially where you've been confused in the past) -- are based on a particular interpretation of being: the Greek interpretation -- phusis which becomes ousia. This interpretation is not "wrong" in the sense of incorrect, it is simply based on more primordial phenomena which was overlooked and which Heidegger says had to be overlooked through no fault of their own (i.e., the ready-to-hand experiences which are traditionally concealed but can be brought out through phenomenology).

We see this over and over. The present-to-hand mode of inquiry, the theoretical attitude, is part of the human being, but ready-to-hand activity is where we find ourselves in our "average everydayness." It is more basic. If we interpret "time" as something present-at-hand, as Aristotle did, it doesn't mean it's wrong, it means it's "privative" -- it's leaving something out. This is why Heidegger never, not once, says anything like "Aristotle is wrong" or "Descartes is wrong." We've been through this over and over again. The rest of your "evidence" is simply misunderstanding, reading into the text your simplistic notions that you want to see. If you continue to refuse to see that, that's your own issue.

"Rightly explained" has nothing to do with "correct." You're misunderstanding that entire passage. Read "rightly explained" as "properly explained" -- i.e., handled phenomenologically. But if you want to die on that hill, you're welcome to.

If we interpret "time" as something present-at-hand, as Aristotle did, it doesn't mean it's wrong, it means it's "privative" -- it's leaving something out. — Xtrix

What is left out is the level of ontology, Being, the understanding of Dasein's main constituents: temporality, care, anticipatory resolution, history, etc. That is to say, the primordial, authentic and true (unveiled). Without this, you remain at a lower ontical level of understanding of the philosophical tradition that Heidegger qualifies in a thousand ways, including the concept of right.

This is the main sense of Heidegger's work that you will find on every page of his books. I have given a sufficient number of quotations that imply his opposition to traditional metaphysics on this basic point. If you want to say that it is not because this tradition is wrong, but because it is insufficient, this is a simple play on words. Because that insufficiency is primordial, according to Heidegger, and prevents traditional metaphysics from solving the basic problem on which all others depend: the question of Being - and of Dasein, consequently.

And how you like to demand quotations - without understand those I am giving you - I would like you to give one where Heidegger says that the traditional metaphysics that is maintained at the ontic level (present-to-hand) is "privative" and equivalent to his own phenomenological analysis. I await with genuine interest.

Heidegger seems to have thought of death as "dispersion", which might be wrong. He seemed to take to heart Nietzsche's phrase "joy in high tension"

I don't understand why you keep posting random, disconnected, Twitter-like assertions. I don't mean to be rude, but so far you have not demonstrated that you have any idea what you're talking about. Please try to be more relevant and more coherent. Otherwise you'll simply be ignored. If you have genuine questions, ask them. If not, your opining about Heidegger is not interesting.

Ignorance

If we interpret "time" as something present-at-hand, as Aristotle did, it doesn't mean it's wrong, it means it's "privative" -- it's leaving something out.
— Xtrix
What is left out is the level of ontology, Being — David Mo

What's left out is a more phenomenological way of treating time.

If you want to say that it is not because this tradition is wrong, but because it is insufficient, this is a simple play on words. — David Mo

It's not a play on words. It's Heidegger's words.

Because that insufficiency is primordial, according to Heidegger, and prevents traditional metaphysics from solving the basic problem on which all others depend: the question of Being - and of Dasein, consequently. — David Mo

It prevents metaphysics from asking the question. He never says anything about solving a problem -- to phrase it this way gets us right back into the tradition.

I would like you to give one where Heidegger says that the traditional metaphysics that is maintained at the ontic level (present-to-hand) is "privative" and equivalent to his own phenomenological analysis. — David Mo

It's not equivalent to his phenomenological analysis, so I can't provide a quotation because he never says that. This would also undermine his entire thesis.

Yes, you are ignorant. Now please go away.

If you want to choose with the full consent of your free will to be ignorant, I'll leave your thread alonw

Yes, I do wish to remain ignorant of your obnoxious, random rantings about something you don't understand. Now please get off my thread.

I tried to help you dude with Mo. I don't "care" about people who use the full consent of their will to ignorant. One thing I hate is bias. Bye!

What's left out is a more phenomenological way of treating time. — Xtrix

"More" phenomenological? Is Aristotle phenomenology?
Heidegger explicitly says that the ordinary interpretation of time derived from Aristotle does not go beyond the ontic level. Please read Heidegger again.

And of course not. Aristotle is not "less" phenomenology, whatever you understand by more and less.

It's not a play on words. It's Heidegger's words. — Xtrix

Where Heidegger says insufficiency is not wrong?

It prevents metaphysics from asking the question. He never says anything about solving a problem — Xtrix

It is a truism, which Heidegger also uses, that if a question is not asked properly you cannot give a correct answer. Do you think that a correct answer can be done to a wrong question?
This is what produces the fundamental flaw in Western metaphysics: the obscuring of the question of being, to the point of denying meaning to the question and the concept of Being.
Heidegger says that the right approach to a question is the condition of the right answer.

...it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been
clarified and answered and taken as a clue-at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. (3/22)

Heidegger does not often use the term "to solve", but uses others with the same meaning. In the previous fragment he speaks of "clarifying". The term "demonstrate" and "appropriate and complete" are used also. Throughout his work other terms are equivalent, such as "unveiling". Or more metaphorical-mythical terms like "shepherd". All of them imply that, although the problem of the sense of Being is not totally solved -this is expressly recognized by him-, the path that Heidegger advocates is the right one and allows to take adequate steps in the right direction. Other ways are insufficient or occlusive. That is to say, the wrong paths.

to phrase it this way gets us right back into the tradition. — Xtrix

This phrase has no meaning to me. Clarify it, please.

It's not equivalent to his phenomenological analysis, so I can't provide a quotation because he never says that. This would also undermine his entire thesis. — Xtrix

OK. In what way is it not equivalent? Why would this undermine your whole thesis?

By the way:

But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy for the moment it was only possible to speak from the horizon of what exists today and from the use of the terms or names that are most common in that framework.
In the meantime I have learned to realise that precisely those terms had to lead irremediably and directly to error. (Carta sobre el humanismo: 358/80; my translation)

How do you deal with this "error"?

Heidegger explicitly says that the ordinary interpretation of time derived from Aristotle does not go beyond the ontic level. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. The ordinary conception of time and Aristotle's interpretation of time are two different things. It is not "derived" from Aristotle.

Almost everything that comes out of your mouth (or keyboard) needs correction. It's boring. Stop talking and start listening.

How do you deal with this "error"? — David Mo

:yawn:

The ordinary conception of time and Aristotle's interpretation of time are two different things — Xtrix

And this?

This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be ditinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later. (18/39)

I put this quotation some days ago. You have a poor memory. (Underlining is mine).

In the meantime I have learned to realise that precisely those terms had to lead irremediably and directly to error.

To lead irremediably and directly to error means to be wrong ( defective, faulty, flawed, inadequate, insufficient, lacking and so). Is it not?
This (like many other quotes I have included) dismantles your theory that Heidegger presents his theory as simply different from that of Aristotle. No. It is about truth versus error.

This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be ditinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from

You have trouble reading, I think. That's fine. But ask yourself: what is it that has become explicit in an Aristotle's interpretation?

Answer: The ordinary conception. They're not the same. Related, but not the same.

lead irremediably and directly to error means to be wrong ( defective, faulty, flawed, inadequate, insufficient, lacking and so). Is it not? — David Mo

Yes, but as I've grown tired of saying: translations of terms is a different topic, and they're often wrong (according too Heidegger). You're stuck in confusing this with a sweeping generalization of all Western thought, which is based on "presence."

Is viewing things as present-at-hand "wrong"?

Of course not.

that of Aristotle. No. It is about truth versus error. — David Mo

Well at least this is consistent with your view that Heidegger has a messiah complex. He'd have to be like that to make such a claim - I.e., that he has the "truth" (as "correct") and Aristotle is "wrong" (incorrect). By all means interpret it that way - no surprise, since you started with that assumption. You see what you hope to see.

I don't see this in Heidegger and he's given me no reason to. I think a claim like "Aristotle is wrong" is so childish I'd be embarrassed to say it. I don't care about right and wrong, I'm interested in understanding the world and its history. Perhaps Aristotle and the Greeks missed certain things. Perhaps Galileo and Newton did. Perhaps everyone has. No doubt we have (and are) missing plenty of things right now, and 99% what we believe right now will turn out to be misguided, limited, etc.

The only thing interesting to look at is what we do with our time and lives. We can't understand that fully if we hold on to dogmas. Heidegger, like Aristotle and Nietzsche (and perhaps even Marx), etc., was someone who was able to look at everything and question it. Some "things" remain concealed even to Heidegger, as they did for Aristotle. This is why he constantly emphasizes questioning -- hardly egotistical. This is why he's saying there is probably a more fundamental "horizon" that is yet to be discovered, and why he talks endlessly about "openness" and "resoluteness."

Or we can take the attitude that Heidegger views himself as being "right" while Aristotle is "wrong," much like modern scientists do about the Greeks.

But ask yourself: what is it that has become explicit in an Aristotle's interpretation?

Answer: The ordinary conception. — Xtrix

If you had not mutilated the phrase you would have realized that the ordinary interpretation is "in" Aristotle already. It is part of the Aristotelian conception of time that last . As you can see in this other quote:

...the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if preontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. (Being and Time: 225/268)

I call your attention, in case you get lost in trtanslation :joke: , to the fact that the accusation against Aristotle is not banal, it is of "concealment". Which implies that it is contrary to the truth, according to Heidegger's definition of truth, not a simple divergence.

In essence, that Aristotelian definition of time, contrary to the temporality defended by Heidegger, consists of this:

Ever since Aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definitions (...)Time is what is 'counted' ;(...) The "nows" are what get counted. And these show themselves 'in every "now'" as "nows" which will 'forthwith be no-longer-now' and "nows" which have 'just been not-yet-now'.(Ibid: 422/477)

In other words, a quantitative and homogeneous concept of time in terms of "present". Elsewhere I have already put a quote summarising Heidegger's (alternative) position.

Yes, but as I've grown tired of saying: translations of terms is a different topic, — Xtrix

What German word does Heidegger use that is not equivalent to "error"? If you know it, say so. If you don't know, don't try to hide your ignorance with undefined statements that say nothing.

Is viewing things as present-at-hand "wrong"?

Of course not. — Xtrix

It depends on the use you want to make of it. As merely natural knowledge of "things" there is no problem. But when the ontology claims to be based on them, they are a serious impediment.

Like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real. In this way "Being in general" acquires the meaning of "Reality". Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted, and so too does our very view of the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. It finally forces the general problematic of Being into a direction that lies off the course.(B&T: 201/45)

Such procedures are facilitated by the unexpressed but ontologically dogmatic guiding thesis that what is (in other words, anything so factual as the call) must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let
itself be Objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all. (B&T: 275/320)

Is it not clear for you?

I don't see this in Heidegger and he's given me no reason to. I think a claim like "Aristotle is wrong" is so childish I'd be embarrassed to say it. — Xtrix

Well, I have already given you a good number of quotations in which Heidegger explains the error that Aristotle begins and continues throughout metaphysics. Until Heidegger arrives and puts things in their place, according to him, by destroying all previous metaphysics (as we saw a few months ago).

What seems childish to me is that you pretend to seek how to understand the world and its history and do not want to accept that there are explanations that are correct and others that are incorrect. Is there no true or false? Anything goes? Then why do you call what you don't agree with you childish? Or why do you say that it is based on pre-judgements? That childishness or prejudiced views are correct too?

In ordinary language right and wrong are words that match many of the adjectives Heidegger uses against his rivals. But you don't want them to be wrong.

One fundamental question you must answer: What does "wrong" mean to you? If you don't answer, I'm afraid this conversation is definitely blocked.

If you had not mutilated the phrase you would have realized that the ordinary interpretation is "in" Aristotle already. — David Mo

They're not the same. This was my point, which you tried, and failed, to show was incorrect with that passage.

The ordinary way of understanding time (1) is made explicit in Aristotle's interpretation (2). That's not a "mutilation," that's the passage itself.

I call your attention, in case you get lost in trtanslation :joke: , to the fact that the accusation against Aristotle is not banal, it is of "concealment". — David Mo

Concealment does not mean "wrong." If aletheia means un-concealment, and this often gets translated as "truth," then this is what was meant by "truth" to the early Greeks. Later on, truth comes to mean "correct assertion," and "wrong" (as "incorrect") becomes its opposite. That does not mean "concealed," in Heidegger or in the Greeks, means "wrong" in the sense of incorrect or in any other sense. Being "concealed" does not mean "wrong" in any way. It simply means it's hidden. This is a mistake you continually make.

Is viewing things as present-at-hand "wrong"?

Of course not.
— Xtrix
It depends on the use you want to make of it. — David Mo

The use is very clear in Heidegger. To view things as present-at-hand is to naturally conceal the ready-to-hand aspects, bringing other aspects to the fore. "Wrong" plays no role whatsoever.

But when the ontology claims to be based on them, they are a serious impediment. — David Mo

Sure, it's an impediment to seeing what gets left out, to what gets hidden, etc. Very true.

Such procedures are facilitated by the unexpressed but ontologically dogmatic guiding thesis that what is (in other words, anything so factual as the call) must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let
itself be Objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all. (B&T: 275/320)
Is it not clear for you? — David Mo

Very clear.

I don't see this in Heidegger and he's given me no reason to. I think a claim like "Aristotle is wrong" is so childish I'd be embarrassed to say it.
— Xtrix

Well, I have already given you a good number of quotations in which Heidegger explains the error that Aristotle begins and continues throughout metaphysics. — David Mo

It's not an error, and it's not wrong. Those terms have no relevance whatsoever. What happens in Aristotle is that the original notion of being as "phusis" (unconcealed sway), while still "in" Aristotle, becomes even more concealed (as "ousia"), and sets the stage for getting solidified into self-evidence. Ditto with time. Thus, it makes it much harder for later philosophers, who take over Aristotle's position, to question "being" or "time" -- they become concealed, "closed off." Heidegger wants to re-awaken the questioning of the early Greeks.

To use words like "wrong" or "error" is, at best, very misleading. And very presumptuous. It's something I'd expect from a first year undergraduate: "Heidegger claims that all Western thinkers, including Aristotle, are completely wrong."

The words matter.

What seems childish to me is that you pretend to seek how to understand the world and its history and do not want to accept that there are explanations that are correct and others that are incorrect. — David Mo

Correct or incorrect have to be defined in a context before this makes any sense. In the sciences, I think it's very sensible to talk this way. I think some propositions and theories turn out to be wrong in many ways, or even completely so. If history teaches us anything, it's that we're almost certainly wrong about many things right now, given our goals and purposes. I don't pretend otherwise.

Is there no true or false? Anything goes? — David Mo

In logic, in mathematics, in the sciences, in ethics, and in everyday life -- yes of course there's true and false. But always within a context. If your goal is to lose weight, then eating apple pie everyday is "wrong," etc. We don't define "true" or "false" in a vacuum.

But none of this applies to Heidegger's analysis. If it did, it would essentially mean that science is "wrong," since science's "founding fathers" held assumptions and beliefs which were rooted in Aristotelian philosophy and emphasize the present-at-hand objectification of nature. If you really want to interpret it this way, again I say: you're welcome to. But I don't go along with it, and think it's childish.

One fundamental question you must answer: What does "wrong" mean to you? If you don't answer, I'm afraid this conversation is definitely blocked. — David Mo

"Wrong" either means incorrect or morally "bad." That's the ordinary usage. We'll discount the latter, because we're not discussing morality. The former refers to logic, in the sense of assertions and propositions and laws of thought. All that is perfectly fine with me. (And Heidegger.)

They just happen not to apply to Heidegger's analysis of the Greeks, as you claim they do.

Concealment does not mean "wrong." If aletheia means un-concealment, and this often gets translated as "truth," then this is what was meant by "truth" to the early Greeks. Later on, truth comes to mean "correct assertion," and "wrong" (as "incorrect") becomes its opposite. That does not mean "concealed," in Heidegger or in the Greeks, means "wrong" in the sense of incorrect or in any other sense. Being "concealed" does not mean "wrong" in any way. It simply means it's hidden. This is a mistake you continually make. — Xtrix

"Wrong" either means incorrect or morally "bad." That's the ordinary usage. We'll discount the latter, because we're not discussing morality. The former refers to logic, in the sense of assertions and propositions and laws of thought. All that is perfectly fine with me. (And Heidegger.)

They just happen not to apply to Heidegger's analysis of the Greeks, as you claim they do. — Xtrix

This is called juggling with words on the tightrope.

To say that an assertion Being towards Real entities, and a Being "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' in its uncoveredness. (B&T: 218/261)

The most primordial 'truth' is the 'locus' of assertion ; it is the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be either true or false--that they may uncover or cover things up. (B&T: 226/269)

Similarly, 'Being false' amounts to deceivingin the sense of covering up [verdecken] : putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not. (B&T: 33/56)

The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth. (B&T: 233/265)

But for the most part this phenomenon has been explained in a way which is basically wrong, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate manner. (B&T: 58/85)

Sorry, it's not that "aletheia" “may be translated” as "truth". Heidegger's very concept of truth is "not covered" or "uncovered" and is opposed to the false or hidden. You can see this in the underlined words (by me) of Heidegger himself. Sometimes he also uses "wrong" or "inadequate". "Incorrect" is less usual.
To say that what is is not is false. Keeping some truth hidden is false, wrong or inadequate. All these words are synonymous used more or less by Heidegger.

Therefore, when he says that the concealment of Being begins with Plato and Aristotle he is saying that the metaphysical path that follows them is wrong, inadequate, incorrect or whatever you want to say. These are similar words to express the same idea of failure.

Of course, this does not mean that all traditional metaphysics have to be discarded. Heidegger expressly rejects this conclusion. He speaks of Aristotle or Kant with respect in some relevant points. But his metaphysics needs to be "destroyed" in the sense of reformulated in a very different sense with important corrections in a phenomenological sense. This is the role he assigns himself.

But none of this applies to Heidegger's analysis. If it did, it would essentially mean that science is "wrong," since science's "founding fathers" held assumptions and beliefs which were rooted in Aristotelian philosophy and emphasize the present-at-hand objectification of nature. — Xtrix

Firstly, science no longer follows Aristotle. Since the modern age. Heidegger did not know much about contemporary physics. The mere concept of cause has not been Aristotelian for a long time. Of course, some similarities can be established between modern science and Aristotle. But not the concept or the structure of science. This is one of Heidegger's false assumptions.

Secondly, Heidegger does not say that science is absolutely wrong. Positivism is wrong when it takes science as a model for metaphysical knowledge. Science has its foundation in the ontic (natural) perspective. That is, it has its limits. When someone tries to go beyond them, he is wrong.

Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences. (B&T: 11/31)

Sorry, it's not that "aletheia" “may be translated” as "truth". Heidegger's very concept of truth is "not covered" or "uncovered" and is opposed to the false or hidden. You can see this in the underlined words (by me) of Heidegger himself. — David Mo

All of which agree entirely with what I'm saying.

When I say "may be translated," I mean exactly that. "Unconcealment" is another way, which Heidegger prefers. Not because "truth" isn't accurate in translation, but because the association "truth" has as "correct assertion" doesn't capture the Greek sense of aletheia.

No juggling. In fact, very straightforward. It takes juggling not to see it.

Therefore, when he says that the concealment of Being begins with Plato and Aristotle he is saying that the metaphysical path that follows them is wrong, inadequate, incorrect or whatever you want to say. These are similar words to express the same idea of failure. — David Mo

No, they aren't. To take "wrong" as being "incorrect" is absurd, and this is not what he says. Ever.

If to be "hidden" is to be "wrong," that's your own business.

"Inadequate" may be fine, as long as it means that their thinking was "privative," leaving out and concealing some aspects of the world. Doesn't make them "incorrect" any more than science is "incorrect."

He speaks of Aristotle or Kant with respect in some relevant points. — David Mo

In every point. He has nothing but respect for these men. If you've missed this, then I suggest reading Being and Time rather than searching for words and phrases piecemeal, as you've been doing. Allows one to understand the context.

Heidegger did not know much about contemporary physics. — David Mo

Oh, good to know. :roll:

Of course, some similarities can be established between modern science and Aristotle. But not the concept or the structure of science. This is one of Heidegger's false assumptions. — David Mo

You don't know what Heidegger assumes, because you don't understand Heidegger.

The talk about science was my own, not Heidegger's. I used it as an example, which you unsurprisingly don't understand.

No one is claiming modern science directly rests on Aristotle's philosophy.

No, they aren't. To take "wrong" as being "incorrect" is absurd, and this is not what he says. Ever.

If to be "hidden" is to be "wrong," that's your own business. — Xtrix

According to you, a proposition that is false is not wrong or incorrect. (???)
You speak very strange English.

You don't know what Heidegger assumes, because you don't understand Heidegger. — Xtrix

No. You don't understand Heidegger because you speak "privative" English.

[I’m posting this here because I don’t think my comments are relevant to the “Heidegger’s Downfall” thread.]

The tradition has always treated being as a persisting presence.
— Joshs

Present to who, though? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say being has mostly been thought as persisting existence or simply persistence, rather than persisting presence? Unless you mean presence to denote simply a general "thereness", rather than something perceived, or even merely perceptible in prinicple. — Janus

This is interesting. I’ve always taken “presence” to be connected with presence-at-hand — i.e., the mode of being we’re in when contemplating things, when things break down. Something like the centipede effect. It’s something derivative and emerges out of a more basic human state, the ready-to-hand — the realm of habit, skill, automaticity, “second nature” actions, etc.

So it’s not perception, but a certain kind of interaction with the world. On this basis do nearly all philosophers begin their philosophy, and so everything said is biased towards an objectifying or “substance-ifying” (ousia) interpretation of the world.

But I’m open to different interpretations.

I’ve always taken “presence” to be connected with presence-at-hand — i.e., the mode of being we’re in when contemplating things, when things break down. Something like the centipede effect. It’s something derivative and emerges out of a more basic human state, the ready-to-hand — the realm of habit, skill, automaticity, “second nature” actions, etc. — Mikie

Yes, Heidegger’s account of presence-at-hand and Being as persisting presence are closely related.

It’s something derivative and emerges out of a more basic human state, the ready-to-hand — the realm of habit, skill, automaticity, “second nature” actions, etc. — Mikie

:up:

I'm interested in why we are tempted toward persisting presence ? Is it an evolutionary advantage ( genetic or memetic) to find and value patterns that are always exploitable ? That which persists allows for investment. Imagine a guaranteed-by-the-gods 10% annual return on savings. Along these lines, do we want to identify with a divine-timeless structure and find an vicarious immortality in it ?

I apologize and withdraw the theme if this is too much of a digression.

So, the question is whether Heidegger is thinking of "persisting presence" in a phenomenological sense, that is that with the present-at-hand experience, the object that was previously "transparent" comes into focus as a persistent presence to be noticed.

This persistent presence could be understood to be dependent on consciousness, on the perceiver, or it could be taken, as it is with materialist metaphysics, to be prior to consciousness. a persistent presence that is "there" regardless of whether it is being perceived or not.