Now you just need to organize with others who do the same and on a grander scale. — NOS4A2

And push government to do more, which is its proper function.

I recommend you organize with others and build your own roads, in the meantime.



:100:

I actually promote this idea. — Garrett Travers

You’re not promoting anything except plagiarizing Ayn Rand books.

This is objectively false and I have provided you a small article on it. — Garrett Travers

Private property is a gift from the state. I don’t care how many private security guards one has. For the millions who can’t afford bodyguards and private security, this is irrelevant. It’s also irrelevant to the law and to rights. Private property rights don’t come from the tooth fairy— they come from the state. No matter how many security guards you can afford. (Legal rights. Whatever else we mean, whether God-given or whatever, I’m not interested in.)

Private property is not a gift from the state, it is a demand from the people — Garrett Travers

It’s a right. But the right to healthcare and something to eat? Guess it’s not “demanded” enough.

It wasn’t demanded by the people. It was enshrined in law — in the US’s case, in the constitution. By landholding slaveowners.

You have the right to eat and live, you do not have the right to my labor to ensure that you do. And no, taxation is never required for any of this. — Garrett Travers

Property rights are enforced by the state, which is funded by taxes. Providing for the poor can be done by the state, funded by taxes. When you say “my labor,” if not your taxes I don’t know what you’re fantasizing about. Go clutch your gun if you need to— but no one is coming for “your labor.” No one cares. What I’m talking about is TAXES and how government spends those taxes. If they can spend trillions on defending your private property, they can spend some on starving children.

The government purports to fund this, while also sending billions to foreign countries and funding, again, murderous wars all over the world for decades. — Garrett Travers

Purports to, and fails to.

And no, my property rights don't vanish because the state stops stealing my money. Come to my home and attempt to steal my property, I'll show you how property rights are ensured. — Garrett Travers

Oh how impressive. How heroic.

Sounds like every other wannabe tough guy who clutches their guns like little squirrels clutch their nuts. Conservative paranoia.

Your property “rights” do indeed vanish without government. Call it whatever you want at that point, but it’s not legal. At that point anything goes. Defend it if you can. Based on what you say, my guess is you’d last about five minutes.

What’s slavery is being essentially forced to work for wages. It’s called wage slavery. I have a little say in government — I have zero say when it comes to the profits I generate for the owners I work for. Sociopaths usually have little to say about this dynamic, oddly. I guess it’s really “freedom.” Government is also the real problem, in this fantasy.
— Xtrix

You aren't forced by any other entity than the state which encloses the entirey of this section of the continent, thereby guaranteeing people of your philosophical leanings cannot erect commons on which you can escape the Free Market and private property. It is not employers forcing you into the market, it is the state. — Garrett Travers

The state is currently an instrument for the employers. They own the state because the people who run the state are beholden to them. Lobbyists write laws, not the people.

True, we can blame everything on governments— but for anyone not caught in the fantasy, this is a convenient cover for the ruling class. “Government is the problem.” And people like you parrot it forever. The one guiding principle. Predictable and, for those willing to give the matter more than 5 minutes attention, completely wrong.

But you demonstrate nicely how effective that propaganda is.

Again, private property is not by and large protected by the state, it is predominantly, and it isn't close, protected by individual property owners. — Garrett Travers

Most property doesn’t need “defending.” No one cares— your paranoia aside.

Property is a right granted and enforced by states. The fact that some people (mostly businesses) hire security guards (many of whom are ex cops) on their own is completely irrelevant. Besides, our military, which protects the entire country (and all property within it), is not a private entity— in fact, we all spent 700 billion dollars on it this year alone.

But I’m glad you’re able to play make believe with your guns. Keep protecting that private property from those ‘injuns and robbers.

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology — Garrett Travers

Predictable. :lol: Called that one.

Ayn Rand’s political philosophy is a joke. Logically coherent, no doubt — but a complete fantasy. And one used to do untold harm.

And yes, I’ve unfortunately read a number of her works, fiction and otherwise.

who thinks everything can be reduced to “trade.”
— Xtrix

Only a sociopath would use objectively true statements as a means to describe someone as a sociopath — Garrett Travers

:rofl:

It’s objectively true that everything can be reduced to trade. Imagine that.

Goes to show objectivism isn’t a philosophy, it’s a sickness.

And I would never help someone on the side of the road as if it were some duty, but only to be kind. — Garrett Travers

More Ayn Rand bullshit, as always.

“I feed my kids because I want to — not because it’s the law!”

Yeah, no shit.

I don’t help people because it’s a “duty.” It’s because I’m not a sociopath who thinks everything can be reduced to “trade.”

Would you extend the same kindness to the homeless in your community, as you would someone who cannot fix their car? — NOS4A2

Yes, and often do. But I’m one person. I know others who do far more than me — and shouldn’t have to, in a country of such enormous wealth and resources. Which is why we should call on our government — and our tax dollars — to help our fellow citizens. I think if we can spend trillions on defense contracts and bank bailouts, we can spread some around to the millions in poverty.

But maybe that’s because I’m not well versed in sociopathic philosophy.

No, private property is almost exclusively protected by individual owners — Garrett Travers

It is not. The rights of private property are gifts from the state. Those rights are also protected by the state. If a bum is on your property, you can call the police. Most people wouldn’t open fire. If a group with greater numbers or greater weaponry wants your land — the state, with their law enforcement and military and technology, will protect you — because the law says you’re the owner.

You’re living in a fantasy.

The "private property requires a state," argument — Garrett Travers

It doesn’t require a state. I never once said that private property is exclusively a product of the state. But I’m not talking about Rome — I’m talking about the world we currently live.

The state has quite literally NEVER protected any peice of my property. — Garrett Travers

But they would if you needed it. As would the courts.

The state has never protected my property from raccoons either— so what?

If having enough to eat and live isn’t a right, neither are property rights.
— Xtrix

This is where you're having serious trouble. You have a right to live, you do not have a right to my labor so that you may live. It is not your right to dictate that my body to be used as your giver of sustenance, that's called slavery. — Garrett Travers

The right to eat and live is just as much a right as property rights — which also requires taxes to support. If we support one, we should support another.

I’d prefer my money go to a starving child, yes. That’s the greater good, in my view. The government, which I fund through taxes, should do this. Not in agreement? Fine — then give up property rights as well, which is also a state supported gift.

What’s slavery is being essentially forced to work for wages. It’s called wage slavery. I have a little say in government — I have zero say when it comes to the profits I generate for the owners I work for. Sociopaths usually have little to say about this dynamic, oddly. I guess it’s really “freedom.” Government is also the real problem, in this fantasy.

You canot have your right to property recognized, without also recognizing my right to property, which ensures that you don't get to eat my food, which I accrued through my labor, without my permission. . — Garrett Travers

I don’t consider food or water “property”.

No one is asking anything from you. If you want to live in a cave, go do it. If you want to be part of society, and contribute to it through taxes — then those resources should go to more than protecting property rights. They should also go to helping children who are starving. Especially in a country of abundance. Most people don’t own property anyway.

There is nothing about your conditions, or anyone else's, that will ever create a warrant on me to provide you with any sustenance. — Garrett Travers

Awesome — so first and foremost let’s abolish private property, which is created and protected by state power. There’s nothing about your condition — or anyone else’s — that will ever create a warrant on me to provide you with these protections.

If having enough to eat and live isn’t a right, neither are property rights.

Sociopaths — I mean so called libertarians —usually miss this point, of course.

Government’s purpose: protect private property. Protect private property from foreign and domestic threat. Provide law courts to settle distributes for property owners. The Ayn Rand wet dream.

Then what do you do? — NOS4A2

I stop and help them. If that’s too hard for you, perhaps a lost child is an easier example. Maybe you struggle with leaving it to the government because you pay taxes— but I don’t.

I wonder what Donald Trump would do.

But this is an individualist, laissez faire system, such as the one theorized by the founders, but betrayed by everyone henceforth. — NOS4A2

What founders "theorized" about this? Certainly not Madison.

Worth remembering that the "founders" were also slave-owning, generally wealthy individuals -- many planters. The Constitution reflects their interests rather well.

Has nothing to do with libertarian revisionism.

The worry for me is, if you limit caring to paying taxes, why should anyone care for those who cannot take care of themselves if they’ve already done it? — NOS4A2

Indeed a "worry for you."

People care about one another. They want their government, the people they elect and the institution they pay taxes to, to give services they cannot individually provide. Just as sensible as infrastructure or a corporation. This is no way negates individuals caring. I don't look at someone on broken down on the road and say "Eh, I pay taxes -- let the government help."

I'm sure people do think this way. It's the same sociopaths who want to generalize their sociopathy to everyone -- attributing it all to "human nature."

I don't believe that religion ought to be accorded any respect whatsoever — StreetlightX

I disagree with this in general.

Regarding Chomsky's work as "religion" or "pseudoscience," I have yet to see any substantiation from you. Again, parroting a handful of experts doesn't prove anything except that you have -- for whatever reason -- chosen to believe that this is "the" truth. What it is, in reality, is a genuine scientific debate, so far as I can see. I've often heard Chomsky use "dogma" to describe gradualism in evolutionary theory, which is also not too helpful. But I wouldn't consider traditional Darwinists to be on the level of creationists.

Ironically enough, you're using the same tactics actual creationists use against "evolutionists" -- and with the same conviction. They also gladly seize upon genuine scientific debate as a means to paint it all as religious.

After fifty years of research, all that is left is the original assumption of infinite generativity

Hardly true. Which you'd know if you read anything outside of Tomasello, Dor, and Everett.

the idea that everything we ever do and experience, which is finite by definition, is always an arbitrary obstacle on our way toward the fulfillment and understanding of our infinite linguistic potential. This is a philosophical assumption, actually a religious assumption

Maybe. But unfortunately for Dor, this has nothing to do with digital infinity or recursive enumeration. I doubt Dor himself knows what "infinite linguistic potential" even means. You won't find any such claims in Chomsky.

This is why I think this discussion -- and most discussions with you -- are pointless. Unfortunate, given that we share similar interests. So it goes.

Ah right so you're just restating your claims without addressing anything I said. — StreetlightX

Yes, because you haven't demonstrated a great understanding of what's being claimed, nor displayed a tone of openness to the ideas.

The authorities you cite may very well be correct, but in order for me to really know I'd have to read responses from Chomsky and proponents of his theory, see if what they say makes sense, cite them, etc. This then becomes a game of two internet forum members trying to out-do one another by citing works from a field they're not themselves experts in. We could do the same thing with quantum mechanics as well. I'd rather not play that game, as interesting as it may be.

I'm not a linguist, and frankly don't care very much whether Chomsky is right or wrong on this issue -- I'll let the experts in that field work that out with new evidence and new theories. What I object to specifically in your claims, is the characterization of his work as "creationist" and "theological," which still strikes me as completely unsubstantiated, and pretty clearly motivated by other factors.

In a related way, I find the speculation that language was originally gestural rather than vocal interesting, because vocal language also involves very precise gestures we don’t think of that way because they are done with the tongue and the mouth — Srap Tasmaner

It's hard to make up a story that starts with a sensorimotor system fully ready for speech. Whatever changed with the human brain, it's unlikely it happened to several people all at once. If some neural rewiring occurred in the brain of one person, and gave that person a selective advantage that than spread to others, then it would take time both to link this change to the sensorimotor system and for others to be able to understand any received messages. There's good reason to believe that gestures -- a kind of sign language -- was the first to develop.

Infinite expression with finite means. That seems to be the case with language -- we can express almost any thought/feeling we want, using very few tools. We see this in writing. The English alphabet consists of 26 letters, yet we see what we do with them. Likewise for phonemes. Limited in number. If we want to claim this was all acquired gradually, it always appeared to me that there's simply not enough evolutionary time -- given that behaviorally modern humans have been around for maybe 200 thousand years. What changed? Well, the capacity for language changed -- the capacity that separates us from other species. Either this took millions of years to evolve gradually, and then reached a point where creativity exploded (tools, cave art, burials, etc), or it happened very quickly (similar to the punctuated equilibrium hypothesis), perhaps even in one individual -- which is Chomsky's position.

All of it is pretty speculative, and although I find Chomsky's position more compelling, I have no solid stake in it. If it turns out language evolved gradually as a communicative tool, so be it. The evidence for this is very limited indeed.

What I'm observing is that the argument against Chomsky is that his theory of universal grammar is not a properly empirical theory — Wayfarer

Yes, that's an augment against Chomsky -- and happens to be completely wrong.

The evolution of language is mostly speculative, whether one claims it evolved for communication or for thought. To argue one theory is empirical and the other isn't (because it's largely speculative), is just asinine.

So let's examine recursion. Does it do this?:

The capacity to acquire German or Swahili or Japanese, which every human baby is already equipped with, is what's being sought to explain.
— Xtrix

The answer is a laugh-out-loud "No". — StreetlightX

Does recursion explain the capacity to learn English and Japanese? No, of course not. Recursion is a property of the human language system. Binocular vision is a property of the human visual system. So yes, exploring this won't explain everything, but it's a research goal.

To philosophize is to pose (big? small? unbegged?) questions in such a way as to make explicit the limits of questioning (i.e. reason's limits). — 180 Proof

Again a matter of definition. By "big" questions, or "perennial" questions, or "fundamental" questions, I mean essentially the same as you're saying here. "What is death? What happens when we die?" Etc. Perennial questions, and certainly at the limit of our experience (although we can make educated guesses -- a long dreamless sleep would be my answer; nevertheless).

This is very general but I actually think I like it the most! Haven't come across this way of putting it that much. — John McMannis

Thanks. I don't think it's that original, just slightly different wording of what others have said.

Do you consider YOURSELF a philosopher by this definition? What about others on the forum? — John McMannis

Good question. I've been called a thinker and philosopher from many people in my life. But that isn't necessarily saying much. I personally hate the moniker and would never identify myself this way. But, per my definition, yes I would be one -- as would probably most people on this forum.

For me this is the essence of the problem. Asking the big questions with total ignorance of the history of philosophy seems inadequate as a definition of philosopher. — Tom Storm

I guess I disagree as a matter of definition. If one is asking big questions, one is doing philosophy. That doesn't mean it's good philosophy. Having read a little is important, as is engagement with others. So take the example of children -- they ask excellent questions. They're all little philosophers, in this respect. But are their answers very serious? "Why is the grass green?" "Where do we go when we die?" etc....all good questions, but we don't necessarily take their answers seriously.

So by definition, in my view, a person is a philosopher who engages seriously with philosophy (which I further define as thinking about these particular set of perennial, universal human questions) -- and perhaps added to that, holds these questions as utmost importance and returns to them frequently. At that point I think he or she has earned the title, just as a writer would who writes often and seriously. An average person who occasionally asks philosophical questions, just as one who can write, doesn't necessarily earn the title.

None of this is supposed to be concrete. It's all rather vague -- but it's the only way I can make sense of it without resorting to the standard appeals to academic credentials.

Butare language, culture, ideas, reason thereby solely biologically determined? — Wayfarer

Not solely, no.

Eh. I wouldn't phrase it like this, nor do I think he would agree. I don't think he would mind being called a "rationalistic idealist" like he labels Cudworth, though he prefers "methodological naturalism." — Manuel

Fair. I didn't mean to imply Chomsky doesn't pick out parts of Plato, Descartes, etc., but he rejects (as he says in the video you linked to) a great deal of this thinking as well. He re-interprets Plato's reincarnation of the soul to be essentially referring to genetic endowment.

What he says is that this tradition should be fleshed out. — Manuel

Right.

But to question the scope of current naturalism isn't therefore to 'accept voodoo'. You should ask yourself why you automatically react that way. — Wayfarer

What is the alternative, exactly? I've written for years on this very forum about the very concept of "nature," and how materialism (or naturalism) cannot explain everything in the world. But that doesn't mean when it comes to language we have to depart from the standard framework of all the biological sciences.

Well in the case of the pre-Socratics these were noteworthy, perhaps epoch defining explorations of the important questions. There has to be a start to everything.

But the key thing is, if a person was still approaching philosophy like no progress had been made since the pre-Socratics and they are unaware of the key issues philosophy has raised, are they really philosophers just by asking questions? — Tom Storm

I think so, yes. But this is a minority view, and I don't pretend to speak for everyone. But apart from professionalization, I can't see what philosophy consists in if not that it's a particular kind of thinking, defined by the questions raised. If one is thinking about/turning one's attention to the question "What is a human being?" or "What is being?" or "What is the good life?", etc., then one is "doing" philosophy. That's what the presocratics were doing, that's what Socrates was doing, that's what peoples throughout history have done -- questions about death, about justice, about power, knowledge, value, and so on. Religion and science have much overlap, in this sense.

When you say "progress," I'm not sure that gets us far. We have much more written works than did the presocratics -- we have 2500 years more of history. That's true. Whether there's been progress or not is a judgment call.

It seems shallow. To me there needs to be a deeper level of approach and possibly some knowledge of philosophy. — Tom Storm

I can't help but think, when you say things like "knowledge of philosophy," that you have a particular view of what philosophy is to begin with -- namely, a field of study, a specialization, akin to a division of labor or academic discipline where there are experts about. That's in fact the common view: a philosopher is one who gets a degree in philosophy, teaches philosophy, or publishes works about philosophy. It's not that those people aren't philosophers, really -- it's that the term is not reserved simply for that.

How much engagement with these questions makes one a philosopher? That's the question, really. Is there some kind of time limit, where now you earn your title? I don't think so. Yet I would be leery if someone claimed to be a "writer," yet never wrote anything. If one claims to be a philosopher, but spends almost no time whatsoever contemplating philosophical questions, then I would probably roll my eyes.

But Chomsky is empirical, and is a scientist. He's not an idealist. The "innate ideas" he's proposing has very little to do with past thinkers. He's starting with a truism in biology: there's a biological substrate. Much like the mammalian visual system, or spatial navigation in ants, it's something that can be studied biologically. It's not magic. It's not supernatural. We don't possess the ability to speak because of a miracle.

We cannot do experiments with humans like we can with animals, so we have to find different ways of studying the biological capacity of language. That's the difference.

He's the modern founder, basically, of "biolinguistics." There's really nothing voodoo about any of this, and attempts to portray Chomsky as a mystic or Platonist is just hyperbolic rantings -- no sense paying much attention to it. The more frequently and vehemently it's claimed, the easier it is to ignore. Because it's unsubstantiated high school gossip.

Except that Chomskites keep wanting to make the move from this triviality ('biology is involved' - yeah no shit Sherlock), to the non-trivial claim that it is this biological 'involvement' (nice and vague) that actually explains the specificities of actually existing grammar. — StreetlightX

That's like saying they're trying to explain the specificities of German or Swahili or Japanese through biology. That's not the case. The capacity to acquire German or Swahili or Japanese, which every human baby is already equipped with, is what's being sought to explain. You mentioned before the principles and parameters view. That's changed somewhat, to the "minimalist program." I talked before about merge, which is central to this view. It's a computational view of language's recursion property -- i.e., binary set formation. From there the research gets technical -- but none of this is the religious chicanery you make it out to be.

It's not just that 'the environment has a crucial role to play' (again with the vagueness) - it's that the environment (or better, interaction in the environment) that explains the grammar. — StreetlightX

What grammar are you referring to? Different languages have different syntax and morphology, which are shaped by the social environment. Who's denying that?

I was thinking some basic reading or knowledge of logic. Your definition means my grandmother is a philosopher. Ok. — Tom Storm

Maybe she is. So what? Were the presocratics "philosophers"? What were their "basic reading and knowledge of logic"?

"So a philosopher is someone particularly interested in basic questions about the world."

No, you said interest defines a philosopher. You also said someone who asks questions. — Garrett Travers

I said a philosopher is defined by the questions he or she asks, because that's what I consider philosophy. The "interest" in these questions is incidental, and obvious.

I don’t have a pony in this race, but Tomasello looks like a guy worth learning about. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but his claims about Chomsky are a joke. His article in Scientific American, years ago, was laughable. Incidentally, I didn't claim he was a fraud, I was referring to Everett. It's not that Tomasello isn't a scientist, it's that he completely misunderstands Chomsky. This has in fact been pointed out several times in print.

He may even have said as much, I don’t know. — Srap Tasmaner

He points out that if you restrict the lexicon to 1, with merge you can get arithmetic. But that's a different discussion.

Try this argument with the visual system or the nervous system.
— Xtrix

Except langauge is not a biological capacity. — StreetlightX

Of course it is. The capacity is there from the beginning, just as walking or vision. Yes, the environment has a crucial role to play.

There is no reason to doubt, and every reason to assume, that the brain, cells, neurons, etc., are involved with the development of language, like any aspect of growth and development. Unless it's magic.

It is not a biological capacity like writing letters is not a biological capacity. — StreetlightX

The ability to write is also not magical. It has a neurological and, hence, biological component as well, yes. Why? Because writing is something that is learned -- like walking or riding a bike. That doesn't mean there's a specific organ in the body that accounts for it. It means the capacity to walk, to write, to speak, to see, to play music, etc., is there -- otherwise it wouldn't be acquired. Hence why we don't see apes speak or play music, or even "get drunk on a Sunday night," for that matter. These are not possibilities for them, because the capacity (which is genetic, despite your claims of magic) is not there.

It's cute how you went from "that's a mischaracterization" to white knighting from your priest once it was pointed out that he said the very thing you said he did not. — StreetlightX

It is a complete mischaracterization, as I said all along. Language is a universal human property. What a Martian would conclude, hypothetically, is hardly what Chomsky is claiming. It would be rational to conclude this, but it's clearly wrong -- there are many languages. There are also many skin colors. But keep trying.

Lmao, Tomasello is one of the most prolific and respected cognitive scientists out there. — StreetlightX

Like Chomsky, in fact.

Notice how this goes beyond mere interest? — Garrett Travers

I didn't say it was about interest -- I said it was about questions. One has to first have an interest, yes -- but that's obvious.

Here is the definition of philosophy: — Garrett Travers

There is no definitive definition of philosophy. Citing a dictionary tells us exactly nothing. To consider it "especially" an academic discipline is really absurd, in my view. That too would rule out the presocratics.

The observation about social context is actually uncontroversial with regard to communication — you can’t study communication without social context, that’s virtual tautology. So, of course, the study of communication takes it into account. But it’s also uncontroversial that the study of the mechanisms that we put to use in action, whatever it is, that study typically ignores social context and quite rightly so. For example, for those of you who know this work, the classic work on neurophysiology of vision, say, Hubel and Wiesel’s work, for which they got the Nobel Prize.

…

Or in fact virtually all of the fundamental work that aims to determine the properties of the modules of cognition at whatever level it’s conducted whether it’s neurophysiological, behavioural, perceptual, whatever, – it ignores social context totally, just following the normal methods of the sciences. However, we’re instructed that the study of mechanisms used, say, in the examples I mentioned, these ECP examples, or the study of, for example, vowel harmony in Turkish, or of the relative scope of operators, or, in fact, everything else about language has to depart from the scientific norm. That’s a principle. It cannot follow the methods of the sciences.

Well, this kind of critique, which is quite widespread, is, in fact, accompanied by a novel concept of science that has emerged in the computational cognitive sciences and related areas of linguistics. With this new notion of science, which is all over the literature, an account of some phenomena is taken to be successful to the extent that it approximates unanalysed data.

…

The major cognitive science journals, and general journals like Science, regularly publish articles triumphantly listing dramatic failures which are called successes because they accord with this new concept, which is unique in the history of the sciences and very radically restricted, in fact, almost specifically to language. So, nobody would suggest it for physics or bee communication or almost anything else, because it’s so obviously absurd that people would just laugh. In fact, it’s not even suggested for systems as close to a language as arithmetical capacity. So, you don’t study arithmetical capacity by constructing models based on a statistical analysis of masses of observations of what happens when, say, people try to multiply numbers in their heads without external memory. At least, I hope nobody does that.

Enfield, in the same article, he also puts forth a far-reaching thesis which is quite standard in the cognitive sciences and a very clear expression of the non-existence hypothesis, I’ll quote him. He says: “Language is entirely grounded in a constellation of cognitive capacities that each, taken separately, has other functions as well.” Notice, that’s kind of an updating of the nineteen-fifties position that I quoted. Well, that means language exists only in the sense that there exists such a thing as today’s weather, which is also a constellation of many factors that operate independently.

…

There’s another influential version of the idea that language doesn’t exist. It’s sort of highly dominant in language acquisition studies and the leading figure is Michael Tomasello. So, in a recent handbook of child development he explains that there aren’t any linguistic rules and there’s nothing to say about descriptive regularities, say, like those ECP examples. Rather, there’s nothing at all except a structured inventory of meaningful linguistic constructions, all of them meaningful linguistic symbols that are used in communication. That’s his topic, there being no such thing as language. The inventory is structured only in the sense that its elements — words, idioms, sentences like the one I’m now speaking — they’re all acquired by processes of pattern finding, schematization and abstraction that are common to all primates. A few other processes, all left quite obscure. So, in other words, these ECP examples that I mentioned, according to this story, are learned just the way a child learns ‘horse’, or an idiom like ‘how do you do’ or, say, ‘kick the bucket’ meaning ‘die’, and so on, or this sentence, they’re all learned exactly the same way. And the child somehow learns that the ECP violation is not usable for communication, even though the thought is fine, although the other expression somehow is. And presumably, the expressions could have virtually any other properties in the next language you look at. In fact, the inventory, as in the 1950’s versions is essentially an arbitrary collection of unanalysed linguistic symbols and it’s also finite, just like Quine’s pattern, apart from some hand-waving. In fact, I can think of no rational interpretation for any of this, but it’s overwhelmingly dominant in the fields, you might think about it.

Enfield also presents a closely related thesis, that’s also very widely held, I’ll quote it: “There are well-developed gradualist evolutionary arguments to support the conclusion that there’s no such thing as language, except as an arbitrary complex of independent cognitive processes.” Again, no relevant sources cited, and none exist.

https://chomsky.info/20110408/

So you don't see a need for any core competencies? — Tom Storm

For example?

So, if I'm interested in biology, that makes me a biologist? — Garrett Travers

If you're both interested in biology and ask/answer questions about biology (and, because it's a science, perhaps conduct research), then yes. What else would qualify you, degrees? In that case, Aristotle wasn't a biologist.

It's not just a matter of interest. Philosophy, if I'm correct, consists not only in the interest, but in really asking these questions. It's engaging and struggling with the questions. That's philosophy. To some degree, perhaps we're all philosophers. If you want to label yourself "philosopher," then I assume it's more than a fleeting hobby -- but something you take seriously, that you are frequently engaged in, that takes priority in your life, that is a top value, etc.

I’m honestly not that interested in the brain science. I am interested in what philosophical hay we expect to make of all this. Thoughts? Why should current findings in neurolinguistics matter to us? — Srap Tasmaner

Because it's the best we can do to study thought. Language isn't the same as thought, of course, but it's related.

But no one has to date proposed anything like Universal Music or Universal Mathematics

Isn't mathematics universal already? — Wayfarer

Indeed.

Tomasello wants to make a name for himself by going after Chomsky, but is as convincing as Everett -- who's a complete fraud.

The reality is that there has been much written about both mathematics and music -- including ideas about how they may be piggybacking off of language.

UG is the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.
— Xtrix

There is no, and cannot in principle be, a ‘genetic component of the language faculty’. That's the point. — StreetlightX

Try this argument with the visual system or the nervous system. Also complex, and also involves genetics.

True, language could be magic. But that gets us nowhere, so I'm not interested.

children are not born with a universal, dedicated tool for learning grammar. — StreetlightX

That's not UG.

Children are born with a capacity to acquire language. Primates are not. This is why children can learn a language and non-human primates cannot.

Whatever is meant by "grammar" here is not the claim being made. Unless one takes grammar to mean "merge," which is an actual claim being made.

It’s the entire research project, which is trash. — StreetlightX

So the biological sciences are likewise "trash." No need to study the genetics of the visual system, or the navigational systems of insects, etc. That's "metaphysics."

It's clear you just don't know what you're talking about. You're welcome to create some straw man and hurl accusations about -- but it's irrelevant.

“A rational Martian scientist would probably find the variation rather superficial, concluding that there is one human language with minor variants”. This ‘one human language’, is of course, Chomsky’s noumenal language — StreetlightX

So the fact that a human baby can learn any language on earth is irrelevant, apparently.

The capacity for language is a universal human property, regardless of whether it's English or Swahili -- which is trivial. A Martian would indeed look down and conclude the same thing about skin -- all humans have it, despite different colors.

I think philosophy, and therefore philosophers, is simply the asking of certain questions. This predates the word "philosophy," of course.

So a philosopher is someone particularly interested in basic questions about the world. Similar to scientists -- with the difference being that scientists restrict themselves to nature.

But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics.
— Xtrix

Isn't the question whether that capacity is specialized to language? — Srap Tasmaner

That the capacity to acquire language is specialized to language? I don't quite understand the question, I guess. Are you referring to things like mathematics and music (i.e., other human properties that it may be more specialized towards?)

You're born with an innate capacity for walking, but the structures needed for walking won't form until you try to walk. — frank

Exactly -- not until you've grown in a normal environment. Not all people can walk, not all birds can fly, etc. -- there are exceptions, depending on environment or genetic disability. But that there's a capacity and a genetic component is just assumed in any other biological system. When it comes to language, or human cognition generally, there's an impulse to become irrational.

So yes, maybe language is primarily a system of communication, and evolved as such. Maybe not. But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics.

Chomsky argues that UG is specific to humans and that there is at least one language specific feature in UG. Others argue that there aren't any language specific features in UG. (Fewer argue that it's not species specific, though there are some who do.) — Saphsin

Exactly.

I find this to be such a dodge. Here, substitute anything that we can do for 'language' and you can see why — StreetlightX

Of course you can substitute almost anything for it. It's a truism. Which is why the arguments against it tend to be absurd -- they're simply misunderstanding it.

Again, in any system of growth and development -- the visual system, the immune system, the circulatory system, or the language system -- there is going to be external data (which have an effect on how it develops -- like in the visual system, where if you manipulate early visual stimulation you get totally different visual systems), some sort of genetic component, and natural law.

So for language, the data could be from English or Portuguese, the genetic component is what's being researched (UG), and natural law will be things like computational efficiency.

That's not enough to answer everything, but it's the framework for any answer -- and used in all the rest of the biological sciences.

To argue this is metaphysics, or theology, or creationism, etc., is simply hyperbole.

This stuff is theory-laden as can possibly be: in particular the language of 'faculties' precisely individualizes and anatomizes what is, properly understood, a social technology. Is there a 'faulty of the internet'? A 'faculty of the post office'? — StreetlightX

That's like asking if there's a genetic component to the Internet or the Post Office. Is there a genetic component to a hammer?

If you think this is the same as asking about the genetic component of language, or vision, or walking -- then yes, you've completely lost the plot.

That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading. — Xtrix

UG is not just the mere idea that there is a genetic component to language. It specifies - gives specificity to - this genetic component, by suggesting that it is composed of - depending on when exactly one were to ask Chomsky, since he keeps dropping elements as they become more and more inconvenient and obviously implausible - sets of rules or principles by which 'external' language becomes articulated. He calls this "I-language" ('internal language'), as distinct from 'E-language' ('external language'). The technicalities of it are whatever, but the whole schema can be captured by recognizing that it is basically a renovated substance-accident model that's just Aristotle linguistically redux'd. — StreetlightX

Recall what Chomsky said, and I was trying to emphasize: UG is the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.

Obviously a lot has to be clarified here. What is meant by "language"? What is meant by "faculty"? And what, exactly, is the theory about this genetic capacity?

You're right that i-language is a term made up by Chomsky. It is taken to consist, essentially, of merge -- the ability to take two objects and make a new one. (i.e., binary set formation.) Recursion is thought to be a property of the faculty of language -- just as binocular vision is a property of the human visual system.

"Faculty" refers to the system/capacity itself. Again, vision is a good example. We have a visual system, a visual faculty. There's no controversy about that -- any more than there is a circulatory system. Is it something you can cut out, like an actual organ? No. But that doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

I don't see how any of this is related to Aristotelianism.

The ridiculousness of the schema comes clear in Chomsky's insistence, often made, that there really is only 'one' language, whereas the actually existing diversity of languages are basically epiphenomena. In Kantian terms, Chomsky posits a linguistic noumena that underlies the linguistic phenomena, with the former accounting - magically - for the latter. — StreetlightX

This is just another mischaracterization, in my view. Of course there's a diversity of languages. There's a diversity of skin color as well. It's not that this fact is "epiphenomena," it's that it's trivial.

Likewise, no noumena are being proposed.

As for the role of culture and society, it does nothing more than bring out this or that feature of I-language already there from the start ('parameters'). This is of course, pure metaphysics, and of the worst kind too [...] — StreetlightX

I don't see how, really. Culture, society, and the environment in general bring out all kinds of features of human beings, not just language. If you restrict the human ability to be around a language, they will not acquire the ability to speak. If you blindfold a human from birth, they won't acquire vision. The environment is extremely important. But there is still, nevertheless, a biological/genetic component -- and that's true for everything in biology. So if it's true for everything, it's going to be true for language.

In any property, there is a genetic component and the data from the environment. There's no way around it. It's true that this isn't saying much, but that's the basic approach to studying any biological property -- whether insect navigation or aviation or the visual system. Why shouldn't it apply to the language capacity? What's metaphysical about it?

I use my computer everyday, but this says nothing about how it came to be as it is. The same is true of language: the issue is to account for why grammar is as it is. — StreetlightX

It will tell you little about how it evolved perhaps, but that wasn't the point. The point was about language's function. Your claim is that it's for social communication. "Function" is a fuzzy word, of course (what's the function of the bone? To store calcium, to keep the body from falling to the ground...) -- but still, when asking this question we tend to look at how the object in question is used. When we do so, it seems to be more about thought than about speech. Does this tell us how it evolved? No.

Having learnt language through social use, and then putting that learning to use in 'inner speech' is perfectly consistent with the theorized developmental pathway of 'inner speech'. — StreetlightX

We acquire the ability to see through our interaction with the environment. We can then shut our eyes and imagine all kinds of things, internally. This tells us nothing about the human visual system.

No one is debating whether there's an environmental/social component to language.

Jokes aside, I was right about the fact that you cannot read: the quote rightly refers to the fact that UG refers to "the genetic component of the language faculty", the genitive here referring not to language simpliciter but to Chomsky's technical term for the so-called invariant and computational part of language which he just so happens to identify with the genetic component of language tout court. One could see, however, how a vulgar reader could confuse the two, insofar as Chomsky himself would like to arrogate his idealist phantasm - really better named the Linguistic Soul to bring out its status as metaphysical hocus pocus - to the status of genetic fact. So I take my concession point back, and Chomsky can resume his rightful place as being mildly more intelligent than his internet stalwart. — StreetlightX

You make it awfully difficult to admit, but yes — you’re right. I should have said the language faculty, or system. It would be like saying that there’s a theory about the genetic component of vision, when what should be said is the visual system — which is obviously related, but not the same thing. Fair enough.

That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading.

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while.
— Xtrix

I don't think it's quite right or fair to elevate your mental illness to the status of general linguistic theory. Like I said, there are plenty of people for whom this internal dialog is minimal or even absent entirely. — StreetlightX

Mental illness? The article you cite itself says that the vast majority of people do indeed talk to themselves. Why you would characterize the vast majority as mental illness and not the exceptions is strange.

If you wanted to seriously pursue this line, then there’s interesting things to be said about the deaf, who obviously don’t think in verbal terms. (At least those born completely deaf.)

But all of this is missing the point. In all people, whether deaf or otherwise, social communication — through speech or sign — is hardly characteristic use. You can elevate that 1% or so of the time when we’re speaking or signing as characteristic of language, but that’s like arguing the primary function of a screwdriver is to open paint cans.

Again, the contingent pathologies of your idiosyncratic self-chatter isn't science, — StreetlightX

As if internal dialogue is somehow a peculiarity of mine. This is just nonsense.

Also, from your source:

One theory proposes that people who do not produce inner speech are unable to activate those networks without also activating their motor cortex.

Another theory is poor introspection, which refers to a person's ability to examine their own mental processes.

According to this theory, everyone produces inner speech, but some people are conscious of it whereas others are not.

Personally I think there’s something to this, but it’s not relevant — except to show how absurd it is to claim inner speech is somehow “idiosyncratic” or “mental illness.” I realize you value “winning” an argument above all else, but there’s no reason to resort to absurdities in that pursuit.

And in any case the idea that thinking is co-extensive with 'inner speech' is basically a child's understanding of thought. No one takes it seriously. — StreetlightX

Nor do I. Which is why I never once said it.

And in any case, those who do in fact study 'inner speech', recognize as a matter of course that it is nothing other than internalized - albeit it transformed in the process - external or social speech - i.e. language. — StreetlightX

Presumably you mean Vygotsky. But this is strange — because at no point did I say “talking to yourself” isn’t internalized speech. I also talk to myself in English and not Spanish, etc. I learned to speak English as a child, and so my internal speech will, naturally, be in English. This tells us exactly nothing about the capacity to acquire language, its evolution, or — relevant to what’s being discussed — characteristic use, which is almost completely internal.

To characterize language as external speech is therefore still pretty strange. Again, it’s asserting that language is primarily a means of communication. But since speech is so infrequent, and communicative efficiency is so often sacrificed for computational efficiency, it’s an odd claim. Language can be used for communication— of course. But so can gait. It’d be equally odd to claim, therefore, that walking is primarily a social/communicative phenomenon.

Which is why I have already addressed this by noting that language is not just any communicative tool, but one with specific design functions geared towards social coordination across distances in space and time. — StreetlightX

Same can be argued about clothing. That can communicate a lot too, and has very specific functions.

It’s true that language also has specific and unique communicative functions. But again, whether this lends support for characterizing it as primarily a means of communication is, at minimum, debatable.

that is precisely how the Baldwin effect works. — StreetlightX

The capacity to acquire language already exists in infants. Once learned, they internalize that language — whatever it may be. English, Swahili, whatever. While every other animal has means of communication, they don’t have language. If language is simply the internalized system of complex social communication, which evolved gradually, then each step along the way had to somehow effect genetics — otherwise non human primates could learn language (as once thought, and probably still thought). But that’s not the Baldwin effect — that’s Lamarckism.

When we think of words, we often see a string of letters. That too is internalized. Numbers are internalized. The alphabet and mathematical symbols are relatively recent phenomena. Should we assume the capacity for writing and mathematics followed the invention of writing and mathematics?

There is no one who has set the study of linguistics backwards by a matter of decades more than Chomsky. — StreetlightX

Says someone who goes on about “arrogance.”

The father of modern linguistics? A charlatan and fool. Why? Because it’s not to my liking.

Not only do some people simply not have an internal dialog, — StreetlightX

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while. We don’t usually notice we’re doing it — but that’s irrelevant. We don’t usually notice we’re breathing either.

any phenomenology of this 'dialog' will recognize it as a low-grade, scattered and fleeting use of 'language' that is more a matter of fragments and shards rather than language-use proper. — StreetlightX

It is indeed scattered. The mind thinks all kinds of things. Similarly, we constantly talk to ourselves.

Again, this is going on close to 100% of the time— that’s just a fact. If language “proper” means what gets communicated, then you’re essentially saying that 1% of the time that we’re actually communicating constitutes proper function. I realize that may be commonly thought — but it’s just a mistake.

it's not that communication is an 'externalization' of language which first finds its home internally; it's that the 'internal' use of language is an internalization of language-use which developed as a communicative capacity between humans in the first place. — StreetlightX

But again, this common story has almost no evidence in favor of it. In fact you’ll find that many of the mechanics of the language system are poorly designed for communication — a fact Chomsky points out repeatedly. You can see this in parsing programs, as an example. Computation efficiency is favored over ease of communication.

Also worth keeping in mind is that nearly every organism on earth, including the insects, have some form of communication. Human speech and sign are unlike anything seen in other species. No other species have language. Given the generic similarity of humans and non-human primates, one could reasonably assume— if the communication story is correct — that apes can learn how to sign if given the opportunity. This too has been tried and has failed.

So whatever is going on with human beings, our ability to think seems interconnected with language — and is unique in nature. It’s mostly an internal process that sometimes gets externalized. But to say language is simply communication is like saying communication is just writing — there’s little reason to do so.

Taking 'internal dialog' as the 'characteristic use of language' is about as sophisticated as considering the Sun revolving around the Earth because that's what you see everyday: a cute bit of so-called 'obvious' folk psychology, but completely wrong when even minimally investigated. — StreetlightX

Forget Internal dialogue and look at the amount of time spent speaking. Compare that to thought. We’re thinking and talking (internally) literally all the time. In fact for any meditators out there, this is one of the first things you notice — along with other mental phenomena.

So you have it backwards. Minimal investigation shows exactly this. Again— that it’s scattered and habitual and mostly unnoticed is irrelevant. It’s still a fact, regardless of the story we tell about language and thought: we simply spend the vast majority of our lives NOT speaking externally.

shows quite clearly how syntactic constraints developed as normative rules to coordinate communication between speakers — StreetlightX

This is almost laughable. By this premise, our communication today should lead to new developments in our language capacity. The genes will come later — once the communication and “normative rules” get internalized.

I’ll check it out to see if it’s indeed as ludicrous as you’re describing. I hope you’re misunderstanding that like you’ve misunderstood and fabricated nearly everything else so far.

What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language.
— Xtrix

Wait, you think UG simply refers to the fact that 'there is a genetic component to language'? My God. I didn't realize I was literally arguing with someone who has no idea what he is talking about. UG does not refer to the mere fact of there 'being a genetic component to language'. That would be trivial and dumb, and thank God even Chomsky is not so vulgar as to describe it as such. — StreetlightX

“Universal grammar is just the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.” — Noam Chomsky

:lol:

https://youtu.be/vbKO-9n5qmc

Almost verbatim. Didn’t have to look very far, either.

Yeah yeah— This only means Chomsky is as dumb and vulgar as me, etc. No chance that perhaps you’re misunderstanding — as you’ve demonstrated repeatedly.

If only you could teach him a thing or two about linguistics and show him how it’s really done.

The question to rephrase, would be that why does it seem so important that someone who is in higher standing with regards to ethics, should be treated any differently. — Shawn

I see. I don't know if Aristotle really argues that the virtuous man should be treated differently, like some kind of master. From what I've read of the Ethics, he's simply laying out an analysis about the function of a human being, and how to live in accordance with that function (reason), towards the ultimate end of happiness.

The question is whether his theories about language do in fact lend themselves to being understood biologically, or evolutionarily, in any sensible capacity. — StreetlightX

Indeed. And since they do, your fabrications are just that.

Don't look at what he says about his theory - look at how the theory functions, what it entitles one to say. — StreetlightX

It "entitles" one to say a great deal, which is why Chomsky is so influential and his theories have been highly fruitful.

You're not a linguist, and in fact haven't shown you really understand Chomsky's work; nor have your childish insults really been substantiated in any way. So if it once again boils down to some strange vendetta you've developed, I'm not interested.

They do not. — StreetlightX

Ladies and gentlemen...science.

It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication?
— Xtrix

This is a total non sequitur. It's like saying that because the function of ears are to hear, it cannot possibly be the case that eyes are also meant to perceive things. — StreetlightX

What? I genuinely don't understand what this sentence is supposed to mean.

I mentioned characteristic use. I'd say that the ears' characteristic use is hearing, and eyes seeing -- which could tell us something about their primary function.

Similarly, the characteristic use of language is internal -- 99% of it. We know that. You can, in fact, check this yourself. So if we want to talk about its "raison d'être", it's function -- it's hardly about communication.

So despite whatever you meant to say, your claim is more like "the eyes' raison d'être is to cry." I suppose we can make up a story that says the 1% of the time we're communicating, phatically or otherwise, is the actual function of language. But there's no evidence for it.

As I said before, there's evidence that suggests that the computational system is not optimal in communication -- it's optimal in linking interfaces. Plenty of work on this.

Chomsky says language is an individual/cognitive capacity; it's not, it's a social one — StreetlightX

This is meaningless. Language can be used to communicate (as can non-verbal behavior), and so is social. It can only be acquired in the presence of a language -- so that's certainly social. But it's still a cognitive capacity. It's genetically determined, which is why children can develop a language and non-human primates cannot, for example. This is not controversial.

Chomsky says language is geared for the expression of thought; it's not, it's geared towards communication — StreetlightX

There's little evidence to support this, as I've already mentioned. Externalization happens maybe 1% of the time. To argue this is what language is "geared towards" is just a fairytale.

Chomsky says language is characterized by universals; it's not: it's characterized by sheer diversity and not a single universal outside of the universality of diversity — StreetlightX

Chomsky does not say language is "characterized by universals" -- this too is completely meaningless. What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language. That language is a universal human property -- i.e., that it's found in every human culture -- is hardly controversial.