Does anyone else think that being influenced by Plato is fine; but, Aristotle's influence on the dark ages, clergy, and religious folks, along with modern day Radians, in a manner of speaking, disturbs you? — Shawn

Not really. Plato had an influence on the middle ages as well, through his major influence on Christianity.

Both men are in a league of their own, and their influence on literally everything in the Western world (and, now, the entire world) is really beyond comprehension. This is almost a cliche now, but it remains true.

Why do you think Aristotle made humanity too dependent on magnanimous men from-which one would derive some privileged status over your brothers and sisters, as seen in the form of master-slave relations or slavery to state it explicitly (according to Russell)? — Shawn

Could you re-phrase this question? I think I'm understanding you but I want to be sure.

:up:

I tried to attribute a metaphysics to him in my work. — Manuel

In a sense we all have a metaphysics. But to describe generative grammar as metaphysical is just nutty.

Appreciate it.

From that article, regarding metaphysics:

I would like to discuss an approach to the mind that considers language
and similar phenomena to be elements of the natural world, to be studied
by ordinary methods of empirical inquiry. I will be using the terms "mind"
and "mental" here with no metaphysical import. Thus I understand "men-
tal" to be on a par with "chemical", "optical", or "electrical". Certain phe
nomena, events, processes and states are informally called "chemical"
etc., but no metaphysical divide is suggested thereby. The terms are used
to select certain aspects of the world as a focus of inquiry.

This is why it's baffling that he can be accused of metaphysical chicanery. He's done more to de-mystify language than almost anyone else in fact.

Indeed. Much like the Bible, in fact. Often revered but never read. Adam Smith also jumps to mind.

in his efforts to make communication a mere auxiliary of language - rather than its raison d'etre - he metaphysicalizes it and places it outside of any natural evolutionary account. — StreetlightX

You keep repeating that, but it's still incoherent. He's said repeatedly that language is a biological capacity, and one that evolved. That's not metaphysics or mysticism or theology.

What he is saying -- as you correctly point out -- is that language is not simply about communication. He defines (1) language as a biological, computational system -- a system for the expression of thought, and (2) that it might have evolved rapidly. Gives plenty of reasons for these claims. Could be completely wrong, but it's not theology.

Incidentally, when looking at the function of language by observing characteristic use, it's not at all obvious that its primary function -- or raison d'être -- is for communication. It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication? Rather, it seems the "function" of language is to link interface conditions, where the computational system is optimal in linking the interface but non-optimal in terms of communication -- and there's a lot of evidence for this. But thanks for the references, I'll check them out.

@Manuel - forgive me for this tangent on language. I should probably start a new thread.

Thanks, old chap.

I guess I’ve failed to persuade you once again.

So what do you find more convincing about language evolution, beyond Chomsky?

No— plenty more to say about it, more in depth and with references. But figured I’d give at least a lightning sketch. I never said it was convincing or even anything other than speculation. But certainly not mysticism.

Also, I googled Ray Jackenoff:

Over the years, I have come to disagree with Noam on just about every detail of the formalism (beyond the existence of phrase structure), and as well on many aspects of the overall architecture of the language faculty. I have even begun to wonder (horrors!) whether Zellig Harris’s notion of transformations might be closer to the truth than Noam’s. But I still consider myself to be working within his overall vision of what language is like and how one should investigate it. I still believe that children have come equipped with a brain specialized for learning language, and I find it important to find out what that specialization is. And I still find it imperative to explore the structure of language in rigorous formal terms, even if my technology is quite different from his (and becoming more so). And I’m still in awe of his incredible intellect, which created this crazy field we’re in. I wouldn’t be in the business if it weren’t for Noam.

So I wonder about that aforementioned quote. But no matter.

Unless mutations to regulator genes is considered saying “nothing” and repeating into mysticism.
— Xtrix

Hahahaha, 'evolution happened because some changes took place in genes' = 'evolution happened because evolution happened'. Does your credulity know no bounds? Which genes? How? When? Via what mechanisms? For what reasons? And how do those changes relate to linguistic ability? — StreetlightX

You already conceded that rapid change is possible— so that already takes the claims out of the realm of “magic.” It’s a claim about how the system evolved— not that it evolved. That’s one point.

As for the questions. Which genes? Possibly regulator genes. How? Via mutation. When? We can’t possibly know exactly when— but evidence from paleoanthropology suggests behaviorally modern humans have been around for roughly 200 thousand years. For what reasons did language evolve? Possibly by chance — but that it stuck around is obvious, and so must have had a selective advantage. I find that an odd question though. What “reasons” are there for anything to evolve beyond chance and selection?

How the changes relate to linguistic ability — I can’t say I understand this question. What do you mean by linguistic ability? According to the article, language is given a technical notion. One basic property — called merge — is what is discussed, along with computational efficiency.

If you find tautologies convincing — StreetlightX

I don’t. But I’m not seeing the tautology here. Language evolved — that’s a given. How? Through changes in genes— that’s obvious. Did this happen gradually or rapidly? Chomsky argues it happened rapidly, and provides reasons and evidence (and speculation) — based on findings in genetics, paleoanthropology, cases of rapid evolution, etc. i don’t see how this equates to “evolution happened because evolution happened.” No one is arguing that language didn’t evolve — is that tautological?

Ray Jackendoff has rightly called Chomskys' view on evolution and language a 'retreat to mysticism', which, of course, it is. — StreetlightX

Never heard of him — but didn’t you mention something about “argument from prestige?”

Regardless— if he offers convincing reasons for this claim, fine. I’m not seeing them from you. Frankly I think the accusation is ludicrous, when Chomsky has said repeatedly that language is biological and has evolved, perhaps rapidly. How that’s somehow “mysticism” is yet to be shown.

So Chomsky's 'generative grammar' does, I think, tend to undermine that dogma - if not by suggesting innate ideas, then innate capabilities, which I think are regarded with suspicion by many naturalists on dogmatic grounds. — Wayfarer

True.

Unlike others here, I'm not an expert, but then I don't claim to be. I just made an observation, is all. — Wayfarer

So far the only person who’s clearly read and understood Chomsky - that I see here - is Manuel. There’s a lot of misunderstanding around what Chomsky says about a lot of things, so it’s important to read him directly, listen to lectures/interviews/Q and As, or speak with him directly.

The rest is just speculation and fabrication, based on God knows what (casual reading, secondary sources, etc).

Regarding the article of this thread, don’t take my word for it — it’s all right there:

As the impact of Newton’s discoveries was slowly absorbed, such lowering of the goals of scientific inquiry became routine. Scientists abandoned the animating idea of the early scientific revolution: that the world will be intelligible to us. It is enough to construct intelligi- ble explanatory theories, a radical difference. By the time we reach Russell’s Analysis of Matter, he dismisses the very idea of an intelligible world as “absurd,” and repeatedly places the word “intelligible” in quotes to highlight the absurdity of the quest. Qualms about action at a distance were “little more than a prejudice,” he writes. “If all the world consisted of billiard balls, it would be what is called ‘intelligible’—that is, it would never surprise us sufficiently to make us realize that we do not understand it.”

But even without external surprise, we should recognize how little we understand the world, and should also realize that it does not matter whether we can conceive of how the world works. In his classic introduction to quantum mechanics a few years later, Paul Dirac wrote that physical science no longer seeks to provide pictures of how the world works, that is “a model functioning on es- sentially classical lines,” but only seeks to provide a “way of looking at the fundamental laws which makes their self-consistency obvious.” He was referring to the inconceivable conclusions of quantum physics, but could just as readily have said that even the classical Newtonian models had abandoned the hope of rendering natural phenomena intelligible, the primary goal of the early modern scientific revolution, with its roots in common-sense understanding.

It is useful to recognize how radical a shift it was to abandon the mechanical philosophy, and with it any scientific relevance of our common-sense beliefs and conceptions, except as a starting point and spur for inquiry.

To read this and conclude Chomsky is arguing that because some ideas were abandoned, that somehow everything is mysterious — is absurd.

To read this and conclude that he offers no alternative to the mechanical philosophy or an account of modern understanding— is absurd.

This is what comes of reading to refute, rather than reading to truly understand. So be it.

Yes, it's telling that the only positive thing Chomsky does in fact have to say on the topic of evolution is in regard to it's pace. Which, conveniently, serves as an excuse as to why he cannot say anything else. — StreetlightX

He says much more, in fact.

The pithy article you cited is nothing but a list of excuses as to why Chomsky can't say anything else about language and evolution - because he has categorically placed it outside the ambit. — StreetlightX

I’ll assume you didn’t read it. I think that’s the simple explanation for this comment— which is utter fabrication. The entire article, in fact, is about the evolution of language— just not one you like.

To say he’s placing language “outside the ambit” of science is truly laughable. Unless mutations to regulator genes is considered saying “nothing” and retreating into mysticism.

"it was acquired not in the context of slow, gradual modification of preexisting systems under natural selection but in a single, rapid, emergent event that built upon those prior systems but was not predicted by them". In other words: magic. — StreetlightX

See above. Proposing a rapid neurological rewiring via genetic mutation is “magic”?

Again, this makes sense if we assume Chomsky is a closet priest/mystic who is using all this as a cover and …

an excuse to veil over his theology of language. — StreetlightX

But I see exactly zero evidence for believing that. Why you do, I don’t know.

Perhaps Chomsky is completely wrong about language. But claiming he’s a mystic resorting to magic, while at the same time taking seriously the long-refuted “work” of Dan Everett — that’s just not convincing.

Well, maybe not, but his generative grammar seems at odds with it. — Wayfarer

At odds with naturalism? How? What’s the alternative— that language is supernatural?

The level of misunderstanding here is baffling. No offense— but how much of Chomsky have you really read?

as if lots of thing couldn't be 'based on common sense' or that 'common sense' mandates any technical elaboration of it) — StreetlightX

I’m sure lots of things are based on common sense. That does not mean we formulate technical notions out of them. This is one case in which we did— and they failed. It’s not simply any case— it was the prevailing view at the beginning of modern philosophy and modern science. I’d say that’s relevant.

You're talking about some conceptual schemes foisted upon science from without, while trying to claim the prestige and backing of science to naturalize what is effectively some backwater vocabulary of a limited cabal of European thinkers. — StreetlightX

Foisted upon science? So Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Locke, etc…the founders of modern philosophy and science — all backwater imbeciles.

:up:

Oh I see I've made the mistake of assuming you've ever read the person you're discussing:

At present, however, we see little reason to believe either that FLN can be anatomized into many independent but interacting traits, each with its own independent evolutionary history, or that each of these traits could have been strongly shaped by natural selection, given their tenuous connection to communicative efficacy.

http://psych.colorado.edu/~kimlab/hauser.chomsky.fitch.science2002.pdf — StreetlightX

Apparently the only article you’ve read. As you’ve cited it over and over again.

Nevertheless— he doesn’t once say that:

language cannot be accounted for by natural selection — StreetlightX

Not once. Read the quote again. There’s very little reason to believe that language evolved in parts or for communication.

Of course natural selection played a role in language. It wouldn’t still be here if it didn’t confer an advantage. That’s different from saying it evolved through incremental steps, each through natural selection. Chomsky is arguing against gradualism.

https://chomsky.info/20140826/

Chomsky is not questioning naturalism.

In which case so much for the failure of mechanism to imply anything - literally anything - about our cognitive abilities. — StreetlightX

I’d say a notion of the material world in the early scientific evolution being abandoned, one based on common sense notions — and which hasn’t been replaced to this day — certainly tells us something about our cognitive abilities. It shows us that yet again our intuitions, everyday experiences, folk source, and common sense notions simply don’t work. We have to find other ways of grasping the world — and we have.

Have you opened a philosophy journal recently? There are a blossoming of theories all over the place. — StreetlightX

I’m talking about science, and I’m talking matter, physical, material, “body,” etc. If a new technical notion has been proposed, I’m happy to take a look.

In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.
— Xtrix

Lol, Chomsky literally says that his shitty conception of language cannot be accounted for by natural selection — StreetlightX

Not once does he say this. Not once.

I suppose if your starting assumption is that Chomsky is an idiot, the above sounds reasonable. But what he says is that there’s little evidence to suggest that gradualism explains language. That’s not saying it’s God-created, that it’s a mystery, that it’s beyond science, that it didn’t evolve, or that natural selection doesn’t apply (of course it does).

True, language could be magic. But that’s the opposite of what Chomsky had said for 70 years or so.

Everything about Chomsky's understanding of language is pseudo-scientific, — StreetlightX

Funny you say this. I recall you cited Daniel Everett a while back in support of your claims — who’s shown to be a borderline fraud, and whose conclusions of the piraha language being thoroughly and repeatedly debunked.

He's a closet creationist — StreetlightX

Okay! :up:

:100:

There is nothing - nothing - about object permanence that makes physicalism or mechanism 'common-sense based technical notions'. — StreetlightX

Contact action, like object permanence, is a “common sense” notion. Same with the moon illusion or any other optical illusion— it’s simply how we see and experience things.

That doesn’t mean the mechanical philosophy is common sense. It means the 17th century notion of understanding was based on contact action. Turns out that’s completely wrong — fine. But importantly, nothing has been proposed since to replace that notion.

I don’t see anything chauvinistic about any of this. You’re simply misreading it.

because Chomsky lacks any terms other than 'the physical' or the mechanical to grasp the world, the failure of his pet vocabulary must imply the failure of human understanding and vice versa. — StreetlightX

Theory.

Physical and mechanical are hardly his “pet vocabulary” — he’s in fact arguing that they fail, but we have other ways of understanding the world. Ways that aren’t based on “common sense.” Namely, our explanatory theories — which are revised in time.

Yeah it "evolved", but exactly how is just one of those mysterious things that we'll never know, because his vision of language is Platonic and basically theological. — StreetlightX

His view of language is biological. Never once has he said the evolution of language is a mystery we’ll “never know.” In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.

You’ve now made a number of things up. Platonist, chauvinist, priest, arrogant, etc. Not sure why. But it has nothing to do with Chomsky. It’s fabrication. But that’s your business.

This is going to be a bit long-winded, but hopefully valuable in getting on the same wavelength.

Capitalism is only one system among others throughout history, defined by private ownership and the relationship between masters owners (employers) and slaves workers (employees). It has its roots in the middle ages and accelerated in the industrial revolution. It's largely replaced slavery and feudalism.

There are many variants of capitalism. Saudi Arabia is capitalist. China is capitalist. Sweden is capitalist. Most nations are "mixed economies." The United States is a state-capitalist system, and around 40 years ago, in the 70s and early 80s, began shifting from an era of "regimented capitalism" (managerialism) which existed from roughly the 1940s, to a neoliberal program. "Government is the problem."

If you agree that what I've just described above is correct, then you have your answer: yes, during the 1950s and 60s, there was a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and a larger "middle class." Is that preferable to the neoliberal era we've been subjected to? Yes. Does that mean we're happy with capitalism? No.

FDR and the New Deal was fine, but didn't go nearly far enough. Capitalism should have simply been abolished.

There was also a violent (but forgotten) fight against the New Deal policies, and right away there was a backlash. The owners of this country always resented it, but couldn't do much about it. The late 60s was the last straw for them -- that "excess of democracy" of some black people getting rights and students protesting and so on. Too much to bear.

You see the thought process laid out clearly in the 1970 Milton Friedman NY Times article about corporate governance, and the 1971 Powell memo to the US Chamber of Commerce (and, later, the Trilateral Commission's Crisis of Democracy). The OAPEC oil embargo of '73 and the "stagflation" of the mid 70s provided enough of an opening to start a push for what was always wanted: dismantling the New Deal, shrinking government (tax cuts, deregulation, privatization), and crushing unions. I assume you're aware of most of this.

So -- giiven all this, the question:

I am just wondering what about capitalism is the more important enemy.. the inequality/instability of income or the power differential? — schopenhauer1

is a false one. The power differential between owners and their employees is not just an unequal one, it's also a morally illegitimate one. Just as in the the system of slavery and the system of feudalism.

Sure, there were some nice masters and lords. There are some nice employers today. So what? Ditto for a more "equitable" distribution. The very system is unjust and illegitimate.

Capitalism also stems from a very strange concept of "liberty" and "individuality" that is, at bottom, anti-social (not simply anti-socialist). It has its roots in ideas about human nature -- elevating "self-interest," "selfishness," and "greed" as primary motives. It's more of a psychological sickness than a philosophy. In my opinion. It all reeks of both intense social phobia and anti-social personality disorder.

People are actually voting that an infinite past is more "far-fetched" than something coming from nothing?

Jesus...

Chomsky's not very hidden agenda: innate ideas. — bongo fury

That the human capacity for language is genetically determined, yes. Is that really still "controversial"? He's looking at human beings like we look at any other biological organism. We have a genetic structure. That's basically a truism.

an apologia for his effective creationism about language — StreetlightX

"Effective"? Chomsky has never once, in my reading, questioned whether language evolved. That it came about rapidly instead of gradually, as some propose, yes. That's "effective creationism"?

It’s just really odd to say we can’t refer to the word physical because Newton’s contemporaries once associated the word to mean things in the world worked like wheels and clocks. — Saphsin

It's not that -- it's that no alternative has been proposed since. As a technical notion. Common-sense notions in everyday discourse is a different matter. Of course I know what you mean when you say "physical." I know what you mean when you say I'm going to "work." When it comes to science, however, that no longer applies. So the argument Chomsky is making is that there hasn't been a replacement.

The common sense-based notion of contact action, as a basis for "understanding" the world in terms of mechanics (mechanical philosophy), was abandoned and nothing has been proposed since.

And what, if we can't square our most advanced concepts of understading to the intellectual standards of literal infants this is supposed to be a comment on our understanding other than the fact that infants are literally the stupidest variety of human on the planet? — StreetlightX

You've missed the point entirely. It's not trying to square our technical notions in science with an infant. It's merely pointing out that, much like the moon illusion, or the stick in water that appears broken, this is simply how human beings see things. As adults we realize the moon isn't that big, that the stick isn't really broken, etc., and perhaps infants and children don't -- but we still see the world this way regardless.

These are "common sense" notions. Chomsky is arguing that common sense notions don't help when it comes to science, and in fact "physical" (in terms of contact action) was one of these common-sense based technical notions that was abandoned. Crucially, another technical notion to replace it has never been given. We just have new ways of understanding the world. But we go on seeing broken sticks and making assumptions about contact action nevertheless. That's why magicians can fool us so easily with slights of hand.

Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science.
— Xtrix

Right, and from this he wants to draw the conclusion that there are some things in the world that will always escape us. — StreetlightX

Maybe not "always," but yes -- he argues, as you know, over and over again that human beings have a scope and limit to their capacities. Again I think the rats in the prime number maze is a good example -- it's not easy to understand why they can't do it, perhaps, but they can't. Human beings also have their cognitive limits, and we learn something about what they are. Common sense ways of seeing the world and talking about the world -- some of which is just psychologically pre-determined -- fall apart when we study things scientifically. I mentioned the moon illusion, but there are many others. Likewise for our words -- common words like "work" mean something entirely different in everyday life compared to their use in physics.

Again, the latter stands as a perfectly reasonable position (that things will always escape us), but movement from A to C simply doesn't follow. If bodies and the physical don't have a place in today's science then they were always insignificant from the beginning other than as conceptual holding-patterns whose time is done. We owe them nothing and they speak to nothing. — StreetlightX

I think Chomsky is going from C to A, not A to C. In other words, he's not saying, as you put it, that because a 17th century notion of "physical" was abandoned (A), that this proves human beings have limits (C). Rather, he takes it as a truism that human beings have limits (C) and that this is a crucial example of our limits. Hence the claim that Newton inadvertently made a contribution to the "philosophy of mind."

So if you find the initial position a reasonable one, you're simply disagreeing that this a very good example. But I think that's partly because you've missed the point about infants and contact action mentioned above.

The point is that these ideas are throughly historical - they had a date of birth and they will have a date of death. The idea that these senses of causality are deeply held eternal metaphysical notions is just rear-guard parochialism. — StreetlightX

Are optical illusions "eternal metaphysical notions"? You're mixing categories here I think. On the one hand we, as human beings, have common-sense experiences and notions about contact action; on the other, we have the mechanical philosophy which tried to describe the world in terms of a causality based in this common experience.

Because the latter was abandoned says nothing about the former. It doesn't make the former go away, nor does it make it some eternal notion.

Even if infants develop certain ideas along a relatively stable developmental path, this might speak to nothing other than the fact, of, I dunno, the necessity of avoiding being eaten by lions. Which is, shall we say, a regional issue at best. — StreetlightX

Maybe object permanence is regional at best as well. Is this really an argument?

Everyone was making a decent enough salary to live in a house, buy some entertainment goods, a car, had all their daily living met.. — schopenhauer1

Imagine using this argument in defense of the system of slavery. Would this satisfy you regarding slavery?

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property.
— Xtrix

But this is simply not true. — StreetlightX

That contact action is a human property, or that it was the common sense basis for the mechanical philosophy?

Your citation seems to be addressing the latter case. That physical flux was the "least popular" explanation of causality around Leibniz's time is interesting, but I don't see the relevance here. In other words, I don't see how it falsifies the claim that it (contact action) was the basis for the mechanical philosophy.

Like, our intuitions are useless. Forget them. They're trash and philosophically uninteresting other than a good historical and cultural tale. If you want to read how absolutely bonkers our (by which I only mean Western) schemes of causality really have been, check out Steven Nadler's editied collection on "Causation in Early Modern Philosophy" (you can find it on Libgen). — StreetlightX

Sure. But I don't understand why you apparently think I'm arguing the opposite of this. That's in fact the point about contact action being a "common sense" basis for the mechanical philosophy -- namely that intuition simply falls apart when trying to explain, for example, the force of gravity. Which is why Chomsky talks about Newton inadvertently making contributions to the philosophy of mind, since it (arguably) demonstrates an example of cognitive limits.

Like, maybe bodies and 'the physical' have a place, but that would have to be argued, and not taken for granted - certainly not in the way that Chomsky does. — StreetlightX

Again I don't quite understand this remark. Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science. I think the following will be helpful to clear away any misunderstanding (this is from Chomsky's lecture in Oslo, which I posted above and which I transcribed -- so any error is mine):

I don't think we can leave materialism behind until someone tells us what materialism is. There was a concept of materialism right through the early scientific revolution, right through Newton -- Newton still accepted it. In fact the great scientists of the next century still accepted it, LaGrange and others still tried to develop a material, mechanistic concept of the universe that went right through the 19th century -- ether theories and so on. It was finally given up in the 20th century. Finally recognized that 'we're never gonna get it.' And totally different ways of looking at things were developed, which have no relation to traditional materialism, if Friedrich Lange is correct -- and nobody has ever suggested another notion.

Materialism is just like anything we more or less understand -- it includes thinking, reasoning, etc. So we can't leave it behind until someone explains what it is. But there's no reason we can't study it. We can study what the human capacity of understanding is. We know some negative things. Like we can't understand how the world works, for example. Because our concept of understanding is too limited to incorporate what Newton described as an absurdity. Newton and Hume and Lock weren't idiots -- we should take them seriously. They regarded it as an absurdity for very good reasons, and modern cognitive science (which somehow tries to recapitulate some of this) finds pretty much that. For example, as I mentioned, an infant, presented with presentations which indicate that there's some kind of causality -- like when the ball rolls this way a light turns red or something -- they will invent a mechanical cause, and they don't care if it's not visible, because infants understand that most of what goes on is invisible but there's got to be some mechanical cause otherwise there's no way to influence anything else. So that does seem to be the way our minds work, and that tells us something about the limits of our understanding; in fact a classical, crucial case -- and it can go on to other cases.

At 1:02:00 on the video.

I think there will be war eventually between the United States and China. — frank

Nuclear war?

Nevermind.

Why what’s wrong?

The implication being that China doing more in fighting climate change will result in a nuclear war?

I didn’t make any claim about whether science works or not.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property. It’s not culturally conditioned any more than the moon illusion is culturally conditioned, or object permanence is culturally conditioned.

Pointing out, as Chomsky does, that we can’t understand the world in this way — as was shown by Newton and others — is perhaps one example of the limits of human intelligibility. The claim that humans have scope and limits is essentially a truism.

I don’t see the relevance of “retrofitting.” No one is trying to retrofit our current understanding, concepts and knowledge to that of 18th century England.

China's approach is significant because of the way that it contrasts with the Western approach which is neoliberal.

This contrast will provide future generations with empirical data about which approach works best; central planning or free markets. — frank

Neoliberalism is hardly the same as free markets — which don’t exist, anywhere.

I have no doubt China will handle this better than the US, which is a failed state.

What claim do 'bodies' or 'material' have which make them anything other than a limited European set of ideas that have been in vogue for some time? — StreetlightX

I suppose we can argue that science is just a Western invention— and there’s something to that. But I’d argue it’s a better example of possible human limits than any of the many examples one could use.

But again, I don’t think the claim is that because one 17th century European conception is obsolete, that all of human intelligibility is lost. It’s that this is one example of something that may demonstrate limits — and a particularly interesting one. You’re saying it’s not particularly interesting — no more so than qi or karma or corpuscles or alchemy. Here again I’d simply say that I do think there’s something sui generis about science. But perhaps that’s another conversation.

But the parochialism lies in the idea that it follows even minimally from the failure of the mechanic philosophy — StreetlightX

When it comes to the mind/body problem, he argues that there hasn’t been a conception of “body” since this time. So ideas about the “physical world” isn’t formulable. That’s one point. But in terms of what’s understood — plenty is understood. Knowledge isn’t impossible. We just have a different conception of “understanding” — one rooted more in theoretical formulation than contact action.

So what about mysteries? Chomsky has made the point, for decades, that human beings have a scope and limits to their cognitive capacities. The same applies here. Perhaps issues like will, the creative use of language, and understanding the world in “physical” terms demonstrate those limits. Maybe. Maybe it will be resurrected — but as of yet, that’s not the case. We still don’t have a conception of “material.”

I think the points are obvious. Of course we have limits. What’s interesting in this particular case — with Descartes, Newton, and the mind/body problem — is that what’s traditionally (and still to this day) been taken as a “scientific” understanding of the world was actually abandoned long ago, and was never resurrected. Thus, there can’t be a mind/body problem — we still have no sense of “body.”

Who cares? Well, I see plenty of threads on this very forum endlessly debating the mind/body issue, discussing the “physical” world, trying to bridge the gap between consciousness and the material world, etc. So I think it’s worth listening to someone claiming that’s all pretty much a waste of time.

As if the whole of the intelligible was at stake in the mechanic philosophy, — StreetlightX

That would be ridiculous, yeah. But I don’t see that being the claim. That mechanical philosophy is just one example— but an important one.

Chomsky is probably right about two things: (1) the mechanical philosophy has exhausted itself; (2) We probably won't end up knowing everything. But that these things have anything whatsoever to do with each other is incredibly silly. — StreetlightX

We may not know everything, and perhaps one example is understanding the world in terms of bodies, material, and physical.

That’s the claim, and I still don’t see how it’s silly. In fact if it’s true I think more should pay attention, as I mentioned above.

then have the gall to suggest that the world is incomprehensible because of that. — StreetlightX

Where does Chomsky say the world is incomprehensible?

He's saying we have a much different understanding today, one not confined solely to mechanistic processes -- like contact action, which was what was once meant by "understanding."

And I'm at a place in my life where I desire having a clean clear mind more then anything and so if I take something that alters my state of being i actually get frustrated — MAYAEL

It really depends on what we deem "good" or "bad." What many may call "clean and clear" is actually an amalgam of unquestioned beliefs, values, and habits that embody themselves in "normal" behavior. Being briefly jarred from what we consider ordinary, "normal," etc., can be very beneficial indeed.

The line between "drugs" and "medicine" is a very thin one, too. I doubt very much you'd be against medicines.

In any case, I'd be careful about extrapolating from your own experiences to such a general degree.

Interesting stuff. Thanks for the reference.

For anyone not willing to read:



See in particular the question and answer section.

What part of
cite where Chomsky clearly states what he Chomsky means by "understanding" and "mystery" and where he soundly demonstrates how he/we can understand whatever it is he/we "will never understand".
— 180 Proof
do you not understand, Xtrix? :roll: — 180 Proof

What part of the article don't you understand?

It's not offering "new" definitions for the words "understanding" or "mystery" -- and asking for such is, as I've said before, missing the entire point. Which you would know if you read it. He does talk at length about aspects of the world that appear to be incomprehensible to the human mind, in the same way that rat's can't run prime number mazes.

So take your rolling eyes and stop wasting time on a thread you never intended on engaging with. Go assign meaningless homework assignments elsewhere.

You kibbitz a lot, Xtrix, without staying on topic or addressing my explicit requests — 180 Proof

I, and others, have addressed your issues. But your requests are based on misunderstandings and arrogant presumptions.

cite where Chomsky clearly states what he Chomsky means by "understanding" and "mystery" and where he soundly demonstrates how he/we can understand whatever it is he/we "will never understand". — 180 Proof

Human beings have scope and limit in their cognitive capacities. That’s obvious. What was once thought as “understanding” — a mechanical view — is no longer the case. Ditto physical and material. This is the claim.

There are things we understand — within the scope of our cognitive abilities — and there are some things we don’t (and perhaps can’t) understand. He talks about rats and the prime number maze — that’s a mystery to them, just as will and the creative use of language is to us today.

If you’re looking for a technical definition of “understanding” or “mystery,” you’ve completely missed the point.

Again, best to start by reading the text rather than coming into a discussion with motivated reasoning, launching accusations which are demonstrably untrue.

t I need to know whether or not Chomsky says anything new on this topic — 180 Proof

It’s important to understand what the topic is first. If you’re unwilling to do this, that’s OK. But perhaps not waste others’ time on a thread you have no real interest in.

Anyway, so Chomsky's sense of "understanding" – by extension explicability and therefore inexplicability (i.e. "mysterious, mystery") – is anachronistic and related to / derived from an out-dated, surpassed, methodological paradigm? – okay, got it. — 180 Proof

No, that's not his sense. What Newton believed isn't what Chomsky believes. The passage you cite is a description of what Newton meant. Chomsky is not advocating "understanding" in the sense of the mechanical philosophy, i.e., contact action. This is very clear, if one deigns to read.

I've been to a few public lectures he'd given in the 80's & 90's and have read most of his books published before the turn of the millenium. — 180 Proof

An odd remark. What’s the relevance? That you’ve read a lot of Chomsky? That’s great— but what about the text in question?

finished reading the article thoroughly) I don't see any reason to adopt the vocabulary of what those in the 17th century thought was the criterion of scientific knowledge, that physical explanations equated to "common sense" and what counts as common sense were people's experience with engineered machines. Of course the world isn't a machine, the world is the world. The modern version of this nonsense is asking whether "if the universe is a simulation" now that we're familiar with video games. There's no reason the world has to comport with our everyday experience, but that doesn't mean increased knowledge of counterintuitive things isn't actual knowledge of how the world works. — Saphsin

Chomsky isn’t saying we don’t have knowledge about how the world works. He’s saying, at least in my reading, that our ideas of intelligibility have changed, and that words like “physical” and “material” are basically honorific. There can’t be a mind-body problem if we don’t know what “body” is, and there hasn’t been a conception since the mechanistic philosophy, which was destroyed with Newton. That’s basically the thesis.

Science of course did not end with the collapse of the notion of body (material, physical, and so on). Rather, it was reconstituted in a radically new way, with questions of conceivability and intelligibility dismissed as demonstrating nothing except about human cognitive capacities, though that conclusion has taken a long time to become firmly established. Later stages of science introduced more “absurdi- ties.” The legitimacy of the steps is determined by criteria of depth of explanation and empirical support, not conceivability and intelligibil- ity of the world that is depicted.

[my emphasis]

but I start from an understanding of scientific explanation in terms of conceptualizing what we know from the sciences today, so it doesn't matter to me if Newton's discoveries betrayed some old promise. — Saphsin

That’s the point: there hasn’t been a new conception of “physical” since Newton.

Well, there's no reason to take mechanical philosophy or its corollary seriously now that we have completely new notions, we know what Newton and his contemporaries did not know. The piece is one-sided, a long list of historical roadblocks of when we figured out how much we don't know as science progressed without mentioning any progressive changes of our picture in reality that science has given us. — Saphsin

What are these “completely new notions”? Chomsky is well aware of relativity and quantum mechanics. I’m not sure what you’re claiming he’s “conspicuously leaving out.” What is the new notion of physical/material?

Strange that you go around resurrecting all my old threads. But thanks!

I'm not a mysterian — 180 Proof

Neither is Chomsky. Try engaging with texts instead of labeling with an “ism.” Or send him an e-mail about his “ramblings” and teach him a thing or two — I for one would be very interested to see it.

Just wanted to say that I think you’ve understood Chomsky very well. That’s pretty rare, in my experience, despite him usually pointing out fairy straightforward things.

The mischievious thought that occurs to me is that perhaps what's being shown here is that matter is basically unintelligible. — Wayfarer

Exactly right. It’s perfectly fine to use in normal everyday discourse, but it has no technical notion.

Not mysticism, but he does include himself in mysterianism — Tom Storm

Really? I’ve never heard him say so, so I welcome the correction if I’m mistaken.

Human beings have a scope and limit. I don’t think that’s “mysterianism.” He uses the example of rats failing at a prime number made as an example. Their cognitive capacities are limited. Ours are clearly limited as well. We know this in terms of senses (we don’t have echolocation or the olfactory capability of dogs), perception (the moon illusion), and in terms of basic biology (we can’t fly like birds). I consider this just truism. Shouldn’t be controversial.

So maybe we can’t “understand” the world in the way understanding was once meant.