It's a spineless, cowardly attitude to blame others for your wrongdoing. — god must be atheist

:lol:

Promoting false equivalence for his corporate masters is what? Not cowardly, I suppose— just stupid and gullible?

False consciousness at its best.

“Your wrongdoing.” Yes— the tobacco companies didn’t deliberately add addictive chemicals to keep people hooked. Fossil fuel companies didn’t definitely cover up the affects on climate. This was all “my” doing— because I have driven in a car. Exactly the propaganda spewed by big oil: do your part, use better lightbulbs, recycle, etc. Well documented and clearly effective. Meanwhile they go on polluting with impunity while the planet burns, all for short term profit.

Blame is relative to one’s power. Those in power deserve more blame. But don’t worry your little head about that— keep with the stupid, simplistic “everyone is to blame” slogan.

Those poor capitalists! How unfair of us to criticize them!

Try keeping your mouth shut about things you don’t understand. It works wonders.

I eagerly await your Trump-like response.

YOU are doing it, and so am I; time to stop blaming THEM, the greedy capitalists. They are not using, per head, or per capita, more energy than you and I use, and blaming them for providing us what we want and demand is HIGHLY HYPOCRITICAL. — god must be atheist

:lol:

They must certainly DO use more fossil fuel, and most certainly DO compel people to use more fossil fuel. They, like tobacco before them, lobby Congress and have deliberately fooled people with misinformation.

You’d have been a great apologist for big tobacco as well, I’m sure. After all, “WE choose to smoke“, etc.

What a joke.

Fortunately the state has "libertarians" ( :wink: ) to aid the transfer of money to Wall Street.

Covid restrictions = tyranny of the state.

If only we'd wake up and remember that the state is there to enrich the already wealthy; to uphold patent laws; to funnel public funds into research and development that is then given over to private hands; to keep taxes lower for the ultra wealthy than for anyone else; to bailout the financial sector whenever necessary; and to subsidize environment-killing fossil fuels.

That's not COVID you're dying of -- that's freedom.

or every single thing he did that night was heroic — Miller

:rofl:

Trolls come out of the woodwork for this stuff, don’t they?

You obviously don't know what Libertarianism means. — Harry Hindu

Libertarianism is a cover for plutocracy. Most are just corporatists. All are capitalists through and through.

But if you want to go on believing the standard lines about “freedom,” you’re welcome.

Why you still vote for the same people that have been in power for 50 years and expect things to be different? — Harry Hindu

You mean capitalists? You’re right— libertarians are a far more extreme version of capitalism.

Not much to say. Can't imagine the outcome would have been the same with a young black male carrying a weapon, either on the streets or in court.

That aside, this little boy shouldn't have been there in the first place, and should have left the situation up to law enforcement. But like the capitol insurrectionists, here's another example of a person whipped into a frenzy by conservative media and the very stable genius.

You're very welcome -- that was fun. Your bishop to d3 on the 23rd move was excellent, really took me by surprise. Good game.

I think it's useful to bring the conversation to our modern understanding of being.

When we talk about the "real world," or "reality," or the world in general, or the universe, we have a certain conception in mind. What's going on in people's heads comes mostly from two sources, at least in the West: Christianity and science, and to be honest it seems as if the Christians use the story of science a lot themselves (excluding creationists, of course).

I'd like to quote from an post a while back which is relevant here.

Most of today's scientists will claim to assume "naturalism" in their endeavors. Someone famous once said that "I believe in God, I just spell it n-a-t-u-r-e." I've heard this a lot from the likes of Sagan, Dennett, Dawkins, Gould, and many others -- especially when contrasting their views with religious views or in reaction to claims that science is "just another religion."

It's worth remembering that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding, in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through our senses and our reason?

A clue is given from the word itself: "natural." And so "nature." This word comes from the Latin natura and was a translation of the Greek phusis.

It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

From Phusis: The Basis of Modern Science?

So we can see some connection here with the question of being. If "phusis" is the Greek term for being, and which is later the basis for both physics and nature, which comes to dominate our modern understanding -- is this not ultimately one part of the "metaphysics of presence" described in the OP?

Thus the "metaphysics of presence" is our philosophical ancestry, with several major variations: phusis, eidos, ousia, substance, God, nature, matter, energy.

We may ask: so what? So we see the world in terms of nature, or matter, or energy, or in the language of science. Science is the best we currently have, so what's wrong with that?

I think we simply have to look around and see how things are turning out to really understand where this tradition has come to. In Heidegger it's come to the "dead end." To Nietzsche, it's come to nihilism. I think both are correct. I would add: capitalism, as an offshoot of this way of thinking about nature and human beings (namely, materialism), is the most destructive force in the world today. It's not government, it's not socialism or communism, it's not what's traditionally thought of as religion (although capitalism is a kind of religion) -- it's the creation of a system of social organization that puts a small number of owners and shareholders on top and everywhere else puts as the servants and wage slaves of these owners.

Perhaps another way to say it: at the core of the issue today is, ultimately, a degeneration of a long philosophical tradition into a world where the central goal is to accumulate wealth and resources. And now we face almost certain destruction at the hands of climate change, thanks in part to the greed and shortsightedness of the fossil fuel capitalists. Yet we go on as the world crumbles around us.

Maybe only a god can save us in the end after all.

The 'now' is simply used for marking before and after, and in counting time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Used for counting time, exactly. I don't see the problem.



That's interesting, thanks.

Case in point.

That's it; we cannot pin down a now. I tend to think it's important to be aware of what we are doing in the kind of Buddhist sense of "mindfulness". That's not a presence which can be pinned down, or elaborated into a theory; not a 'thin' present-at-hand kind of presence, but it seems to be the foundation of any examined life,and I can't see phenomenology as important except in this regard. — Janus

I'm prone to want to merge a lot of what I've learned in meditation with Heidegger's ideas, yes. I, like you, see the meditative practices of the east to be phenomenology. Their concepts about "time" don't mirror Western conceptions -- the focus tends to be more on "impermanence," change, flow, and desire. Heidegger doesn't talk that much about desire, however. He does bring in the term "care," which I'd like to say is similar to "willing," but I don't find much textual support for this move.

Maybe it's off-topic and more in line with Heidegger's idea of authenticity. Do you see that idea as being related to his treatment of being? — Janus

Yes, in the sense that there is no "ground" of being, and that the acceptance of the anxiety that arises from this groundlessness is liberating. You don't "flee" it and conform to the rules and norms of society in an unthinking way, you face up to it (to death, to contingency, to the un-grounded nature of the world) and take ownership of your life. I think this is what is meant by authenticity.

Again, this isn't very clear from his writings. But I haven't read enough division II to be able to cite much supporting textual evidence.

But I wasn't proposing any metaphysic, I was trying to speak phenomenologically, which is to try to articulate lived experience. When we are "busy "being" (coping, interacting with, engaging with, "on the way to," etc)" is it not always now that we are doing that? — Janus

I know what you're saying, and I wouldn't say "no," I would say it doesn't come up very often. When it does, I can't see a way around what you're claiming. I think there's plenty of truth in it. There is this activity, there is this being, but it's hard to pin down a "now." That's why I was thinking you were arguing for eternalism: that a past and future are real, but occur in the present.

You can do a heavyweight, substantive reply with one line, or offer tons of fluff. — frank

And Frank decides to go with the third option: a one line reply of fluff.

I am taking liberties in the sense that I don't claim what I am saying is what Heidegger would say. I don't say the past or future are illusions, but that they exist, as past and future, only now. This does relate to Husserl's notions of retention and protention. Do you think Heidegger would say that dasein, the 'being-there', is now? — Janus

I think this is a matter of presentism and eternalism, with you seemingly arguing in favor of the latter.

I think Heidegger would say we don't often think about time in this respect -- we're too busy "being" (coping, interacting with, engaging with, "on the way to," etc).

Time doesnt exist because you have to know time is consequence of pyhsical nature, so you notice time because cycle occur, people know it hapened one day because sun make one cycle, and if you go as deep as you can, you know smth happened because you saw cycle, change happens out of this, and we say this happening: time. — Nothing

Then it seems what you're saying is that time is a measurement of change (e.g., the sun rising and setting). In which case we're equating time with what clocks measure (the sun being one kind of clock).

If time is objectified it appears as a flow or movement from past through present to future. But this is an abstraction; for lived time there is only now, not a 'dimensionless-point' now but an infinitely expansive now in which, and only in which, the future and the past exist as such. — Janus

I think you're taking liberties, because Heidegger is never so clear, but I also think that you almost have to be correct. When meditation is taught in eastern traditions, there is an emphasis on the "now" as well -- and past and future are seen as an illusion of some kind. The only "reality" is the one unfolding in the present.

Seems true. On the other hand, is this not simply another interpretation from a present-at-hand mode of being? While the now might not be quantified, we're stilling conceptualizing it and speaking of it. If anything, I see us as only being able to piece it together second-hand, in a way -- like automaticity or even deeper aspects of our being that are unconscious, and in fact largely beyond our ability to be it to individual awareness (like the internal workings of our liver and circulation).

Thnks for answer,
try time think one time you consider cycles and another time you say there is no cycles. If it is only now, tomorow never comes, past doesnt exist, or you show me, where ? Please try with cyles. I am looking into: time exist because cycle exist — Nothing

It's difficult for me to follow you. When you say "Please show me, where? Please try with cycles," I'm at a loss, for example.

So even though this wasn't directed to me, I'd ask: What is your question, exactly? What do you mean by "cycles"?

I think what it tells us about their being is that they occur in a certain mode of our being -- call it an abstract or linguistic mode, of which I would include mathematics and music. Quantities and geometric shapes are human phenomena. This is a Kantian move, really, but with the "subject" and "time" as interpreted differently.
— Xtrix

That’s helpful for explaining what you’ve been trying to get at. There’s more to do, but I could definitely see preferring to start here. — Srap Tasmaner

Was it the reference to Kant that helped? I'd like to know for future exchanges I might have with others.

asking how long it takes for a number to be a number is meaningless
— Xtrix

Yes, well, that’s the point of saying that mathematics is ‘timeless’ — Srap Tasmaner

When did I say mathematics is timeless? That's what I'm arguing against.

Numbers -- and words -- are products of the human mind, of the human being.
— Xtrix

And? What does their being the products of Dasein tell us about their being? — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I don't like the word "product" either really.

I think what it tells us about their being is that they occur in a certain mode of our being -- call it an abstract or linguistic mode, of which I would include mathematics and music. Quantities and geometric shapes are human phenomena. This is a Kantian move, really, but with the "subject" and "time" as interpreted differently.

By hand, it might take you a minute or two to work out that 357 x 68 = 24,276. A calculator or computer will do it faster, but still take a measurable amount of time. But how long does it take 357 x 68 to be 24,276? — Srap Tasmaner

This assumes "time" in the sense of physics, as sequence of seconds. That's not what I'm referring to.

When we see something as "present" before us, as "here," this is a mode we're in as a human being. Heidegger calls this the present-at-hand. Something being "present" in this case does also indicate time -- the time of the "present" -- but how we conceptualize this present can vary. The traditional way of thinking about it is as a measurement, a "second," a moment, a "now-point." Time itself gets objectified, quantified. Time itself gets interpreted as something "present-at-hand," in other words.

This is the point.

So how else can we interpret time? First we should use a different word when talking about something other than the traditional/ordinary view of time: temporality. Temporality refers to various "ecstasies" of human activity -- for example, projection and anticipation. Both projection and anticipation is where the concept "future" will arise from, and where we will eventually quantify as a "not-yet-now," an approaching now-point.

So you see that in this respect, asking how long it takes for a number to be a number is meaningless. Numbers -- and words -- are products of the human mind, of the human being.

If we move to the secondary sense of "time", as what is measured, we find the conception of a continuity without any nows. The nows are seen as artificial. Therefore, when Heidegger says “The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present..." in your quoted passage, this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle. It conflates the distinction between the primary sense of "time", and the secondary sense of "time", which Aristotle tried to establish. — Metaphysician Undercover

Artistotle is interpreting time as something present-at-hand, according to Heidegger. Whatever secondary sense you're referring to, it's not at all clear. "Continuity without any nows" is what, exactly? Perhaps citing Aristotle to support whatever claim you're making would be helpful.

Corporations should have their powers checked as much as the governments. Monopolies need to be broken up and competition promoted. — Harry Hindu

Exactly the alternative I mentioned. "Free markets" and "competition" is the answer. Which has been a complete failure on every level except one -- namely, the level of plutocrats. Libertarianism is just another cover for plutocracy. Capitalism through and through.

A nice story, though.

Philosophy can be summed up completely in the following:

What is matter? Never mind.
What is mind? No matter.

This is from a story told by Bertrand Russell.

Figured this was a good place to put it— I found it amusing.

So to possibly close out this thread, I think it’s safe to say that not only was COP26 a complete failure, but did more harm.

Worth taking another look at the poll — most were correct, in the end.

If you indeed don’t know, then it’s responsible to be honest about it yes.

To understand the libertarian mind, remember the mantra: the government is the problem.

Don’t bother asking what the alternative is.

In a way, it does. Without oxygen, there aren’t human beings. Without human beings, there is no mathematics. In a sense there is no “time” either, if by time we mean in the traditional sense.

Mathematics is a human activity. Humans do indeed exist “in” time (or, better, “as” time).
— Xtrix
So the second sentence supposes an identity that is not there? — Heiko

No, it supposes human beings. Human beings are certainly "there." As are mathematical objects.

Mathematics do not know time. — Heiko

Mathematics is a human activity. Humans do indeed exist “in” time (or, better, “as” time). When we think in symbols, we’re thinking in a certain moment in time.

Mathematics does indeed presuppose time.

So far as I am aware, persistence is not a notion used in formal logic. Nor does formal logic presume that individuals persist over time. — Banno

Formal logic is an abstract activity of the human being, dependent on a certain mode of a human being. Like mathematics. Formal systems do indeed presume persistence -- the persistence of symbols, as mathematics presumes a persistence of number. Hence why Plato talks much of mathematics.

.and why should we fall back to this anachronistic greek interpretation when we have better ones in our formal logic? — Banno

I'm not recommending we go back to this. The claim is that this is what permeates the western tradition. Formal logic is still very much included in this tradition.

One thing I really like is Heidegger's hermeneutic approach: you start from the asking of whatever question, and you don't skip right over how the question is asked, and why, and by whom, and what they think they're up to, but start there, with that vague understanding. And it's fascinating to see how he treats this not just as methodology but as part of the essential structure of the world: we ask vague questions about things we kinda already understand because some of what we understand or could understand is hidden, and that's part of what we investigate too. — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly, and with the emphasis on "hidden." I think the aim of phenomenology, in Heidegger's hands, is aimed precisely at that: what's hidden, what's concealed. There's much in life that we take for granted, after all.

He's aware of Kant's criticism - so go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness. — Banno

But remember Heidegger is not doing mathematical logic, and so far as I know doesn't use "being-ness" - at least not in B/T or Intro to Metaphysics. I've invoked that term here, as I have "is-ness," but only in an attempt to understand. Heidegger isn't treating being as a predicate.

...constant presence...
— Xtrix
So now we have three ways of talking about existence: this; subject of a predicate; and something like member of the domain of discourse. — Banno

Well there are many more ways I'm sure, but the thesis is that underlying these various Western interpretations is a fundamentally Greek one: constant presence, ousia. That's the claim.

My previously expressed qualm about "presence" is that it apparently preferences time over space - my prejudices, from my previous life as a student of physics, lead me to think that as far as possible we ought treat them in much the same way. So the being of this armchair extends back to when to was constructed, and forward to when it is destroyed. But also sideways to the bookcase and downwards to the floor. — Banno

I agree with you that it should be treated the same way, from the purview of physics. But let's put that aside for a minute and just see if there's any truth in the claim itself (made above, about presence). I think there is, especially if we do a historical and "hermeneutical" analysis of Greek texts (in which this interpretation is said to originate).

If we do agree that there is truth to this claim, you then rightly anticipate the next question: what do we mean by "time"? But again, before we get into that I want to make sure we're on the same page, because it's a very big claim to make indeed.

Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno

Well here I have to nitpick a little bit, because in Heidegger "temporality" will not mean "time" exactly. But I think you mean time in the sense of physics, so in that case no, time isn't preferred. Temporality is preferred -- and we can get into that afterwards, it takes up a lot of pages in Heidegger as you know ("time" is right in the title, after all).

My next criticism would be that presence reduces to being a member of a domain of discourse. That woudl need some filling out, but basically it is saying that the things we talk about ar in a sense given - a familiar notion for you, I suppose. But if I am right, nothing is added to the analysis of being by including presence. — Banno

I'm not sure how to proceed here, because I'm not sure what "member of a domain of discourse" really means frankly. But just to be clear what the claim is: I'm not saying being is presence, I'm saying being was interpreted as essentially meaning that which is constant, stable, unchanging -- that which arises and is there before us, "present" before us. That is to say: Ousia -- this often gets translated as "substance" but it has connection to Plato's "idea."



You're right -- my fault. It's funny, because I was about to put what he was referring to in brackets, but had to run out. The "proof" he's referring to is the existence of the outside world. Here's the prior paragraph:

Kant presupposes both the distinction between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me', and also the connection between these; factically he is correct in doing so, but he is incorrect from the standpoint of the tendency of his proof. It has not been demonstrated that the sort of thing which gets established about the Being-present-at-hand-together of the changing and the permanent when one takes time as one's clue, will also apply to the connection between the 'in me' and the 'outside of me'. But if one were to see the whole distinction between the 'inside' and the 'outside' and the whole connection between them which Kant's proof presupposes, and if one were to have an ontological conception of what has been presupposed in this presupposition, then the possibility of holding that a proof of the 'Dasein of Things outside of me' is a necessary one which has yet to be given would collapse.

I don't want to be "quoting scripture" either. I posted this because I came across it when reading something else in the text, and thought it pertinent. I don't consider citing Heidegger to be settling anything -- but he does word things well on occasion.

Returning to more mundane, down-to-earth theories, I suppose there's no real reason to oppose Chomsky's idea of the gene-language connection although, from what I know, he's probably incapable of giving a detailed exposition of how exactly genes and language interact; what he's done is merely propose a thesis topic and chances are he's hoping someone will prove his point for him à la mathematicians and their conjectures. — TheMadFool

There has been interesting research from neurolinguistics about the brain's role in language, and some research about genes involved, but I wouldn't say it's detailed or extremely well understood. What's also interesting is the work that was done on language acquisition in children, some of which conducted by Chomsky's late wife.

Formal language , as a capacity humans possess due to brain structures , is one thing , but language understood in a much broader sense has been claimed as an ontological a priori — Joshs

I'm meaning the former, yes. Language itself, however, is still a "property" of the human being, and so there is an ontological grounding to it as well.

To build nature, one needs a language to do — TheMadFool

No you don’t. Nature is what is. We can call it anything we like, impose on it rules and symbols, think about it this way or that way. Language is a human faculty, like seeing. There’s every reason to believe, and no reason not to believe, that the brain is involved in these systems.

Incidentally, non-human animals and babies (pre-linguistic) interact with the world just fine without language. Many aspects of human activity, from habits to sleeping, doesn’t involve language. Language itself is simply expression of thought. So if we’re searching for a ground, language seems like a shaky one indeed.

What Chomsky points out is trivial -- he's saying there's a genetic component to language, and that's all. I've never understood why this is controversial. Of course it's hard-wired into us somehow
— Xtrix

Last I checked, genes, and their components DNA/RNA, constitute a language. The bases - Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Cytosine (C), Guanine (G) - are the letters and the words are base triplets (ATG for example), each triplet coding a specific amino acid. Google for more information.

Also, what of Galileo's claim that "the Book of Nature is written in mathematical language"? Genes are, what?, a chapter in the Book of Nature and that means...since the universe needed a language, a mathematical one...Chomsky is wrong - language precedes genes. — TheMadFool

I can't tell if this is serious or not, which isn't a great sign I guess.

Assuming it's serious: the structure of DNA and the naming of nucleotides as "A," "T," etc., is an analogy. Yes, we impose this structure on what we see. We impose form on music and on the world through our concepts, numbers, etc.

Saying "language precedes genes" is like saying "vision precedes genes" or "the liver precedes genes." Really? Does walking precede legs? These are what was once described as "endowments" of nature, which today we think of in terms of DNA and genes. But it's describing a biological truism: there's a genetic component to vision, just as there's a reason we grow arms and not wings. Likewise for the faculty of language.

If we deny this we're really off in space, in some idealistic reality where everything is "language." Absurd, in my view, but so be it.

An interesting passage:

The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. This is why a demonstration that two things which are present-at-hand are necessarily present-at-hand together, can give rise to the illusion that something has been proved, or even can be proved, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.

(p. 205)

I think many on this forum are largely operating within this purview as well -- which is to say, one oriented towards subjects representing objects, and a picture of the human being as an evolved animal with reason, or a mind. Zoon echon logon holds true to this day.

Try this: one might argue that being, "is" and so on are of some import, but the whole purpose of philosophy is to answer the great question of what a man is to do with his life (sic.). Hence, such weeny whiny arguments are not for real men, but an indication of nerdish cowardice. — Banno

But here I think you fail to notice that these questions of ethics and morality, which I'd agree are ultimately what we're after, are rooted in our beliefs, values, and attitudes towards the world. They're rooted largely on the question "What am I?" "What is a human being?" etc. Aristotle is a well known example, of course. Politics and governance are grounded on answers to these questions, even if held tacitly as unquestioned presuppositions. If it is assumed that we're created by God, for example, the answer to "What should I do with my life?" is answered in a very definite light indeed.

So most niche intellectual pursuits I would agree are ways of avoiding the "real" questions of action, of living in the real world, etc., and questions about being could be added to this list. But from my view, I keep the question you raised in the background at all times -- and this is in fact what motivates me to even care about the question at all. On the surface it seems the most hifalutin, abstract bullshit you could imagine.

Better to look at what philosophy is in terms of it's method - critical analysis that seeks clarification - than in terms of this or that content. — Banno

Critical analysis presupposes thought and awareness and, in fact, human being, does it not? When we analyze, question, interrogate, investigate, dissect, clarify, etc., we're engaging in a very human activity. We can call it "philosophy" or "thinking" or anything we like, but my claim is about the question of being as first in rank -- as the broadest of questions and deepest. I don't think this should be controversial, really. If you ask about being, you're asking about everything. Hard to get broader than that. It may not be the "central" concern, or the most interesting, or the most relevant to our lives, or the most studied, or the most popular, etc.

I would say the "method" of philosophy is really phenomenology, by the way. But replacing this word with "critical analysis" doesn't matter that much to me. The point above stands either way, as both assume the human being.

It's this very move that is contended: treating existence as a state. As if there were things that do not exist, waiting to change their condition into one of existence. That is, treating existence as a first order predicate. — Banno

Well then here we agree. Being (or existence, whatever we like) isn't a "state." It's not as if being emerges from a void of nothingness and "comes into being." That's certainly not the claim I want to be making.

it seems a rookie mistake for Heidegger to have made. I guess his attention was elsewhere. — Banno

Heidegger is well aware of Kant -- in fact he had several lectures on him.

Descartes not only evades the ontological question of substantiality altogether; he also emphasizes explicitly that substance as such-that is to say, its substantiality-is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. 'Being' itself does not 'affect' us, and therefore cannot be perceived. 'Being is not a Real predicate,' says Kant, who is merely repeating Descartes' principle. Thus the possibility of a pure problematic of Being gets renounced in principle, and a way is sought for arriving at those definite characteristics of substance which we have designated above.

B&T p. 94

He goes on, of course, but I won't bother quoting the entirety of it. Needless to say he's certainly aware of the mistake you claim he's making.

Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?
— Xtrix

I assume your answer is 'being'. — I like sushi

No, I would say awareness— wouldn’t you?

Even so, if this is your view then what exactly do you mean by 'being'? — I like sushi

This is the question of the OP. But I don’t give any definition or interpretation myself. Again, it would be a little like asking “What is God?” I could add to a long list of interpretations, but I’d rather delve into the question itself, who’s asking it, and its history / development.

I'm with Banno in regards to words. If Heidegger cannot make clear what 'dasein' means then the reader should have serious concerns about everything that follows. — I like sushi

I agree. He should be clear about it. This is why he dedicates 100s of pages to expand upon it. In the end, dasein (literally “being there”) is interpreted as temporality.

Alarm bells should ring there for anyone looking critically at his work. — I like sushi

Well what are you getting at here? Are you of the opinion that Heidegger is a charlatan, or simply misguided? Perhaps you agree with what Russell said was “language running amok” (paraphrasing) or when Chomsky says its “empty verbiage.”

I respect these men and I sympathize with this view, yet I also feel I’ve learned a great deal from Heidegger — so the onus is on me to explain what’s so interesting. Apparently I’ve failed to do so up to this point. But I can only keep trying, against the charge of charlatanism and obscurantism.

Earlier I returned the discussion to the OP: The OP asks the question "why is there something?"

Does the theory of being you are presenting answer this question? — Banno

This will sound evasive, but no. Nor would I say I'm presenting a theory of being, since I've not defined what being is. Perhaps it's best to look at a positive claim, one made by Heidegger and one which I agree: the traditional interpretation of beings, starting with the Greeks (especially Plato and Aristotle) and stretching throughout the history of the West, is the that of constant presence. If we agree on this, we can proceed with the more general question.

How can this be contended? '-ness' forms a noun from an adjective, expressing a state or condition. — Banno

@Janus

If I may preface this by something relevant here:

It simply no longer occurs to us that everything that we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise-- that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an absolute, that instead, they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages.

We also find the same relations in our word "Being" (das Sein). This substantive derives from the infinitive "to be" (sein), which belongs with the forms "you are," "he is," "we were," you have been." "Being" as a substantive came from the verb. We thus call the word "Being" a "verbal substantive." Once we have cited this grammatical form, the linguistic characterization of the word "Being" is complete. We are talking here at length about well-known and self-evident things. But let us speak better and more carefully: these linguistic, grammatical distinctions are worn out and common· place; they are by no means "self-evident." So we must turn an eye to the grammatical forms in question (verb, substantive, substantivization of the verb, infinitive, participle).

This is important to keep in mind.

Lastly:

Above all we must consider the fact that the definitive differentiation the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in Greek form of onoma and rhema was worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being that has been definitive for the entire West. This inner bond between these two happenings is accessible to us unimpaired and is carried out in full clarity in Plato's Sophist. The terms onoma and rhema were already known before Plato, of course. But at that time, and still in Plato, they were understood as terms denoting the use of words as a whole. Onoma means the linguistic name as distinguished from the named person or thing, and it also means the speaking of a word, which was conceived grammatically as rhema. And rhema in tum means the spoken word, speech; the rhetor is the speaker, the orator, who uses not only verbs but also onomata in the narrower meaning of substantive.

[...]

Thus the two terms onoma and rhema, which at first indicated all speaking, narrowed their meaning and became terms for the two main classes of words.

(All from Intro to Metaphysics, "The Grammar and Etymology of Being.")

So appealing to grammar doesn't help much. We can categorize the word itself, but that's not really the point. If being isn't a "thing," then it's not a noun. "Is" isn't a noun either.

But remember, the question isn't "What kind of word is 'being'"? The question is what is "it"? What is the meaning of being?

Can you think without 'language'? As in this worded stuff I'm using here? — I like sushi

These are open questions, but my opinion is that we can indeed think without language. You can visualize a scene without a verbal commentary, for example. Or rotate an imaginary object in your head— which doesn’t involve words but which nevertheless happens internally.

There’s also the issue of awareness. When I’m imagining something or talking to myself, projecting into the future or remembering an experience from my past, I consider it thought. Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?

It seems the answer is Awareness, or perhaps our consciousness. (I use the terms interchangeably.) Awareness, then, seems “bigger” than thought — in the sense that we can “hold” thought in awareness.