To repeat: the very fact that Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong" not in terms of calculation but in the bigger picture led to a remarkable re-evaluation of the history of science. See David Hilbert, et al.
— Xtrix

What was the picture being described by the laws of motion? — VagabondSpectre

Not one of a 4-dimensional spacetime or of non-Euclidean geometry. Doesn't really make it "wrong," I suppose, but less explanatory than relativity.

So when Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong", what you should actually be saying is that we found a more accurate/reliable/robust model which encompasses the Newtonian model. — VagabondSpectre

Correct. See above.

The claim that "modern science is cardinally focused..." is so far totally unsupported. Says who?
— Xtrix

Interesting question, but appealing to authority is not scientifically sound. — VagabondSpectre

Sure. But I'm not appealing to an authority -- I'm asking you to, so that he or she will provide evidence. If you can, I'm all ears. But so far you haven't.

We would have to do a random sampling of active or historical scientific inquiries, and then do quantitative and statistical analysis to determine whether or not they were heavier on evidence gathering and predictive modeling, or heavier on making unfalsifiable hypotheses.

Once we have gathered and preprocessed the data, we could make a null hypothesis like "we expect to see an even distribution of the predictive model approach vs the untested hypothesis generating approach". Then when we actually crunch the numbers, assuming our sample is sufficiently large, if we see large deviation in one direction or the other, we then have a potentially significant signal that tells which direction to lean regarding the claim "modern science is cardinally focused on understanding the world through empirical evidence and predictive power, not mere "rationality"; (what Descartes did)".

You might want to say "correlation is not causation" and that would indeed be very astute. We could take our analysis to completion by gathering additional data of factors which we think might impact cardinal focus of individual scientific inquiries. Using something like muti-variate regression analysis, we could potentially generate a model between the relationships of circumstantial factors and the cardinal focus of scientific inquiry in general. We could then use these relationships to create a statistical model that tells us what the most likely cardinal focus of a given scientific inquiry is if we are given the specific factors that we checked in our analysis. If our model generates predictions with very high or useful precision and accuracy then we call it robust. — VagabondSpectre

Let me know when you conduct this experiment. I wish you the best of luck, but I won't hold my breath. Personally I think it's a waste of time. But in any case, the point stands: there's no evidence for your claim. So why say it? That's not scientifically sound either.

Stop trying to demarcate science
— Xtrix

Stop trying to couple it with non-science. — VagabondSpectre

I haven't once said anything remotely like that, because before we can "couple" non-science with "science," we have to know what "science" is. No one can offer a definition that shows Aristarchus wasn't doing science but Galileo was, for example, so who cares?

You, on the other hand, have repeatedly tried to demarcate science, ignoring evidence that doesn't fit. Also not scientifically sound. I can make guesses as to why this is, psychologically, but otherwise it's not very interesting to me.

That's a completely meaningless statement.

Both are scientific theories. They're not "read off" from nature without any contribution of the thinking mind; there's nothing "backwards" about this.
— Xtrix

The experimental evidence is in our face phenomenon... — VagabondSpectre

That's not what you said. You said:

You're looking at it backward actually. QM and GR are "in our face" phenomenon that we cannot deny. — VagabondSpectre

So quantum mechanics and general relativity are "experimental evidence" now? That's completely meaningless as well.

Our thinking minds tend to want to reject these things as spooky and unintuitive nonsense, and it is only the experimental evidence that manages to persuade us in the end. — VagabondSpectre

"Us" being human beings...also with thinking minds.

I never stated anything about a "god of nature."
— Xtrix

I don't mean a god over nature, I mean god from nature; the god of nature... It's what you said in your opening post so I'm not sure why you're not interpreting this correctly. — VagabondSpectre

From nature, "of nature"? I'm not being deliberately contrarian here, I just really don't know what you mean. My only point in mentioning the quote about "I spell God 'nature'" was to emphasize the point that many scientists assume (reasonably) a kind of naturalism when dealing with the world. That wasn't meant to imply a kind of "God of nature." But I take your point, perhaps it was ambiguous.

It's worth remembering that science was simply "natural philosophy" in Descartes' day, Newton's day and Kant's day. This framework and its interpretation of the empirical world dominates every other understanding, in today's world, including the Christian account (or any other religious perspective, really). Therefore it's important to ask: what was (and is) this philosophy of nature? What is the basis of its interpretation of all that we can know through our senses and our reason?
— Xtrix

No, because neither you nor I know what "modern science" is. We can't pinpoint when it begins. We can only speculate as to what makes it 'distinct' from any other rational inquiry. So far, its successes in technological advances and some kind of "method" has been offered. I don't find that very convincing.
— Xtrix

I have no trouble with saying modern science is different in many respects with whatever the Greeks were doing. As I said before, it's undeniable that many things have changed. But when you look at what's going on, at its core, it seems like what we call "doing science" is actually something that's been with us (as human beings) for a long time indeed.
— Xtrix

I'm having a hard time comprehending which of the above positions you actually occupy. — VagabondSpectre

I don't see any conflict.

1) What is now called science was once called "natural philosophy." Nothing controversial about that.

2) When "science" (modern science) really emerges is quite fuzzy, and distinguishing it from other rational inquiries by appeals to a special "method" isn't convincing to me.

3) However we define "modern science" -- perhaps whatever academic research, experiments, published articles, etc. is happening -- it seems that this activity is in many ways different from Greek "science" in terms not of its core (inquiry) but of technology (e.g., microscopes) and sheer scale (many more people engaged in this activity consciously and cooperatively).

So I occupy one position really.

Do we not know what modern science is, and therefore cannot say how it differs from what ancient Greeks were doing? — VagabondSpectre

Yes.

Or are there obvious differences between what ancient Greeks were doing and modern science? — VagabondSpectre

At the periphery there are differences, sure (microscopes, telescopes, computers, a division of labor in research, and so on). See above.

But as trying to understand the world using reason, experiment, observation (empirical data), etc. -- no, there's no difference in my view between humans doing this now and humans doing it then. All it takes to understand this is to see that these people weren't sub-human barbarians or "primitive" at all, and to know a little history. (I keep bringing up Aristarchus, for example, for a reason: because you continue to avoid that point; was he "doing" science or not?)

If so, what are those obvious differences? (hint: predictive power and a focus on experimental methodology). — VagabondSpectre

Not all inquiry is predictive, and sometimes there's little actual experimentation. So while this is a fine rule of thumb, perhaps, it's hardly exhaustive or definitive. It's also way too simple, as I've pointed out before, and kind of reeks of hubris.

But even if we accept your definition, I've given examples of the Greeks (and Muslims, and Persians, and Babylonians, and Christians, etc) meeting these criteria. Yet you reject that as science because they're "primitive, superstitious" people. Can't have it both ways.

Either the Greeks were doing science, or they weren't doing science and then neither are we (in which case we need another definition in order to exclude the Greeks).

If you want to try and get at *the very core of human inquiry and knowledge*, then you have no reason to refer to the problem of induction as irrelevant. The thing we and the ancients share is that we both lived or live in worlds that appear to have causal consistency. We observe things, use those observations to formulate an idea or an action, and then we observe the effects of those ideas and actions. In general, we want our actions to create more desirable observations. The only real signal we have to refine our ideas and actions is the observable results of those actions. The ancients kinda knew this, but they did not seem to realize that instead of focusing on how elegant an idea sounds in and of itself (or how persuasive it may be to the rational mind), we should be forced to reject it if experimental evidence controverts it, and beyond this, that we can never actually test the validity of such speculative ideas unless they can actually generate predictions that can be tested. — VagabondSpectre

Yes, causality is important.

Your characterization of the "ancients" is simply sophomoric, I'm afraid. And you've repeatedly avoided clear examples that outright refute this caricature.

With these last two sentences, we have a robust definition of the scope of science (being concerned with observable phenomenon and falsifiable models) that does depart from the more full blown realm of philosophical inquiry that the ancients were engaged it. It's a drastic departure from the focus of those ontic schools that instead presupposed some anthropically biased/pleasing framework. — VagabondSpectre

Again, it's not so robust. But leaving that aside, what "ontic schools" are you talking about? And please don't give me a superficial analysis like "Thales believed the world was made of water" or something like that. I'm hoping you're more familiar with the presocratics than that.

It's just not so simple -- and who really cares, anyway?
— Xtrix

I thought you wanted to comment on modern science via commenting on ancient science. Am I wrong? — VagabondSpectre

Yes.

You're equivocating between the epistemological foundations of modern science (it's the inductive method), and other schools which are less strict. — VagabondSpectre

So you're in the camp of still believing in some special "inductive method." That's fine. I'm very familiar with those in your camp -- there have been plenty since Bacon. But there's no reason to take it so seriously, especially as there is plenty that goes on outside of such a "method" thus making it fairly meaningless (in my view).

I've given plenty of examples at this point, which you continue to ignore, so I'll take that to mean you have some attachment to belief in such a dogma about a special "method" and will gladly let you go on holding it. Again, this wasn't the purpose of this thread anyway.

I suggest Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science for a longer, more thorough disquisition about this from a historian of science.

Gaining knowledge using predictive power as a confidence signal IS induction. — VagabondSpectre

That's not inductive reasoning. Inductive logic has little to do with "predictive power." You're just confused here, I'm afraid.

But regardless, I'm glad you admit that reason and logic is used in science.

So when I say "science relies on the inductive method, not mere rationality", I'm actually pointing to the specific form of "logic" (induction) that scientific proofs require as their literal standard for truth and knowledge. — VagabondSpectre

No, you contrasted "rationality" by conflating it with "rationalism" (hence why you mentioned Descartes) which is completely wrong. Inductive reasoning already assumes reason (it's right there in the word), and hence rationality - ratio is Latin, which translates as "reason."

So yes, dealing with the world "rationally" is a human activity, part of an attempt to understand things using reason. That's philosophy, that's science, that's everything in between when we're not completely under the direction of emotion, whim, instinct, superstition, etc. If you want to go on believing that only the parts of this activity that check off a DSM-like list should be considered "science," all evidence to the contrary, you're welcome to.

Hi. Excuse me if this is somewhat obvious but it may be worth remembering "science" isn’t a single entity to be analyzed using identical systems following identical rules. There may only be one "true" reality of everything, but our current scientific understanding necessitates the deployment of different paradigms for different areas of research. — Zophie

That's a good point.

It’s possible this may have something to do with the potentially irreconcilable disagreement I’m seeing here. Apologies in advance if I'm saying nothing new or interesting. — Zophie

Your point is a good one but I'm missing how that pertains to what we're discussing, which is at this point whether or not "science" is a distinct activity, defined by and owing its success to a special "inductive method." I maintain there is no such method, Vagabond is arguing in favor of one. There being vastly different fields in science with their own set of background premises, while true, doesn't shed much light on our disagreement.

Postpositivism, which prioritizes predictive power, is a typically physicalist approach marrying the formal and physical sciences. Constructivism-interpretivism is a more lenient approach suiting the cognitive and social sciences. To a postpositivist, most hypothetical links from φυσις to modern science would be implausible because we can’t conduct a survey collecting testimonials of dead people, and that’s just too bad. (Lol.) To a constructivist-interprivist, however, it’s possible to sufficiently ground a hypothesis by extracting common themes and standpoints in the literature. For φυσις, this may invoke the "natural elements" of Indo-European mythology as an effort to properly bookend an account and thereby make it robust enough to be considered scientific. But even if it’s given that mythology is early evidence of proto-science as I contend, the notion is still, clearly, highly tentative. I mention this because, judging from post histories, paradigms haven't been given much mention, though I personally think they bring a lot of clarifying power to any discussion. Hopefully that can be appreciated here to at least some degree. — Zophie

I'm failing to see the relevance. What "hypothetical links" do you mean? I'm mainly talking etymology, with the question of the meaning of being as a guide (a la Heidegger).

I agree that paradigms are an important concept; I like Kuhn a lot too. But I'm not seeing the connection to this thread and the analysis of the meaning of "nature" and phusis.

As for the question of φυσις being some kind of weird non-divine driving force of science, it may actually be a question of what one thinks science is supposed to do. — Zophie

Who said anything about a "driving force"? Not I. Also, why the characterization of phusis and "weird non-divine force"? There's nothing weird about it. Nor is it weirder than a "void" or "force field" or "substance" or "God" (in Spinoza's sense) for that matter.

If science tells us how, then φυσις is probably an antiquated and superstitious container of convenience which is probably no longer relevant. If science tells us why, though, then I’m afraid the spectre of φυσις is transformed into what are mysteriously now known as the "Laws of Nature" (not "Natural Laws"), which appear to serve as a kind of “known-unknown” foundation for coherent scientific explanation despite being.. somewhat ad hoc. — Zophie

There's nothing superstitious about it.

As for being antiquated, yes it is -- since it was the word for the sense of being in Greek, it's from antiquity and thus antiquated. But as with most things Greek, this has dominated Western thought ever since.

Here is where I get turned around. First you aver that scientists admit a god of nature as some kind of serious and relevant sentiment that can help us understand modern science (as if it is an operant world-view; as if it contextualizes the entirety of it).... — VagabondSpectre

I never stated anything about a "god of nature."

But you actually are trying to say that modern science must be the same thing that the ancients were engaged in, because there is inquiry involved in both, and because there are some etymological relationships.... — VagabondSpectre

No, because neither you nor I know what "modern science" is. We can't pinpoint when it begins. We can only speculate as to what makes it 'distinct' from any other rational inquiry. So far, its successes in technological advances and some kind of "method" has been offered. I don't find that very convincing.

Yes, the Greeks were doing "science" in any meaningful sense of the term. They conducted experiments, they took careful observations, they theorized about how things worked, etc. Did they have laboratories, microscopes, telescopes, and particle accelerators? No. So obviously things have changed, and in that sense sure, it's very different. But is that what modern science is?

It's just not so simple -- and who really cares, anyway? If Aristarchus wasn't doing "science," then all you've done is defined "science" as "something that happens now." That's fine. I just - again - don't find it convincing.

I think I understand what you're trying to do: you are trying shed light on the inherent epistemological limitations (the doubts) of modern science by showing how it is similar to previous and falliable phases of human inquiry. — VagabondSpectre

I don't see why one would have to shed light on this -- it's a truism. Of course science is fallible. The human mind is fallible-- it has its scope and its limits. I'm not trying to shed light on that -- on the contrary I, along with everyone else, takes it for granted. Not very interesting.

I've been quite clear, I believe, in what I'm trying to accomplish here. If it isn't clear to you, then just ask me -- so you don't have to guess. Not a problem. Because so far your track record is well below 50% accuracy.

Science in its modern incarnation started with an admission of said uncertainty. — VagabondSpectre

When? With Descartes? Was Copernicus not a scientist then? Or, again, what of Aristarchus?

I'm really not interested in trying to define science. Your attempts to do so have been all over the place, but have now apparently settled on "predictions" as the key feature. OK, in that case I'll repeat: the Greeks made predictions too. The most famous, as you know, was that Thales was able to predict an eclipse. Even if that's completely wrong, there's plenty of examples of predictions, of experiments, of observation, of theory formation and theory-testing, etc., among the ancients. Plenty of wrong views, too, and plenty of mistakes -- no doubt.

I have no trouble with saying modern science is different in many respects with whatever the Greeks were doing. As I said before, it's undeniable that many things have changed. But when you look at what's going on, at its core, it seems like what we call "doing science" is actually something that's been with us (as human beings) for a long time indeed.

What does this mean? Take mathematics, for example. The capacity for arithmetic is universal -- any child in any culture can learn it, if taught. But how many thousands of years did it simply lay dormant in the human mind? Or music, for that matter. Music is another universal, and yet it wasn't until very recently that it was standardized in any meaningful way around the time of Guido of Arezzo. Should we say music didn't exist prior to him? Or that "history" didn't exist prior to Herodotus? You could make that argument -- and many do -- but I don't see the motivation or point of doing so. It makes much more sense to say that these are human capacities, as is --- let's call it the "science-forming capacity." Much like language, its been there since humans evolved in their modern form 200K years ago or so.

Again, that's not denying that things have radically changed or even that we haven't progressed (if one accepts the standards of progress).

But your notion that science "progresses" is itself a picture that isn't really justified. In some ways it does, in others it doesn't. But in any case, the best scientists are well aware that theories today will morph and adapt in the future -- that's just basic. It's pure hubris to assume otherwise.
— Xtrix

I can basically defeat this sentiment merely by saying "computers". By what standard has modern science not progressed? — VagabondSpectre

By the same standard that it's "progressed," I suppose. Which is to say: no agreed upon standard. Are computers a progression? Are atomic bombs (especially if they wipe us out -- "progress"?) Maybe, maybe not. In the latter examples, if a goal is stay alive -- then that's a very definite REGRESSION.

To be less ambiguous: "progress" is a value judgment, and a vague one at that. Have things changed a great deal? Absolutely. They continue to change. Someone in Gutenberg's time may have given "moveable type" as an example of progress instead of "computers." Who knows. But this view of "upward" movement is similar to the view of science as "accumulation," as if we're "getting somewhere." I'm not denying that possibility, in fact I think in many respects we have, but this determination depends on our goals, purposes, and human interests.

The entire thread seems to sniff in this direction though... That science isn't so great — VagabondSpectre

I can't help if you take it this way. I've never given the slightest indication that science "isn't so great."

Remember, modern science is cardinally focused on understanding the world through empirical evidence and predictive power, not mere "rationality"; that's what Descartes did. — VagabondSpectre

You say this, and yet a moment earlier talked about "induction." Is logic and reason involved in "science" or not?

I'm not using "rational" the way you're thinking -- apparently as something pertaining to "rationalism" (which is what textbooks of course say Descartes was).

Of course science involves rational inquiry. That's a truism. Nothing complicated about that. The claim that "modern science is cardinally focused..." is so far totally unsupported. Says who? Thought experiments don't count? What about Brahe? Was his careful data collection not science? If it wasn't, then who needs "science" anyway?

Stop trying to demarcate science. It's been tried over centuries by brighter minds than yours, and it's failed. Ignoring the literature on this and grasping for this or that "definition" is simply a waste of time. For every "key component" you mention, I can offer counterexamples. It's not because I'm a genius, it's because defining science by a "method" and thus trying to separate rational inquiry into "science" and "non-science" is a fruitless.

Yes, if one thinks of the "progress" of science as akin to climbing a mountain or filling out a crossword puzzle -- as "accumulation" of some kind. True, that's how the history of science looked for nearly 300 years until Einstein, and I'm sure you'll find many who still think that way. But that doesn't mean we have to take it seriously.
— Xtrix

Einstein did not overturn Newton... Can't stress this enough... — VagabondSpectre

There's no need to "stress it" because I neither said it nor believe it. You simply missed the point -- again.

To repeat: the very fact that Newtonian physics turned out to be "wrong" not in terms of calculation but in the bigger picture led to a remarkable re-evaluation of the history of science. See David Hilbert, et al.

Just what I said. To take one example, quantum mechanics and relativity will doubtlessly in the future be either brought together or re-interpreted somehow, or subsumed under a newer theory. And so on forever, really. Much of all of this has to do with the questions we ask, the problems we face as human beings -- and that in turn is dependent on our values, our goals, our interests, etc.
— Xtrix

You're looking at it backward actually. QM and GR are "in our face" phenomenon that we cannot deny. — VagabondSpectre

That's a completely meaningless statement.

Both are scientific theories. They're not "read off" from nature without any contribution of the thinking mind; there's nothing "backwards" about this.

The next breakthrough will not overturn them, it will encompass them. — VagabondSpectre

Maybe. That's one possibility, as I mentioned above. They could also be completely overturned.

I've been sensing a bit of an attitude from you as well... Curious...

Normally my posts start out pretty dryly, and I end up reciprocating... Curiouser... — VagabondSpectre

Fair enough. If there's any frustration from me, it's only over the fact that this whole conversation is a digression that misses the point of this thread, but I'm (obviously) perfectly willing to have it, since I do mention "science" in the title.

To be quite clear: I don't view "science" as completely separate from philosophy, and as I point out in the first post, it was initially called "natural philosophy." Newton and Galileo didn't consider themselves "scientists." Scientists, then and now, are trying to understand this "nature" (or universe), and so it's worth asking what "nature" means. That's the point here-- and I haven't really gotten started with that question yet. Tracing the history of the concept "nature" in the sense of "universe," or what's considered all that exists, sheds light on both how we see the world and how we define ourselves as human beings. Needless to say, this matters a great deal and has real consequences in the world around us -- and thus the fate of humanity, ultimately.

That may sound grandiose, but think about it for a minute: does it matter what, say, political leaders of the world believe? Well if it influences their decision-making, then it certainly does. And those decisions matter; in fact you and I are living with them.


As far as the philosophy of science: our observation and experimentation with nature -- i.e., dealing with it empirically -- is very important. I'm not disagreeing. Making predictions is very important. Falsifiability is important (as Poppers pointed out). Advances in technology is important. Formulating sensible explanatory theories is important. Etc., etc. All are relevant aspects of a general endeavor to understand the world.

It's true I reject any sense of a "method" that clearly divides "science" from "non-science." People have tried to prove that such a method exists, and many still believe some algorithm or set of rules accounts for science's success -- the inductive method, ability to be falsified, predictiveness, etc. But I remain underwhelmed by these attempts, as there are always examples that simply don't fit --- and feel it's a pretty irrelevant question anyway. What good does it do?

Regardless, people who identify as scientists, who go to school and study physics, chemistry, biology, geology, psychology, or medicine, do important work and operate, in their interchange with the world, within a certain set of beliefs and assumptions -- otherwise there would be no field and no science whatsoever. That set of beliefs, assumptions, and axioms is what interests me here, especially when it comes to ontology: what it means to "be," what it means to be "human," etc. This is all defined in a certain way: for example as matter, as energy, as natural law, as the "physical," as nature, as substance, as "objects," etc. etc. It's there I want to focus:

It turns out that φῠ́σῐς (phusis) is the basis for "physical." So the idea of the physical world and the natural world are ultimately based on Greek and Latin concepts, respectively.

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought. — Xtrix

Maybe.

'Logos' is the Greek, the word, or thought, or idea or reason. — unenlightened

That's one translation, the common one. There is that meaning in ancient Greece, as well. But in Homer, Heraclitus, and others, the word logos is more akin to "collect," or "gather."

Thus logic is the laws of thought - how it works; or of words. — unenlightened

What does the "thus" have to do with? This implies that this sentence follows from the first -- which it doesn't, because you haven't explained anything.

"Logic" is an abbreviation of επιστεμε λογικε, as the "science of logos" -- logos here meaning "assertion." This sense of logos as "assertion" has an interesting story as well.

As if there is a clear demarcation. Philosophers do not teach and teachers do not philosophise. — unenlightened

Of course they do. What's the point?

You're not describing a modern scientific attitude or position though (science accepts that the jury is still out on "all there is"). Asking for some kind of grand definition for everything is not a scientifically coherent question. — VagabondSpectre

No one is asking for a "grand definition of everything." Nor have I said that -- not once.

It's not a very definite worldview.... — VagabondSpectre

It most certainly is, as I have repeatedly explained.

You keep suggesting that modern scientists "conception of being" hinges on the developmental history of science, — VagabondSpectre

I'm not suggesting this. Nor have I stated it -- not once.

So my point is: let's look at the words and see if their history through the ages gives us an clues or illuminates our current, powerful (and dominant, at least among educated people) understanding of being. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. I personally think it does, and helps us become a little less dogmatic and guards against the pitfalls of "scientism" and, more importantly, a kind of nihilism that Nietzsche analyzed and warned us about. Why is this, in turn, important? I've already written enough, so I won't bore you further, but it turns out this has definite real-world consequences which we all are currently living in — Xtrix

but what if someone creates a brand new theory of matter? In order to understand the cutting edge, do we actually need to examine the hilt or the pommel? In the case that modern models deviate entirely from models of old, we don't actually need the models of old to comprehend the new, but we absolutely need to examine the new in and of itself. — VagabondSpectre

I never mentioned anything about old or new models.

Different explanatory theories arise and pass; sometimes they're based on older theories, sometimes a synthesis, sometimes completely novel.

But to answer: No, one doesn't need to understand the history of something in order to practice it. Nor do they even, for that matter, have to understand or explain the theoretical basis for it. You don't have to be a baseball historian or understand the physics of swinging bats to play baseball. I suspect many researchers don't have much of an idea about the philosophical, historical, and theoretical underpinnings of their specific, technical activities either.

That's not a problem really, but it's also no surprise that those who tend to make the biggest contributions are the ones who do bother with philosophy -- Einstein is a prime example, although there are many others.

But all this is, again, a digression that really misses the point.

Perhaps it's true we get less wrong now, but that's not what scientists tend to think
— Xtrix

Of course it's what scientists tend to think. If scientists did not believe they could get less wrong in the future, they would not believe in that science could progress. — VagabondSpectre

But your notion that science "progresses" is itself a picture that isn't really justified. In some ways it does, in others it doesn't. But in any case, the best scientists are well aware that theories today will morph and adapt in the future -- that's just basic. It's pure hubris to assume otherwise.

That being said, to say we get "less wrong now" than in the past is impossible to measure, so there's no sense talking about it. Were Humphry Davy, Faraday, and their contemporaries "less wrong than right" compared to our contemporaries today? Who knows. In fact it's almost certain there are far more hypotheses that aren't confirmed by the data in today's world simply by the sheer amount of what's being undertaken. But who cares? That's not how science is judged. The activity of trying to understand the world rationally continues, regardless.

All scientists believe that we get less wrong now than in the past (or at least, what we got wrong in the past, we get less wrong today). — VagabondSpectre

No, they don't. In fact the statement is borderline incoherent. See above.

Think about this for a second... If science has no progressed since Aristotle, how pathetic does that make modern science and scientists? — VagabondSpectre

Yes, if one thinks of the "progress" of science as akin to climbing a mountain or filling out a crossword puzzle -- as "accumulation" of some kind. True, that's how the history of science looked for nearly 300 years until Einstein, and I'm sure you'll find many who still think that way. But that doesn't mean we have to take it seriously.

hey acknowledge that there is still much we don't know, we're probably on the wrong track, that hundreds of years from now what we know currently will be outdated, etc
— Xtrix

What do you mean "probably on the wrong track"? — VagabondSpectre

Just what I said. To take one example, quantum mechanics and relativity will doubtlessly in the future be either brought together or re-interpreted somehow, or subsumed under a newer theory. And so on forever, really. Much of all of this has to do with the questions we ask, the problems we face as human beings -- and that in turn is dependent on our values, our goals, our interests, etc.

Are you aware of the empirical tracks that science at large is presently mapping? — VagabondSpectre

Depends on what "empirical tracks" are, and what field you're talking about.

You're making an almost purely relativistic comparison. "Science today is not perfect, science yesterday was not perfect, therefore science does not progress, it will always be the same, and what we know now is just as wrong as when we read the portents from sheep guts". — VagabondSpectre

Well needless to say I don't believe any of that, as you know. If you made even a slight effort to understand by taking a few moments to think, instead of reacting, you'd see that fairly easily. In fact your apparent emotional reaction and frustration with all of this is in itself interesting.

I'm not saying that thought experiments have no place in doing science, I'm saying that the crux of modern science (again, why it has been successful) is the demand for actual observable experiments to confirm the prior speculations. — VagabondSpectre

That's fine -- but why only "modern"? That's my point. It's not that we're not very successful, or that observation, experimentation, and predictiveness doesn't exist or isn't important. Of course all of that is very important indeed, and a key feature in the success or failure of achieving our goals. The point is that there is no clear separation between this and anything going on over the last 4,000 years. There are plenty of examples, at any period, of blind alleys and mistakes -- in every field; there's also examples of huge breakthroughs and significant progress. So in ancient Greece, for every Aristarchus there is a Ptolemy. In the 19th century, for every Darwin there is a Lamarck. Then there are many grey areas -- the rethinking of Newtonian physics through Einstein's relativity, as you mentioned.

As long as humans are attempting to understand the world rationally, there will always be mistakes and successes. When we're completely irrational, that's not only no longer "science" but no longer "philosophy" either -- it's just nonsense. But even here, in the case of folk science, myth, superstition, and religion, there's a lot of overlap. Remember that chemistry emerged from alchemy, that astronomy evolved from astrology, etc.

So yes, logic, reasoning, rationality -- attention to details, thought experiments, speculations, theory-creation, testing hypotheses, careful observation, and repeatable experiment are all very important pieces of our attempts to understand the world of nature. No question. Whether we call this activity "natural philosophy" as Newton, Galileo, Descartes, and Kant did, or we call it "science" in the 21st century doesn't rally matter much. The goal is the same: understand the world. This has been true for a long, long time, and there are plenty of historical examples.

The problem your having is in believing that science owes its success to a special method, which we can understand and define, and which scientists can use consciously and deliberately, and that this is a relatively recent invention which sets "science" apart from other endeavors, all of which now become "non-science" or perhaps "quasi-science." But when one starts reading history or even the contemporary era, one finds that this distinction really starts to break down, that it's harder than you think to define, that while there are many examples where it fits there are many others where it doesn't fit, etc.



But my point of this thread wasn't to digress into the definition of science or the scientific method, per se, but rather to assume that people (like yourself) do indeed believe there is a useful and relatively clear demarcation and try to figure out what the historical basis for its ontology is. By "ontology" I mean its perspective on what the world 'is,' about what exists -- about being. When you ask that question, you often find that the answer given is "The universe, or nature as a whole, is all that is." Then when you ask what the "universe" is, you're given answers about matter, motion, and forces -- concepts from physics and chemistry.

Those fields tell us about atoms and molecules, about energy and mass, about causes and effects, and about space and time using (mainly) specialized, technical language, logic, and mathematics -- backed up with empirical evidence from observation and experiments.

And that's where we stand currently. If science interprets "all there is" (being as a whole) as, essentially, "physical nature," then that's a very definite worldview -- a very important ontology. It's opposed, say, by Christian ontology where all that is, all of being, is "creation" and "God."

So my point is: let's look at the words and see if their history through the ages gives us an clues or illuminates our current, powerful (and dominant, at least among educated people) understanding of being. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. I personally think it does, and helps us become a little less dogmatic and guards against the pitfalls of "scientism" and, more importantly, a kind of nihilism that Nietzsche analyzed and warned us about. Why is this, in turn, important? I've already written enough, so I won't bore you further, but it turns out this has definite real-world consequences which we all are currently living in.

If modern science was full of shit, then satellites would fall out of the sky, smart phones would stop working, vaccines would not work, the new Tesla autopilot would crash more often than humans, etc... — VagabondSpectre

I don't think we're full of shit. I don't think the Greeks were full of shit either, though. My point was that there are examples of people getting things very right and getting things very wrong. Perhaps it's true we get less wrong now, but that's not what scientists tend to think -- they acknowledge that there is still much we don't know, we're probably on the wrong track, that hundreds of years from now what we know currently will be outdated, etc. A little humility is required (which is easy when studying history and then projecting, say, 2000 years into the future). I would hate to think people 2000 years from now would look back and only see our flaws and mis-steps and thus label us "primitive" people who were "full of shit." I don't think that's entirely fair.

The whole point is to reduce the bull-shit; that's the scientific shtick. Making a relativistic comparison to ancient bull-shit and saying "oh sure, everything we know now is probably bull shit" is fine, but the evidence is stacked against you. — VagabondSpectre

I agree. I would just take issue with the sweeping claim of "ancient bull-shit," however. Does that include all of Aristotle's work? Does it include Aristarchus and Archimedes and Euclid? Apparently not. So at least we can admit it wasn't all bullshit, just as it isn't all bullshit now (which was the point I was trying to make by giving examples of how we currently have plenty of bullshit too; it wasn't to suggest we're completely full of shit).

This is a ludicrous assertion. He conducted many thought experiments, yes, and he even got stuff wrong, but he was also a champion of observation and the application of maths to those observations. — VagabondSpectre

How could it be otherwise? Of course he was a champion for observation, calculation, and precise reasoning. This has nothing to do with the myths of dropping balls from Pisa or experimenting with a frictionless plane, for example. I find it odd that you declare it a "ludicrous assertion" yet don't provide one example of a Galileo experiment, even in your citing Wikipedia. If he performed one, that's fine -- maybe he did. But the major breakthroughs he made were mainly thought experiments. This is not meant as a criticism of Galileo.

But more importantly, this statement of mine was in response to your claim about experimentation, and so I think you're very much missing the point.

No, we don't. It's just not so simple, otherwise there wouldn't be work in the philosophy of science.
— Xtrix

There's no work in the philosophy of science. It's already a matured school, and scientists at large hardly even use it. — VagabondSpectre

There's plenty of work in the philosophy of science, even today, as you know. There's things published all the time. Whether "scientists at large" (not sure what this means) "use it" (use what, exactly?) is irrelevant: I'm talking about the philosophy of science. That would indicate it's a job for philosophers, not scientists. I realize most scientists regard philosophy with a great deal of contempt, in fact, so it wouldn't surprise me if they don't bother with the philosophy of science at all.

Why didn't the Greeks get anywhere interesting beyond apriori mathematics and some masonry skills? — VagabondSpectre

? Masonry skills? "Apriori mathematics"? What are you talking about? Your history is very confused.

They had some bright people, but the limited information they had - the limited observations they could make - resulted in a worldview that was perforated with bull shit. — VagabondSpectre

So they were just like us, in other words. Plenty of bullshit everywhere -- as many scientists admit freely -- that we're simply not yet aware of.

But we have "some bright people," too.

Archeology is an interesting field, and archeologists readily accept that the inductions they make are more precariously hinged on available evidence (like the ancient Greeks they have much more limitations, but unlike the Greeks they understand this fact and refrain from bullshitting before the evidence arrives. — VagabondSpectre

Oh, is that what the Greeks did? Good to know! In fact I know a lot of archaeologists who do a lot of speculations -- historians too. Why? Because the data isn't there yet. It doesn't stop them from speculation and making educated guesses. Take the "invasion of the Sea Peoples," for example. We don't know what happened between 1200 and 800 BCE, but there is plenty of speculation (and most, we will find, is probably completely wrong) that people in the future will call "bullshit."

And when was that, exactly? When did this notion take hold? The 17th century? 18th? 19th? Are you really so certain it was this notion that drove progress? So what was happening in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance? Or the Islamic Golden Age? Or Ancient Greece? Or even in Mayan astronomy, Babylonian mathematics, and Egyptian engineering? Was all this activity non-science?
— Xtrix

Some of it may have been downright scientific, but if we're talking about the modern body of scientific knowledge, then it all needs to be checked by modern standards. — VagabondSpectre

Modern standards like what?

To argue we are "special" somehow is a very common stance. Every culture does it. So you're in good company. Unfortunately, the historical evidence just doesn't support it.

You're seemingly ignorant of history, I'm afraid. No offense meant. It's just worth digging a little deeper, otherwise we get a kind of tunnel vision where we believe we've reached a pinnacle of human progress.

I don't have the answer to exactly when modern science was developed; — VagabondSpectre

Well ask yourself why. The answer may be interesting.

Science historians often begin the era of modern science with Copernicus or Galileo, which is why I use them as examples, along with Newton -- often acknowledged as one of the greatest scientists. These guys did lots of purely thought experiments, used mathematics (or invented some of their own), were completely wrong about a lot of things, were Christians (in Newton's case, fairly devout), etc. They also didn't identify as "scientists," but as "natural philosophers." So were they not scientists? Were they not doing science? If they were, then so were many of the Greeks, like Aristarchus. If they weren't, then when does "science" really begin? The 19th and 20th century? With Galton, Maxwell, Einstein, Bohr perhaps?

I think you see the issue.

It's like you're objecting to the existence of a discrete contemporary organism by pointing to an evolutionary lineage of predecessors.Yes, science evolved, no, modern science is not constrained by its prototypical origins. — VagabondSpectre

No, there's no "objecting" to it -- I'm trying to understand it, just as I would a "discrete organism" by both understanding its current iteration and its historical evolution. Who said anything about being "constrained"? Are birds "constrained" by the fact that they've evolved from dinosaurs?

When a good empiricist speculates, they do it for practical reasons, and they do not go on to accept the speculation without adequate experimental validation. — VagabondSpectre

In response specifically to the "experimental" part: What about astronomers? Most could not (and still cannot) conduct any direct experiments whatsoever. In fact a great deal has been learned without any experiments at all -- just careful observation and reasoning.

Regardless, yes of course they don't just "accept the speculation." The Greeks didn't do that, the Muslims didn't do it, the Babylonians didn't do it. You keep trivializing these people as "primitive" and "superstitious," but I think that's a big mistake. You've studied history, yes? How can you not be impressed by the astronomy of the Maya or Babylonian astronomy and mathematics? Of course looking back over a distance of millennia makes us view some of the beliefs and practices of these cultures to be barbaric -- but that's quite apart from the obvious achievements.

Yes we get things wrong, but you're fundamentally misunderstanding (or just not perceiving) that the modern science is an observation/experiment/prediction demanding crucible compared to the science of old. — VagabondSpectre

And Archimedes and Aristarchus didn't demand these things? Of course they did. In many cases they even carried out experiments, too. Now it's true that prior to telescopes and microscopes and other technologies, only educated "guesses" and speculations and theorizing were possible -- but we're often in the same position today with many things, like linguistics: we can't conduct the types of experiments on humans that would be necessary for understanding how language develops. Or when it comes to abiogenesis or the reasons for the Bronze Age collapse, or a host of other things. So what? That doesn't make us primitive -- it means we're struggling to understand the world and working on more creative ways to attack a problem or question.

What are your intentions in trying to compare modern scientific standards to ancient ones? They're vastly different. — VagabondSpectre

You keep saying that, and keep failing to show what exactly those standards are and how they differ. When you do -- for example, observation and experimentation and prediction -- it's shown that the ancients were often (not always) doing the same thing. And not just the ancients, but the people of the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance, and in the modern era.

Things certainly change -- theories change, technology changes, etc., but what we've ended up with in our modern concept as an "enterprise" or a "community" of people in labcoats carefully conducting experiments in a laboratory (or some portrayal like that) is a limited and rather narrow view indeed. I'm sure you would agree. So if it isn't that exactly, then why bother pretending that it's a clear-cut, separate "department" from natural philosophy?

Yes, the problem of induction is a thing. "How do we know that just because something has given us predictive power in the past that it will give us predictive power in the future"?... This is not a question that concerns me... — VagabondSpectre

I never once mentioned the problem of induction. Nor does it interest me.

What "science of old" are you referring to, exactly?
— Xtrix

Specifically, pertaining to the method itself, where rigid testability and reproducibility standards do not exist (i.e: where speculation reigns)... — VagabondSpectre

And we're back to the "method" again. It's true that modern science grew up with inductive logic and the "inductive method," especially in the writings of Bacon. But it's been shown over and over again to be a myth. And that's not my view -- that's coming from many creative scientists and philosophers of science. I think they're on to something.

The bottom line is this: "science" as a human activity is a kind of inquiry and questioning of the world, asking basic questions about it in an attempt to understand it somehow. This rational inquiry used to be called "natural philosophy" before even the word "science" (mid-14th century) appeared. This is not to say what we presently mean by "science" is the same as what was meant in the 19th century, or that there's no differences at all between "philosophy" and "science," or that there aren't clear examples of the "scientific method." I think the analogy of an organism is exactly right, say a dog: we know it's different than it was a 100K years ago (a wolf), we know it's evolved, and yet here it is. Like anything in the world, there are aspects that stay the same and aspects that are changed.

The point of this thread is to analyze, in particular, the ontology of science in the sense of studying "nature" or the "physical world," which is what is very often claimed. The question then is "What is nature/what is the physical?" Even if we accept that science is a completely distinct human enterprise, characterized by a special method, which is where we've digressed, we are still in the position of having to explain its ontological basis. Why? Why is this important? Because unexamined conceptions, especially fundamental ones, can lead us down blind alleys for decades without us realizing it. To think of "nature" as matter in motion, or the "physical" as anything "material" (like atoms), etc., has real world consequences for inquiry and research. If we really don't know what these terms mean, can't define them precisely, or define them in such a way as to be absurd, then we're potentially treading water in many pursuits. It doesn't mean we stop everything until we "at last" have discovered the "true" foundations of science, but it also doesn't mean we simply gloss over examining them because it's "highfalutin philosophical mumbo-jumbo."

The origin of both "nature" and "physical" is the Greek term phusis. All of Western thought has been shaped by the Greeks, from the Romans to the Christians, to the Scholastics and Descartes, to Galileo and Newton, to Einstein, Heisenberg and Schrodinger, up to Sagan and Hawking and Dawkins and Greene and Chomsky.

All of them, whether "philosophers" or "mathematicians" or "scientists" or whatever, continue to operate in an ontology that had its inception in Greece -- in the thought of Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus and, later, Plato and Aristotle. These latter two men's influence, especially, is impossible to ignore. To dismiss it all as historical rambling, or to wave off the Greeks as "primitive, superstitious speculators," is pure insanity. In my view.

Imagining the way the world could be, could work, has been, or will be, without conducting a single experiment to validate those imaginations. — VagabondSpectre

Galileo didn't conduct any experiments besides thought experiments. Aristarchus figured out the approximate circumference of the Earth with basic mathematical reasoning. Many of Einstein's ideas were also based in thought experiments.

But we *do* know what science is (it's a body of concepts and models with sufficient experimental predictive power). We even know what it really is (induction via empiricism). — VagabondSpectre

No, we don't. It's just not so simple, otherwise there wouldn't be work in the philosophy of science. The notion of "science," and the notion of a scientific "method," has a very long and interesting history, and sometimes it fits what goes on -- but often times it doesn't. To say that it's just a matter of empirical observation and experimentation does little good -- that's natural philosophy, too. The Greeks were doing that as well. Is archeology not a science because it doesn't have "sufficient experimental predictive power"? What about genetics or evolutionary biology?

You're free to suppose science as continuous and emergent thing, tracing roots through ancient times (and ancient fallacies), but its evolution is much more discretized than that. — VagabondSpectre

Not really -- because we don't know what "it" really is. What's evolving, exactly? If you believe something, some discrete "enterprise" or "activity" has evolved which we label "science," then that's one way to look at it -- but again we're left with "What is science?" Well, if we take a look at the beginning of modern "science," in Copernicus and Galileo, and even in Newton, you'll find lessons that don't fit your current conceptions very well at all. Take Liebniz, even -- was he not a scientist? Was he a philosopher?

Remember, these categories didn't exist to Liebniz, Newton, or even Kant. They certainly didn't matter to Democritus, Archimedes, Aristarchus, or Euclid.

Before the notion experimental validation is how we should test scientific models really took hold, — VagabondSpectre

And when was that, exactly? When did this notion take hold? The 17th century? 18th? 19th? Are you really so certain it was this notion that drove progress? So what was happening in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance? Or the Islamic Golden Age? Or Ancient Greece? Or even in Mayan astronomy, Babylonian mathematics, and Egyptian engineering? Was all this activity non-science?

I have given you a compressed definition of what "nature" means in terms of modern science. Nature is the way things are as revealed by controlled and repeated experimentation and testing (consistent observations and predictions) — VagabondSpectre

The "way things are"? So only the things that "science" tells us are "real" truly "are"?

Importantly, nature is the thing science is attempting to model; — VagabondSpectre

That's fine, but what is it? What is nature? Just "whatever it is science studies"? That's not saying that much, although that seems to be the case. Natural philosophers did that very thing.

it cannot reason from nature or appeal to nature (the naturalistic fallacy). — VagabondSpectre

That's not the naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy, as Moore formulated it, has to do with justifying moral claims on the basis of what's natural.

Speculating about the nature of things (meaning to say, making untested or unstable assumptions) is one of the cardinal differences between a primitive and error prone ontology like Aristotelian teleology (haphazardly assigning qualities, functions, purposes, etc...) and the modern scientific method. — VagabondSpectre

No, this is completely wrong.

"Speculation" about things -- thinking about them, trying to understand them, formulating hypotheses, making guesses, conducting creative thought experiments, etc. -- are simply what human beings have been doing for millennia. They go down many blind alleys, they're often wrong, theories get overturned and adapted, etc. This is true today as well -- we're no doubt wrong about many, many things. The Standard Model, quantum mechanics, mathematics, atomic theory, the Big Bang, not to mention neurology, psychology, and sociology, will go through many changes in the centuries to come. To look back on the Greeks and dismiss them as primitive, along with their "error-prone ontology" (whatever this means), is simply a common mistake. It's one you can make only if you truly believe there's a discernible and clearly-defined boundary between OUR "science" and superstitious speculations of the past.

Again, it's simply not that easy -- and completely unsupported by historical evidence.

The move from philosophical speculation to more strict empiricism is why modern science actually got somewhere. — VagabondSpectre

Eh, this is nonsense I'm afraid, and you know it. Just think about it for a minute. Take an example I gave: Aristarchus. Was he wrong? Was that not science? Was that superstition? Or maybe just "luck"? Was that not "getting anywhere"? What about Democritus's theory of atoms? Was Euclid a superstitious man? Did the Phoenician sailors, using the stars as navigation, get lucky in their calculations? Ditto the Egyptians, with their elaborate constructions of the pyramids, or the Sumerians and their ziggurats?

All these primitive, superstitious people -- without our modern sensibilities and "method" of science -- seemed to "get somewhere," I'd say. In fact they laid the foundations for much of what we currently know.

I don't say this facetiously, it's the very crux of science itself: make no starting assumptions about what something is or the way things are, — VagabondSpectre

Science has no starting assumptions? That's just nonsense. See below.

Predictive power is ultimately the only signal of truth that we have. Comparing this to the sciences of old, much of it is comforting self-delusion and window-dressing derived to fit metaphysical prior assumptions. — VagabondSpectre

What "science of old" are you referring to, exactly? I imagine for every example of views later proven false, like Ptolemy's, you can also produce many from the 19th century that were completely false (miasma theory), or the 18th (corpuscularianism), and on into the contemporary era. There's plenty of self-delusion going on right now, undoubtedly.

But to say science is "assumption"-free is just utter nonsense. Scientists are at least assuming there's nature to be studied (or the cosmos, or the "universe,") and that it follows comprehensible causal patterns. So there are assumptions of intelligibility, predictability, causality, and spatio-temporal relations as well -- before we even set about researching or attempting to understand some aspect or another.

Furthermore, what matters when trying to understand something is questioning, interrogating, and interpreting. You don't start from "nothing" and simply read off reality from nature. There's a contribution of our thinking minds, in how we perceive, categorize, and interpret the world.

We should really start to break down these false and rather simplistic notions like "the scientific method" that distinguishes "science" from "non-science." Better to say that there is, and always have been, human beings who are curious and interested in understanding the world. We do it with creativity, with our language and logic and mathematics, with observing and experimenting, with theorizing, with speculation, with collaboration with others, and with simple trial and error. We make "progress" (which is value and goal-dependent), we create new technologies, we document new findings and build off of them, and on and on.

We can go back and forth between "philosophy" and "science" if we want to define things in a certain way. As Bertrand Russell said once:

"Roughly you'd say, that science is what we know and philosophy is what we don't know. Questions are perpetually crossing over from philosophy into science as knowledge advances. All sorts of questions that used to be labeled philosophy are no longer so labeled." —

That's fine, provided we want to define things this way.

speculating about nature in the field of science and physics is done only to look for insight and clues that can lead to deeper discovery, otherwise they're putting the horse before the cart. — VagabondSpectre

What do you mean by "speculating about nature"?

Science is entirely based on the empirical validity of induction. — VagabondSpectre

Says who?

That is to say, experimental consistency with respect to prediction is the actual driver of scientific knowledge. — VagabondSpectre

You present this as if you've stumbled on the true definition of science. But in reality, it's not at all clear what drives scientific knowledge -- especially if we don't know what science really is.

You seem to be responding to my initial post -- but the rest of what you've written has almost nothing to do with it. I'm interested in the ontology of what's called "science," which seems to me to be bound up with a conception of nature. Thus I track the idea through history, to the Greeks and the word phusis (translated into Latin as natura and the root of "physics") -- which is in my title: φθσισ. The point is to explore this ancient Greek sense of phusis, as this was their word for being, and to see how it differs from our modern conception of being in science ("nature," the "cosmos," etc).

Talking about the inductive method isn't relevant here.

It seems that our understanding of being as presence stems from a certain kind of care. — waarala

Right, in this case a "falling," I suppose, which later gets interpreted over as an aspect (or "ecstasy" of) temporality.

I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth.
— waarala

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean? — Xtrix

I am just trying to understand what H. means (in B&T) with the "authentic existence" and how it relates to History (Geschichte, not historie as science) as H. understands it. — waarala

It's difficult to know what Heidegger means by "authenticity," but from my reading it means something like not only owning your "self" as a unique individual (as opposed to the herd mentality and conformity of the collective "they" of which we are necessarily a part of), but owning and taking responsibility for your own being, in a way -- to see that there's no grounding and that you can decide any way you like what you are, you can define yourself in any way you'd like. You see this all over when people try defining a human being, "human nature," as a "creature of God," as "rational animal," and even further as a "mind" (thinking thing,res cogitans), as a "subject," as a "self" or even "I".

Authenticity is recognizing your being, your very existence, your ontological nature, not simply your ontical nature as present-at-hand "fact," "material," "substance," "energy," or even "spirit" (since the soul is a kind of "substance" -- an entity, a being). To see that first and foremost, you're a being -- you exist (This is a reversal of Descartes, since we're saying here essentially "Sum, ergo cogito" -- and that there's no "right" way to think about, interpret, categorize, or speak about it. Being (including our being) is a kind of "nullity."

In other words, you can interpret and describe "being" (your own and the "outside world" as well -- being in general apart from your particular being) in essentially any way you want, and this groundlessness is anxiety-provoking, but if you "flee" it, "flee into the crowd," into conformity (so to speak), never face up or allow yourself to feel this "existential anxiety," you're inauthentic.

All this implies a value-judgment, but I don't mean it to. There's nothing "bad" about one and "good" about the other -- they're simply different ways of living.

Drama queen, you make me ill. — neonspectraltoast

This has likewise been reported, and will (like your other posts) undoubtedly be deleted by the moderators.

But keep going until you're kicked off the forum, by all means.

No. Feel free to go away and use Twitter.

I've reported your posts -- which should, rightfully, be removed soon. Take care.

"Being" has been Heidegger's main concern right from the beginning. From this one could ask, that is Heidegger interested merely in something static? — waarala

No.

Is he not interested in change or becoming at all? — waarala

He is, yes.

Is he reducing becoming to being? — waarala

No more than we'd reduce "becoming" to a word or a concept -- or any-thing at all. Does becoming have being? Sure. Is that "reduction"?

Already in Being and Time being was interpreted to mean something temporal. — waarala

Not really. If you have a passage you're thinking specifically about, please direct me to it.

Heidegger often says that time, "temporality," is the horizon for any understanding of being. That's a difficult sentence to get your mind around, but since we're essentially caring, temporal beings (human beings), and we have an understanding of being, it is only through temporality that something like "being" can be understood.

Being is not an entity, an object, a process, or a property, remember. Yet every time we use "is," we're operating in a pre-theoretical understanding of being. This is what he analyzes in Being & Time, although he never finished the rest -- as you know.

So it's not that being = temporality, but any understanding we have about being occurs in the context of, or on the basis of ("horizon"), time. Ultimately he will show that in the Western tradition, from the Greeks onward, our understanding of being has taken place by privileging presence -- and so a definite aspect of time: the present.

I think for H. it is a question about some enduring whole amidst the change. That is, if there shall be Dasein and its truth. — waarala

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here. How does the second sentence relate to the first? And what does the second mean?

But the change of being can't be pure becoming (change) or nothingness for us. — waarala

What does "change of being" mean? How can being change? It's not a property or a being (entity).

Yeah, I realized early on this site is full of know-it-all pricks who would rather listen to themselves talk than to give a guy a break. Frankly, I'm not interested in your asinine rebuttal. — neonspectraltoast

What a funny demonstration of hypocrisy. It's funnier that you don't see it, I guess.

Not interested in my reply, yet everyone in this forum is a "know it all prick" who "would rather listen to themselves talk." Hmm...takes one to know one? Apparently.

Next time, try Twitter if you want to utter nonsense.

What we know is that nothing is concrete. Everything is in flux, in motion, changing from one moment to the next. And to me this has more in common with a dream than a concrete physical reality.
— neonspectraltoast

If nothing is concrete, is that statement concrete? — Xtrix

No. It's some kind of paradox. Because of its truth it is made untrue. — neonspectraltoast

So no, that statement isn't "concrete," but yet it's "true." But then because it's true, it's untrue.

To wave your hand and say this is simply a "paradox" is a cop out. I could use the same justification for the opposite claim -- namely, that everything is NOT "in flux" and changing, but is rather always the same, and that this is the only concrete. Why? "It's a paradox."

Normally I'd ignore comments like yours -- as most others do, I find. When it's a thread I've created, I don't take that attitude. I don't like when people jump into these discussions by blurting out whatever comes to their head. This isn't Twitter.

What we know is that nothing is concrete. Everything is in flux, in motion, changing from one moment to the next. And to me this has more in common with a dream than a concrete physical reality. — neonspectraltoast

If nothing is concrete, is that statement concrete?

If we're going to debate anything, we have to use language. That doesn't mean the thing being debated is dependent on language. — Marchesk

You're assuming there's something "out there" independent of our thoughts, words, and interrelations. While that may be the case in a Kantian sense, it makes no difference when discussing anything phenomenal. In that case, there's a contribution of the thinking mind -- always. Anything "beyond" this or "independent" of it we simply can't discuss.

So yes, what's debated is indeed partly dependent on language.

Analyzing the language usage of "social distance" and "flattening the curve" isn't going to tell us how long to continue to doing both, for example. That's a matter for the epidemiology of Covid-19 and health care capacity balanced against economic concerns. — Marchesk

And how do we determine how long? Well, using words -- but how do we determine? By using models and analyzing statistics. Epidemiology and medicine don't have a nomenclature? Is how long we social distance for really independent of words and their meanings? Of course not.

You seem to be framing the problem as if people and phemenoma "suspend" until we find the "right" definition, or something to that effect. That's obviously not the case, and no rational person will argue that, so why create an obvious straw man?

There's an enormous amount of interpretation that goes on, even in looking at the world. Study vision, and you'll see what I mean. So even on a non-verbal level, we're interpreting. Thus, the world does depend on us. Assuming there's something out there, independent of our being, has a long tradition - but as long as we're assuming a subject/object ontology, there's simply no denying that any object and thus any phenomena is a representation to us, is filtered through the brain and, thus, dependent on us in part.

Realism does zero good to resort to, nor have you made any clear arguments in its favor.

My own answer to the above question would simply be happiness.

Happiness here covers a broad variety of emotions and mental states including all sorts of satisfactory, comfortable feelings from peacefulness to orgasms. — hunterkf5732

Sounds like hedonism to me. "Happiness" is something even Aristotle said as the ultimate good (as translated from "eudaimonia"), but he talked about it as excellence of character, as arete, as cultivating virtues. A far cry from Jeremy Bentham and the unfortunate belief that you seem to hold -- but which is quite common in modern times, especially in the West and especially in the United States. Maybe not explicitly, but tacitly -- people are living the answers to the question of "What is the purpose of my life?" and by the looks of it it's exactly as you describe: comfort, sex, distraction, entertainment, material goods, commodities, abundance of food, comfortable furniture and cloths, fancy cars, lots of money, etc.

To me that's a sad state of affairs.

I prefer Aristotle and Nietzsche, actually. Not the "will to live" but the "will to power," and "happiness" is therefore "whatever augments the feeling of power." Note that this does NOT often correspond to pleasure or even the will to live -- people go through much pain in fact.

Purpose is important to think about, and is often dismissed as a philosophical question. But it's one of the more important ones in our times. It also flushes out this underlying view of human nature which is at it's heart quite nihilistic, and very narrow indeed.

To view "happiness" as sitting on a big sofa eating Bonbons and watching a huge HD plasma TV is kind of pathetic, wouldn't you say?

But it wasn't. Their cosmology was wrong. — Marchesk

Wrong to us, yes. But this itself assumes some correspondence theory of truth about something "out there." That itself is the subject/object assumption.

The point is that debating meanings does not resolve debates such as realism/idealism, because the nature of the world does not depend on our language usage. Nor does our ability to know, for that matter. — Marchesk

Our ability to know, and our language use, does not influence the nature of the world? And exactly what is that "nature of the world" outside of our knowing and talking about it? Please enlighten me.

You believe in a correspondence theory of truth, assuming some "thing" is out there, some nature or universe, which we may try to 'read off' and understand but which isn't dependent on us at all. But anything, even that very belief, comes out of the human mind and is therefore bound by interpretation and perspective, which in turn are shaped by our values and beliefs, which likewise are shaped by our social worlds in which we get grow and develop. Maybe it's some "thing in itself" outside of our representations, but in that case you're simply talking about Kant.

unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration.
— Xtrix

It appears like you haven't read any of my posts, because that is just about all I've been doing here, is justifying this claim. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in that instance. But yes, you're right -- that wasn't entirely fair. On the other hand, you've quoted very little -- if anything -- from the texts themselves and thus offered little philologically. Heidegger, on the other hand, provides a great deal -- a sampling of which I have already given.

To make it concrete: you declare "phusis is not the Greek term for being," but offer no real alternative outside of the "being and becoming" dichotomy. You keep saying that "being" is essentially something "changeless," which is a very common interpretation and which constitutes one side of the being/becoming dichotomy -- and this is precisely what I reject.

I've pointed out repeatedly that this is not what phusis means, and you seemed to agree -- but that you equate it more with "becoming." But becoming -- change itself, let's say -- has being. It "exists." This is hard to comprehend ONLY if you equate "being" with "the un-changing, the permanent" -- but then we're at step one, since this is what you do. I've asked multiple times that you try suspending that interpretation so as to better understand where Heidegger and myself are coming from.

You've invoked Parmenides but never quoted him. Heidegger has an entire book on the man, which is enlightening. To give only a cartoon sketch: the goddess truth, aletheia, turns out to be directly related to phusis.

The supernatural or spiritual realm wasn't some separate other plane of existence. It was part of the same cosmos. — Marchesk

Right, in that case it was "consistent with the universe" too.

I'm not interested in substituting discussions of philosophical issues for debating semantics. If that's what philosophy amounted to, then it would be a sub-discipline of linguistics. — Marchesk

Eh that's just nonsense. First of all, linguistics has plenty of overlap with philosophy. Second, it's not a matter of "substitute" -- you cannot discuss or engage in philosophy at all without a semantic component. Ever. So to divide this into "semantics" on the one hand and "philosophical issues" on the other is pretty absurd.

It matters for how we say things and what we mean. It doesn't matter a lick for what is the case. — Marchesk

Yes, it does. "What is the case" itself is completely meaningless otherwise. The very statement, "what is the case," itself has a meaning. In this case, it implies something beyond "merely" debating words and definitions.

No one is saying we should ONLY debate definitions. If this is what you're attributing to me, you're wrong. We don't put all action or investigation on hold until we settle on a definition.

On the other hand, all action and investigation is conducted on the basis of tacit meanings -- otherwise it'd be a matter of pure instinct.

We wouldn't because they don't exist and aren't consistent with our universe, — Marchesk

They don't exist? Do numbers exist? Depends on the meaning of "existence" -- which is a word, with various meanings. Guess that matters.

"Consistent with our universe" is meaningless. Maybe it implies some correspondence idea of knowledge, I don't know.

Regardless, your claim was that words and word usage doesn't matter. That's still completely wrong.

In neither case is it a matter of definition or word usage. It's rather a matter of what kind of world we live in. — Marchesk

That's just not true. If it were so easy as simply being a "matter of what kind of world we live in," then we'd all still believe in Ishtar and Yhw and a geocentric universe. Words, word usage, meanings, etc., play an indispensable role in science AND folk science, as well as average everyday existence. There's no way around it.

This is a good point, but the problems still exist even if you reframe the debate, as you mentioned in parentheses. It doesn't make the fundamental issues with perception, consciousness and language go away. — Marchesk

Sometimes. But in many cases, it simply causes the question or the problem to disappear. Why? Well take consciousness -- the "hard problem." What's the problem, exactly? Someone has to tell us what "consciousness" is. Likewise with "God's existence." Why is that not a "hard problem"? It certainly was for centuries, but that essentially drifted away.

I think the same is true of the mind/body problem, which serves as the underlying assumption to all "problems" and investigations into perception, language, etc.

No, phusis was not the Greek term for being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is. Ousia as well, later on. The evidence doesn't support you on this. I'll stick with Heidegger's extensive scholarship over yours, unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration.

So if Heidegger introduced a concept of Being which is supposed to be equivalent with the Greek concept of phusis, then this Heideggerian concept of Being is not the same as the Greek concept of being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Heidegger didn't introduce anything of the kind, as I've already made clear. What he does do, knowing Greek, is analyze the texts thoroughly, giving convincing evidence.

All you've done, on the other hand, is repeat a dichotomy which he repeatedly says is a mistake and due to poor translation over many centuries. I've given you the sources, quoted extensively, and offered to go into the weeds if necessary; you don't seem particularly interested in that. That's fine. I take partial blame for not being clearer, and appreciate your time.
__________
For the rest of us, let's get back on track:

Phusis is the Greek understanding of being as emerging, abiding sway. Being and becoming, and "being and seeming" come out of this originary sense. Later, "being and thinking."

The basic feature throughout Western thought which has dominated all thinking since the inception has been presence. From this soil we get the changeless Forms, substances, matter, existentia and essence, subjects and objects, God and creation, "nature," physics, metaphysics, etc. All presuppose presence.

Our modern age is a secular and scientific age. We go to scientists for the "truth" now, using their stories rather than myths and legends. But this understanding of being as "nature" or as "subjects and objects," has led both to a peculiar view of what it is to be human and, ultimately, to nihilism.

I'll fill this out more in a future post, with references.

"Phusis" does not mean the same as "being". You're wrong to equate these two. They are completely distinct. So if that is your "entire point", it's wrong. Your quoted passage says that "Being" (it's capitalized, so this is the third sense, the Heideggerian sense) is equivalent to the ancient Greek "phusis". But this sense is not "being" in the ancient Greek sense of "being", it's a new sense created by Heidegger, signified by the capitalization. — Metaphysician Undercover

Phusis was the Greek term for being, yes. This is exactly what Heidegger says, and he's correct. You're hung up on the capitilization, but that's irrelevant. It doesn't signify anything. I only used it, mistakingly, for clarity. It's not a special "Heideggerian" sense at all. Being is often capitalized in translations, yes...but EVERY noun in German is capitalized. There's no reason to capitalize it, and in many translations they don't. So you're simply wrong about that.

As for whether Heidegger is correct in claiming phusis is the Greek understanding of being - well, that's the topic- one may find convincing or not. It convinces me.

I wanted to know in what sense you were talking about "being". Are you discussing what things have in common, "being", existence, like when we say that a thing "is", instead of a fictional thing which is not? In this case "being" is a verb, what a thing is doing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying it's a "verb" isn't quite accurate either, but yes I mean it in the former sense of "is-ness" you mentioned.

You seemed to be switching back and forth between the two — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really, although being can only really be discussed through beings. If you take away all beings, it's not that there is left over "being" as a void of some kind.

Regardless, using your terms of verb vs noun, I've been clear about the distinction between being and beings. Again, this is the ontological distinction.

Instead of giving me a clear answer, you've introduced a third sense of being, a capitalized "Being", which appears specific to Heidegger, but you want to assign it to ancient Greece. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no third term. I mentioned that i capitalized it for clarity only, so you wouldn't take it to mean "permanence" and so not to confuse you. I may have failed but that was the only reason - no third term.

It is not the verb I described above, because you say it is not a property of things, the activity which is proper to things as "being". — Metaphysician Undercover

You're the one defining being as a verb. I never said that. Being is that on the basis of which beings "are" at all. It's not an easy concept to define. Maybe "existence" is better, but even that doesn't quite capture it because of historical connotations.

Instead, you assign to it the mystical description of "emergence", or "emerging sway". The problem though, as I explained to you already, is that these concepts are better associated with the ancient Greek "becoming", rather than "being", — Metaphysician Undercover

But you see that you're begging the question. You're simply starting with the dichotomy of being vs. becoming and trying to fit the data in with this dichotomy. But emerging is phusis, and not simply change and motion. It's the "is-ness" of anything at all, and the fact that it is - whether it changes or moves or is at rest. It's not an action, it's not a property, it's not an entity. When we ask about becoming, we say "becoming 'is' xyz" - we're presupposing being. In this sense "change" has a kind of being as well. Just because it's a verb or an activity doesn't matter. Ditto for whether something is abstract or "not real" like unicorns or imaginary numbers. They all "are."

Greek "becoming", rather than "being", and these two are distinct in ancient Greek conceptualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. This distinction has its origin in ancient Greek thinking, it's true, but it grows out of an originary unity, the Greek notion of being is phusis. Once we get to Plato and Aristotle, the split between being and becoming and "being and seeming" take off. But we're attempting to go back even further, to the milieu in which they grew.

OK, so you want to remove "being" in the sense of the verb, "the 'being' of beings" and replace it with "the 'permanence' of being". That's fine, if it makes more sense to you this way, but the problem is that we are discussing how the ancient Greeks talked about it, and they used what is translated as "being", and Parmenides described this in terms of permanence. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he didn't. That's how you are using it. Permanence and impermenance applies to beings. Parmenides is talking about being. Heraclitus is, likewise, talking about being. Our predominant interpretations and translations of these men are simply wrong. Now this is a big claim to make, and needs to he supported. I'm prepared to do that through the fragments themselves, but it could take a while. For the time being, just briefly suspend incredulity and assume it, at least to fully understand my position.

This I don't understand either. What do you mean by "showed up"? — Metaphysician Undercover

They are present before us, they appear to us, they "are."

Is Wittgenstein relevant here? — TheMadFool

I'm embarrassed to say it, but I've never read Wittgenstein carefully enough to say anything useful about him.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology — Xtrix

Yes, very much so. I wholeheartedly agree! And well said, if I might say so myself. :)

I still don't see how this equates to "First we must define our terms before we do science." I'm discussing the ontology of science in the sense of "nature" -- the study of nature, the "naturalistic stance" that pervades it, etc. That's a very concrete framework, a view about the universe.

To trace the concept of naturalism and thus "nature" historically can tell us something about the philosophical (ontological) basis of our modern science. This is the point of this thread. It's not that science has to suspend while we explore its theoretical evolution, however, and it's not simply a matter of definition. In that case I would simply ask: "What is the definition of science?"

That intellectual virus "First we must define our terms" infects this thread.

This is your point?

In that case I don't see the evidence for it. Neither I nor others have made any such claim, so far as I can tell. Speaking only for myself, "first we must define our terms" completely misses my aim in creating this thread.

You start out by referring to "the being of entities", and that is consistent with the ancient Greek usage of being, which is a verb. The you switch to equate "being" with an entity ("Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing..."), and that is to use "being" as a noun. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the being of entities is phusis, the emerging sway.

That "entities may be seen as changing or not changing" is indeed discussing beings. There is a distinction (which Heidegger calls the "ontological distinction") between Being and beings (I capitalized the former in this case for clarity). Being is the basis on which any particular entity (a being) shows up, but "it" is not an entity. Being is not a property, either.

I can't find where in my statement you think I meant anything like this, but if it came off that way that was not my intention. Being is not an entity or a property. But do all beings "emerge"? Of course, or they wouldn't be beings for us at all. This "emergence" is phusis -- the Greek term for Being.

Hopefully that was clearer.

So we can talk about the being of things, and the becoming of things, but this is not to talk about the same aspect of the things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Translate your sentence this way: "the being of beings and the becoming of beings." You see where the problem is, I think. The equating of "being" as something changeless, as something opposite of "becoming," of all change and motion and flux -- this is the mistake. Better to say "the permanence of beings and the becoming of beings." In that case, I totally agree they're very different aspects.

Substituting "being" for "permanence" and than contrasting it with "becoming" is just a mistake, or at the very least confusing. Why? Because as you say here:

but it is supposed that the thing itself provides some unity, by having both being, and becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "thing" (the being) itself exists, of course -- whether changing or otherwise. It has being. "Becoming" in general has "being."

But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:
— Xtrix

Now you're switching "being" to a noun, talking about "beings", and this is not consistent with the ancient Greek. — Metaphysician Undercover

Beings are nouns, yes. Being, on the other hand, isn't a noun, or a "thing." The being of beings is what we're discussing, in fact. If no-thing emerged or showed up in any way for us, there'd be no question of being at all.

There was this type of thing, and that type of thing, "species", and fundamental elements which all types of things were composed of, but they didn't have an overall concept of "being" which could be used to refer to any different thing as "a being". — Metaphysician Undercover

They did: phusis. That's the entire point.

Heidegger says it better than I:

"What we have said helps us to understand the Greek interpretation of Being that we mentioned at the beginning, in our explication of the term "metaphysics" -- that is, the apprehension of Being as phusis. The later concepts of "nature," we said, must be held at a distance from this: phusis means the emergent self-upraising, the self-unfolding that abides in itself. In this sway, rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originally unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which that which comes to presence essentially unfolds as beings. But this sway first steps forth from concealment -- that is, in Greek, aletheia (unconcealment) happens -- insofar as the sway struggles itself forth as a world. Through world, beings first come to being." —

That is from page 64.

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.
— Xtrix

He says that what is, is, and cannot not be. This means impossible to change, therefore stable. If he said that what is, is possible to not be, then it would refer to instability. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's discussing Being. One may interpret this as opposing being to not-being in the sense of "nothing," and thus arguing that "nothing" is impossible. The argument that any change is impossible is another interpretation, and one I never found very compelling from reading the fragments.

But it is my experience that in way too many Internet philosophical discussions, the request to "define X" is more a challenge intended to divert. Someone is attempting to move away from an argument that has been successful made. — Frank Apisa

All too often ego takes control...and people will do everything possible NOT to concede a valid argument. — Frank Apisa

Yes. That's a good point, and I've noticed it as well. I'm sure I've been guilty of it, in fact. It's especially "useful" to save face when someone else has far more knowledge than you do about a matter, and thus can present far more evidence and reasons for his or her argument. That's what many would accuse Socrates of doing, in fact, and one of the reasons Nietzsche (to name one) comes down pretty hard on him.

We don't simply want to be undermining everything and postponing action -- political or otherwise -- UNTIL we "finally," at long last, discover some ultimate definition or bedrock axiomatic truths. In that case, even geometry wouldn't be possible.

My point was a simple one about discussions on a philosophy forum. In that case, invoking everyday words and their meanings in to the discussion is a mistake, and shows either ignorance or a certain laziness which one would never bring to a physics or biology department.

If you do survey of topics with techinical definitions that differ greatly from their common lexical definitions I feel they'll be about highly abstract matters - far removed from what people are concerned about in their day to day lives. — TheMadFool

Sure. So what? Take, as I mentioned, the example of "energy." I know what people mean when they talk about "having no energy today," or something to that effect. Or when Trump labeled Geb Bush "Low energy Geb" or something like that. In neither case are we using "energy" the way it's used in physics. But is that a problem? All it means is that common sense notions and everyday usage doesn't work in that particular domain of study.

In medicine, it's particularly important to use the right terms -- specificity and detail matter. In mathematics, it's absolutely essential, although this is the most extreme case perhaps.

My point in raising this issue is simply not appealing to common usage when discussing science or philosophy, or simply engaging in a fruitless discussion on "let's define x," without any knowledge of the history of the field in question, its problems, its terms, its theoretical basis, etc. I see a lot of that here.

No, you don't need to find the basis for modern science in order to do science. — Banno

True, no more than you need to find the basis of "sports" to play basketball. What's your point?

"Stupid, lazy millennials" (and not just millennials).

It's difficult to say exactly what happened with Bernie. On the one hand, the DNC consolidated their power in a hail-Mary attempt that ended up succeeding to beat Sanders back, and never supported him from the beginning. Nor did most of the media pundits and op-ed contributors. If they had supported him, rather than playing up "socialism" and convincing voters that he had "no chance" of beating Trump (which wasn't supported by polling), who knows what would have happened.

On the other hand, the voters didn't show up in the numbers we needed. He also didn't win over the African American vote. Remember that although Elizebeth Warren was in the race, even if you counted all of her voters Bernie still only had a plurality in many states.

It's worth keeping in mind, when trying to understand what the hell is happening here, that propaganda and misinformation are everywhere, that many Americans get poor or little education, that most are living paycheck to paycheck regardless of their "class" status, that real wages have stagnated and thus they are deeper in debt than ever before, and that the neoliberal-dominant legal and economic system in which they have grown up has many built-in measures (some accidental, most deliberate) that encourages and magnifies social isolation and division (through media-fueled fear and suspicion of others, "wedge" issues, etc), constant diversion and perpetual work. These phenomena have all been studied systematically, but the evidence for this is everywhere, just look around.

So this is all as much "true" as saying that they're stupid and lazy, which may also be true.

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example.
— Xtrix

Right, this is "being" in the Parmenidean sense. Being is associated with truth, what is, is, and it is impossible for it not to be, and what is not, is not, and it is impossible for it to be. What is, i.e. "being" can be understood as eternal changeless truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well remember what's getting translated as "truth" -- αλεθεια, aletheia. The concept of "truth" has gone through many semantic changes. In fact it says basically the same thing as phusis, as the simple perception of things, as that which shows itself, discloses itself, or in Heidegger "un-conceals" itself. All of this to the Greeks is "true."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.
— Xtrix

I don't see any "original unity". Being in the sense of what emerges is more like Hegel's "being". Are you sure that Heidegger doesn't get his sense of "being" from Hegel? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well it's not really a "sense," it's simply interpreting the texts. Heidegger himself makes very few positive claims about being. Hegel was one of the first to discuss the presocratic thinkers, so perhaps there's some influence in that sense.

But I'm not understanding why you don't see the unity. That which emerges, that which shows itself, which "appears," is the being of entities in the Greek sense. Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing, moving or not moving -- but they all exist, they all "are." To say entities that move or change or "become" do not possess "being" is simply a mistake.

This seems a little confused to me. It appears like you are saying that there is a sense of being which means phusis. There is no "being in the sense of phusis". That is a misrepresentation. However, there may have been a "phusis in the sense of being". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the Greek understanding of being is phusis. When I say "being in the sense of phusis" this means the same: phusis is the word that describes the being of beings. Heidegger says the same, and it's worth going over the reasons for this-- I can't transcribe his entire lecture.

"Phusis in the sense of being" seems to me an attempt to fit things into what you're already expecting, to make "being" something more fundamental as "changeless." But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings:

"Phusis is the emergence can be experienced everywhere: for example, in celestial processes (the rising of the sun), in the surging of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of animals and human beings from the womb. But phusis, the emerging sway, is not synonymous with these processes, which we still today count as part of "nature." This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-iself may not be taken as just one process among others that we observe in beings. Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable." (Intro, p. 15) —

Being relates to phusis, and becoming relates to phusis, as two distinct ways of describing what is referred to by phusis. — Metaphysician Undercover

No: phusis is being itself. You continually come back to separating "being" and becoming" and then want to make phusis 'related' to both -- but rather "being" in the sense you mean (as changeless) and becoming are both aspects of being in the Greek understanding (phusis).

Being always refers to the stable aspect of phusis, — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that's how you're interpreting it -- and you could be completely right, of course. But unfortunately in this case we'll have to get "into the weeds" about it by analyzing Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle.

as described by Parmenides, — Metaphysician Undercover

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however.

Ok buddy. I like Protagoras too. Appreciate the input.