That we can recognise pain behaviour when we see it is not the issue, of course we can. That Wittgenstein acknowledged this is not an insight of his. The issue that concerns metaphysics and on which Wittgenstein seems silent is embedded in Metaphysician Undercover's question: what makes the difference between mock pain behavoiur and real pain behaviour. — jkg20

It's a good thing I only referred to real pain behaviour then, I guess.

Wittgenstein is silent on the issue of real vs. mock pain behaviour at §293 because that's not what he's talking about in that section. However, I understand that you and MU are interested in the question, so I agree that Wittgenstein is inconsiderate for not addressing it there.

Anyway, I only entered this discussion to correct MU's claim that Wittgenstein contradicts himself at §293, which I think I have done. MU won't agree, of course. I was foolish to think that he might actually try and understand Wittgenstein.

Here's that quote I mentioned. It probably won't satisfy radical sceptics, but Wittgenstein discusses pain and pain-behaviour throughout the late 200s/early 300s of Philosophical Investigations if you're interested:

303. “I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am.” — Yes: one can resolve to say “I believe he is in pain” instead of “He is in pain”. But that’s all. —– What looks like an explanation here, or like a statement about a mental process, in truth just exchanges one way of talking for another which, while we are doing philosophy, seems to us the more apt.
Just try — in a real case — to doubt someone else’s fear or pain! — Wittgenstein

But, since there is a real, known difference between honestly expressing one's feelings, and deceptively expressing one's feelings, your conclusion has already been refuted. If there was no intermediary between one's pain, and one's expression of pain (pain behaviour) such deception would be impossible. If the intermediary was only added in the cases of deception, for the purpose of deceiving, it would be evident, the person would not be showing the beetle, creating a veil in between, when other times the person would be showing the beetle and there would be no veil. Therefore deception would be impossible.

I still do not see the impossibility you are talking about, although it might be there somewhere. Let's change the example. A fake Picasso and a genuine Picasso can both have exactly the same appearance. Nevertheless, a fake Picasso and a genuine Picasso are distinct things. Sure, both Picasso and the faker need the same materials in order to accomplish their goals. However, Picasso's goal is not to produce a genuine Picasso, he could hardly fail to do that after all. He is also not attempting to produce a representation of a genuine Picasso. The faker's goal, however, is precisely to do the latter. With genuine Picasso everything is there on the surface, so to speak. With a fake Picasso the story is much more complicated. In many cases, deception requires a lot more work than sincerity, although of course it can sometimes be hard to be honest as well.

The obvious rejoinder to this is dreams. Our own dreams are the equivalent to a beetle in a box as nobody else can experience a dream we have. And yet we can easily communicate dreams we remember to other people.

So how does that work? People do legitimately dream and they do legitimately talk and write about dreams remembered. We can't check their accuracy. But we can certainly understand what is being related, more or less. — Marchesk

Your "obvious rejoinder" could be any subjective sensation, but I think it misses the point of Wittgenstein's example. It is not about an inability to communicate regarding dreams or sensations. As I quoted earlier, the target of Wittgenstein's beetle example is the view that each of us "knows what 'pain' means only from one's own case, for it seems that it is the sensation one has that gives the word its meaning".

If I were to tell you that I had an amazing dream while driving to work the other day, you might think I must be talking about a day dream. If I were to insist that I was not day dreaming but really dreaming, then you would have to question whether I was using the word correctly and actually knew what a dream was.

This (hastily drawn) example is intended to show that we do not know the meaning of the word 'dream' only from our own case, nor is it the sensation of dreaming one has that gives the word its meaning. Otherwise, why should you not accept my story?

To repeat the dilemma I quoted earlier: "If what is in the box is relevant to the meaning of 'beetle' then no one else can understand what I mean by 'beetle'; and if 'beetle' is understood by others, it cannot signify what is in each person's private box."

If I understand Wittgenstein correctly (and I might not), then it is not the subjective experience of dreaming that determines the meaning of the word. Obviously, we are all taught how to use language, including words such as 'pain', 'dream', and 'remember', by others who cannot access one's private sensations. This all relates to Wittgenstein's remarks on the misguided notion of a private language.

296. “Right; but there is a Something there all the same, which accompanies my cry of pain! And it is on account of this that I utter it. And this Something is what is important — and frightful.” — Only to whom are we telling this? And on what occasion?

298. The very fact that we’d so much like to say “This is the important thing” — while we point for ourselves to the sensation — is enough to show how much we are inclined to say something which is not informative. — Wittgenstein

If I understand Wittgenstein correctly (and I might not), then it is not the subjective experience of dreaming that determines the meaning of the word.

To be cautious as W exegesis, I think you would need to add the qualifier "just" between the "not" and "the subjective experience". Some people read W as denying outright that the inner has any role to play at all in determining the meaning of words, which I do not think he does. What I think he does is challenge the idea that "inner" here means "necessarily private and unknowable to others". Anyway, that's my interpretation, which might be wrong of course.

To be cautious as W exegesis, I think you would need to add the qualifier "just" between the "not" and "the subjective experience". Some people read W as denying outright that the inner has any role to play at all in determining the meaning of words, which I do not think he does. What I think he does is challenge the idea that "inner" here means "necessarily private and unknowable to others". Anyway, that's my interpretation, which might be wrong of course. — jkg20

That's an interesting take, but how do you reconcile it with the closing line of §293: "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant"?

Well, I guess I have to construe it as the first premise in a modus tollens argument, the second premise being that the object is not irrelevant.

And therefore, we do not construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name'? Seems convoluted. I don't follow how this reconciles with your reading that Wittgenstein challenges a private "inner".

Anyway, I only entered this discussion to correct MU's claim that Wittgenstein contradicts himself at §293, which I think I have done. MU won't agree, of course. I was foolish to think that he might actually try and understand Wittgenstein. — Luke

I didn't say Wittgenstein contradicts himself, he's very careful not to do that. However he invites you to make an interpretation which requires contradiction by using two univocally distinct, and incompatible by way of contradiction, definitions of "beetle".

I argued that jAmEs' and your interpretation requires that Wittgenstein contradicted himself, therefore they are faulty interpretations. The second described use of "beetle" in the analogy, in which there might be nothing in the box, is a completely different and contradictory set of circumstances from the first described use, in which there is necessarily something in the box. There is a clean break between the two described language-games. If you interpret that the second described use is somehow related to the first described use, as you continue to, you imply that Wittgenstein contradicted himself.

Therefore if Wittgenstein did not contradict himself, you have a faulty interpretation, because you continue to relate the two senses of "beetle" in your faulty interpretation. It is only in the second definition of "beetle" that what is in the box is irrelevant. In the first sense of "beetle", what is in the box is very relevant.

I still do not see the impossibility you are talking about, although it might be there somewhere. Let's change the example. A fake Picasso and a genuine Picasso can both have exactly the same appearance. Nevertheless, a fake Picasso and a genuine Picasso are distinct things. Sure, both Picasso and the faker need the same materials in order to accomplish their goals. However, Picasso's goal is not to produce a genuine Picasso, he could hardly fail to do that after all. He is also not attempting to produce a representation of a genuine Picasso. The faker's goal, however, is precisely to do both of those things. With genuine Picasso everything is there on the surface, so to speak. With a fake Picasso the story is much more complicated. In many cases, deception requires a lot more work than sincerity, although of course it can sometimes be hard to be honest as well. — jkg20

This example might not be so good, because what you question is the need to assume an intermediary between the internal feeling of pain (beetle), and the observable act. The intermediary, which allows for the existence of deception is an activity which lies unobservable between the observable behaviour and the internal intention, veiling the intention. The existence of unobservable activity, and its role as the intermediary between the internal "beetle", and the outward observable action, is what allows for the occurrence of deception. Therefore the observer never has a clear, unobstructed view of the internal feeling, because one is always looking through the veil of unobservable activity. The important concept here is unobservable activity.

Would you agree that there is never a direct and necessary cause/effect relation between the internal feeling, and the outward action, such that we could look at action Y and say it was directly caused by feeling X? There is internal, unobservable activity between these two. And this is why we cannot say that we observe directly the inner feeling, or even deduce the inner feeling from the outer act. Consider a reflexologist who taps the knee with a hammer. The fact that this medical specialist can make determinations about one's neurological system, from this act, indicates that there is not a direct cause/effect relation between the hammer tapping, and the physical response. There is unobserved activity in the neurological system which lies between. In this case, the neurological medium is at the unconscious level, but we are talking about activity at the conscious level. From the perspective of the consciousness and self-reflection, the neurological medium between the outward act, and the internal feeling, appears to us as intention instead.

So consider your example. We are concerned with human activity, and distinguishing the genuine from the insincere. In the example, we have two finished products, two distinct paintings. The actions themselves, of the people doing the painting, is unobservable. This action is the intermediary, and if we could observe it, we would see how different the two actions actually are, we'd see that the forger is copying certain techniques. In the case of language, we have words as the finished product. The genuine and the insincere might appear as exactly the same words, especially in the written form where we cannot see the person's mannerisms ( and the proverbial "lying eyes"). However, if we could see the activity which is the thinking responsible for choosing the words, we'd see the difference. This activity, the thinking is the intermediary, unobservable activity.

Now we can proceed to observable activity itself, behaviour, of which speaking words is a type. So speaking words can be our example of behavioural activity. We can understand that the thinking activity by which a person chooses words, is in some way directed by intention. And it is the intention itself which is judged as either genuine or insincere. The unobservable activity of thinking is between the observable activity, and the intention, making the intention inaccessible through cause/effect analysis of the observable activity.

Sorry, to be clear, how I would like to interpret W is that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant" is true for him precisely and only if the object is considered to be necessarily private, so as per his analogy in the case where the beetle cannot be shown. Where the beetle can be shown, is a case he says nothing about, because it is not, as you point out, his target at all.

The intermediary, which allows for the existence of deception is an activity which lies unobservable between the observable behaviour and the internal intention, veiling the intention.

I might have misunderstood you then. I was under the impression that your view was that pain behaviour is the intermediary in cases of both genuine and fake pain. Now though you seem to be suggesting that the intermediary is also hidden. I'm not sure I understand that, but it might just be lack of imagination on my part.

Sorry, to be clear, how I would like to interpret W is that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant" is true for him precisely and only if the object is considered to be necessarily private, so as per his analogy in the case where the beetle cannot be shown. — jkg20

This might be Wittgenstein's position, and it might appear to be true logically, because if the object is necessarily private, it cannot be observed, and therefore one might say that it ought not be considered. But that would be faulty logic. Being private, and unobservable does not necessitate that the object cannot be relevant, and cannot be known. We can consider a private cause with only an observable effect, as a relevant cause, and that cause as potentially knowable through understanding the effect.

I might have misunderstood you then. I was under the impression that your view was that pain behaviour is the intermediary in cases of both genuine and fake pain. Now though you seem to be suggesting that the intermediary is also hidden. I'm not sure I understand that, but it might just be lack of imagination on my part. — jkg20

I was saying that there is necessarily an intermediary, in order that deception is possible. The intermediary disallows us from saying that the beetle could be shown, because we can't see past the intermediary. The intermediary, like a blind, could be partially seen and partially hidden. We see one side of the blind, but not the other side. So if we look at "pain behaviour", we see some of that behaviour, what is exposed to us, but not all of it because the other side is not exposed. We do not see the internal neurological activity and the thinking, but we hear the noises and see other actions. The internal thing, which we might say "causes" the observable activity is the unobservable side of the blind. It is a part of the behaviour, but an unobservable part. You might assume a direct causal relation between the pain and the behaviour, and therefore believe that the behaviour is a direct indicator of the pain, but deception demonstrates that this is incorrect, because intention plays a causal role in the behaviour as well. Therefore we cannot accept that the behaviour provides a direct indication of the feeling, because we haven't accounted for the influence of intention.

If I understand Wittgenstein correctly (and I might not), then it is not the subjective experience of dreaming that determines the meaning of the word. Obviously, we are all taught how to use language, including words such as 'pain', 'dream', and 'remember', by others who cannot access one's private sensations. This all relates to Wittgenstein's remarks on the misguided notion of a private language. — Luke

But It has to play a role because we talk about our subjective experiences. It would be absurd to relate my dream to you if my dream played no role in the language game, because then what the hell would I be talking about and how could you understand it?

But maybe I misunderstand the private language argument.

In neither case is it a matter of definition or word usage. It's rather a matter of what kind of world we live in. — Marchesk

That's just not true. If it were so easy as simply being a "matter of what kind of world we live in," then we'd all still believe in Ishtar and Yhw and a geocentric universe. Words, word usage, meanings, etc., play an indispensable role in science AND folk science, as well as average everyday existence. There's no way around it.

That's just not true. If it were so easy as simply being a "matter of what kind of world we live in," then we'd all still believe in Ishtar and Yhw and a geocentric universe. — Xtrix

We wouldn't because they don't exist and aren't consistent with our universe, but the kind of world we live in is no simple matter to figure out. That's why we had those crazy beliefs, and it's why philosophy kind of started with skepticism.

We wouldn't because they don't exist and aren't consistent with our universe, — Marchesk

They don't exist? Do numbers exist? Depends on the meaning of "existence" -- which is a word, with various meanings. Guess that matters.

"Consistent with our universe" is meaningless. Maybe it implies some correspondence idea of knowledge, I don't know.

Regardless, your claim was that words and word usage doesn't matter. That's still completely wrong.

Where the beetle can be shown, is a case he says nothing about, because it is not, as you point out, his target at all. — jkg20

Could you explain how the beetle can be shown? I understand it to represent the subjective aspect of a sensation, or in philosophical jargon: qualia. This is what sections 296 and 298 that I quoted earlier appear to indicate; e.g. the 'something' that "accompanies my cry of pain" (which is "important" and "frightful").

Nice.

Could you explain how the beetle can be shown?

There lies the rub. To be honest, I am not certain that this interpretation of W is correct, nor that the ideas I am trying to force on him do so either. I am trying to see if there is room for both the general Wittgensteinian position that "nothing is hidden, everything is on the surface" on the one had, and the idea that pain behaviour and mock pain behaviour are distinct things. If they are distinct, then it is fairly natural to think that the difference lies in what the actors are feeling, but if everything is on the surface, then so is what they are feeling. In the end, it may not be a tenable position, but I have yet to see an out and out contradiction in it.

They don't exist? Do numbers exist? Depends on the meaning of "existence" -- which is a word, with various meanings. Guess that matters. — Xtrix

I'm not interested in substituting discussions of philosophical issues for debating semantics. If that's what philosophy amounted to, then it would be a sub-discipline of linguistics.

Sure, if we're going to debate the existence of numbers, it's helpful to state what that means and what's being argued. But to insist that the debate is over the definition of existence, numbers or math is to misunderstand the argument.

Regardless, your claim was that words and word usage doesn't matter. That's still completely wrong.. — Xtrix

It matters for how we say things and what we mean. It doesn't matter a lick for what is the case.

"Consistent with our universe" is meaningless. Maybe it implies some correspondence idea of knowledge, I don't know. — Xtrix

It is meaningful when you take into account the cosmology of the ancients who believed in those deities compared to cosmology today. Yahweh literally sat on a throne positioned above the visible stars, which were angels. Heaven was located in outer space. The earth had corners and the sky was held up by pillars, with a firmament that separated the water above from the Earth below. Hell, or Sheol, was a literal cavern in the ground where the dead went to wait.

The supernatural or spiritual realm wasn't some separate other plane of existence. It was part of the same cosmos.

That the beetle cannot be shown is the condition laid out in the premise, which makes the two uses of "beetle" completely separate, distinct, and incompatible with each other. If what I call "beetle" can never be corroborated with what you or anyone else calls "beetle", because we cannot see inside another's box, yet we still use a sense of "beetle" which is meaningful to us, then the two senses of "beetle" must be completely distinct and incompatible. If we could see inside each other's boxes, we could attribute that meaningful sense of "beetle" to the similarities of the thing

Luke's mistake is to dismiss the first sense of "beetle" as an invalid sense, through the devised loophole of finding similarity in "contents of the box" rather than within the thing in the box as stipulated by Wittgenstein. So the second sense of "beetle" is still related indirectly to the thing in the box by referring to the box instead of the thing. This loophole interpretation is the one which creates the contradiction between 'there is something in the box' and 'there might be nothing in the box'. This is the mistaken interpretation of those who believe that Wittgenstein demonstrated the impossibility of private language.

Wittgenstein's mistake is that he did not turn inward in self-reflection to understand the inner aspects of the human mind, in order to understand that not even the owner of the box can see the beetle. This would have revealed to him, the aspect of language which no one has the capacity to understand, that part of language which refers to the private. Instead, he presents the internal as accessible to the individual, one's own beetle can be seen by that individual, which is a false premise. And this is what is clearly lacking in Wittgenstein's analysis of language. He appears incognizant of the fact that language can be used to refer to the unknown, so he does not ever get to the point of presenting language in its natural form, instead he presents it as being constrained by knowledge.

the aspect of language which no one has the capacity to understand,that part of language which refers to the private.

This seems really odd. It sounds like you are suggesting there could be words and phrases in a language that cannot be understood by anyone. Perhaps I am biased, but wouldn't a word or phrase at least have to be understandable by someone to count as part of a language? I am unsure that I am right about W, but I am even less sure that you are.

It matters for how we say things and what we mean. It doesn't matter a lick for what is the case.

Whether you are a realist or an idealist, certainly it, i.e. word usage, matters a lick for our capacity to find out, understand and express what is the case. That alone makes examining how words are used a useful activity for philosophers to engage in.

Not sure what I wrote to prompt it, but compliments are always welcome :wink:

Part of the joy of life is the attempt to verbalize our thoughts in such a way that others can see the deeper meaning of our words. There is security in knowing it will never be so. What is yours is yours and mine, mine.

The joy is in the proof that other individuals exist, and we celebrate those who prove, through poetry, that we have our own. We are all valuable.

I'm not interested in substituting discussions of philosophical issues for debating semantics. If that's what philosophy amounted to, then it would be a sub-discipline of linguistics. — Marchesk

Eh that's just nonsense. First of all, linguistics has plenty of overlap with philosophy. Second, it's not a matter of "substitute" -- you cannot discuss or engage in philosophy at all without a semantic component. Ever. So to divide this into "semantics" on the one hand and "philosophical issues" on the other is pretty absurd.

It matters for how we say things and what we mean. It doesn't matter a lick for what is the case. — Marchesk

Yes, it does. "What is the case" itself is completely meaningless otherwise. The very statement, "what is the case," itself has a meaning. In this case, it implies something beyond "merely" debating words and definitions.

No one is saying we should ONLY debate definitions. If this is what you're attributing to me, you're wrong. We don't put all action or investigation on hold until we settle on a definition.

On the other hand, all action and investigation is conducted on the basis of tacit meanings -- otherwise it'd be a matter of pure instinct.

The supernatural or spiritual realm wasn't some separate other plane of existence. It was part of the same cosmos. — Marchesk

Right, in that case it was "consistent with the universe" too.

This seems really odd. It sounds like you are suggesting there could be words and phrases in a language that cannot be understood by anyone. — jkg20

I'm saying that there is part of language which cannot be understood. In other words it is impossible for anyone to completely understand the thing which we call "language". You might extend this also to imply that any particular instance of usage cannot be understood with absolute clarity and certainty. There is no absolutely correct, ideal meaning of a word or phrase. This is due to "the beetle in the box" being unknowable, even to the one holding the box. So if for example meaning is what is meant by the speaker of the word or phrase, even the speaker is not absolutely certain of what is meant. And if meaning is attributed to use, not even the speaker is absolutely certain of the purpose of the word or phrase.

I am unsure that I am right about W, but I am even less sure that you are. — jkg20

This is not W's position, it is mine, and it's where I think W went wrong. W described the person holding the box as being able to see the beetle, I describe the person as incapable of apprehending the beetle. My perspective resolves the incompatibility between having the meaning of "beetle" based in what's in the box, and having the meaning of "beetle" based in how people use the word. We can use "beetle" to refer to what's in the box, without knowing what's in the box. W did not entertain this possibility because he started in the Tractatus with the assumption that a word always had to refer to something, to have meaning. When he later realized that this wasn't true, in the PI he introduced the idea of "use" to understand meaning, meaning is derived from use. Those are the two, very distinct, sources of meaning described in the beetle in the box analogy. What Wittgenstein doesn't proceed to consider as a possibility, is the instances when a word is used to refer to an unknown thing. There's something (a beetle) in the box but it's not known what it is. In reality, the unknown plays a very important role in meaning, it makes an appearance to some degree in all usage. But it's difficult for most people to relate to unknown meaning.

There lies the rub. To be honest, I am not certain that this interpretation of W is correct, nor that the ideas I am trying to force on him do so either. I am trying to see if there is room for both the general Wittgensteinian position that "nothing is hidden, everything is on the surface" on the one had, and the idea that pain behaviour and mock pain behaviour are distinct things. If they are distinct, then it is fairly natural to think that the difference lies in what the actors are feeling, but if everything is on the surface, then so is what they are feeling. In the end, it may not be a tenable position, but I have yet to see an out and out contradiction in it. — jkg20

This certainly made me re-think my position.

One way of looking at it is to re-visit what Wittgenstein says at §304. He admits that there is a difference between real and mock pain behaviour. ("What greater difference could there be?") Regarding the sensation itself, he affirms that it is not a Nothing; "only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said". The private sensation is real, but nothing can be said about it; nothing further about it can be described or discussed in our public language. I think the same issue arises in more recent philosophical discussions such as 'Mary's Room' and the like.

Regarding your example, you are correct that "the difference lies in what the actors are feeling", since the distinction is between pain behaviour with pain and pain behaviour without pain. The difference is, obviously, the pain (having it or not having it). What is hidden, if anything, is what pain feels like for me, compared to what it feels like for you. Is it the same? We can't talk about it, so who knows? It won't affect the meaning or use of the word 'pain' anyway. Regardless of what it feels like internally for each of us, reactions to pain, or pain behaviours, tend to appear similar across genuine cases, which may help to explain why someone can pretend to be in pain. This public exhibition also seems the more likely determinant of the meaning/use of the word 'pain'.

That alone makes examining how words are used a useful activity for philosophers to engage in. — jkg20

I haven't seen that it's been very successful in resolving philosophical issues.