Reread the following: here. You're boring me.

how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?
— Xtrix

You are just bringing up a cryptic word and thinking it's going to get somewhere in a conversation. — Gregory

You're not answering the question.

I'm not interested in your opinion about this thread's topic, of which you've contributed nothing. There's nothing "cryptic" about the word phusis, by the way. And if there is, you wouldn't even know it because you understand absolutely nothing about it.

Concepts are what count. — Gregory

Phusis is a concept, a very concrete one. It's also the topic of this thread. If you know nothing of ancient Greek thought or the Greek language, or don't find it compelling, feel free to utter off-topic, incoherent nonsense like "concepts are what count" and "Kant enjoyed doing it" somewhere else. In fact, I urge you to.

We have no sure knowledge of what ancient texts mean. — Gregory

Another silly statement. We have no sure knowledge about any historical event, either. Is history therefore not worth pursuing?

It's very easy to utter complete nonsense and posture as a "philosopher." But there are people out there doing real work and making real progress while you engage in your mental masturbation. Please leave the real work to them.

I have no interest in your ramblings.

Who exactly are you responding to? If no one, what are you talking about?

There are also many spiritualities. Look at the Car's Jr. star and try to imagine it NOT having a smiling face. This is what Kant did for the world, and he enjoyed it. — Gregory

And he "enjoyed" it? What does that mean? And what, exactly, are you claiming he "did for the world?" And, further, how does ANY of this relate to phusis or anything anyone on here is talking about?

Yes, this is what I was saying, something is being interpreted, and this is what you have named "phusis". As I explained there are two distinct descriptions of this thing, one under the terms of "being", the other under the terms of "becoming". If these two distinct descriptions were consistent with each other, like "half empty" and "half full" are consistent with each other, there would be no problem. But Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that these two descriptions are not consistent with each other. Whatever it is which is described as "being" cannot be the same thing which is described as "becoming". So, Aristotle proposed that this one thing, "phusis", has two distinct aspects which he called matter and form, to account for these two distinct descriptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example. In that case, yes of course that's radically different from something that perpetually changes. That's one way to define "being."

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis.

"Becoming" has as much "being" as form or Idea, in this sense.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes.
— Xtrix

Right, these are the two distinct aspects. Stability relates to being, and instability relates to becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, they both relate to being in the sense of phusis mentioned above. They're both aspects of this. Phusis -- the Greek understanding of being -- is not only "stability" or "changeless Form." If that were the case, the only entities that "are," or that "have" being, are those that don't change. But that's absurd: a river "is" just as much as a triangle, matter, or universal concept "is."

Phenomena seem to change and some seem to stay the same way. This relation between the permanent and impermanent is an ancient distinction. But to ascribe "being" only to the former is a mistake, and quite different from the Greek concept of being in phusis. This is Heidegger's point and the point I'm attempting to make here.

you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself
— Xtrix
Skimmed over your post, and you got this right! Only, the universe is not a thing. — BraydenS

Lol. Ok bud, whatever you say. :) Enjoy talking about something that doesn't exist with someone else. It's too riveting for me.

Having contradictory interpretations is not the same as "half-empty"/ "half-full", as these two are not contradictory. Do you see the difference, between interpretations which are different, yet consistent with each other, and interpretations which contradict each other? It is the latter which I see as a problem, the former is not a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I see the difference. The analogy was flawed, of course. The point remains: something is being interpreted. We all agree. I'm not denying that there are conflicting interpretations -- in fact the history of how these interpretations evolved is the point of this discussion, in part.

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.
— Xtrix

I don't see where this comes from, nor what you mean by it. Can you explain? What do you mean by restricting being? — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, it does need explanation. The "restriction of being" I was referring to was Heidegger's chapter of the same name in Introduction to Metaphysics, in which he discusses the four ways Being as been contrasted with an "Other." Becoming, seeming, thinking, and the ought -- these are the four.

Being and becoming, along with "being and seeming," are the most ancient. He discusses how they became disjoined, and how the disjunction sprung from an essential unity. That unity is phusis.

Things that manifest, that emerge, that "grow," come to take two on different aspects -- that which persists in stability and that which is unstable, which arises and perishes. This relates also with that which "appears" as a "seeming" -- a semblance, which eventually hardens into a "mere seeming" in the sense of Plato, who then contrasts this with the Idea.

I'm simplifying greatly, of course. There's a lot of evidence supporting this which we can discuss further, but in general this is what I meant by restriction of being. You may find it compelling or not, but it's worth exploring.

They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.
— Xtrix

What about your thesis that all philosophy is saying the same thing? How can any philosophers disagree? — Metaphysician Undercover

They can disagree in all kinds of ways. I'm not denying that. True thinkers think being. There are many ways of interpreting and talking about it.

I am talking about the idea of everything, not everything. — BraydenS

This assumes there's a difference, which is not obvious. But let's say there is. In that case, nature is everything as well. Everything within nature is substance. There, I just defined it into existence. I guess that settles it?

An idea of everything is itself natural, that is, within the universe, that is, limited. That is why you cannot talk about the universe/everything. — BraydenS

If we can't talk about "it," and only the "idea" of "it," then you're essentially equating the "universe" with Kant's thing-in-itself, which isn't compelling at all. We can argue the same way about "God," too.

This is exactly why armchair philosophy and throwing around definitions without context is a waste of time. It proves nothing, it's not interesting, it doesn't further the conversation along -- we can't disprove it, we can't study it -- who cares?

Quite apart from the fact that this has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.

But a definition isn't something you find. It's something you create. — BraydenS

Yes, you create a definition in the context of a wider explanatory theory, which you don't have. What you don't do is walk into a physics department and declare what "energy" means to you based on your extensive armchair contemplations. Likewise with philosophy. If you care to give evidence or reasons, or demonstrate any knowledge of the questions and controversies within the philosophy of science, you're welcome to. In the meantime, we can "define" things out in space all we want -- so what?

You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.
— Xtrix

I believe exactly the opposite. Not declaring a definition accomplishes nothing. Declaring a definition accomplishes something. — BraydenS

No, it doesn't. Simply defining something for yourself may be fun, but it "accomplishes" exactly as much as saying nothing at all. Defining something with reason and evidence within a wider theory, sure. That's in fact what they do in science. But all of that extra work hasn't been done in this case, thus accomplishing nothing.

If you view making up a definition for yourself as an accomplishment, you're welcome.

I have settled something, I have settled some defintion, my definition, of a word. — BraydenS

Fine -- which is completely useless to a conversation with other human beings. Better to go talk to yourself in that case, because otherwise it's settled exactly nothing.

I have no doubt it appears like nonsense to those who look for definitions endlessly outside of themselves, — BraydenS

"Outside of themselves" is meaningless. Definitions don't float around in space somewhere to be found, nor is anyone saying this.

And it is nonsense. As I've noted before, spin doesn't work here -- you either know Greek or not, for example. Stopped being a sciolist.

believe the idea of everything is the same as everything — BraydenS

And yet you've still not shown the difference. Something completely unknown, which cannot be sensed or talked about in any way, which you claim the universe to be (but not the "idea" of it), is a useless concept. I suppose the "idea" of a cup can be talked about, yet the cup "outside our idea" is completely unknowable? That's Kant. That's nothing new. Why you invoke this for differentiating "universe" and "nature" is strange indeed.

who belittles on impact from anger (which always springs from some weakness), — BraydenS

Who's belittling? And who's angry?

Besides, anger does not always spring from weakness. But your welcome to keep declaring broad, vague, unsupported statements.

who thinks things are "interesting for their own sake" (and not for some power) — BraydenS

Got me there, I suppose. I do find things interesting for their own sake, yes. There's obviously a degree of pleasure and perhaps "power" involved -- but it need not be "useful." Playing music, thinking, etc.

who gets on his high horse while talking about the "philosophy of science", — BraydenS

I pointed out that there is such a thing as the philosophy of science. This puts me on a "high horse"? I'm precisely saying the opposite: a little humility is appropriate. Walking into a discussion and simply conjuring personal definitions, without any explanation or demonstrating knowledge of the topic or its history, perhaps would count more as being on a "high horse."

In fact, I even have the virility left to properly define science as a philosophical system of thought — BraydenS

Again, declared without an explanation. Yes, I happen to agree that science is philosophy -- I said that from the beginning. It was called, in Descartes and Newton, "natural philosophy." That's not the point. Perhaps if you deign to read before feeling entitled to make sweeping declarations, you could contribute something.

So far you've contributed nothing.

Science is applied epistemology. — BraydenS

This doesn't make sense even as a personal definition. Espistemology is a branch of philosophy, that studies knowledge. That's where the word comes from -- the Greek for "knowledge." Science is not epistemology, "applied" or otherwise. Science is, as I repeat, natural philosophy. It's concerned with nature, in theory and in practice. Again, this isn't MY definition. I didn't simply "come up" with it.

As I said elsewhere -- a prerequisite for this discussion is knowledge of Greek history and language. I'm not interested in personal, context-free definitions. If that's all you have to contribute, than I thank you and I wish you well. If you have something of real worth to contribute, I'm all ears.

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?
— Xtrix

Because we cannot talk about or sense the universe in any way, only parts of it. — BraydenS

We can't talk about the universe in any way, yet you are talking about it.
We can't sense the universe in any way, except its parts -- and what are its parts? Everything in nature.

This is all pretty silly. No offense.

asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized.
— Xtrix

But you just exclaimed that your use of understanding the etymology of the word was for "understanding science", which is a philosophical system of thought built on it's ability to be applied practically and pragmatically. — BraydenS

No, I said this is my belief. But regardless of whether it has any "use" at all, it's interesting for its own sake.

Also, to casually throw around a definition like "a philosophical system of thought [redundant] built on its ability to be applied practically and pragmatically [redundant]" is kind of ridiculous. There is such a thing as "philosophy of science," if you're not aware. That means many minds, much greater than yours, have struggled with the question of what science is. It's not so simple. You could be right or wrong, but simply declaring it accomplishes nothing.

I'm always struck by people who want to quickly and confidently proclaim a definitive answer, or some solid definition, for something or other -- without any context. I'm further struck to watch as they're satisfied by this, as if by doing so they've settled anything.

We have to do better than this. Try reading this thread for starters. Spouting empty nonsense won't be tolerated -- it'll be, properly, ignored.

Every "part" of the universe is nature. — BraydenS

Then why bother distinguishing the two and say nature happens "in" the universe?

We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."
— Xtrix

I don't see what you'll be getting out of your foray into etymology intellectually besides context, but carry on as you wish. — BraydenS

We'll be getting out of it a better understanding of the philosophical foundations of modern science (and not only that). Understanding science, such a huge feature of our present historical time, is important if we're to understand where we're going as a species. That's my belief.

But ultimately, asking what one "gets out" of philosophy is implying it has to have some use, which is reminiscent of those among us who can't see the value of anything that can't be monetized. Kind of sad.

If I could interject here.

Zeno's paradoxes are precisely that. Paradoxes. There are many of them.

Or take the ship of Theseus -- is it the same ship or not? Should we be arguing about it?

There can't be any answer to these riddles. They're interesting to think about, but the both of you taking a position and trying to defend that position is fruitless.

OK. And not reciprocally? What part of the universe isn't nature? If everything that happens "in the universe" is nature, then why not say the universe and nature are the same thing?

This isn't much of an answer, I'm afraid. But regardless, like I've state elsewhere, I'm not interested in just "defining" what the word means. There's too much of that that in philosophy already. We're trying to explore the basis for the word itself -- which was a Latin translation of the Greek word "phusis."

Plato demonstrated the appearance of incompatibility between Heraclitus' becoming, and Parmenides' being, and Aristotle showed conclusively that this is the case with a number of arguments, one I presented already in this thread. Apprehension of these arguments leads one away from accepting any postulates which stipulate that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's true that the distinction between "being and becoming" have their origins in Plato and Aristotle. But think about it for a minute -- what, exactly, "becomes"? Things change and move, they arise and pass -- but this presupposes a being and thus being itself. Plato associates Parmenides' being with some kind of permanence opposed to change.

It's not that any of this is "wrong" -- that would be presumptuous. They weren't idiots. Rather it's that by this point the original sense of being, as phusis, is pushed to the background. By the time Plato and Aristotle show up, being has transformed into "idea" and "ousia." But most of the trouble lies in our interpretation of what "becoming" means.

If this is really what Heidegger says, I think he is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't take my word for it:

Even today, in accounts of the inception of Western philosophy, it is customary to oppose Parmenides' teaching to that of Heraclitus. An opt-cited saying is supposed to derive from Heraclitus: panta rhei, all is in flux. Hence there is no being. All "is" becoming.

[...]

Of course, when someone asserts the opposite, that in the history of phlosophy all thinkers have at bottom said the same thing, then this is taken as yet another outlandish imposition on everyday understanding. What use, then, is the multifaceted and complex history of Western philosophy, if they all say the same thing anyway? Then one philosophy would be enough. Everything has always already been said. And yet this "same" possess, as its inner truth, the inexhaustible wealth of that which on every day is as if that day were its first. —

I think that's clear enough. I think you should check it out, too -- definitely worth the time. It's Introduction to Metaphysics p. 74.

It may be the case, that Parmenides describes "phusis" with "being", and Heraclitus describes "phusis" with "becoming", but this does not mean that being and becoming are one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it just means we're in one phase of "restricting" being, which has an interesting history, and begins with this distinction and then, later, "being and seeming," "being and thinking," etc.

So for example, if one person describes a substance as solid, and another person describes the same substance as liquid, this does not indicate that "solid" and "liquid" have the same meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. It does mean, however, that "substance" retains its meaning.

To extend this analogy to our case, it would be like describing a substance as a "substance and a liquid." We have to know something about what "substance" means before we can contrast the two. There's also the problem of what we mean by "liquid" (or in this case, "becoming").

"Heraclitus, to whom one ascribes the doctrine of becoming, in start contrast to Parmenides, in truth says the same as Parmenides. He would not be one of the greatest of the great Greeks if he said anything else. One simply must not interpret his doctrine of becoming according to the notions of a nineteenth-century Darwinist." (Introduction, p 75.) [My emphasis]

Maybe you do not see this as a problem, but I do, as I think it makes it impossible to understand the thing being described. Therefore, I believe that this problem of contradiction needs to be exposed, as Socrates and Plato did, and addressed in a rational manner, as Aristotle did, before we can proceed toward an understanding of the thing which is being described in contradictory ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see this particular issue as a problem, no. There are many ways of interpreting things. The wave-particle business you mentioned is a good example. So's the proverbial glass being "half-empty" and "half-full." Is either a "problem"? Well maybe, but what's not an issue is that something is being interpreted.

Anticipating later analyses: it's worth remember that, at bottom, whenever we are engaged in these questions and problems (in philosophy or science), we're interpreting and analyzing -- which is a certain mode of our existence. That mode, reaching back at least to the Greeks, involves presence. This is a mode of our being -- Heidegger calls it the "present-at-hand" -- and includes (of course) an aspect of time (the present).

This in turn is related to ideas of "truth" and all of its transformations, which in the early Greeks was called "aletheia." This term, like phusis, has to do with a "disclosure," an "openness," an "emergence" -- all of which shows up in the context of "presence" and is closely related to "phusis." And so we're back at the OP question.

Thank you, James. I'll check out the links and those citations soon.

This idea of "being" can be contrasted with the "becoming" of Heraclitus. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As Heidegger points out, and quite rightly, Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. They're both discussing being. "Being and becoming" is the first "restriction" discussed in his Introduction to Metaphysics, in fact.

Again I return to the question of phusis. It's here that we find clues to the Greek conception of being. Parmenides and Heraclitus are interested in exactly this question.

To argue being is distinct from becoming and pit these two thinkers against one another may be something we learn from philosophy books and in most school rooms, but it's just a mistake- in my view. There are better analyses.

What would be interesting would be to see how both "becoming" and "being" get unified into the one Latin concept of "existence". I believe it its done through the Aristotelian matter and form, but this would be a complex research project. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think your analysis is way off base and therefore your research project, although it would be doubtlessly complex, would be a blind alley.

This is vague, of course, but it would take a while to dismantle most of what you said, and I'd prefer to stay on the topic of phusis - the Greek conception of being at the beginning of Western thought.

"With the question of the meaning of being, our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that must be treated phenomenologically. [...] This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. (Being & Time, p. 50)

In Heidegger, phenomenon = the manifest. Regarding phenomenon and seeming (semblance), the latter already includes the former -- that is, no-thing can "merely look like so-and-so" without first manifesting (be a phenomenon in the first sense).

That's the phenomenon aspect of "phenomenology."

As for the λογοσ, which you mentioned:

"λογοσ as "discourse" means rather the same as δηλουν: to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as αποφαινεαθαι. The λογοσ lets something be seen (φαινεαθαι), namely, what the dis­course is about; and it does so either for the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse 'lets something be seen' απο ... : that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (αποφαναισ) so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the λογοσ as αποφαναισ." —

He'll eventually say that logos, as a "letting-something-be-seen" can be true or false, but truth in the Greek sense of αληθεια (aletheia), "unconcealedness." And falseness as "covering up."

Αισθησισ -- perception, gets invoked here, etc.

In the end, phenomenology means:

Thus "phenomenology" means [...] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". —

Logos, therefore, plays a prominent role and is important to understand in our search for the meaning of being. Later it becomes relevant in terms of how it's evolved as a term and eventually comes to mean "logic" as the science of thought. But that's a different matter.

If you want to understand the ancient Greek meaning of "Being", read Parmenides — Metaphysician Undercover

An excellent place to start, no doubt. Now to study the morphing of this understanding in the time between Parmenides and Aristotle is especially fascinating.

To me this gels with phenomenology as a making explicit of what is tacitly already dominant. — jjAmEs

Very well said. Yes indeed, I couldn't agree more.

It's not only the emphasis on "practical" behavior which is novel, as overlooked as that has been in academic philosophy - but a way in which to analyze it without invoking the use of traditional concepts (I.e., "phenomenologically"). This is why people unjustly accuse Heidegger of being a charlatan, as he had to essentially invent words in order to discuss the topic.

I'll leave you to more fruitful discussions with others. Thanks. — TheMadFool

There's no sense taking this personally. I respect what you say about science - there's plenty of truth in it. But as much as I'm normally not a stickler for staying "on topic," I don't want to lose sight of my main question and be sent adrift on a discussion about empiricism. You can understand that I'm sure.

Nevertheless, if you're uninterested that's fair enough.

About the word "being" itself in Greek I don't have much knowledge. I didn't think there was such a word, actually. Phusis (as that which emerges), and later ousia, seem to be the words used, but if you know more I'm certainly interested.

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. — javra

That's a very important point - you're absolutely correct.

The word logos as "discourse" is what's commonly assumed, and later becomes a matter of propositions and eventually logic. But initially it was much closer semantically to an idea of Phusis.

I'll respond more fully later about all of that, but your point is well taken.

Focus on the essential. Logic & math are also found elsewhere but the empirical is an exclusively scientific feature. — TheMadFool

Where is this "elsewhere"? What are you implying? If the empirical is exclusively scientific, it doesn't mean science is exclusively empirical. It includes, therefore, logic, mathematics and theory. These are usually considered "cognitive" or "mental." Is this "elsewhere" not science? Is the study of linguistics not science, for example?

There is a theoretical component to the activity we call science. There's a "mental" component to all conscious experience, empirical or otherwise. I'll assume you're not denying this.

Therefore, with this taken as a truism, we're already within a traditional conception: that of the "mind" and the "body" (Descartes) or perhaps the "subject and object" (more in Kant). This is the philosophical basis for modern science, including contemporary science.

What was the notion of "nature" in the 16th and 17th centuries? Take Principles of Natural Philosophy, Descartes' rarely-read but arguably most important work (according to him), or Newton's Mathematical Principles for Natural Philosophy, as two important examples. Take even Galileo's Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences. In the latter, he starts off discussing, to no surprise, Aristotle's Physics. The very titles of the former examples indicate that "natural philosophy" is presupposed as a very definite domain of philosophy (here meaning"thinking" in the broadest sense, perhaps).

Ask yourself what these three men's conception of "nature" was. Whatever it was, it will give us a major clue into the intellectual foundations for modern philosophy and science. So the question isn't a trivial one. You agree that Galileo, Descartes, and Newton weren't imbeciles; it's therefore important to actually read what they said. We may have more knowledge now, based on new discoveries, and in this sense we have gone "farther" than these thinkers. But any progress has been won on the tracks they laid.

The ultimate goal here is to learn something about phusis and, more importantly, about Greek thought. If we agree with Heidegger that these first thinkers (Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus) were more concerned with "being" than most philosophers since (as the question has gone largely unasked in its own right), then our question is also about being -- our particular, "Western" understanding of being -- our "ontology."

We can't study "being" in the scientific sense perhaps -- if science is more narrowly defined -- but whatever "it" is that allows the very things science studies (physical, chemical, biological beings) to show up for us in the first place -- THAT can be considered "being." No matter the mode we're in when things appear to us. By "no matter the mode" I mean not only our theoretical mode (in our Western,present-favoring understanding of beings as "substance" [[i]ousia[/i]]), what Heidegger called "presence-at-hand," but also our "practical" mode, seen in our everyday actions, interactions, routines, and habits -- most of which is not consciously chosen and of which we're not usually constantly aware of. He calls this the "ready-to-hand."

Heidegger says the latter (everyday activity and habit) tells us more about where our usual "theoretical" ontological interpretation comes from in the first place (and also our interpretations of human nature, the "world," time and space). He concludes that our current, unquestioned and tacitly assumed interpretation (when doing philosophy and science) has its origins in the Greeks, and is due to them favoring the present, which is only one aspect of our "lived time" of everyday life (he calls "temporality"), which is an experience of all-three-at-once.

Whatever allows any of this to show up, that's essentially being. Any understanding of it -- and we all have an understanding, theoretical or "pre-theoretical." Therefore, everything that shows up within this understanding (whether pre-theoretically, or theoretically as in "interpretation" or a "system of beliefs") -- behavior, science, customs, a shared worldview, morality, a class system, gender norms, etc., is going to make sense within this context. In the Greek world, for example, "saints and sinners" wouldn't have made any sense. In the Medieval world, they certainly did. So an understanding of being is arguably as fundamental to culture as religion or language is.

Heidegger wants to get "under" or perhaps "outside" of the traditional ontology by flushing out these "everyday" experiences and analyzing them philosophically -- but without the "baggage" of the tradition's (ultimately Greek) vocabulary and semantics. This is the topic of Part II of Being and Time, which never came but which he published in other volumes.

I've provided a little background here in order to move the conversation in a perhaps a more fruitful direction.

Physical laws are as much physical as the objects they obey them for the simple reason that they're perceivable or observable. — TheMadFool

That's not what Galileo or Newton thought. But regardless, if those things are all "physical," then anything we can understand is physical. Not much of a definition.

Science is empirical. — TheMadFool

Partly, but not always. It's also theoretical. It involves logic, mathematics, etc.

I offered you a definition of physical as that which can be perceived through the senses (and instruments). — TheMadFool

I never asked you for a definition of "physical" and, as I've stated before, I'm really not interested. All you've done is offer a fairly commonplace idea of what physical is -- you've not advanced the conversation, which is about phusis. Giving me your own personal opinion about what you think "physical" means is useless. Quite apart from that, this definition itself is problematic, and only pushes us to now ask "what is perception and the senses?" If the senses are part of the body, and we have no idea what "body" means, then the notion of "physical" as "anything we can perceive with our senses" is itself a definition built on sand.

This definition also tacitly assumes a subject/object dichotomy as well, which I've written about elsewhere.

This conversation isn't supposed to be simple. It's not a matter of me inquiring about "what physical means" and then everyone offering their own "take" on it, based on their favorite readings. It's also not an exercise in "let's try to come up with a definition." This problem has been around for centuries, thought about by far better minds than ours, and persists even today. To think we're going to settle it by throwing around a definition is pure hubris.

That being said, I'd like to return to the actual guiding question:

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought. — Xtrix

This perhaps was vague, as I didn't emphasis the notion of "phusis" enough. But since I've now clarified what I meant several times, I don't feel this is a reasonable excuse anymore. Others on this thread have understood me correctly.

So if you have insights or analysis about the Greek notion of "phusis," which has shaped every concept of "nature" or "physical" to this very day, including yours, then please do share. Like I said, I'm particularly struck by Heidegger on this one but am open to others I may not have been aware of.

What part of "you're missing the point" don't you understand?
— Xtrix

Put your attitude back in your pants. You don't own the point here. — Baden

Fuck you. That better? :)

You're right, Bernie's a total sellout. I'm bored talking with you.

I'll give you a concrete example. My sister and her husband are looking at probably three months of lockdown or semi-lockdown and no work. They live in LA. Their rent is 3 grand, close to a grand for health, and another 2 for bills and food. Let's say 6 grand a month. How long do you think 1200 bucks each is going to last?

In contrast, a treasure trove of $500 billion has been opened for big corporations to dig into.

The bill is shit. — Baden

What part of "you're missing the point" don't you understand?

I haven't argued that it's a great bill.

A "no" vote would have been in keeping with everything he says he stands for. A "yes" vote looks like capitulation. — Baden

We're in a pandemic. I don't think he cares about the optics right now. A "no" vote would have accomplished exactly nothing. If this truly turns you off to Bernie, by all means keep holding your breath for someone more principled.

"What we need is a revolution pragmatism."

I'm still digging into the bill. But I really don't like what I see. — Baden

Neither did Bernie, I'm sure. You're missing the point.

A "no" vote would have demonstrated a "revolution" in your mind eh?

If you realize that it is a common interpretation, then why ask me for passages? All you need to do is read his "Physics" to see that the theme of the book is change. He starts by saying that physicists take for granted that either some things, or all things are in motion, and he proceeds to the conditions of change (the causes), and then to talk about time and motion. Why would you interpret his "Physics" in any other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about interpreting his Physics, per se. It's about the concept of phusis.

Why did Bernie sell out on the corporate bonanza bill? Anyone? — Baden

You may have noticed we're in the middle of a pandemic. Bernie is principled, but also pragmatic. This bill was by no means perfect, and he spoke out against the parts he abhorred, but something needed to be done -- and quickly.

To describe this as "selling out" may sound great in conservative media (or even liberal media), but it's a complete joke. Just think about it a minute.

Nothing that can't be detected or measured i.e. perceived is real in science. — TheMadFool

But this just isn't saying much. It seems to me you're defining science in a reaction to religious or supernatural claims. But religious believers will claim God is "detectable" as well. There's no sense debating them.

If science is simply anything we can reasonably understand, fine. That's philosophy, too. That's life, in fact. So what?

The basis for modern science is the concept of nature. This concept has gone through many mutations throughout history. It's very true that when trying to define "science" we may emphasize the empirical, the senses, the "physical," careful observation and experimentation, the use of mathematics, clear language (technical nomenclature), the role of theory (Kuhn and others), and so on, but even all these attempts take place against the backdrop of an understanding of being, an understanding with a history -- what Heidegger calls the "tradition." Its roots lie in Greek ontology, which is what I'm trying to explore here.

My question is about phusis. Ultimately this is the point. As a reminder.

For Aristotle, the physical is the world of "becoming", change, and this is the subject of ancient Greek science, and Aristotle's "Physics". In a number of distinct places, he demonstrates that "being" and "becoming" are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's really not that simple. But if you have passages you want to share that you believe support this thesis I'd be happy to take a look.

I realize this is a common interpretation of Aristotle, by the way.

The idea of the physical is intimately tied to the senses. What is physical is exactly that which can be sensed; — TheMadFool

Sounds more like empirical to me, but I take your meaning.

Naturalism, to me, is the philosophy that claims that all there is is the physical; in other words, what is real has to be sensible in some way or other. Since this implies that what isn't sensible iisn't real, naturalism excludes religion and the spiritual from the realm of reality for they deal in what can't be sensed. There is good reason to assume such a position because to admit the non-physical as part of reality is like a blind man admitting colors into his world; even if there are colors, the blind man will never perceive them and it will fail to make a difference to his world. — TheMadFool

What about the forces of nature? Are those "physical"? Newton thought that notion was absurd. Quantum entanglement, curved spacetime. Einstein considered a lot of this "non-physical." Etc. Is language and mathematics physical?

Physical is an honorific term. What it appears to mean these days is anything we more or less understand. If we understand it, it's physical. Again, I'm not too interested in coming up with definitions, I'm interested in the etymology of phusis. At least in this thread.

The religious, the spiritually inclined and supernaturalists may counter naturalism by saying that it is possible for existence to be true despite nothing being perceptible through the senses i.e. all is not physical. However, a moment's reflection reveals a serious problem, the problem of defining reality. Being perceptible through the senses and not being perceptible through the senses are contradictory statements and, as it appears to me, it's impossible to bring them together under the same banner, reality. If both the perceptible and the imperceptible are real then what is not real? — TheMadFool

The word "real" is likewise honorific. If we define reality as anything "perceptible" or "physical" or "natural," etc., then we get an answer in one step: reality = the natural. But that only means we have to understand what physical and natural mean, and then to have some idea of what "material," "matter," and "body" mean (including the senses, which are part of the body), and so on. So we're back to the beginning and the topic of this thread.

Incidentally, there hasn't been a notion of "body" since the 17th century.

The whole third chapter of the Introduction - tellingly titled 'The Restriction of Being' - is more or less an account of how Plato and Aristotle fucked up (or began the fucking-up-of, completed by Latin translators) the perfectly good notion of φῠ́σῐς that the pre-Socratics, Heraclitus and Parmenides in particular, had - at least according to Heidi's as-usual idiosyncratic reading of philosophical history. — StreetlightX

The fourth chapter. But yes, in that he discusses the various "restrictions" made through history. I don't understand why you say that Plato and Aristotle "fucked up," though. Heidegger never implies anything like that. In fact he believes the beginning of Western philosophy (the "inception") reaches its end with Aristotle. By that point the "idea" and ousia had come to the fore, but hadn't completely lost the presocratic sense of phusis either.

Regardless, I'm not seeing your point with this response, which was supposedly a reaction to my statement that Heidegger contradicts de Beistegui in a number of ways. Maybe I'm completely wrong, but I don't see anything in your response that shows how.

There was no metaphysics in Aristotle. "First philosophy" is his physics, and what's later called "metaphysics" is just as much physics.
— Xtrix

Perhaps you could argue why this is so.
It is not immediately apparent to me as a phenomenon. — Valentinus

Sure, although I'd rather just quote directly from Heidegger so there's no mystery:

"Aristotle’ s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately thought out, foundational book of Western philosophy.

Probably the eight books of the Physics were not projected as a unity and did not come into existence all at once. Such questions have no importance here. In general it makes little sense to say that the Physics precedes the Metaphysics, because metaphysics is just as much “physics” as physics is “metaphysics.” For reasons based on the work itself, as well as on historical grounds, we can take it that around 347 B.C. (Plato’s death) the second book was already composed. (Cf. also Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, p. 296, originally published in 1923. For all its erudition, this book has the single fault of thinking through Aristotle’s philosophy in the modern Scholastic neo-Kantian manner that is entirely foreign to Greek thought. Much of Jaeger’s Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 1912, is more accurate because less concerned with “content.”)

But even so, this first thoughtful and unified conceptualization of nύσις is already the last echo of the original (and thus supreme) thoughtful projection of the essence of nύσις that we still have preserved for us in the fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides." (On The Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle's Physics B, 1. p. 3, in German from the Gesamtausgabe: p. 241) —

Remember that "metaphysics" was coined after Aristotle. "After the physics lectures" is what it probably meant. It's evolved to mean essentially anything "outside" or "beyond" what is physical, but that's misleading. Heidegger often uses it as basically synonymous with "ontology" in terms of its subject matter for most of history after Aristotle.

But the point is the same: phusis is the concept we're trying to understand here, in light of the question of the meaning of being.

Aristotle emphasizes that metaphysics (which he also calls “first philosophy”) is required only to the extent that there is indeed a motionless reality, without the existence of which physics would be the primordial and universal science. It is the very existence of a motionless reality that turns physics — the object of which is the kind of reality that has the principle of its own motion and rest within itself, in contrast to the technical object — into a merely secondary philosophy. For Aristotle, Φῠ́σῐς does not designate the whole of reality, but only “a specific kind of beings.” There is, therefore, a reality of being, which the world of becoming does not exhaust." — StreetlightX

There was no metaphysics in Aristotle. "First philosophy" is his physics, and what's later called "metaphysics" is just as much physics.

What this writer is indicating is that there's a difference between the "becoming" world and the "motionless" world, and tries to say the former is "physics" (secondary) and the latter "metaphysics."

Parts are reminiscent of the old Parmenides vs Heraclitus "dichotomy" as well. Although the interpretation is fine, I don't find it all that profound. It's actually quite common.

I don't know anything about de Beistegui, but from what I Googled he's supposedly a Heidegger scholar. That's surprising, because none of this comes close to Heidegger's analysis. Heidegger in fact contradicts much of what's referenced here.

Was Sandyhook a "false flag"? I could cite Alex Jones and several articles about it. I guess that makes it plausible, in your world, and totally worth entertaining?
— Xtrix

That's a bit of a strawman argument, isn't it? — fishfry

No.

How does one relate to the other? — fishfry

Because not only is there no evidence, it fails at being even interesting speculation. That's how it relates.

When the government tells you the North Vietnamese attacked us at the Gulf of Tonkin, or that Saddam has WMDs, are you one of those people who wave the flag for war without a moment's thought? You never question what you're told? Ever? — fishfry

Yes, questioning the motives and pretexts of government foreign policy, formulating alternative narratives, and (most importantly) relying on experts and the documentary record to support these narratives is important.

So far you've cited NY Post speculations and betting odds for a stupid, stupid idea. What's more embarrassing is that you continue on in your quest to make it look less stupid. But this isn't Fox News, and cheap spin doesn't work.

There's no way Hillary Clinton will be the democratic nominee. Ever. Put your money on it if you want. I'll gladly lay the odds.

I'm curious, do you even read much political commentary? I agree Hillary's not getting much buzz lately but Cuomo's name keeps coming up. Just yesterday he officially denied he's running for president, saying, "This is no time for politics." Exactly what a politician would say, don't you agree?

Are you completely unaware of all of this that I'm talking about? — fishfry

Right, because you've proven yourself such a very widely-read, credible source of news, you feel perfectly entitled to ask me that question.

I suppose you take seriously the "perfectly reasonable" speculation that Cuomo will jump in and be the nominee too, eh? I've got a better one: I have reason to believe, based on what "many people are saying," that Fauci will try his hand at the democratic nomination. People are saying it, so it must be credible and worth discussing. Haven't heard anything about it? Probably because you don't follow the news -- or at least aren't as well-read as I am. Pity.

I guess I'm ultimately the fool for wasting time responding to you.

"Aristotle’s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately thought out, foundational book of Western philosophy."

Perhaps I should have started a thread about this to make it more accurate.

That's interesting indeed. I'm not familiar with Cunliffe but will check it out.

A thought: idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing. — Pneumenon

This entire thesis rests on suppositions: (1) that there's such a thing as the mind/body problem, (2) that there's a subject apart from an object, that there's an "external world," etc. These show up over and over again.

But as I've pointed out elsewhere, the very notion of subject/object, "inner and outer worlds," mind and body, etc., already presume an understanding of what it is to be. They themselves operate in the context of an ontology. In the West, at least, that ontology is still very much Greek. Until we understand this point fully, we're operating in a blind alley.

(This is not to say these problems don't exist, or that they're "wrong," by the way.)

I want to repeat part of my initial post:

So the question "What is 'nature'?" ends up leading to a more fundamental question: "What is the 'physical'?" and that ultimately resides in the etymology of φῠ́σῐς and, finally, in the origins of Western thought: Greek thought.

The analysis of this concept is very important indeed to understand our current scientific conception of the world, and therefore the predominant world ontology (at least non-religious, or perhaps simply the de facto ontology ). Does anyone here have an analysis to share, original or otherwise? Full disclosure: I am particularly struck by Heidegger's take, especially in his Introduction to Metaphysics. But other analyses are certainly welcome.

I'm interested in the analysis of the Greek word phusis. The claim that this word is the origin of our word "physics" and "nature" shouldn't be controversial, but perhaps it is more troubling than I assumed -- in which case, if anyone wants me to elaborate further on why I make that statement I'd be happy to.

Otherwise, if we take this as a given, we should move on to understanding the word itself and its historical variations in meaning. To do so, one should know something about ancient Greek history and both Homeric and Attic Greek language. These should be considered prerequisite for this discussion -- at least in terms of what I'm interested in hearing. This is what I meant by "analysis." I did not mean armchair speculations, feelings, evidence-free claims, vague statements, etc.

Friendly clarification.

in regard to etymology, the Greek word is similar to saying something like: "Events keep Happening."
It is relentless and leaves us poor mortals trying to get a grip when we control very few things. — Valentinus

Why is phusis something like "Events keep happening"? Could you offer more here please?

"I don't agree.... I don't believe.., ..nor has it ever been defined."

From our friends at Dictionary.com:
"scientific method, n.
The principles and empirical processes of discovery and demonstration considered characteristic of or necessary for scientific investigation, generally involving the observation of phenomena, the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the phenomena, experimentation to demonstrate the truth or falseness of the hypothesis, and a conclusion that validates or modifies the hypothesis."

As to your opinions and your beliefs, how do they weigh in the scales of argument? — tim wood

It's not my opinion -- it has never been defined. Maybe it will be some day. I don't "believe" because I see no evidence for the claim that you and others are making. If you have evidence, present it please.

By the way, this is now the fourth time in this forum that someone has quoted the dictionary to settle an argument. It's almost unbelievable. Were you really thinking, in this case, that I believed there wasn't such a thing as a science dictionary -- or dictionaries in general? Or that someone couldn't simply make up a definition? Is this how we settle philosophical questions about meaning? By consulting the dictionary?

We have to do better than this. Within the context of philosophy -- in this case, the philosophy of science -- there have been many attempts to define the scientific method, as I assume you know. It is often believed that there is one, even among scientists. But there isn't. The concept of the "inductive method" goes back at least to Bacon, and we could talk about that and its variations in history, but there's a great deal in science that simply doesn't fall into this methodology.

Science is not separated from "philosophy," as I indicated in my original post. It's certainly not separated by a special "method" that accounts for its successes. If you have specific insights or evidence that demonstrates it, I'd be happy to hear it. But citing the dictionary? Come on.