I think the correct description of Kant's view is that they're not representations, they're phenomena, appearance. — Wayfarer

OK. This differs how from the following:

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

(Which is where this diversion started.)

If there's any "difference" at all, it's simply that phenomena usually refer to something "outside" the subject -- i.e., the object. But this, in turn, is only known as representation -- or appearance, if you prefer. Makes no difference. Now, what the phenomenon or object is in itself we can't know and can say nothing about, because our world is the world of representation (meaning nothing other than sensations in time and space, activity of the brain). If representations "of" something - apart from what they are -makes any sense, it's of something we can't fully know since our understanding and knowledge is bounded by time and space.

This is why Schopenhauer titles his book "World as Will and Representation." He identifies the thing in itself with the will, whereas Kant said there's nothing to be said about it. Was Schopenhauer way off base as well?

Not once did I bring up Locke in this discussion.

To summarize this non-exchange:

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things known to reason a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

Again: what "qualifications"?

Representations are not what's a priori -- the forms of intuition are.
Phenomena are not unknown particulars -- this is simply meaningless.

I really hope you don't teach.

You use wiki, I use Kant. — Mww

No, you haven't. If you'd like to, feel free. I won't hold my breath.

And actually I've used both Kant and Schopenhauer. You've made a claim about phenomena and representations being different, refused to provide any relevant evidence to support the claim, told me to find it myself, then changed the subject. Now you want to behave as an adolescent. That's fine. Doesn't change the facts.

I refer again to https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/369165 . (For anyone serious who's interested in Kant's transcendental idealism.)

Representations and phenomena are the same thing, and beyond this the thing in itself. There is no phenomena as "unknown external object" -- that's the noumenon.

And that's where it stands thus far.

This is Locke’s representative realism, not Kant. — Wayfarer

Brilliant analysis.

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. — Mww

I guess Kant is ridiculous then.

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. Even a simple Wikipedia search admits it's pretty open-ended:

"In Kantian philosophy, the unknowable noumenon is often linked to the unknowable "thing-in-itself" (in Kant's German, Ding an sich), although how to characterize the nature of the relationship is a question still open to some controversy."

I could be completely wrong, but to say it's ridiculous is just nonsense. I see no evidence so far that I am wrong, of course -- except for your armchair philosophy.

If it was crucial, why didn’t he talk about it, other than to say there’s nothing there to talk about? — Mww

Oh lord. Is this a joke?

Hell.....I can do this chit all day. — Mww

You mean talk nonsense? Yes, that's obvious.

I notice also you're trying to avoid defending your ridiculous claims about phenomena. Which is a smart move on your part, to avoid further embarrassment.

For those interested:

Kant:

"Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous intuition by which we can intuit things a priori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not at the are in themselves[...]" Prolegomena, p. 17

The "thing-in-itself" is a crucial part of Kant's philosophy.

Thus,

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans. — Mww

Is a bit ridiculous. And probably the source of his confusion.

Find your own. — Mww

Yeah, I figured as much.

I'm sorry you're so confused about this. Perhaps studying Kant would help.

And I don't have to "find my own" because you won't find your conception of "phenomena" in Kant anywhere.

The forms of sensibility are time and space. These are a priori. We can't experience anything at all except through these forms. Matter, causality, phenomena or objects of any kind are experienced through these forms -- as representations. Beyond these representations is the unknown and unknowable -- the noumenon, the thing in itself.

This is Kant. To say phenomena is in some Twilight realm and "really exist" outside our representations is a complete misunderstanding. To say phenomena is just a "qualification" of an "external object" is likewise a misunderstanding -- any object whatsoever is an entity, a being, a phenomenon -- we only experience this as representation. What is the object, the phenomenon, the "external world" in itself? The noumenon.

I sometimes can't believe this is a philosophy forum.

Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. — Mww

Different qualifications of the "external object"? What does "different qualifications" mean? So phenomena and representation are different or not? If not, which is what you seemed to be saying, then how do they differ? If they're the same, then that's exactly what I said above.

Representations are general things known a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. — Mww

This is completely wrong. Find me one supporting sentence from Kant that states this. The phenomena being "unknown particulars" is meaningless. If it's phenomena, it's representation.

we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

How this got started.

If not phenomena, then what is phenomena? Something "undetermined." But not an unknown thing in itself. Something between that is undifferentiated but with which we have representations of (which is the thing in itself in Kant). Then I hear something about physical objects.

Your whole thesis is confused. The onus is on you to demonstrate where Kant says there's some other realm between the known and unknown where this phenomena supposedly lies (since it's not "representation" according to you, yet we can still talk about it). Maybe the Twilight Zone?

Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. — Mww

Meaning the thing-in-itself, the noumenon. Yes, of course. Representations "for us" is redundant.

But they are real physical objects nonetheless. — Mww

What does the "they" refer to? The representations or the "object itself"?

The quotes you provide say exactly what I've said all along: phenomena and representation are the same thing, otherwise there would be no need for the idea of the thing in itself. Are you failing to grasp this or what? At this point I'm not sure what you're arguing, because you're making the case for me.

Your Schopenhauer is pre-dated by: — Mww

Yes, true...and?

Agreed. Makes me wonder why you’re having so much trouble with it. — Mww

Oh I see, it's in fact I who am having trouble. How Trumpian.

But that assumes our representations are not based on something related existing outside and independent of the knowing subject. — Marchesk

No. That would be the thing-in-itself which we cannot know, since everything we can know are representations (from "sensibility" in space and time). Any story you make up about what the thing-in-itself itself comes from your experience of the world. Schopenhauer claims it's the "will," for example. To say it's "physical objects" or anything like that is already missing the point -- they too are representations.

If your system says phenomena are experienced through representations, so be it. Just don’t call it the Kantian system. — Mww

It's precisely the Kantian system. How else is phenomena experienced?

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations. — Mww

This is not Kant at all. Nor would he ever make any such claims. In that case the "real physical objects" would be the noumenon. If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations.

Again, this is introductory stuff. Not difficult. See the Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Aesthetic.

Or, if you like, Schopenhauer puts it clearly:

"What is extended in space, and hence the objective, material world in general, exists as such simply and solely in our representation, and that it is false and indeed absurd to attribute to it, as such, an existence outside all representation and independent of the knowing subject, and so to assume a matter positively and absolutely existing in itself."

True, but that doesn’t say phenomena are representations. If it did, it would be tautological, re: the phenomenal world is the world of phenomena. Thus, to have meaning, either it is not the world of representations, or phenomena are not representations. Take your pick. — Mww

In Kant, phenomena are only experienced through our representations. What is the object "beyond" our representations? The ding an sich, the noumenon. So yes, the world and the phenomena of the world are representations. Saying phenomena is something other than or different from our representations, which is what you're arguing, is to speak about the noumenon, which is unknowable in Kant. Phenomena that isn't representation and isn't noumenal is meaningless.

In terms of "the philosophical basis for modern science" (which was also being discussed) what has Kant contributed? — Galuchat

Now you're diverting. There's plenty that can be said about Kant's influence on modern science. But first one needs to understand Kant. Saying it's mere "physicalist pap" shows you're not worth having that discussion with, however.

Welcome to my ignore list. — SophistiCat

I'm devastated.

Kant was what was being discussed. Try to keep up. Go hero-worship somewhere else.

I'm not a Kantian nor do I advocate for Kant's philosophy. But let's at least understand what he was saying.

It's not physicalist. Read some Kant and get back to me.

From the Kantian epistemological thesis, yes, it is a mistake: we as subjects have representations of the outside world, but they are not phenomena. — Mww

Of course they are.

Phenomena are “...undetermined objects of empirical intuition...”, thus not technically representations. — Mww

The phenomenal world is the world of representations. All else is noumenonal, the thing in itself. This isn't that hard.

It is not clear what this question is asking. — SophistiCat

Funny, no one else seems to be struggling with it. I guess that makes you special. Congrats.

The point of this question, which lists a hodgepodge of enduring conditions and potential threats, is also unclear. — SophistiCat

No it isn't. Maybe to you -- although I doubt you're being sincere -- but not to anyone else. The point was stated in the post: I'm interested to get a sense of what people would choose, if they had to. Of course I could write a thousand different qualifications and include a thousand other problems -- that goes without saying, but I was assuming we're all adults.

There's always at least one person who wants to play Socrates and claim fake confusion. So boring. Nonetheless, if something as clear and straightforward as this is really that confusing to you, feel free to simply ignore it and go on your merry way.

That’s mistaken I believe. The ‘phenomenon’ is all there is for us - as opposed to the negative sense of noumenon. He is explicit enough about that I felt? — I like sushi

Yes. So what’s “mistaken” exactly? That Kant believed in an outside world? I’m not seeing your point.

ir enough - I agree that dualism has had a significant influence in those areas. But my impression was that it is also commonly thought to be a mistaken view. See, for example, Dennett's Cartesian Theater criticism. — Andrew M

I’m not sure about mistaken, but simply one formulation which happens to be the most dominant in the west.

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism? — Andrew M

Both deal with scientific theories, and a knowing subject is thus assumed.

And again, I’m not necessarily talking about mind/body dualism. I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object).

True- not meant as an exhaustive list, of course. Just off the top of my head. But you’re right, that could be a big problem - or a blessing. It’s hard to know at this point.

I’m a triggered snowflake, Sean Hannity. There, now go rest easy in your reality.

Science is successful in telling us all that stuff. — Marchesk

Science is successful in telling us stuff about stuff, and by stuff we mean everything.

So science is good at telling us that everything is everything. That galaxies and brain waves etc exist.

I’m getting bored.

Climate denier who’s not read a word of Chomsky. Got it.

You cracked the case. Good for you.

Also- epidemics, war, etc, effect the third world quite a lot I’d say. But I don’t have access to your very credible, very edgy sources.

You need to get your head out of your daily diet of media hysteria. — fishfry

Yes, and be more like you and your ilk— ignoramuses who feel superior believing they have special knowledge. So edgy, so adolescent.

Please substantially tell us and the science community how climate change is “hysteria.” I eagerly await enlightenment.

Science is successful at telling us that this “stuff” is galaxies, cells, brain activity? Or is “stuff” now something else?

Now THOSE are problems. Worrying about crap you read in the mainstream media is a fool's game. I suggest that in the new year we all try to focus on what's real and what's merely illusion. — fishfry

So climate change and nuclear weapons are mainstream media illusions, and the “real” problems are that many people can’t eat or find clean water.

What a stupid, stupid position.

So literally everything? Fine. Good observation.

I would say we’re beings among other beings. “Stuff” is misleading.

Maybe. He won by a few thousand votes in normally blue states and lost by 3 million in the popular. Hardly a guarantee.

"Physical," "material," "body," etc., are honorific terms. They used to have a technical notion within mechanical philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries. They no longer do. Thus, "material world," "material reality," "physical world," etc., is completely meaningless. As is the mind/body "problem."

Fair enough. Glad to help.

Within a LARGER scope, it could be meaningless or not, depending on your metaphysical position, which ultimately can be no more than belief. Within the scope of science, the concept of an atom does have meaning, or we wouldnt be able to make sense of scientific theories. — ernestm

It's quite true that an atom makes sense in chemistry and physics. That has nothing to do with "material," which is meaningless. It used to have a meaning in science, in Newton's day, in terms of the mechanical philosophy, as "body," -- but that was abandoned long ago.

So to say

...such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

really doesn't mean anything at all.

ooh. I didnt know that. I'll do some reading on it, thank you ) — ernestm

Can't tell if this is sarcastic.

But it doesn't matter, because such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

The term "material" is meaningless. Hence also the "material world."

Thats not empirically true. The USA and Nicaragua are the only two nations which did not sign up to the Paris Accord. Everyone else generally agrees the planet is warming up. — ernestm

I think every country, including this one, has a majority of people who believe the climate is changing and it's man-made. That's not my point. Also, Brazil is in the Paris Accord as well -- as is the US (until later this year). That's meaningless. My point is the percentage of people who deny it's happening altogether are going to be found in larger numbers in fossil-fuel exporting countries. And that's indeed what you find. Empirically.

It seems mostly unique to the USA. — ernestm

I'm not sure if that's true, but the level to which the propaganda is implemented is probably unique. Nevertheless, other countries whose economies depend of the exporting of fossil fuels are also persuadable. Brazil, Russia, Australia, Britain, etc.