Morality is about how people emotionally respond to social interaction.
Emotions are about feelings and that means subjective values are brought to bear on ALL moral situations. — charleton

Suppose that it is true that some emotional feelings are in regards to morality. E.g., anger is triggered upon experiencing injustice. It does not follow that morality is subjective, just because the emotional feeling belongs to a subject. The sense of sight always belongs to a subject, and yet it does not follow that the object seen is not objectively real.

But selfishness is unjust. Therefore objective morality, in which justice is the criteria, cannot come from the selfish desire of survival. Not that survival is incompatible with morality, mind you.

Indeed, no. Your assumption that god exists makes you think morality must be objective. — charleton

It may be so that the existence of God and objective morality are directly linked. I.e., no God, then no objective morality, and vice versa. This seems to be your view since you brought up the topic of God in the discussion. However, my argument for an objective morality in the OP does not mention God at all, and so I am not using the existence of God to demonstrate that morality is objective. You are barking up the wrong tree.

And as this "net gain" criteria is objective, it is compatible with an objective morality.
— Samuel Lacrampe
Even if it's unjust? — BlueBanana

No of course not. The "net gain" criteria is closer to a last resort, not the first. Equality in treatment, or justice is the first. Then in the rare case when we stubble upon a situation where two choices have the same level of justice, then we may look into the net gain. Such is the case in the Trolley Problem. I would think however that such cases are rare, and so the net gain criteria is not often required.

I wouldn't call the minimal action done to only prevent further crimes a punishment, but if that is done, what about not killing Hitler, instead putting him in jail? That's merciful, but arguably unjust. — BlueBanana

For the sake of argument, let's assume that such an act is indeed unjust. It is also no doubt merciful. How do you now judge the merciful act to be morally good?

What about dragging the moral agents into all this? Is killing other animals for food immoral? (I think it is but as >90% of people are not vegetarians I think it's a safe bet to ask this rhetorical question.) What about non-conscious things? Do they deserve equal treatment? — BlueBanana

As stated in the OP, I would like to keep the discussion to the morality of men towards men only. I can however point you to another discussion called In defence of the Great Chain of Being, which talks about morality of all beings, and should provide some answers. If you have any enquiries about it, I can see you there.

No, I argued that treating others the way they want to be treated leads to contradictions. You can't take people's desires into account with golden rule in a way that doesn't lead to contradictions. — BlueBanana

I agree. Desires are not always just, and so should not be considered to determine the moral value of an act. (I admit I forget what the dispute was about on this one. Maybe we resolved it?)

Thought experiment: If you were the only person alive, what would you separate into GOOD/BAD categories? Most likely that which you divy into these categories are for survival purposes. Morality is merely 'mans' attempt at survival. — Vaskane

Hello. There is an error in category. What pertains to survival, or more generally speaking health, is indeed a type of objective value (good/bad); but it is a physical value, not a moral one. Morality pertains to the interaction among beings, and for this discussion, I have limited the topic to the actions of man towards man. With that, there is no morality to speak of when there is a single person left in the world.

We choose to participate in moral actions hoping for equality, the fact is equality doesn't exist. — Vaskane

Even if you are right that equality does not exist, it does not follow that it cannot or should not exist.

If the existence of God logically follows from the rest of the argument,
— Samuel Lacrampe
It does not. You have it backwards. — charleton

So if the existence of God does not follow from my position that morality is objective, then why did you bring it up in the first place?

Nature has no integers or equivalents.
There are no straight lines, circles, geometric shapes, in nature.
Maths relies on all these fictions including irrational numbers. — charleton

And yet planes fly, houses stand, and you are using a computer to respond to these posts. But more importantly, if you do not believe that math is objective, then by extension you do not believe that logic is objective. And in which case, there is no common ground for you and I to have a coherent discussion.

Please state the "laws" of morality! — charleton

In general, since morality is the science of "what ought to be", this "ought" implies a law. Specifically in my objective morality, the law is justice, that is, equality in treatment under similar situations, or by extension, the golden rule.

It'd not be immoral to not give him a death sentence and instead put him in jail. The jail sentence doesn't exist for the sake of punishing criminals but simply to prevent the criminals from repeating the crimes, and therefore mercy doesn't apply to that situation. — BlueBanana

I agree with this. But I thought you were presenting an example where the act can be morally good yet unjust, when you said here "Having mercy is never immoral, while any punishment can be just as long as the same law is applied equally to all criminals." But now, you say it is merciful to put him in jail; which to me is a form of punishment. Long story short, we have yet to find a case where an act is morally good yet unjust, or vice versa.

Sure the golden rule can be interpreted that way but that leads to contradictions. I want to be treated the way I want to be treated -> treat others the way they want to be treated, which can directly contradict the way you want to be treated. — BlueBanana

It now sounds like we are arguing about the same position, namely, that the act of "imposing my desires on others (and no other reasons)" cannot pass the golden rule without contradictions. As such, this act cannot be just.

But say that it does not result in a greater good, or a net gain, but rather a net loss.
— Samuel Lacrampe
That's of course another situation, which is treated differently from one where it leads to a net gain. — BlueBanana

I didn't attempt to generalize it. I claimed that the opposite can't be generalized. — BlueBanana

Perhaps a misunderstanding once again, because I agree that for some situations, the net gain is a reasonable criteria for a morally good act. And as this "net gain" criteria is objective, it is compatible with an objective morality.

I am reading the "Commentary on the Book of Job" by Thomas Aquinas right now. If I get some new insight, I will post it here. It's a long commentary (like 50 lines of commentary for every 10 lines in the book) so don't hold your breath.

Having mercy is never immoral, while any punishment can be just as long as the same law is applied equally to all criminals. — BlueBanana

Why do you claim that mercy is never immoral? Is it not immoral to pardon Hitler over and over again, such that each time you set him free, he kills more and more jews?

the act of "imposing others' desires against my will" cannot be accepted, by definition.
— Samuel Lacrampe
Accepting something based on rational reasoning dodsn't make it your will. — BlueBanana

Either I misunderstand you, or misunderstood me. Regardless, the treatment of "imposing others' desires against my will" clearly breaks the golden rule of ethics, and the golden rule is directly derived from justice. As such, this treatment is necessarily unjust.

I'd think about the situation objectively and try to not be selfish, and accept my situation as a just sacrifice for a greater good. — BlueBanana

But say that it does not result in a greater good, or a net gain, but rather a net loss. In which case, unequal happiness is not better than equal misery. As such, we cannot generalize that "unequal happiness is always better than equal misery".

Only if you believe in the god delusion. — charleton

If the existence of God logically follows from the rest of the argument, then it does. Don't run away from the laws of reason just because you don't like the conclusions that follow. :wink:

Incorrect. You believe the mathematical laws to be objective, don't you?
— Samuel Lacrampe
No, why? — charleton

No? The formula 2+2=4 is not objective, but man-made? What about the laws of logic then? After all, mathematics is just logic applied to numbers.

Say, 1500 years ago slavery, misogyny, stoning, mistreating animals, etc might just have been common everyday stuff of no particular consequence/interest, whereas today they're considered immoral or criminal. I guess the contemporary political correctness movement exemplifies emerging morals or moral awareness. — jorndoe

You here speak of changes in the legal system, not changes in the moral point of view. Nobody wants to be a slave; not the masters, not the slaves. And nobody wants to be the victim of misogyny or stoning; not now, not then. Similarly to today, those victims surely would have wanted to revolt on the grounds of injustice. In general, we cannot discover a morality from historical facts, because morality is about "what-ought-to-be", not about "what-is".

Either way, not all situations are (readily/necessarily) morally decidable, as shown by the Trolley problem. — jorndoe

The trolley problem is not a moral issue but merely a rational one. I did not mention this in the OP, but one necessary component of a moral/immoral (as opposed to amoral) act is intentions. If you never intended to kill anyone, as is the case in the trolley problem, then the accidental killing of people is not immoral. At worst, you made the wrong judgement resulting in an honest mistake.

Nah, the nazis forfeit their rights.
violation of the above may entail forfeiture of some or all of them — jorndoe

That's a good answer. It agrees well with your morality.

Suppose we wanted to reduce morals to something. What might this something then be? What would acceptable "moral atoms" look like? Self-interest alone doesn't do it for me (like some rules seem to suggest), but maybe that's just me. — jorndoe

Golden Rule. It is a great practical way to determine if justice was intended or not.

"Do unto others as you would have done unto you" does not just automatically lead one to just war theory. [...] And even then I don't see how, of all doctrines, just war theory somehow naturally flows from the golden rule. You'd have to, at the very least, argue the case. — Moliere

They are connected, because both are derived from justice. Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" is the only way to preserve equality in treatment when interacting with others. Just War Theory: how to conduct a war while preserving justice. If you are in conflict with a neighbouring country, how would you want to them to behave towards you in order to resolve the conflict? E.g., you would likely want them to first use peaceful acts before resorting to force. As such, to preserve justice, you ought to behave the same way towards them. Thus the Just War Theory is related to the Golden Rule.

but if you can accept those terms, then I don't see how you would be able to dissent from the example I used earlier. — Moliere

I forget what example you are referring to.

I must say, you touch on what I believe is the one weak point of my argument. But I will try my best to answer it.

As per point (1) in the OP, if the act is just, then it is morally good, and if unjust, then morally bad. It is nonsense to speak of an act which is morally good yet unjust, or morally bad yet just.

Now you ask "why be morally good"? For no other reason that it is morally good. Morality is not a means to another end, but an end in and of itself. "Why should I do x if I don't want to?" Because it is morally good. "Why should I not do y even if I want to?" Because it is morally bad.

If by 'revenge' you mean "a desire for justice (and nothing beyond it)", then it is not immoral.
— Samuel Lacrampe
Circular reasoning. — BlueBanana

My point was that 'revenge', once clearly defined, cannot be just, while at the same time immoral. But we can work on a concrete example if desired.

How? How is imposing everyone's desires on everyone against their will not equal? — BlueBanana

"Equality in treatment" means that for a given situation, whatever act you choose, you must also accept it from others under a similar situation. Now, the act of "imposing others' desires against my will" cannot be accepted, by definition. As such, it is an unjust act.

So equal misery is better than unequal happiness? — BlueBanana

This depends once again on the net result, but for the most part, yes. What if you were on the bad end of that unequal happiness situation? Would you not wish for that slightly better equal happiness?

How does the golden rule deal with injustice? [...] So the other failing of the golden rule is it does not adjudicate between actually lived conflicting principles. It doesn't tell us how to deal with enemies. — Moliere

Actually it does. See for example the Just War Theory: how to conduct war in accordance with justice (and by extension, the golden rule). To name a few criteria, a war is just if:

• It is reactive and not proactive.
• All peaceful alternative actions have first been exhausted.
• The physical evil inflicted on the enemy must not exceed the physical evil caused by the enemy (i.e., do not overreact).

The practice of the golden rule does not lead to extreme pacifism. Self-Defence and enforcement of laws are actions that are compatible with it.

The reason that this had to be declared was that morality does not definitively entail it. — charleton

Quite the opposite. Unless you believe the content was purely arbitrary, then it is reasonable to suggest it was inspired by real morality.

If morality had included this, the declaration would not be necessary. — charleton

Incorrect. You believe the mathematical laws to be objective, don't you? And yet, math is taught at school. We can all rediscover mathematical laws on our own, but it is better to teach it in order to speed up the learning process and avoid errors along the way. The same goes for the laws of morality.

Yeah, it may be the case that after a while, through good habits, we perform a morally good act with little to no reasoning. The ability to rationalize the act may still be present, but not necessarily activated.

Says the argument in the OP.

The criteria for moral value is justice; and justice is equality in treatment among all men; thus equality in treatment is the criteria for moral value.

Hello. I like your post, and want to analyze it.

the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the fruition of these same rights. — Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, Article IV

This is good. It is another way to interpret the golden rule.

So your morality consists in total freedom of the individual, with the exception of harm. I have a couple of questions on your no-harm morality.

(1) Is it morally wrong to eat animals and plants? (2) Is it morally acceptable to lie to others if they never find out? (2) Is it wrong to give an employee a raise, and another no raise, due to favoritism?
Is it wrong to do harm to the nazis to prevent them from killing more jews?

"Equality in treatment" is the criteria of moral value (goodness/badness) specifically, not value in general. There are other types of values, and you are close to the mark when it comes to physical values. I would say the criteria for that one is more accurately health and safety of the individual, but you can indeed extend it to the species.

We know that moral value is different than physical value because the nazis, which are (almost) universally labelled as morally bad, would still be labelled as morally bad, even if they had successfully preserved and expanded their reign.

I have decided to stop taking your comments seriously. With that, thanks for increasing the Replies count on this discussion. I suspect this attracts more readers. :blush:

I think you are begging the question here. There might be disagreement about what constitutes 'an objective judgement' for many kinds of reasons. But here you're more or less insisting that objectivity is self-evident or that there are some objective criteria which just naturally everyone will agree on. And I don't think you've established that. — Wayfarer

I may have misunderstood your point, but are you saying that the right factors that influence the act are not obtained objectively? Maybe an example might help.

A policeman arrests a black man that was present at a crime scene, and does not arrest a white man that was not at the crime scene. If the reason the policeman arrested the black man and not the white man was because of race, then the act was not just, because race is not a valid reason to arrest someone. If on the other hand the reason was because one was at the crime scene and the other was not, then the act was just, because this is a valid reason to arrest someone.

Even if my position were to have changed, it does not entail that morality is neither absolute nor objective. But regardless, my position has not changed. Can you describe how you think it has changed?

So reason is present in the topic, even if it is not made explicit in every moral actions.

This is question begging nonsense. — charleton

This is merely an opinion or position. An argument is a position backed up by reason.

A MASSIVE error. You omitted children and women. Did you realise that it was international women's day this week? — charleton

I was aware. As previously stated, by 'men', I mean mankind. This is a conventional term in traditional philosophy. Thus I am not omitting children or women. But what is the point to linger on this? Do you want me to apologize? I can if you want. My intent was not to offend anyone.

As I said earlier, "To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only." In your response, neither A nor B are accepting the same treatment from the other. Thus equality in treatment is not preserved.

To generalize: "Equality in treatment in all men" means that for a given situation, a just treatment is determined such that all men must follow it for others and themselves, as well as from others. This is really nothing more than the golden rule.

Haters gonna hate, but not philosophize. :groan:

I don't say morality is subjective. I say that moral feelings, impulses, attitudes, judgments, values, ends.... vary from one person and from one cultural context to another, though it seems there are common biological bases to all that variety, rooted in our nature as human animals. — Cabbage Farmer

I agree. Inasmuch as if the human eye sees an object, it is likely that the object seen is real, so it can be that if humans have a moral feeling, it is likely that it points to a real morality. That said, I do not use this argument in the OP.

For instance, if a man assaults anyone who looks at him crooked, I don't call his action "just" and "good" in light of the fact that he treats all his victims the same. — Cabbage Farmer

You omit that equality in treatment in all men includes the very man treating others too. If the man wouldn't want others to treat him the way he treats others, then he is not just, because he treats himself differently than he treats others.

All we know is, a concept of equality or proportionality must factor into the characterization somehow. But how? And what else can or must factor into our characterization of justice? — Cabbage Farmer

See example 2 in the OP. Justice can be relative to the factors that determine the act. Those factors are found rationally. As long as for a given rational factor, everyone is treated equally, then justice is done.

One of us says the pieces should be the same size. Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers. [...] — Cabbage Farmer

In example 1, you omitted the phrase "all else being equal". This example was intentionally over-simplified to introduce the concept. Example 2 gets more complex and introduces the factors you mention. If you have a valid argument to introduce a factor that makes justice relative to it, then the acts remain just as long as everyone involved is treated equally relative to those factors.

As I've argued above: Even if we grant that the morality or "goodness" of an act can be evaluated purely in terms of a conception of justice, and even if we grant that equality or proportionality is essential to any conception of justice, it has not been shown that there is an objective standard by which to arrive at a single noncontroversial definition of justice adequate to this purpose. — Cabbage Farmer

Justice: equality in treatment in all men, even when it is relative to some factors which were arrived at rationally. The factors are determined through objective reasoning; the persons are compared against those factors objectively; therefore justice is determined objectively.

The principle of the matter can co-exist, though. If I and everyone treated everyone and themselves exactly as they pleased there is nothing contradictory in that. It's completely equitable in that everyone is treating people in the same manner. Whether we succeed is another matter altogether. — Moliere

Let's use an example. Person A wants to live. Person B wants person A to die. How do either person A or B can act so that the equality in treatment is preserved at all times?

To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only. But the two behaviours cannot co-exist mutually because what pleases you does not necessarily coincide with what pleases others. Therefore this behaviour is incompatible with justice.

The first thing that strikes is the word "men". These days in most civilised societies justice is also offered to women. Odd that you you should hold such an outdated notion. — charleton

Justice should also be offered to children you know; why are you omitting children? :joke:
By 'men', I mean mankind. A minor misunderstanding.

Secondly, you strangely use the word "all". I suggest that there is not a single society that has offered justice to all men and women, let alone 'all men'. — charleton

You may be right, but that would merely suggest that no society is completely just; not that justice is subjective.

Third, I think you have a big task ahead if you think that people who the society deeds as worthy of justice, shall receive that justice equally. — charleton

Are you saying that just people are not necessarily treated justly? Once again, you may be right, but that only speaks of the injustice in the world; it does not entail that justice is subjective. Since morality is about 'what-ought-to-be' and not about 'what-is', you cannot defend or attack a morality based on historical facts.

As per example 2 in the OP, justice can be relative to some rational factors. In this case, it is relative to how starving some people are. Giving unequal pieces of cake relative to how starving people are can still result in equality in treatment, because anyone would get a larger piece if that person was starving too.

To generalize, we can always rely on the golden rule: "I should treat others in a way I would like to be treated if I were in their situation". This is always just, because you treat others as equal to you.

Yeah thanks. I think you are correct that I could have used the term 'fairness' in this case too. I think 'justice' is the more general term to account for the treatment of all beings, and 'fairness' is the more narrow term to account for the treatment of beings of the same species only. E.g. It is fair to treat all men as equal, and it is just to treat man as man and animals as animals.

Killing someone as a revenge might be just, but not moral. — BlueBanana

If by 'revenge' you mean "a desire for justice (and nothing beyond it)", then it is not immoral. But if you mean "a desire that goes beyond justice (i.e. swinging the pendulum the other way)", then it is immoral, but also unjust because you are now treating the victim differently than how you would want to be treated.

I don't see how that is unequal just because there's someone deciding about the nature of that equal treatment. — BlueBanana

To impose your desires on others against their will results in unequal treatment.

Another example, what if you can choose to help one person or multiple people, but if you only help the one person, their gain from the help is greater than the combined gain of the multiple people? — BlueBanana

This case is similar to example 2 in the OP. The justice is relative to the predicted net gain, and this does not entail unequal treatment, because if the predicted gain was equal in both options, then I would help everyone equally.

The practical solution is found through the Golden Rule: "How can I act in a way that I would want others to act towards me?". The golden rule is directly derived from justice, because it demonstrates an equal treatment between yourself and others.

So I'm arguing that objectivity as a criterion tends to imply a quantitative, rather than qualitative, judgement. — Wayfarer

I agree that what is quantitative is objective, but a thing does not need to be quantitative to be objective. The proposition "what is not quantitative is not objective" is itself not quantitative, which would make it not objectively true; thus making it a self-contradiction.

Say you're adjudicating a dispute between claimants to native title of some lands against an industrial interest that wants to develop them for commercial reasons. [...] — Wayfarer

Your example points to a moral problem that is challenging, but not subjective. Any judgement which has an objective criterion implies a 'better' or 'worse', depending on how close it gets to meet that criterion. Judgements with subjective criteria don't enter the realm of 'better' or 'worse'. In your example, while the ideal solution may be challenging to attain, there are nevertheless solutions which are clearly better or worse. E.g., siding with one of the two parties is clearly better than kicking both parties off to build your own private mansion. Therefore the problem remains objective.

Regarding 'impartiality': I agree that it has a place in the topic, but it is not incompatible with 'objectivity'. I argue that a judge must remain impartial precisely because the criterion of judgement is objective.

Subjective. — charleton

Are you saying the definition of justice is subjective? Definitions of concepts are always objective. If not the case, then the Socratic Method of finding correct definitions would be in vain. At worst, you could say that my definition is wrong and then proceed to explain why.

Alright. What if the information told by your conscience contradicts the information told be somebody else's conscience. The usual way to resolve a conflict is through reasoning.

But if you claim that conscience informs you without the use of reason, then it seems you are told what to do, by the conscience, without understanding the reason why it is morally good. In which case, how could you know that the information is morally good, and not information rising from some selfish desire?

What would be an example from your experience?