I mentioned it only to remind you that we're establishing a scenario that does not presuppose either LFW or compatibilism. You had said, "I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step." — Relativist

LFW or compatibilism are not presupposed. As quoted below, you said that intent implies agency. I responded that it does not if there is no initial step.

Acting with intent implies agency. — Relativist

We have spent enough time establishing common grounds. You know where my disagreement lies: You believe that compatibilism allows for agency; I believe it does not because agency implies an initial step from the agent as per this article, and I see no initial step under compatibilism. You have attempted to defend it by showing here that the person has causal efficacy, and while that's true, it is different than an initial step. If you can one day defend that there is an initial step under compatibilism, then we can chat again.

So...even if LFW is true, there was no initial step? — Relativist

I thought we were setting aside any mentions of LFW/compatibilism. :wink:
Since you're asking... LFW allows the causal chain to branch out to multiple paths. Making choice A, between A and B, initiates path A.

There were external influences, such as the discussion we're having, but no one else demanded, encouraged, or even suggested I raise my arm at that time. — Relativist

Not under compatibilism. Since your decision was determined, we could say the factors demanded (better yet, compelled) that you raise your arm.

My decision, (and only my decision) was the direct cause of the arm lifting. My thought processes (and only my thought processes), was the direct cause of the decision. — Relativist

As previously stated, this does not imply agency. Cog B, and only cog B, is the direct cause of the movement of cog C, yet cog B is not an agent.

I’ll respond either tomorrow or Sunday.

Alright. Let's remove the word "necessitated". That decision was caused by prior factors - my response, your beliefs, mood, etc. I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step.

The fact that I made the decision is important, because without that - I wouldn't have lifted my arm. — Relativist

Sure. And in a system of cogs A, B, C, cog B is also important for cog C to move; but it is not an initial step.

But that decision was necessitated by prior factors - my response, your beliefs, mood, etc. I see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step.

Which step in the process is the initial step?

I accept that the arm-lifting was intentional. But I believe another criteria for agency is the capacity to initiate an action. Can you defend that the action was initiated by you?

So far so good. Where do we go from here?

I agree with the description up to and including "I lift my arm once I realize the alarm is sounding."

After that, ...

We know the arm-lifting action is initiated by the firing of neurons — Relativist

The arm lifting is caused by the firing of neurons. Why do you call it "initiated"? It is not the start of a causal chain, or the start of a branch of a previous causal chain.

Alright, let's reset and find some common ground. I dropped the points that I believe are not essential.

Yes, the factors (beliefs, dispositions, moods...) all apply in the decision making.
Yes, LFW implies contingency; and determinism is not compatible with LFW.

You are missing the point! Make no assumption at all, and just explain what seems to be going in in your mind. — Relativist

I genuinely don't know what you are asking if I did not do it correctly last time. Can you do it first? Then I will do the same.

I'm afraid we are making very little progress. Here's an attempt at answering a few objections but I'm not hopeful we will reach an agreement and we may have to call it quits soon.

Because of our moral sensibilities- the emotions we feel when considering the acts. — Relativist

We can feel emotions about dog behaving badly as well, and judgement does not follow from mere emotions. The fact is that we consistently judge humans to be morally evil when misbehaving (not dogs), and moral evil is not compatible with determinism.

You erroneously assume moral "motives" can't exist under compatibilism, you ignore the many complex factors involved with developing our various tastes, wants, and even our beliefs about morality. I described some of the details on my last post, and you simply ignored it. Did you even read it? — Relativist

I think you misunderstand my argument, as I do believe that moral motives can exist under compatibilism, and this is not my point. But I don't want to spend more time trying to clarify it, so let's drop it.

Yes, I read all your posts. I don't comment on every line because that would take too long, but in general, my view is that adding more determined factors to the explanation does not resolve the issue. In the end, each factor is nothing but a cog in a large system of cogs.

This is problematic, because there's no evidence of any causally efficacious factors in the world that are NOT deterministic — Relativist

You forgot your original point of this topic. Pasted below. I'm just responding to the objection that God must exist if we have LFW. After that, yes, LFW is not compatible with determinism and I reject determinism.

OK, let's not assume God. Early in the discussion, you agreed that ontological contingency requires a source of contingency. If there's no God, then human life came to exist as a product of deterministic laws of nature. A deteministic law cannot be a source of ontological contingency. Case closed. — Relativist

Of course not. There's no reason to think an OG has the capacity for intentional behavior and to make decisions. — Relativist

The OG's actions cannot be determined from prior causes, being the first cause. So if its actions are also not free, then what are they?

I don't know what you're looking for, because it seems self-evident. So it would be best if you describe the process as you perceive it during the act, . Needless to say, don't assume LFW in your description — Relativist

Okay, I will assume determinism and not LFW. When a person raises their arm, all the mental processes originate from factors outside the person, just like the computer booting up originates from a person pressing the power button. In both cases, the event is not initiated by the object acting the event. Under determinism, the only initiator is the OG, and every subsequent object is just a cog.

It is appropriate to hold oneself (or another person) accountable for a bad act because we know he could have chosen not to do it. Here's how he could have: if he had a stronger disposition to do good, [...] he would not have done it — Relativist

In other words, we reward and penalize certain behaviours as a form of conditioning, like training dogs to behave a certain way. This objection is addressed in the video. This explains our rules on a societal level but it does not explain why we praise or blame people on a personal level. There's a difference between judging a dog and judging an (adult) human for acting badly. We judge the dog as poorly trained, but we judge the human as being morally wrong or evil.

It's PRECISELY why we perceive that we could have made a different choice. To deny this, you would have to assume that fantasizing about a past choice entails a perfect duplication of the mental conditions that led to the decision. If it is NOT perfect, then it is not a valid basis for claiming this is a good reason to believe a different choice was actually possible. — Relativist

Conceiving valid thought experiments is not impossible. For one thing, we don't need to simulate every factor; we can just use the mental factors we currently have (current mood, beliefs, etc.) and only need to imagine a simple situation.

Additionally, as described in the video, we perceive freedom differently between cases with only one type of motive (e.g. ice cream vs ice cream) and cases with multiple types of motives (e.g. ice cream vs charity). In the latter, we perceive to be free, where as in the former, we do not.

If there's no God, then human life came to exist as a product of deterministic laws of nature. A deteministic law cannot be a source of ontological contingency. — Relativist

I can only grant you that LFW came from something other than deterministic laws. After that, to claim that this something must be an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God is jumping to conclusions.

As a side note, would you not agree that an OG would necessarily have LFW? Since it is the first cause, its actions cannot be determined by any prior cause.

It sounds ludicrous to claim I do not initiate the raising of my arm. — Relativist

Can you further explain what you mean by "initiate"? For example, when a computer boots up because a person pressed the power button, who initiated the event—the person, the computer, or something else?

Simply declaring that LFW accounts for other, non-actual, possibilities ignores these mental processes. — Relativist

These mental processes are not ignored in LFW. They are part of the decision mechanism but they only serve to inform, not compel. The mental process serves to predict the end goal of the choice, called motive. If there is no conflict between two types of motive, then the decision mechanism is very much as you described under compatibilism, i.e., the strongest motive wins. But if there a conflict between two types of motive, i.e. pleasure vs moral duty, then the agent is free to choose between the two motives.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency. — Relativist

This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors. As an analogy: In a mathematical formula, the result may change if the variables in the formula change; but for a given set of variables, we do not expect more than one possible result.

To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists. — Relativist

This is not necessary. The current topic is only to determine whether LFW exists; and we can know that something exists without knowing where it comes from, which is a different topic. Also, many people who believe in LFW do not believe in God.

You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd. — Relativist

I don't dispute that B has causal efficacy. I dispute that B has agency, as agency requires the capacity to initiate an action, and B does not initiate the action.

You ignore the fact that every part of a person has been caused even under your paradigm. — Relativist

Yes, there is a cause to our existence, including our power of free will. But once we have it, it gives us the power to initiate an action. LFW allows us to select between choices A and B, i.e., to initiate the action to actualize contingent world A or B.

But how can a person have actually made a decision that differs from the one actually made? I have been arguing that, irrespective of LFW or compaitibilism, our choices are made due to a set of mental factors, and that GIVEN those factors, no alternative decisions are possible. Can you falsify this? — Relativist

Alternative decisions are possible if we have the power of LFW which gives us exactly that: the ability to make alternative decisions. This power would be irreducible to any underlying mechanism, otherwise it would not be free.

I could provide arguments to defend LFW, but to understand them, it is best to first understand the scope and limitations of LFW. For that, I recommend watching the video on free will. Sorry to keep pushing it, but I think it's the fastest way to describe LFW. It's 20 min long but you can just watch the first 12 minutes.

I choose to lift my arm, and voilà : my arm lifts. I can initiate this action any time I like. I am lifting it, not forces outside of me. — Relativist

There are no physical forces outside of you but all the factors that necessitate your actions originate from outside of you.

This contradicts omniscience. Omniscience entails knowledge without a process of learning or observing. — Relativist

There are different views on God's omniscience. To obtain omniscience through observing (at least for knowledge about free willed behaviours) is still a form of omniscience. And God can still be omniscient at all times if He stands outside of time.

Thanks for sharing the view about Molinism; I did not know about this. At first glance, it sounds promising.

Either these things necessitate the decision, or there is some randomness to the decision. — Relativist

Libertarian free will (LFW) and randomness are similar in that they are both free (i.e. not determined), but a free-willed behaviour is ordered towards a deliberate end where as randomness is not. You can see a diagram in this video at time 0:51.

agency entails
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-reflection on, and caring about, our actions — Relativist

Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.

I'm also curious how you account for free will given God's foreknowledge. — Relativist

God's foreknowledge does not entail fate; rather, He observes us in the future as though it is happening in real time. As an analogy ... suppose we have LFW and I videotape your free-willed behaviour for one day. If I watch the video, I foreknow what your behaviour in the video will be since I already observed it. This does not change the fact that we have LFW.

From birth, onward- we learn, establishing knowledge that influences our thinking. The collection of all these things (central nervous system, innate cognitive ability, memories, conditioned responses, etc are what makes us who we are. — Relativist

Not an argument against compatibilism, but for info, under libertarian free will, all these things are real and they inform and influence our decisions but do not compel - like a king listening to his advisers, the free will has the final say.

Identify this alleged inconsistency. — Relativist

In summary, real metaphysical agency (not merely the perception of agency) necessitates freedom, i.e. contingency. Since necessitarianism does not allow for contingency, it is not compatible with real metaphysical agency. I don't believe I can explain why any better than what I have done previously, so if you disagree, we can just agree to disagree.

I only brought the word "soul" because you brought it up in your previous comment. If it does not speak to you, we can just drop the word entirely and simply use "will". Regardless, the point remains that the definition of libertarian free will does not match the definition of compatibilist free will.

So you're simply stipulating that a soul exists, and on this basis - you "prove" a god exists. — Relativist

The OP does not presuppose the existence of souls. The current discussion on free will is more like a tangential topic.

To be clear, I have not been trying to convince you that compatibilism is true. Rather, I'm explaining my point of view. You reject it, and that's fine - I realize my position is inconsistent with theism. — Relativist

I understand that your position is inconsistent with theism and that's fine, but as per the second paragraph in my previous comment, your position is also inconsistent with the existence of any real metaphysical agency - which you seem to believe in.

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)"
— A Christian Philosophy

This definition matches a compatibilist definition of free will. Our choices are entirely the product of internal factors (whims, beliefs, desires, needs...). — Relativist

Here is one misunderstanding. When you speak of "internal factors", I think you mean any factors inside the body: beliefs, desires, genes, etc; and by "external factors" you mean things in the environment. I mean something else: Imagine we have a libertarian free will - we can also call it a soul for the sake of clarity. In this context, any cause other than our free will or soul is an "external factor" and it includes not only the environment but also beliefs, desires, genes, etc. In that light, my definition of libertarian free will does not match a compatibilist definition of free will.


Secondly, I dispute that necessitarianism is compatible with intentions, free choice, control, and agency. Consider the statement "water streams look for the path of least resistance". The word "look" is used here in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, water streams do not literally look for anything as they are just molecules driven by gravity and friction.

Likewise, under necessitarianism, we might say we have intentions, free choices, control, and agency; but only in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, there is no real intention, free choice, control, or agency since everything is just a cog in a large system.

Given the lack of progress in the discussion, it's possible we are not going to reach an agreement. I can try a few more times to show why I disagree but then we may have to call it quits.

Compatilists refer to the "principle of alternate future possibilities" — Relativist

Necessitarianism does not allow for alternate future possibilities, right?

Your choices seem free to you, I'm sure. You agreed the decision process is consistent with the PSR, so exactly what can you show to be inconsistent with determinism? — Relativist

My choices seem free, and compatibilist free will is consistent with the PSR. But under necessitarianism and compatibilism, no choice is actually free. Thus, necessitarianism and compatibilism are inconsistent with the observation that my choices seem free.

I agree that we have real agency, and yet this is not possible under necessitarianism where all actions from every part, like cogs, are necessary.

I agree that fatalism is a wrong view, and yet under necessitarianism, we have no power over future events since the future is fixed.

I'm pointing out that because decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. — Relativist

Sure. I accept the burden of proof to defend the existence of libertarian free will. For now, I'll continue to argue that compatibilist free will leads to fatalism.

Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur. — Relativist

B is essential for C to occur, but this does not dismiss fatalism. E.g. cog A is connected to cog B which is connected to cog C. Cog B is essential for cog C to spin, but cog B has no control over the outcome. Adding complexity to the system, like a computer process or a compatibilist mental process, does not change the fact that there is no control from any of the parts.

I understand your view of compatibilism but I don't understand why this does not entail fatalism. If all choices are the product of factors (internal or external) and all these factors are caused by something else, then all our choices are caused by something else. Given a specific set of factors, all originating outside of ourselves, the outcome is inevitable.

I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. — Relativist

In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR.
Libertarian free will is defined as: "the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)". Since the "ability to choose freely" is contained in the definition of libertarian free will, then the explanation for our free choice exists inherently in the power of free will (reason type 3 in the OP).

Another way to say the same thing: if we suppose that we have the power of libertarian free will, then how do we explain our ability to choose without being compelled by external factors? Answer: because we have the power of free will; that's precisely what the power is supposed to do.

More details are provided in the following video: https://youtu.be/k_PoOKDVUdc
The full video is 21 minutes long, but you can skip to timestamp 15:28 for this specific topic.

After doing a bit of research, it seems that modal collapse or necessitarianism is problematic because it removes the freedom that seems intuitive in metaphysics, possible outcomes, decision-making, responsibility, etc. Let's take your example:

"If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred. Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X."
The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion. "I should" becomes "I will (or not)". Why make an effort to learn, grow, or improve if the future is fixed?

So even though we can conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions, I dispute that this would have any use, even for future cases.

My understanding is that modal collapse or necessitarianism is not strictly speaking impossible, but it is undesirable because it leads to absurd conclusions. It trivializes modal reasoning, and modal logic would be reduced to only very specific applications that would not be metaphysically true. As such, necessitarianism is best to be avoided if possible.

I believe in a hard version of the PSR: everything must have a reason/explanation/ground. No exception; not for the fundamental laws of nature or for the PSR itself.

The fundamental laws of nature do not exist necessarily and so must have an external reason to exist.
The PSR has an internal reason to exist (reason type 3). As defended in this post, the PSR is a principle of metaphysics which means it is part of the fabric of reality. And the statement "a thing that is part of the fabric of reality exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.

This [purpose] is automatically true if you presuppose PSR. This should be true for all types, not necessarily requiring a free-will system. — PartialFanatic

A thing that exists or occurs out of necessity (reasons type 1 and 3) do not need a purpose to explain why they exist or occur. E.g., a water stream looks for the path of least resistance, not purposely but simply out of causal necessity from the laws of nature such as gravity and friction.

In addition, I feel there is a lack of distinction between existential reason (reason for existence) and purpose (reason to exist) in "Man itself" section, although I feel that it is irrelevant to the core argument. — PartialFanatic

I believe these are the same as what is described in the OP as efficient cause and final cause. Indeed, if man is designed, then they would have a reason for existence (efficient cause) as well as a reason to exist (final cause). They would also have the other two causes: material cause (a physical body) and formal cause (a design).

That god can create any possible world does not explain why he created this one. And if god created this world out of necessity, then it could not be other than it is. Modal collapse. — Banno

As per the OP, there are 3 types of reasons that fulfill the PSR. Reasons type 1 and type 3 are necessary reasons. Type 2 is a contingent reason and applies to agents with free will. As long as the agent has a purpose to decide what they decide, then the PSR is fulfilled, despite the choice being contingent. In our case, the OG would have a purpose to stipulate the actual world, even if that purpose is unknown to us.

I agree that IF libertarian free will exists, then it is a source of contingency. Would you agree that IF quantum collapse is indeterminate, the it is a source of contingency? — Relativist

Yes, I agree with that in theory.

Conceiving of a counterfactual world does not imply that world is physically or metaphysically possible. — Relativist

I suppose that's true; just like we are able to talk about impossible worlds. Nevertheless, modal collapse should still be avoided when we talk about metaphysically possible worlds.

There is no source of contingency in the physical world to account for the counterfactual 2-moon earth. — Relativist

Still struggling to see how the laws of motion would dictate that the Earth couldn't have two satellites, when other planets do. — Wayfarer

My two cents. I think what Relativist is saying is that, assuming deterministic laws of nature, then there would have been no possibility of having two moons in the past or in the present because it did not happen. But there could still be two moons orbiting the Earth in accordance to deterministic laws of nature in the future. E.g., the current moon splits in two; another large body passes by and starts orbiting the Earth; etc.

An agent having the power of free will implies two things.
1. The agent has many things to choose from (in this case, many possible worlds can be designed).
2. The agent can select one of the many things at will (select to design the actual world).

Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny — Relativist

If the main point of point 2 is to describe out contingency would work, then I accept the description. I would then also add free will as another possible way to get contingency.

Overall, it seems we are almost in agreement, except for the possibility of inherent existence and quantum. I'm not hopeful on reaching an agreement on quantum but it may be worth spending more time discussing the possibility of inherent existence.

The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world. — Relativist

How could that be? If we found out that all outcomes in the actual world occur out of necessity, then conceiving a possible world with some different outcome would necessarily have a logical error in it.

If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

I agree that the ontological grounding (OG) must exist necessarily and so it is the same in all possible worlds. But now we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), and have a possible explanation for the actual world (it was freely chosen) even if the specifics of that explanation are not known to us.



I agree with your points 1, 3, 4, and 5.
I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion.
I choose point 7 over 6 but I must change it slightly:

7. If you are committed to an OG, then you should reject any version of a PSR that requires everything to have an explanation. You could accept "necessary" and/or "autonomous" as sufficient explanation. — Relativist

I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier.

That's logically impossible. There can be no explanation for an OG. It must exist autonomously - not dependent on anything else. But since the OG is not contingent, it exists necessarily — Relativist

What kind of necessity are you referring to? There are only two kinds of necessity: internal and external; that is, logical (or inherent) necessity and causal necessity. You correctly reject causal necessity because the OG has no cause. It follows that it has existence by logical or inherent necessity. Existence by inherent necessity fulfills the PSR and is not dependent on anything else.

Tautologies refers to PROPOSITIONS, not to existents. — Relativist

It's both. Tautologies are necessarily true, and truth means conformance to reality. Thus, the outcomes from tautologies occur in reality. E.g. "2+2=4" is a tautology because II and II are inherently found in IIII. And sure enough, two and two of anything results in four of that thing in reality. Not just in our world but all possible worlds. On the other hand, outcomes described by the laws of nature also occur in reality, but these laws are not tautologies and so these outcomes do not occur in all possible worlds.

Since quantum indeterminacy is likely to be real, you have a choice: reject the PSR outright, or accept the probabilistic result of a quantum collapse as adequately explained. — Relativist

The solution to the QI vs PSR problem is discussed in this post. There is a long and a short answer. The short answer is that quantum experts themselves claim "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics", and something that nobody understands cannot be used as a valid argument for or against anything.


It sounds like you believe in the PSR but allow some exceptions. This is problematic because how do we decide when exceptions are made? You made an exception for the OG, but could have just as easily made one for the laws of nature directly, which would end the discussion right there.

Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. This is done by the OG having existence inherently, such that the statement "this being-that-inherently-exists exists" is a tautology, and is therefore self explained. I presume you agree with that given what you said:

Whatever it is, the OG cannot have been caused, because it's a first cause. Can an uncaused thing be contingent? To be contingent, something must account for that contingency - such as its cause (whatever caused it, might have not caused it). But if it exists uncaused then I suggest it must exist necessarily - any OG must exist necessarily. — Relativist

This self explanation does not apply to the laws of nature because they are not tautologies, i.e., they can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction.


Modal collapse: Modal collapse is often used to critique arguments like the ontological argument for the existence of God (source), which shows that it is commonly agreed to be a weakness.


Quantum indeterminacy (QI): QI is incompatible with the PSR. QI allows for outcomes to occur without reason, and this goes against the PSR that demands a sufficient reason for everything that exists or occurs. I presume you agree with that as well based on your statement quoted above. Indeterminate outcomes are contingent, and thus something must account for that contingency.

That's because a natural OG, which includes the laws of nature in its structure, would exist necessarily. — Relativist

Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they are contingent facts that need an explanation outside of themselves, i.e., a cause. As such, the OG which has no cause cannot include the laws of nature in its structure.

Additionally, if the OG has necessary existence, it must be the OG in all possible worlds. Thus, if the OG included the laws of nature in its structure, then the same laws of nature would exist in all possible worlds and this would result in a modal collapse.

It's logically impossible for an OG to have been designed. — Relativist

Agreed, but what I meant was that the OG is a designer that designs the laws of nature, not that the OG is designed.

If there is a designer with free will, it could design creatures that lack it, so it seems irrelevant whether not the designer has free will. — Relativist

I agree that a thing with free will can design creatures that have or lack free will. I'm not sure what this is in response to.

Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. — Relativist

Yes, I agree that there is an OG.

You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. — Relativist

I am unclear from your comment whether you agree with the conclusion from the OP, that the fundamental laws of nature must be designed. If so, then we can infer that the OG has the faculty of being a designer; which in turn implies a free will, because beings that are not free cannot produce things out of design.

We have a choice here, not about whether rocks sleep so much as about how we use the word "rock". — Banno

Okay, that makes sense!

So, in no possible world is there a rock that is asleep or awake, and so no world is accessible in which the rock is awake. — Banno

This is nitpick, but is the definition of "rock" so clear and tight that it cannot allow for the logical possibility of a rock being asleep or awake? I'm thinking of Rock Biter in the movie The NeverEnding Story.

Interesting. Yeah, I can see how excluding the law of excluded middle makes sense in database programming.

To be honest, I still don't fully agree with your view on the fundamental laws of logic. But I enjoyed the chat. Cheers!

Right. My last comment could have been clearer. What I meant was "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half empty", where empty is contradictory with full.

Anyway, I don't want to linger on this topic for too long, so I'll leave it here. Thanks for the chat!

Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone.

As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words.

Here is my point again in a syllogism:

P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM.

I'd still argue that adding the mode "possibly" does not violate the law of excluded middle (LEM). LEM says "either P or not P, and no third option". Granted, we can have "possibly P" or "possibly not P". But this is different than "P" or "not P" because "P" and "not P" are saying different things, where as "possibly P" and "possibly not P" are saying the same thing in different ways. E.g., the statements "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" and "there will possibly not be a sea battle tomorrow" have the same meaning.