The problem I see with your interpretation of the story of the fall is that it sounds like this advent of knowledge and self-consciousness is a good thing; a natural evolution of the species progressing towards a higher state. In the christian interpretation however, the event of the fall is the reverse; the fall of a great species down to a lower state. It is so catastrophic that it took the blood of the son of God to redeem the species (and even then we will only see the effects after death).

I understand that there is room for interpretation of symbols such as for the tree of knowledge, but there is no discussing that the event is a bad one.

I admit that this infamous tree of knowledge of good and evil does suggest that Adam and Eve acquired the knowledge of good and evil only after eating the fruit. But it would be absurd to believe that the original sin resulted from mere bad luck of committing an evil act they had no knowledge of. Even C.S. Lewis, one of the big boss of christian philosophy, is perplexed at the role of the tree itself in the event, and just ignores that part. Who am I to disagree with sir Lewis?

I interpret the ‘fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil’ to be a symbolic reference to the advent of self-consciousness — Wayfarer

Well upon realizing they were naked, they indeed became self-conscious.

I reject with the conventional definition of morality(as a code of conduct). I also reject the objective/subjective distinction, as you already know... — creativesoul

Ah yes! Hello again.

Murder is wrongful killing by definition. — creativesoul

I don't disagree. Did I say that murder was sometimes not wrongful? Otherwise, accidental killing is not wrongful, as it is accidental, and killing is not necessarily murder.

I am not sure what you mean by this; but how do you know that God does not have a sense of humour? Jesus' first miracle was to turn water into wine at a party. I find that humorous personally.

All codes of conduct are man-made. If morality is a code of conduct, then all morality is man-made. Universal and objective are not equivalent on my view. — creativesoul

But then how do you explain the fact that is it universal? All other things man-made seem to differ depending on time period, place, culture and so on; does it not?

Doing something other than what one was told to do(in the case of Adam and Eve) was evil prior to their becoming aware of it. God is the arbiter of good and evil in the story. — creativesoul

In christianity, God is not above goodness (i.e. he arbitrarily chooses what is good and evil), but he is goodness, that is, goodness is part of his essence. This is how christians escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

That's ethics, and again those are not objective. Rather they are subject to historical, familial, and cultural particulars. Attempted murder is punishable by law, because it is an act that we - as a community of people - have decided is unacceptable. — creativesoul

I admit I use the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' interchangeably, as I don't know what the difference is. But how can one disagree that attempted murder is unethical? Would you like to be the target? Would anyone? If not, then it is unethical by applying the Golden Rule.

As for unbaptised infants - that is what ‘limbo’ was supposed to be the solution for, although as I understand it, this has now been deprecated in Catholic theology. — Wayfarer

As I see it, there are only two logical outcomes: saying yes to God or saying no to God. The former is the state called heaven; the latter is the state called hell. There is one more transitional state called purgatory, which can be symbolized as the time it takes for the subject to make up his mind over the other two choices. But I cannot see limbo as a logical possibility, unless it is also temporary.

But I suppose on reflection one of the reasons that Catholics might oppose abortion, is that it prevents an infant from receiving the opportunity of salvation. — Wayfarer

This might be a secondary reason; the primary reason is simply that humans have ontological value and should not be harmed if it can be avoided.

Yes, but not in the strict sense of picking evil for the sake of being evil. I am optimistic that most people are not made of pure evil. Rather, picking evil is done as a means to the end of obtaining another good. This good cannot be a moral good (that would be a contradiction) but ultimately a physical or emotional good. E.g. 1: Hitler knew that his treatment of the Jews was evil, and it is reasonable to suppose he did so as a relief of his hatred for the Jews. This relief of hatred is a form of emotional good. E.g. 2: I know that giving money to charity is morally good, but I am tempted to avoid it because it would result in less money for me to buy physical goods.

P1 is false. Morality is a conventionally defined as a code of conduct. — creativesoul

If intention is not a necessary component of morality, how do we account for the fact that attempted murder is punishable by law? If only attempted, then there is no actual murder that occurred.

P2 mistakenly presupposes that the quality of an intention is existentially contingent upon the subject's knowledge of that quality. It's not. As if an intention's being evil/good requires the subject's knowing that. It doesn't. An intention is good/evil regardless of the subject's awareness/knowledge of that. One can have evil intentions and not be aware/knowledgable that they are. — creativesoul

How can I intend to do x if I don't know what x is? E.g. how can I intend to draw a quasar if I don't know what a quasar is? I suppose I could do end up drawing one by accident, by continuously drawing random lines, but then it would still be unintentional.

What counts as objective morality? — creativesoul

I mean to say that it is part of objective reality, not man-made.

I personally argue for universal morality, but it doesn't seem to be fitting to this thread's intentions... — creativesoul

It is fitting in the sense that universal (objective) morality is assumed in my argument. But more than that, I try to prove that its knowledge must be innate for it to apply to us.

following Augustine, holds that man is corrupted by sin, the result of which is death, and the only remission of which comes from faith in Jesus Christ. — Wayfarer

What you write is correct. But this 'corruption by sin' refers to the corruption of the body, from immortal to mortal and prone to physical suffering, and corruption of the appetite such as physical and emotional passions. It does not refer to going from a state of pure goodness to the ability to be evil. Salvation by Jesus is salvation from death and removal of the original sin which we carry similar to a birth mark; but even then, we still have the capacity of choosing against good, due to free will, and picking hell over God.

The Church recognises 'virtuous pagans' such as Plato et al, however, I'm fairly sure that they're not 'in heaven'. — Wayfarer

I am no theologian, but this idea seems absurd to me. If true, then an infant dying right after birth would end up in hell because it did not have time to 'know' Jesus.

That is precisely my point about your previous argument: Beauty is in the subject because it is a value; and values are things in the subject. We can simplify by saying "beauty is in the subject because it is in the subject". This is circular. How do you know it is only a value?

But to say that "beauty is a feeling in the subject because it is a value judgement" is begging the question, because value judgements are made only on things which are not properties of the observed objects.

the will has been corrupted by original sin — Wayfarer

This cannot be. If the will was uncorrupted (incapable of evil) prior to the original sin, then what caused the original sin? No, instead, the will being free from the start was always capable of both good and evil (by definition of free will), and the original sin resulted from choosing evil. And as described in my post, the evil was fully known for it to be a sin. It is not so much the act of eating the apple that corrupted Adam and Eve, as though the apple contained some kind of corrupting substance, but the disobedience towards God, which occurred prior to the act of eating the apple.

So even if we wish to do good, we might be incapable of recognising good, and therefore doing what is good, due to our fallen condition. — Wayfarer

How can one be blamed for a bad outcome if he could not have reasonably foreseen it? E.g. You give me food to bring to the hungry. Subsequently, they die from poison that you had injected in the food. Although I am part of the causal chain of events leading to the bad outcome, how can I be blamed if I had no knowledge of the poison?

It is only by virtue of receiving instruction, and thereby hearing of God’s saving grace - should we choose to accept it - that we then are able to choose what is truly good. — Wayfarer

The Good in christianity is no different than the Good spoken of by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, or Confucius, all of which existed before Christ. The Golden Rule of ethics, which is tightly connected with the Good, "occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition" (source).

I'm late for the discussion, but here is my two cents anyways.
The 'test of imagination', as Chesterton calls it, is useful for determining if a thing or event is logically possible or not: If you can imagine it, then it is logically possible; if not, then not. E.g. I can imagine a unicorn; I cannot imagine a triangle with four sides.

If I understand, your hypothesis is close to Kant's, which claims that the perceived data is modified in the mind, and is therefore different from the raw data from outside the mind? But then how do you explain that when both you and I read the message "Montréal is in Québec", we both perceive the same information, such that we can have a coherent conversation about it? It seems to me that the simplest hypothesis is that we are both observing the same outer object.

Now, that is a good example to work with. Color exists only in minds. You could say that our visual experience is also a feeling. But colors are the result of reflected light interacting with the eye-brain system, and the light is reflected off the object. So color is a relationship between the object, light and our eye-brain system, as color carries information about all these things because they are all a cause of your experience of color.

So, when I say, "The apple is red." I'm really referring to this relationship, not just myself, not just the apple, but the whole relationship - which is objective. The same can be said about the painting, as you only get the feeling of beauty when looking at the painting, so beauty is a relationship between you and the painting. — Harry Hindu

I think you are right that colour is in the mind, if we talk about what is being perceived only, because if the object or subject is travelling at high speed, then the colour perceived may change. But if we talk about the property that reflects only a particular light range, then it is a property of the object, because it is part of it.

We disagree about beauty ONLY if we mean that beauty is a property of the painting. If we are actually referring to our feelings, then we agree. So our disagreement comes from one, or both, of us misspeaking, or making a category error. You and I can still disagree on our theories of reality and our relationship with it, but we would both still be making objective statements about the world, so our disagreement isn't based on a category error, but simply a differing of explanations of the world and our place in it. — Harry Hindu

I agree with you that, in theory, we should not argue about properties of feelings, and should only argue about objective properties of outer reality. But this is still putting the cart before the horse, because some people might still argue about the beauty of the painting, claiming that beauty is in fact a property of outer reality. So far, we have found one solid criteria: touch. I will also add anything that is measurable by an instrument, because instruments cannot be biased with feelings. Thoughts?

My answer would be that you can't reach out and touch beauty on the painting. It's not a thing out there. It's a thing in here. You can reach out and touch the rectangular shape of the painting. — Harry Hindu

I think that is a reasonable answer. I agree with it. But maybe the example was a bit too easy. What about the colour of an object? Touch does not help us differentiate between different colours.

This is why we can agree on the rectangular shape of the painting but not on it's beauty. We can only agree that you find the painting beautiful and I don't. In talking about the beauty of the painting, we are really talking about each of our selves, not the painting, which is why we disagree on the beauty of the painting. In disagreeing, we are referring to each of our different states, one which has beauty and one which doesn't, not the painting. We agree that the painting is rectangular because that is a property of the painting. — Harry Hindu

I agree with everything you say, and that is because this sounds close to my relative-objective test, where I claim subjects cannot disagree on the ranking of degree of objective properties. Now I find it odd coming from you because I think this contradicts the following quote:

Agreement has nothing to do with it. People can agree on things that are just wrong. People agreed that the Earth was flat. Is the Earth flat, or does it only seem that way from our perspective? — Harry Hindu

Yes, it is a relative example. It is a relative objective example. Your own example I quote below is an example of a relative objective statement. You yourself call it objective, and it is describing an object relative to a standard.

The objective truth about snow is that it is colder than 0 centigrade, and that a hot tub is colder than 100degrees centigrade. — charleton

So relative things can be objective at the same time; and therefore to say "snow is colder than hot tubs" is an objective statement. It is either true or false.

I think this is wholly nonsensical. — charleton

Maybe I can help you understand, but I'm gonna need more productive input from you than saying it is nonsensical.

You misunderstood me. I did not ask for your position, but the reason why you have this position. Why do you think that beauty is a mere feeling of the subject, as opposed to a property of the painting; and why do you think 'rectangular' is in turn a property of the painting, and not a mere feeling of the subject? In other words, the title of this discussion: How to determine if a property is objective or subjective?

For me the issue is that language itself is a "container" -- at least to the degree that we believe in translation. Do we think in words? In my experience, we do, with maybe a little wiggle room for some kind of spatial-temporal reasoning. Can we generally strip meaning from its body? It's not so clear. — t0m

You bring a good point, but yet I think we can still think without using words or images, or imagining any other containers. Think of the concept of 'justice'. Can you describe this concept with words? It may be possible but I can't because I don't know its essence yet. Can you use an image for it? The concept itself does not seem to be physical. And yet, the word 'justice' is not a meaningless word, and I'm sure we can all use it correctly to describe a specific situation. This goes to show that we can think about some concepts like 'justice' without having to rely on containers.

I agree that some media or containers are better suited to convey specific types of information, much like it is better to use a picture than to describe a place using words. That said, you could still describe the place using words and convey the same information; it would just take a lot of words.

Perhaps put more simply : It is up to the information processor to establish the identity between the information particulars encountered across multiple mediums. This identity belongs to the interpreted information, not to the information medium, and therefore does not inform us on the medium, which means that this does not contradict the claim that information is material. — Akanthinos

Sorry, I did not understand that paragraph. Could you perhaps rephrase it?

So you don't seem to buy into my Relative-Objective test. In which case, how do you yourself claim that such a property as 'beauty' is only a feeling but a property like 'rectangular' is a real property of the object?

Your contention that "most would find...." is totally humancentric. Even if you could test every human, this would not be objective in the way people want it to mean; regardless of human interest or opinion. — charleton

Then how would you test if a property is objective or not? Otherwise, do you agree with the following example? Some people may not find snow to be that cold, and some others may not find a hot tub to be that hot; but everyone finds a hot tub to be more hot than snow. As such, coldness and hotness are objective properties. They are relative, but still objective, because everyone finds that X is hotter than Y. We don't see that phenomenon with subjective things like beauty.

Sharpness is a value judgement — charleton

Assuming that this is true, this still would not be a proof that it is subjective. There is such a thing as objective values. ;)

How can it be objective and subjective.This is an abuse of language. — charleton

I'll explain. If 'beauty' is subjective, then the statement "This painting is beautiful" says nothing about the object which is the painting, and says everything about the subject, namely that he feels beauty when observing the painting. But then saying "I feel beauty when observing the painting" is now an objective statement, because the property 'feeling beauty' is about the object which is 'I' in that statement.

This is the point which I objected to in this thread. It is physically impossible to strip away the container from the information package, because then the information would be lost. Without the container, there is no information. So the container, which makes the existence of information possible is just as essential as the contents. There is no contents without a container. Therefore it must be accepted that the container is part of the information package. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that with no container, there is no information. But as I have previously stated, it does not follow that the container is an essential property of information, as it could simply be the cause to its existence. Or to use Aristotle's language, the container could be the efficient cause of information, not necessarily its formal cause. And I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook.

Furthermore, we can prove that a container is not essential to information because we can imagine information being acquired directly through telepathy. The fact that we can imagine a thing proves that it is logically possible. And if logically possible, then a container is not an essential property of information.

I honestly don't see a difference between your definition and mine. Regardless, under this definition, it is coherent to use the word 'subjective' when describing a statement such as "this painting is beautiful".

But surely, you see a distinction between the two previously stated sentences A and B, do you not? That A is related to the subject's feelings (what I call subjective), and B is related to the object.

There is evidence to suggest that for every person raised in a 1st world economy, 5-8+ people could be raised without malnutrition or neglect in a 3rd world economy. — XanderTheGrey

Should we really place any moral value on individual human life? Personally I can see no value. — XanderTheGrey

Hello. I see a contradiction between these two statements. If humans have no "moral" (I think you mean ontological) value, then your argument in the first quote has no effect. 1 x 0 = 8 x 0 = 0.

Why would a "good and just" God not destroy the Devil, if the Devil is the sole perpetrator of all evil in the world? — Jamie

Free will. God gave to some of his creatures, namely men and angels, the power of free will. I think it is logically contradictory to give a creature free will, while also decide to destroy the creature as soon as it chooses evil.

Also, the devil is not the sole perpetrator of evil in the world. We create our own evil too. It is possible that the devil influences us into choosing evil, but the decision is ultimately ours. This is once again due to free will.

God kind of opened a big can of worms when he decided to give free will.

I want to summarize what I learned so far on the original post, including the arguments and counter-arguments.

(1) The original post serves to demonstrate that the container of information is a separate thing from the information itself, because while all the properties of the container may fully change (say from purely visual properties of a letter to purely audio properties of a speech), the information does not. In other words, the metadata is a separate thing from the data. It may be that information is dependant on a container as a necessary cause for its existence (at least in our physical universe), but it remains that they are separate things, as an effect is separate from its cause.

(2) By the law of identity, the information stripped of its container is not merely a copy in each separate container, but is in reality one and the same thing, because all the properties that make the information is the same in all containers. The same info is acquired whether it is obtained from a book, an ebook, or an audiobook.

(1) and (2) together should be sufficient to deduce that information is not physical, as a single set of info may be located in many places at the same time; but let’s back it up with another argument.

(3) By the law of conservation of mass and energy, all physical things transmitted from an emitter to a receiver must be lost by the emitter by the same amount that is gained by the receiver. Information does not behave that way because the emitter does not lose the info transmitted. The containers abide to that law, but as previously demonstrated, the info contained is a separate thing from the containers.

Bob’s your uncle.

EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.

I too read this as saying that each particular thing has a particular form associated to it. But I could be misreading it, because my understanding is that forms are generals, not particulars. E.g., particular rocks participate in the one form of rock-ness, and particular rivers participate in the one form of river-ness.

Yes, that is all correct. So subjective means a feeling in the subject when observing the object. And the feeling is itself objective to the subject.

Now for the next question. Consider the following two statements again:
A. "This painting is beautiful."
B. "This painting is rectangular."
We have thus far only assumed that statement A is subjective, and B is objective. But can we back this up? I claim we can by using the Relative-Objective Test, as per the original post.

A. When testing two different paintings, some subjects will observe painting (1) to be more beautiful than painting (2), and some will observe the opposite. Since there is no agreement in the order of degree of beauty, this means that beauty is subjective.

B. When testing two paintings of different shapes (not just size), a large majority of subjects will observe one painting (say painting (1)) to be more rectangular than the other, while the minority (likely blind) will not see a difference; but no one would observe painting (2) to be more rectangular than (1). Since there is an agreement in the order of degree of 'rectangular', (at least no opposite order is observed), this means that 'rectangular' is objective. Thoughts?

I agreed that the input could come from outside the mind. I see no reason to believe that it necessarily does, nor do I see reason to believe that all of the input comes from outside the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are correct about not all concepts coming from outside the mind. Just because I have a concept of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist outside the mind (sadly). Only 'simple impressions' as Hume says, like colours, sounds, and basic shapes, must exist outside the mind.

As for your test, it's as I told you, a matter of whether or not we agree, and often we do not. As I told you, I often disagree with people as to the colour of something. So your test, and the fact that we often disagree about things, indicates that input must come from within the mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes... We are back to that special case when perceptions of objects are false. But if we assume that the perceptions are true (I don't think this is a stretch), then the test would work, would it not? You and I observe a ball and both agree that it has roundness. Conversely, you and I observe a cube and both agree that it does not have roundness.

I still do not understand your use of English. I would not say that I recognize a triangle in the three sided object, I would say that I recognize the three sided object as a triangle. Do you see the difference? I recognize a certain object as a car, or another object as a house, meaning that for me these objects fulfil the conditions required for calling them by those names. I do not see the concept of a car, or the concept of a house within these objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Honestly, I don't see a difference. The concept of X is by definition composed of all and only those properties essential to X. If you recognize a certain object as a car (again assuming no false perceptions), then some of the properties of that object must be essential to the concept of a car; or else, you would not recognize it as such. And if so, then the object has the concept of a car, by definition.

Saying the same thing with math:
Let concept X = A+B
Let observed object Y = A+B+C
Therefore Y = (A+B)+C = X+C

Our concepts can be compared if we find their essential properties, based on our implicit knowledge of them. E.g. my concept of triangle-ness has the following essential properties: 'flat surface' and 'three straight sides'. If yours has the same essential properties, then this proves they are the same.

Finding the essence of concepts from our implicit knowledge of them is basically what Socrates did in Plato's dialogues, sometimes successfully; and this method presupposes that concepts are the same in everyone.

Abstracted things are artificial, and decided upon too. What else, other than a human mind would perform the act of abstraction, and whether the abstraction is correct or not, is decided upon by the human mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought we agreed that the input cannot come from the same place as the output, and that we cannot conceive simple concepts we have not yet observed, as was the case for the blind person not conceiving colours, a deaf person not conceiving sound, and an emotionless person not conceiving sadness. I accept that the abstraction process is happening in the mind, but the input must come from outside. Or else, how would we test that what I conceive as green is the same as what you conceive as green, if not by both of us observing the same colour located outside of our minds?

I don't get this at all. We do not recognize a concept within things. The concept is within the mind, and when we apprehend a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept, we feel justified in calling the thing by the name which corresponds to that concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I understand your distinction between "recognizing a concept within things" and "apprehending a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept". If we apprehend a particular object which has a flat surface with three straight sides, then we recognize a triangle in that object. And if our perceptions are true, then the object truly has triangle-ness as part of it.

Objectivity is only that which is agreeable to a community of humans. — charleton

This might be what happens in practice, but in theory, we are aiming to find properties that exist in things in themselves, even if unachievable.

Regarding your example on sharpness, you may be right that it is not possible to objectively find if a lemon is sharp in the absolute sense, because it is may be a relative term. But while relative, it could still be objective. Let's test it with my Relative-Objective Test (still working on the name): If all subjects were to rank the sharpness of two lemons with different degrees of sharpness, what would happen?

(1) Most would find that lemon A is more sharp than lemon B; the rest would find no difference; and none would find that lemon B is more sharp than lemon A.
(2) Some would find that lemon A is more sharp than lemon B; some would find no difference; and some would find that lemon B is more sharp than lemon A.

If result (1) happens, then sharpness is objective, according to my relative-obejctive test. If result (2) happens, then sharpness is subjective.

I think we are very close to reaching an agreement.

You agree that beauty is a feeling about something and that "subjects" only have feelings, so why say that nothing has beauty in itself? — Harry Hindu

By "nothing has beauty in itself", I mean it in the sense that nothing is beautiful in itself; not that nothing has beauty as a feeling. As you demonstrated, if beauty is a feeling, and this feeling is in the subject, then subjects have beauty. But this is different than saying that subjects are beautiful. I suppose it is a matter of distinction between data and metadata. The 'feeling of beauty' is data within the subject, where as 'being beautiful' would be metadata about the subject. And the latter is false because beauty is only a feeling. Therefore, although I agree that 'feeling of beauty' is an objective statement about the subject, 'being beautiful' is not an objective property; and as such, 'being beautiful' is what we call subjective.

Another thing that can be subjective are statements: E.g. "This painting is beautiful".
In this statement, the object is 'painting', and as we have established, 'beauty' is not about the object but about the subject of the statement; therefore the statement is subjective. Granted, we can change the statement into an objective one without really changing the meaning, as so: "I feel beauty when observing this painting". In this statement, the object is 'I', and the property 'feeling of beauty when ...' is objective. But I still see two challenges that remain:

1. Since we will still use the first type of sentence in our everyday language, it is useful is make the distinction between subjective and objective statements.
2. We don't always need to say "I feel that X is Y" to make sure the statement is objective; as this depends on the property Y. E.g., if the property 'rectangular' is objective (not merely a feeling), then to say "This painting is rectangular" is already an objective statement. It would be pointless to say "I feel this painting is rectangular".

First let's clarify a few things, just in case there is a misunderstanding with these.

1. Words are not concepts. Words point to concepts. Words are man-made and decided upon; concepts are abstracted. The word 'bird' in english is different than the word 'oiseau' in french, yet they both point to the same concept: the flying beaky thing.

2. Just because I claim that concepts have essential properties, it does not follow that the particular thing we observe necessarily has these essential properties too. We could have false perceptions. E.g. a colourblind may observe a grey chair, and thus have 'greyness' in mind at that moment, but it does not follow that the chair is objectively grey.

Now, I will attempt to break down my previous argument in steps:
1. An property of a concept is called essential if, when it is removed, then the concept is no longer present (not recognizable). Conversely, a property is called accidental if the concept remains after the property is removed. This is easy to see: A triangle in which we remove its three sides is no longer a triangle; therefore 'three sides' is an essential property of triangle-ness. Conversely, a triangle in which we remove its colour remains a triangle; and therefore colour is an accidental property of triangle-ness.
2. The fact is that we recognize a concept in some things X, and not in other things Y.
3. This means that properties of that concept exist in X and not in Y.
4. If all the properties in X were accidental to the concept, then the concept would still be present in Y, as established in step 1; but it is not.
5. Therefore some of the properties found in X are essential properties of the concept.

To answer you question directly, I too think 'beauty' is just a feeling. That is a consequence of it being subjective (which we assumed). This also means that nothing has beauty in itself, as it is always a feeling within the subject when observing the object. And if nothing has beauty in itself, then it is never an objective property.

My question for you is, do you know of a way to find if a property is objective or subjective?

The point is. that things are only "wet" because we call them "wet". That constitutes "the fact" that some things are wet, we agree to call them wet. If we didn't call them wet, then there would be no fact that they are wet. If we agree to call certain things wet, this does not prove that wetness has certain essential properties, it proves that we can agree about which things to call wet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless I misunderstood what you said, I think I agree with you that just because we agree on the meaning of the concept 'wet', it does not follow that the particular thing we observe is in fact wet. It could be a false perception of wetness. But this is besides the point about essential properties. If you and I mean the same thing when using the word 'wet', then the meaning has some essential properties. More explanation further down.

[...] but this does not mean that any particular word necessarily refers to any particular set of essential properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it does. Let's say you and I observe a chair. Assuming no false perceptions are present, you would be confused if I said "This is a lake", and rightfully so. Because the observed things correspond to the properties attributed to a chair, not a lake. Sure, some of the observed properties would be accidental, like its colour and location, but some would be essential like having a backrest or being a structure. And no observed properties would correspond to properties essential to the concept of lake, like 'a large body of water'.

If we cannot define "greenness", only experience it, then how can it have essential properties? — Metaphysician Undercover

This concept is so basic that it has only one essential property: being green, or this; which does not help. Another reason why 'greenness' was a bad example to prove my point. I should really stick to triangle-ness haha.

According to what you say, I assume that I am correct in calling this green, and the others are correct in calling this blue, because this is how we each experience the colour. How can there be essential properties of greenness when the same colour is correctly called green by me, and blue by others? — Metaphysician Undercover

Essential properties are essential to the concept; not necessarily essential to the particular things we observe. We could have false perceptions of the things we are observing. And when you call the thing green and we call it blue, we may disagree on the fact, but we still understand what each other mean by green and blue.

By projecting beauty onto the painting, I just mean that I, the subject, get a sensation or feeling of beauty when observing the painting, which is also what you mean I think; I don't mean any physical projections.

Also, what is beauty? Besides being what you call, "subjective", what is beauty? Is it not a feeling? Isn't it a feeling you get when looking at the painting, and not a projection (because that doesn't make any sense)? And in this case, the feeling would be attributed only to you. You are an object, no? — Harry Hindu

This is the part where I claim you are making an error. Yes, my feeling of beauty is a property of me, and is therefore objective. But no, 'beauty' is not a property of me, as it is only a feeling I get when observing the painting, and neither is it a property of the painting. It is therefore subjective.

Let me put the same point in a different way. Consider the following two statements:

• (1) "This painting is rectangular."
• (2) "This painting is beautiful."

Statement (1) is objective because 'rectangular' is attributed to the object, which is the painting. Statement (1) is not objective because 'beauty' is not attributed to the object. It is therefore subjective.

I hope this clarifies things.

Hey! Don't make the topic more confusing than it already is.