We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: Properties of a concept are essential if, should these properties be removed, then the concept would no longer be present. Conversely, properties are accidental if, should they be removed, the concept would still be present. Now, some things (1) have wetness and some things (2) don't. It means that properties of wetness are present in (1) and not in (2). If all these properties were accidental, then their absence in (2) would not result in the absence of wetness. But wetness is absent in (2). Therefore some of the properties of wetness absent in (2) must be essential to the concept of wetness.

I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I was going to object, but I find I have trouble arguing about this topic. If you don't mind, I will drop it to focus on the other topics.

When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. [...] There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover

This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality.

But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours? — Metaphysician Undercover

Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause.

We have concepts of ultraviolet and infrared as wavelengths, but have no concept of the colour they may produce if we were able to see these. By the way, I think it is impossible for us to conceive a new colour, for the same reasons.

Maybe greenness was a bad example to use. Instead, imagine if you were incapable of feeling the emotion sadness. I can do my best to describe to you that it is the emotion one gets when being aware of a good that no longer exists; and from this, you may be able to infer that it is a painful thing; but it would not substitute the experience of the feeling itself. And the concept is the thing in itself.

You are making an error. To say "the painting is beautiful" is not the same as to say "I feel the painting is beautiful". In the first statement, the object is 'painting', and the property is 'beautiful'. In the second statement, the object is 'I', and the property is 'feeling the painting to be beautiful'. In the first statement, 'beautiful' is subjective, because it is only a projection of my feeling and not a property of the painting in itself; where as in the second statement, 'feeling the painting to be beautiful' is objective, because it is a property of me at that moment.

To put this finding in general terms, properties such as 'beauty' is always subjective, where as properties such as 'feeling of x' is always objective. The trick is to remember that 'beauty' is not the same property as 'feeling of beauty'.

Yeah you're right; my bad. I have changed my last post to assume that 'beauty' is subjective. My point was not to focus on how to prove if a thing is subjective, but to determine the relationship between a subjective property, and the subject and object.

See you later.

Subjects are just other objects. Just as we can describe the differences between objects based on their attributes and properties, we can also make distinctions between subjects based on their attributes and properties. We also refer to subjects as if they were objects. — Harry Hindu

I see your point, Mr. Hindu. Let me try again to describe the difference between an objective and subjective property. A property is objective if it is attributed to the object. So far so good. But, a property is subjective, not if it is attributed to the subject, (for as you say, this is still objective towards the subject), but if it is projected by the subject onto the object. This sounds complicated, so here is an example.

(Edited) I observe a painting and say "this painting is beautiful". Let's assume we know that 'beauty' is subjective. So 'beauty' is not a property of the painting in itself. It is also not a property of me, because my expression of 'beauty' was never about me; only about the painting. Rather, this property is a projection of my feeling of beauty onto the painting. This is what we call subjective.

True, but neither does it turn impossible just because we add the concept of nonsensicalness in front of it. — BlueBanana

I aim to reductio ad absurdum this one. If omnipotence is capable of creating nonsense, then this omnipotent being may both exist and not exist, may be you, and me, and everyone else, may turn truth into falsehood, and good into evil. As a believer of such a being, are you an atheist, a theist, and a pantheist, all at the same time?

Making sense or being logical are properties and laws of our universe, and they don't necessarily apply outside it. — BlueBanana

I don't agree that other universes may have different laws of logic; only different laws of physics. Can I back that up? Alas I cannot because any logical and sensical argument I could come up with would only beg the question. That said, I suspect you of being inconsistent: if you entertain the idea of having different laws of logic in other universes, then why not entertain it for our universe as well?

So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it.

What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I claim concepts exist as things in themselves, found in particulars, and later abstracted in the mind. We describe concepts with words and definitions, but these are merely signs pointing to the concepts.

I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet". — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you. My method was not to separate the essential from the accidental properties, but merely to demonstrate that the essential properties existed. Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not.

I think that the essence of five is defined by order. [...] What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts.

How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

I side with Hume and Descartes, among others, when they say that we acquire most of our concepts from observation of the outer reality. The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. Therefore the concept is not conceived in the mind, but is abstracted from observation of outer reality. One might argue that since colours are physical, then so is the concept of greenness; but I counter-argue that since size and location is not an essential property of greenness, then the concept is not physical.

What counts as objective? I mean, what is the criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as that candidate being objective? Subjective? — creativesoul

In theory here are the criteria: a property is objective if it is attributed to the object; and subjective if it is attributed to the subject. In practice, I don't know of any way other than my relative-objective test. Maybe my test is flawed, but there is no denying that some properties are attributed to the objects and some properties are attributed to the subjects. Again, if in reality the earth is round, then 'being round' is an objective property of the earth.

Where did Gandhi say that? Also I thought last time was your last comment on this. ;)

It sounds like you want a reason to believe that logical contradictions are not part of omnipotence. Alright. To say something that is illogical is simply to say something that is nonsensical. As such, saying "a triangle can have four sides" is no more sensical than saying "the smell of purple is tall". The former statement may appear more sensical than the latter, but it is not insofar that a contradiction is present. And a nonsensical statement does not turn into a sensical statement just because we add the concept of omnipotence in front of it. As such, an omnipotent being cannot create a triangle with four sides, any more than it can create a tall smell of purple.

I heavily disagree. Most people would recognize that object, or a triangle with rounded angles, as a triangle. Furthermore, it's only our culture that has taught us what is a "proper" triangle; without that influence, a human could recognize the three examples as equally triangle-like. — BlueBanana

They are like triangles, and it might be a useful description in everyday talk, but they are not triangles. Similar to an egg being like a sphere or close to a sphere, but it is not a sphere. Besides, one property of triangles is that the sum of the angles equals to 180 deg. These rounded triangles don't have this property.

Now, my favourite part of the argument (which unfortunately is a tad off-topic so no further comments on this): an omnipotent being could create a triangle with four sides. This is, however, independent of whether the definition of triangle is its triangleness or that it has three straight sides and angles. — BlueBanana

I am not sure if you are saying that an omnipotent being could in fact create a triangle with four sides, or if you are saying that this idea is absurd. My position is the latter. As Aquinas says, contradictions do not fall under the omnipotence of God.

So, what's being said is not talk? — creativesoul

When one is talking, the content of the talk is not necessarily about talking. Ironically, we are talking about talking right now, but we could be talking about unicorns too. Analogy: A story book has a story in it. The story is not necessarily about books, although the story is told through a book.

"Round" is a word. — creativesoul

Round is indeed a word, said by me, the subject, about the earth, the object when I observe it. The question is, when I say "the earth is round", am I saying something about me or about the object?

I don't want you to take me the wrong way here. I'm not so much as disagreeing with what I think that you're trying to do. Rather, I'm attempting to save you from all the troubles that will surely come from employing the objective/subjective distinction. — creativesoul

At this point, I suspect that you and I are not on the same page; and if we are not, then we cannot have a productive argument. Maybe it is best to leave it at that. It could be due to my own limitations by the way.

The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place.

So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? — Metaphysician Undercover

It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition.

What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A property is essential to a concept if, should it be removed, the concept would no longer be present. Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice.

• Case (1): Two workers having the same work qualities (skills, seniority, quality of work, etc) are paid the same.
• Case (2): The same two workers are not paid the same; one's pay is the double of the other.

How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? ... — Metaphysician Undercover

I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides.

Say that to Samson.

E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me?
— Samuel Lacrampe

Much easier to deploy with 'triangles', that argument. ;-) — Wayfarer

This critical question is the sole reason I took on philosophy. Still searching for the answer.

Sorry for the long wait on this.

I defined it as what is helpful to one's goals. — Harry Hindu

I am intrigued about this definition of 'good'. Does it follow that if there is no goal, then there is no good? What if I say "something is good looking". What goal would that refer to?

I may not have the last word, but I am claiming the title of posting the 500th comment. I declare myself above the rest of you until the 1000th poster shows up. See you then.

I agree with everything you say (some of it is actually quite insightful), up to the following part:

These things that are neither include thought, belief, meaning, and truth. There is nothing that can be said which does not require all of these things. All things said consist of things that are neither subjective nor objective. That is... the content of all talk consists of that which is both, objective and subjective... Thus, all talk is neither. — creativesoul

This simply cannot be true. Let's suppose that the earth is round in reality (a safe supposition I think). It is therefore round whether subjects like us exist or not. Therefore 'round' is a property of the object, and is fully independent of subjects and their talks. Now I, a subject, say "The earth is round". According to you, "the content of all talk consists of that which is both, objective and subjective... Thus, all talk is neither." But as previously stated, 'round' is an objective property of the earth in reality. Therefore, the content of this talk, being about an objective property of the object of talk, is objective.

What's being said, as compared to the subject saying it?
Help me out here. What counts as "the content" of talk? — creativesoul

Correct. The content of talk is what is being said.

If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe.

To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak.

So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Technically, you may be right that we could be mistaken about our notions and the real concept, but I am optimistic that it is not the case; because if my notion of "yes" could be your notion "no" and vice versa, then it would be utterly hopeless for us to try to communicate.

Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle says, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts; this is how we can have intelligible conversations; but not necessarily the explicit knowledge. E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. Plato and Socrates used dialogues to obtain the explicit knowledge. I think their underlying assumptions is that the concept is found if all parties agree with the definition. Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). If this corresponds to your notion of it, then we can conclude that we have found the real concept.

Which part specifically? Otherwise, the view that man is a rational animal with free will comes from Aristotelianism and Scholasticism. Source

if there is such a thing as a universal conscience and sense of duty, then why are there psychopaths and sociopaths? — Matthew Gould

I don't know much about psychopaths, but will attempt to explain it anyways. Sure, maybe they lack a sense of duty, but it does not follow that objective morality does not exist. Much like most people will see the red of a red chair, colourblind people will not, but this does not change the fact that the chair is red.

why is it that we impose laws on people without a conscience when we are basing our moral code on our consciences and senses of duty? Isn't that a form of tyranny? — Matthew Gould

This depends what we impose. If we impose our subjective preferences on others, then it is tyranny. But if we impose justice on people, then it is not tyranny, because tyranny is unjust by definition.

If there was a universal moral code then why is it that certain laws are implemented in one place and not in others? — Matthew Gould

There may be different moral laws in different places, but then it could say something about the quality of the law-making of the place, and not of the universality of the moral law. Some regions have the caste system. Would you not agree that this system of law is unjust?

I was unclear about your position in the last comment. My bad. I think the theory is very close to what you suggest. It is about stripping off the accidental properties and retaining the essential ones, the unchangeable ones, the ones that, if removed, then the object would lose its nature. E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me? What if I lose the property 'ability to think'?

Indeed, if we could draw concepts or visualize them physically in our imagination, then that would make concepts physical. The fact that we can't, supports the claim that they are non-physical.

... Unless your point was that if we cannot physically visualize them, then concepts are not real? This would presuppose the maxim that what cannot be physically visualized is not real. But this is a self-contradiction, because maxims cannot be physically visualized.

I think you are confusing the content of the talk with the talk itself. Sure, the talk is linked to the subject insofar as the subject is talking. But the content of the talk may be about an object. E.g. "This animal is dead". The property 'dead' is clearly about the object, not about the subject saying it.

And if this still does not address your objections, then we can leave it here.

OK, so your principle of identity involves "exact same properties". How does the concept of "five-ness" which is in my mind, qualify as the same concept of "fiveness" which is in your mind, when they are described by these different properties ("in my mind" and "in your mind"). Clearly they don't have the exact same properties, and are therefore not the same concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of".

If the thought content is about the object, then it is objective; and if it is about the subject, then it is subjective. The important thing is to figure out if it is in fact about the object or about the subject. "The ball is round" is an easy enough example of an objective statement. But what about "the ball is beautiful"? Is 'beauty' an objective or subjective property? The relative-objective test can determine this.

Who does not like justice, and likes injustice done to themselves? Who does not like being treated with respect? Who likes being lied to? Virtually nobody. But maybe I misunderstand your statement. Maybe you can provide an example, and I will see if I can clarify how the Golden Rule applies.

If that were the case than all thoughts about the object would be equally objective and subjective. — creativesoul

Indeed they are. If I say "God exists" and you say "God does not exist", both of our claims are equally objective, even though one must be true and the other one must be false.

This is what I suspected before; and I find a contradiction in the following two statements:

(1) "... because everything ever thought/believed and/or spoken comes through a subject, there is no such thing as an objective thought, belief, and/or statement thereof."
(2) "I would agree that we can find ourselves defining(talking about) that which is not existentially contingent upon human thought/belief and/or language."

Best I can agree with, is that the thought is subjective in the sense that the subject produces it, but the content of the thought can be objective, if it is about the object.

Here are all the essential properties of the concept of triangle-ness: 'flat surface' + 'three straight sides'. This implies that it also has three angles, and so it would be redundant to add it as a property, similar with the property that the sum of its angles is 180 deg.

What if there was hypothetically speaking a shape that only had one of those properties? — BlueBanana

There is: a flat surface with three angles and rounded sides. Like this. Clearly, this is not a triangle.

And on a related note, how should we approach the fact that real life triangles don't have straight sides, or that we can recognize this as a triangle? — BlueBanana

Perfect triangles can exist, even if only in our minds. I am guessing you know what I am talking about, and this fact proves that we both have the same concept of what a triangle is. As for your linked example, sure I can guess the shape of a triangle in there, but I would not bet all my money on it, because it does not clearly show the aforementioned essential properties.

Maybe I was attacking a straw man the whole time. Can you clarify what position you have in this discussion? I genuinely thought you were claiming that it is impossible for us to determine if a property is objective or subjective, that is, linked to the object or the subject. If that is not the position you are defending, then just ignore my previous comment.

I am not saying that everyone presupposes that; and just because some do not, it does not follow that it is false, because no one's opinion is infallible. Admittedly, neither is C.S. Lewis. Let's raise the quality of the arguments on both sides.

I summon the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you want them to do unto you. The fact is that this rule occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition. Source. And this rule implies that all humans have equal ontological value, or else we would not demand to treat them as equals.

A triangle with an amount of sides other than three can exist, as triangles aren't defined by having three sides. — BlueBanana

What do you mean "triangles are not defined by having three sides"? What is the true definition then?

I would think that finding necessary properties of concepts would be sufficient to prove that we can in fact escape said dichotomy. But here is another reason: How do you explain the phenomenon that many subjects agree on a given property of an object? E.g. all subjects observe that the chair has four legs.

Hey! This is my discussion and I can talk about whatever I want in it. >:)

If by 'human nature' you mean that all humans share some same essential properties, then yes, morality presupposes there being a human nature, for the following reasons:

(1) Morality implies voluntariness, and voluntariness implies free will. Thus if morality applies to all humans, then all humans must possess free will.
(2) Morality is also called practical reason, which implies reason in general. Thus if morality applies to all humans, then all humans must possess reason.

And lo and behold, the essence or nature of humans is traditionally: an animal with reason and free will. Note, this may not be the only part of human nature, but it is a part of it.

Hello.

First, I disagree with the claim that the moral code is different depending on where you are. The concept of the Golden Rule, do unto others and you want them to do unto you, occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition. Source.

Now the source of moral code that is the Golden Rule, is our conscience, or sense of duty. E.g. if a baby is drowning and the situation is such that you can safely rescue it, I am pretty sure you and everyone else will experience a sense of duty to do so. That is not to say that everyone would actually choose to save the baby, but everyone would experience the duty of doing so.

Finally, everyone seeks justice and rejects injustice, at least to themselves. Combine this with the Golden Rule, and it follows that there is a universal way of acting that is righteous. E.g. nobody wants to be lied to, so we ought not to lie.

Hello.

My view is that this is primarily a safety issue. Why are seat belts required by law? Because statistics show that there is a correlation between the use of seat belts and the severity of injuries in car accidents. Similarly, we should look for the correlation between gun ownership and injuries, regardless if these are intentional or accidental. By collecting data points on these two parameters in as many states as possible throughout the world, we can determine the statistical correlation between the two; and one of three possible results would follow:

(1) There is a correlation, with an upward slope where more gun ownership increases the probability of injuries. As such, gun ownership should not be legal.

(2) There is a correlation, with a downward slope were more gun ownership decreases the probability of injuries. As such, gun ownership should be legal, and perhaps even required.

(3) There is no correlation. As such, gun ownership is not a significant factor in the safety of the citizens, and so its legalization is a matter of personal preference.

Now I am not a hard-working scientist but a lazy philosopher; and so I don’t know the final answer; but I think this is the best way to end the debate.

So it is quite clear that each of these answers does not carry the same information, despite the fact that they might all be the correct answer to some specific questions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that each thing (a) to (d) do not have all the same properties, because they all look physically different, but they still all have the same property of pointing to the concept of "five-ness". This should clarify why only V is the correct answer to the question "what is the Roman numeral for five?", while all of them are correct answers to the question "What results from 2+3?".

By what principle of identity do you claim that these are the same concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

I will indeed use a principle of identity: If things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing; and if not, then not. Two sticks may look identical, but are not one and the same because they have different x, y, z properties. What about the concept of 'triangle'? To me, its essential properties are 'surface' + 'three straight sides'; nothing else. What about for you? If your concept has the exact same essential properties as my concept, then they are one and the same.

The claim that "the same" information is carried by different media is a false premise. The fact that we interpret 5 in a different way from V, and in a different way from ***** is evidence of this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am late in this discussion so I apologize if this was already addressed, but why do you say we interpret these differently? It seems to me that they all point to the same concept.

What results from 2+3?
(a) five
(b) 5
(c) V
(d) *****

Are these answers not all true? If they are, then this also answers your objection on what basis could we claim that the media is different: Different media may point to the same concept. And the fact that these media can be physically different show that they are separate things from the concept they point to.

“When a wise man points at the moon the imbecile examines the finger.”
― Confucius