I am open to suggestions.

So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. — Metaphysician Undercover

We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal".

If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd.

Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair.

Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2). — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct. This was not what I was saying, but I was mistaken because I forgot that universals may be a members of higher universals, like the human genus is a member of the genus of living beings.

[...] The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd.

Hello.

Is THAT concept, stripped from images, when communicated via a sensible medium- sensible or insensible? — Daniel Smith

The concept itself must be insensible; because if it was sensible, then we would have no use to communicate the concept through a second layer of sensible images and examples, which are numerous, as you said.

Do ideas and concepts exist apart from the sensible images of which they are composed? — Daniel Smith

I would also say yes, by pointing to the concept of "justice". We all understand the concept, and yet have no clear sensible image of it. The image of a scale is merely a symbol of it, not the real thing.

Let's consider again the two statements below.
(1) Each universal form is particular because if it was not so, then they would fail the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.
(2) A universal form cannot be a particular because a particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class."

I don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars".

If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises.

What if we learn the morals without being taught? What if they exist independently of humanity, and can be observed? — BlueBanana

That is precisely my point, that if moral knowledge cannot be taught, then we must acquire it through observation of our own innate knowledge of it. Unless you are suggesting it can be observed elsewhere?

To demonstrate why the P3 doesn't work: It is absurd to suppose that knowledge of anything is taught. If it was, then who was the first teacher, and "why would he tell us?!" — BlueBanana

Knowledge of most things can be observed empirically. Once observed, then it can be taught to others who did not observe it. The absurdity is valid only for morality, because other than through innate knowledge, we cannot observe morality directly; only acts which we then judge to be morally good or bad. But then this judgement presupposes a moral knowledge.

I appreciate that you guys are consistent in your belief system, that if morality is wholly subjective, then Hitler and the Nazis were indeed not objectively morally bad. I also appreciate that you believe they were morally bad, according to your personal moral system. Now I will attempt to refute your claim that morality is subjective, in two ways.

(1) While it is good that you are of the opinion that Hitler was morally wrong, even if it is a strong opinion, it is nothing but a mere opinion if morality is subjective, and is no stronger than the opinion that chocolate is the best flavour of ice cream. Now according to our moral system, we should be tolerant of others' opinions for subjective topics, as is the case with the flavours of ice cream. But then there is a contradiction because on one hand, our moral system does not tolerate immoral acts, and on the other hand, it says we should be tolerant of subjective differences.

(2) Justice among humans can be roughly defined as "equality in treatment". Under that definition, Hitler and the Nazis were clearly unjust, for they did not treat Jews as equal to themselves. Now, can it be possible for justice to be morally bad, and injustice to be morally good? These statements seem to be as contradictory as "a squared circle".

It is just a misunderstanding on how the term "particular" is defined. The way you use it for the universal forms, I now understand it to mean that each universal form is unique; and I agree.
According to the dictionary here, particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class." In this strict sense, universal forms cannot be particulars because they are synonymous to "specified group" or "class" in the definition, and this would not make sense. In this strict sense, only things like individual rocks can be particulars because they are individual members of the universal form of rock-ness.

Morality and goodness are wholly subjective. — charleton

Does it follow that Hitler and the Nazis were not objectively morally bad during the Holocaust, and that they were simply the minority in terms of opinion on the treatment of the Jews?

Hello.
I think you are close to the mark. Let's make the distinction between principles of morality, and then moral rules. The first principles are things like "do good and avoid evil", and "all humans have equal ontological values". These are innate. From there, we can deduce second principles like "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you", and "treat everyone equally". First and second principles are unchanging.

Then, we can deduce more detailed moral rules like "don't kill, steal, or lie". These rules are relative to the situation, and are judged good or bad based on if they meet the principles, for a given situation. Since situations are numerous, complex, and changing, then moral rules can evolve to account for the evolving situations.

Is it the individual's survival, or survival of the species as a whole? If the former, then your morality can be reduced to the survival of the fittest. If the latter, then would you judge a society where humans are farmed like animals in order to increase the population growth, as a morally good?

So the feeling of guilt is what makes us no longer attuned to the Holy Spirit, and thus the removal of the feeling would make us attuned again, is that correct? What follows is that the feeling is a false feeling because we are not truly guilty of anything. But then the Bible is counter-productive, because you claim it gives the message about the feeling of guilt, but then it also teaches people that they are sinners, thereby feeding the feeling of guilt on whoever reads it.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point — Samuel Lacrampe

Yeah I said that. I did not mean it in the sense that individual persons must have individual ontological value, or do not share a common human nature. I meant it in the sense that I am me and not you, and you are you and not me. From this, we conclude that we have separate identities or individual forms (called soul in this case), although we both participate in the same universal form or species of human.

The point I made earlier in the thread, is that this perfect universal is "the ideal", and as the ideal, it is no longer a universal, it has the characteristics of a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.

If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular?

Back! Happy New Year all! >:O >:O >:O

The problem is that we make mistakes, we find out later that our universals were not accurate, so we change them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible."

To solve the paradox, we need to make the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. As per Aristotle, we have implicit knowledge of universals, obtained through the process of abstraction, and we are searching for the explicit knowledge. The ability to describe the universal accurately is the explicit knowledge, and the ability to judge if our description is accurate is the implicit knowledge. This is how the socratic method works. This also explains why we can all use the concept of 'justice' correctly and meaningfully in a sentence (e.g. "the holocaust was unjust"), but have trouble coming up with the perfect definition of 'justice'.

Regarding the universe as the One: I will put this topic on hold for now to focus on the one above.

Hey MU. My turn to apologize; I will be busy and likely not as responsive on the Forum, possibly until the beginning of next year. I hope to resume this conversation at that point, and get to the bottom of this reality thing.

Cheers.

Hello everyone.

I apologize for the delay in responses. I have been very busy lately and will not be as responsive on the Philosophy Forum, possibly until the beginning of next year. I do however intend to get back to you at some point.

Cheers.
-Samuel

Hello. Nice writing; very poetic. I just want to analyze some of it.

Something (we call them gods) plucked us from our habitat and taught us “right from wrong”. This is the knowledge of good and evil that brings....guilt. Guilt is what severs our connectivity with the divine. This is why sacrifices were implemented. It doesn’t undo sin, it absolves guilt. This is why FAITH in Christ absolves all sin. — Steve

You make it sound like the gods were the cause of our guilt, which in turn separated us from the divine; and then another god, Christ, removed our guilt. This seems counter-productive.

When you believe that you are forgiven you have no guilt so you can connect with the divine and renew your role in creation. — Steve

Is it real forgiveness, or merely the belief of forgiveness which removes the guilt? I think the former makes more sense than the latter.

Hello.
What would be the criteria to determine the good or bad ticks?

Hello.
Are you asking if the knowledge is within the subject? Yes, knowledge is always in a subject, for only subjects can know things. However, the knowledge is about objective moral goodness.

If "helping out others" and "remaining safe" are both nothing but desires, and there is nothing else to influence our behaviour, then it follows that the behaviour simply follows the strongest desire. But then there is nothing praiseworthy or virtuous about the behaviour, because desires are involuntary.

What is praiseworthy is selecting those desires, the following of which is beneficial for society. — Inter Alia

Are you saying here that we have the power to select between desires? If so, then this power cannot itself be another desire, but something above it. Do you agree with free will then?

the intuitive pull of your example comes from empathizing with the emotional upset feeling of being neglected that we can readily imagine. [...] Emotional harm is sometimes tricky to deal with because we often feel injured when in reality we have not been. Not being given a bonus that you were never promised is not an injury; your co-workers getting one and not yourself might be insult, but not injury. — VagabondSpectre

I want to clarify that the emotional pain is an effect of the immoral event, not a cause. I.e., the victim feels upset because the event is immoral, and not the other way around, that the event is immoral because the victim feels upset. As a mere effect, the emotional pain cannot be the criteria to determine if the event was immoral. It must be something else, like the fact that the treatment is unequal among employees.

I would say that an employers freedom to give away un-promised bonuses however they choose is more important than an employees desire to gain unearned money or not feel somehow excluded. — VagabondSpectre

The employer is free to act this way in the legal sense, but he is not "morally free" to treat different employees with different levels of respect. I.e., the unequal treatment remains immoral, even if there is nothing the employee can do about it.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. This view allows for both individual forms and universal forms.

Unless I misunderstood, it sounds like you claim that the whole, the universe, is the one and only true identity as the starting point; and then from there, associate individual things as the divided parts of the whole, like body parts are to one body. Where does the individual form fit in, if individuals do not possess true identities? Also, is your view pantheism?

For example, if you're caught and go to prison you have done harm to yourself — Sam26

But in this case, the harm is an effect of the act, and so not part of the act itself. Another way to look at it, is that if you are caught, then you could defend yourself on the grounds that the act is not immoral until you are put away, because no harm is done to yourself or your loved ones before you go to prison.

In this case is there harm done? I would contend that there is harm done to your character and/or to your psyche, that is, any normal thinking human being would know and understand that since they were willing to take the life of another that that diminishes them in some way. Over time, I think any normal functioning person, would be affected by the memory of such an act. — Sam26

I agree, but this harm is again an effect of the immoral act, and so does not make the act immoral. In other words, the person is harmed because the act is immoral; and would not be harmed if the act was not immoral. And so, we have yet to determine what makes the act immoral in the first place.

let's say that the person is incapable of feeling empathy, and as such there character and/or their psyche is not affected by this act. Moreover, there is no detectable harm done, then I would say that the act was not immoral. It's not immoral, not only because there was no detectable harm, but it's probably not immoral because this person's brain is not normal, that is, they're impaired in some way. It's still a crime, but the person may not be morally responsible (at least in theory). — Sam26

Your logic is circular. In this example, you claim that not feeling harm after committing an immoral act is not normal, thereby implying that the act is the criteria to determine how we should feel. But on the other hand, you claim that harm is the criteria to determine if an act is immoral or not.

Hello. I have a couple of questions.
Why do you claim that if morality is objective, then God exists, then predestination exists?
I am assuming that you are not a theist; and by extension, that you do not believe in objective morality. Does it follow, in your view, that Hilter was not objectively immoral?

Courage is when the desire to help out-competes the desire to remain safe. — Inter Alia

This does not agree with the definition I stated. I courage is defined as "the will to do something that goes against one's inclinations (or desires)", then courage cannot itself be an inclination or desire. Maybe you don't agree with the definition, and believe that courage is in fact a desire? But courage is praiseworthy; and there is nothing praiseworthy about submitting to our desires.

This, however, is not a fair characterisation of what I've said, [...] everyone already knows what is a 'Good' society as an evolved instinct [...] I guarantee they will have a definite idea of where we want to be, and be very uncertain about how to get there. — Inter Alia

Understood. So I am still at the point of understanding your position. Could you then describe to me this definite idea of where we want to be, with respect to a good society?

I am surprised that you do not see injustice in this scenario. If your 1000-employee company gave everyone a Christmas bonus every year except for you, would you not be upset, and rightfully so?This behaviour is called discrimination, which is defined as "unjust treatment of different categories of people or things".

If the employer gave a raise to one person and not the other, and the person who did not receive an unearned raise never found out, there would be no harm and so it wouldn't be immoral — VagabondSpectre

This contradicts what you said earlier here about potential harm. On the same rationale, if your spouse cheated on you and you never found out, then there would be no harm and so it wouldn't be immoral either; but this is absurd.

I understand. So your view is that harm is an essential property of immorality. But this still does not explain how an attempted murder, causing no harm, is immoral. I think you have answered previously that harm is always done to the immoral person, but what reasons do you have to believe that?

Got it. What about a case that involves no harm, either potential or actual, such as this?
Two employees have the same skills and seniority. I give a big raise to one, and none to the second one. This seems unjust; and yet I did not harm anyone.

The point though, was that the concept of one changed, evolved. My proposal was that in the original sense the concept of "one" did not allow that one could be divided. But then someone proposed the principle of fractions, which would require that "one" be redefined such that the one could be divided. There are numerous examples of evolution in mathematical principles. The addition of the numeral 0, and negative integers is one example. More recently we have what is called imaginary numbers. Before imaginary numbers, there was no square root of -1, that was disallowed by the conceptual structure. Now there is a square root of -1, it is allowed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that, if we remove the identity or unit such as 'm' from the number, that anyone thought that 1 could not be divided. As you say yourself later on, one body can be divided into many molecules, and everyone can see that. So I think your claim once again shows the evolution of symbols, not of the concepts they point to.

Otherwise, I agree about your statement regarding how one object is composed of many parts. Physical objects can in theory be divided into an infinite quantity of smaller parts.

Yes, they are members of the universal form, hydrogen, but that's a human designation based in our determination of similarity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted.

Besides, do you not believe in objective species at least when it comes to living beings, such that all humans are part of the human species, all dogs part of the dog species, and all trees part of the tree species? Science could explain this by mere DNA, but this only pushes the problem back a step, and does not explain why the DNA is similar among beings of the same species.

Does it follow that attempted murder is not immoral?

It sounds like you equate 'will' or 'intention' to 'desires', 'inclinations', 'emotions'. But if this was the case, then the term 'courage' would be meaningless, because is means "the will to do something that goes against one's inclinations."

It also sounds like you equate moral success with the success of a society to survive. But does it follow that a society built on slavery is morally successful, so long that everyone survives?

Ah! yes, thank you. In other words, unjustified harm is an essential property of immorality. I got confused when he said that it was both, that harm causes immorality and immorality causes harm, where as in this case, it is actually neither.

Sorry we couldn't come to an understanding. I thought you meant "harm causes immorality" when you said the following:

what would make it immoral other than the harm done? — Sam26

I.e., if harm makes an act immoral, then harm causes immorality. I understand you don't mean "harm causes immorality every time", but maybe that "harm is a necessary cause for immorality".

I haven't worked out how to reply to multiple people yet — Inter Alia

Hit 'Reply' on several posts from different people.

If there is no harm done when one acts, then I don't see how an act can be called immoral, i.e., what would make it immoral other than the harm done? [...] Since I believe that all immoral acts have the property of harm, that is, that harm is necessarily a property of an immoral act. Thus, both your questions, ("...is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral?") are answered in the affirmative. I've already explained how intention isn't necessarily a feature of an immoral act. The latter part of your question is essentially the same as the former. It's the same as A=B and B=A. — Sam26

There is an error. 'Because' has the word 'cause' in it. My question could be rephrased as "Does harm cause immorality, or does immorality cause harm?". "A causes B" is not the same as "B causes A". But from what you said, it sounds like you mean "harm causes immorality".

Also, in an earlier post I showed how intent is not necessarily a feature of an immoral act, the example being an accident where one didn't intend to cause harm, but harm happened nevertheless. Most immoral acts that people commit are intentional, but not all, is what I'm saying. This is the point of calling some immoral acts accidental, it's an accident because someone didn't intentionally set out to harm someone, as opposed to intentionally doing something to harm someone. This is clearly seen in a drunk driving example, or even in an example where someone is not paying sufficient attention to what their doing. In each example one is held accountable for their actions in spite of not intentionally harming others. [...] Another important point of what makes something both immoral and accidental is responsibility, I'm held responsible for the act of driving drunk and causing harm to someone or myself, because of what I could have reasonably foreseen in terms of my actions. Thus it not about intention, but about what one should have known about certain actions, and thus we are responsible for actions taken that could lead to harm. — Sam26

I see your point, but want to show you that intention is still the root cause of all immoral acts, including immoral accidental ones. Let's consider the example of harm caused by drunk driving. Yes, the person did not directly intend to harm the victim by driving drunk. But did he have the intention to avoid harm? Logically, either the driver (1) intended to avoid harm as the end goal, or (2) he did not.

(1) The driver had the intention to avoid harm as the end goal: If he could foresee the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could not have made the decision to drive drunk, because this would contradict his intentions. Conversely, if he could not have foreseen the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could still make the decision of driving drunk without contradicting his intentions. But then he is not responsible, because as you said, immorality necessitates responsibility; and responsibility necessitates being able to reasonably foresee the outcome. Therefore the act is not immoral.

(2) The driver did not have the intention to avoid harm as the end goal: If he could foresee the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could still have made the decision to drive drunk, without contradicting his intentions. Then he is responsible; then the act is immoral.

Conclusion: although the person may not have the direct intention of causing a harmful outcome, the intention of avoiding harm or not as the end goal is still the necessary root cause to an act being immoral or not.

So your position is that an immoral act is always harmful because the person that causes the immoral act always harms themselves. In your view, is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral? If the former, then how do you know they harm themselves? If the latter, then what makes the act immoral besides intention?

Otherwise, I agree that harm is essential to physical evil.

I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting topic. I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged.

That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. [...] Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made?

My position is that both types of forms exist objectively. Indeed, particular forms must exist in order for a thing to have its own identity. But then it must also have a universal form in order to be part of the genus or species it belongs to. If this was not the case, then two things made of the same material could in principle behave completely differently. E.g., two rocks composed of the same minerals, when put in contact with fire, could react differently, such that one could be inert, and the other one could blow up. But this would be absurd. We could never know any generalities; only particulars after having done particular tests on each one of them. Furthermore, we could never perform any inductive reasoning, such as "all rocks made of this mineral are inert to fire", or "all fires are hot", or "no human can breath under water", etc.

That is correct. My point is therefore that an object being mental is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is non-physical. And as it is the case for mental images conveying no information, so it is as well with mental images that do convey information, for they remain mental images. The image remains physical, even though the information it conveys is not.

Great discussion. I want in. Is either harm or intention essential to morality? Consider the following cases.

(1) Harm without intention: a rock falls on someone. This is not immoral.
(2) Harm with intention: A person intends and successfully kills someone innocent. This is immoral.
(3) Intention without harm: A person intends but fails to kill someone innocent. This is still immoral. I personally would not appreciate this. Would you?
(4) No harm, no intention: A rock; that's it. Clearly not morally bad, and yet, also not morally good.

If the above judgements are correct, then it follows that harm is not essential, where as intention is, unless there exists a case where morality exists without intention.

A few things to note:

• Although it is difficult, or even impossible, to discover some's true intention, true intentions still exist.
• In more complex cases, the intended outcome is more challenging to achieve, but this does not change the intention itself. I.e, willing good or willing harm as the end.