Any property that is physical is objective. Why? Because any physical property is measurable (at least in theory), and if measurable, then it is mathematical, and if mathematical, then it is logical, and logic is indubitably an objective property of reality. This is why a science is less prone to debate if it is quantifiable. — Samuel Lacrampe

I screwed up. I still claim that whatever is measurable is objective, but it is not because it is a mathematical kind of property. I think it is actually because the property is measured by an instrument which cannot have any subjective bias.

Nevertheless—to further complicate things—in accordance with Harry Hindu’s posts, this would also lead to conclusions such as: the presence of subjects is objectively real. [...] Also, leading to a kind of pseudo-paradox: the subject is itself objectively real; i.e., the presence of the subject is objective, and thereby fully entwined with objective reality in total. — javra

This paradox is caused by not clearly identifying who or what is the object in the situation. Example:

I observe the colour yellow and say "Yellow is the best colour". In this case, the object is 'yellow', the subject is me, and the property is 'best colour'. The property is obviously subjective because it is not linked to the colour yellow in itself. Now, you come in, and observe me saying that statement "Yellow is the best colour", and so you conclude "Sam's best colour is yellow". In this case, the object is me, the subject is you, and the property is 'best colour being yellow'. The property is now objective, because any new subjects, you or someone else, will hear me saying "Yellow is the best colour".

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved.

You can't ever escape making objective statements whenever you associate truth to your statement. — Harry Hindu

Truth is not a criteria to determine if a property is linked to the object or subject. "Yellow is the best colour" is indubitably subjective, for how could there be an objectively best colour? Yet this statement is true to the speaker.

If subject 1 says "this food tastes good", and subject 2 says "this food tastes bad", both are giving true information. But truth cannot contradict truth. Therefore the truth in both statements cannot be about the object, which is the same in both statements; and must be about the subjects, which differ in both statements.

Unless I am mistaken, then it seems to me that both the "daytime-nighttime" and "road sign" examples are determined to be objective through a process similar to the objective-relative test, thereby arguing in favour of the test.

Logic is an objective property or reality? Where was the syllogism five minutes after the big bang? Where is modus ponens among the mosquitos? You've managed to name one of the most subjective things there is. Logic is unquestionably the work of the human mind. — fishfry

You asked for a proof earlier. There is no stronger proof than a logical or mathematical proof, is there? And this is sufficient to demonstrate that logic is objective; or else, how can logical proofs be strong if logic is merely subjective? Even Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum is an "archimedean point" only because of its logic.

Mass. Nope, not objective. Depends on the velocity of the observer. — fishfry

Mass of an object depends on the observer? Do you mean that a scale recording an object's mass of 10 kg would change its value if I, an observer, move very fast? This is not rhetorical; I am genuinely ignorant of that phenomenon.

Color. Nope. Depends on the eye/brain system of the observer. Wavelength of light reflected off the object. Nope, depends on the relative velocity toward or away from the the observer. Red shift. — fishfry

I think you are correct about that one. I think I was referring to something closer to the property that makes only certain light frequencies reflect back, but this is not really the 'colour'. I'll abandon that example to focus on simpler ones.

Awesome! As Mr Tasmaner said, my icon is the Great A'Tuin from Discworld. I did not know about this whole turtle story, and found out upon further reading of the article that Terry Pratchett, the creator of Discworld, got the idea from that story in the first place.

Any physical property is objective? I'd give you Bishop Berkeley as a refutation. Or Plato's cave, or Descartes's demon. — fishfry

How do idealists account for the fact that you and I see the same objects with the same properties? I suppose it could happen that you and I coincidently subjectively posit the same properties at the same time, but this hypothesis is much more complicated than the hypothesis of objective properties, is it not? It would therefore be shaved off by Occam's razor.

No, because who would decide the criteria? — Wayfarer

My hope is that, if a property is objective, and that object 1 has a higher degree of it than object 2, then most subjects would observe it as such, and the others would not see a distinction, but nobody would be able to observe that object 2 has a higher degree of the property than object 1. The last underlined statement would be the criteria.

Example: test for 'redness'. Let's observe a supposedly red ball 1 and a green ball 2. I foresee most subjects to observe ball 1 as being more red than ball 2; then the rest, being colourblind, will not see a distinction; but nobody would observe ball 2 as being more red than ball 1. If the criteria is met, then 'redness' is an objective property.

But nothing is ultimately objective, in the sense that all judgement has a subjective aspect or pole. — Wayfarer

That's why I'm challenging you to name a SINGLE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE of a thing you claim is objective, so that in the spirit of rational inquiry we can examine your claim. — fishfry

What about essential properties of objects? E.g. a triangle necessarily has the property of having 3 sides.

Sure. To clarify, I am talking about objective properties, not objective statements. "God exists" is an objective statement (regardless if true or false), but I am concerned whether 'beauty' is an objective property, such as in the statement "This waterfall is beautiful".

Any property that is physical is objective. Why? Because any physical property is measurable (at least in theory), and if measurable, then it is mathematical, and if mathematical, then it is logical, and logic is indubitably an objective property of reality. This is why a science is less prone to debate if it is quantifiable. As such, properties like mass, length, energy, and even colour are properties of the object of thought.

Unfortunately, these are the only examples of properties I can give with confidence right now, without relying on tools like the relative-objective test. Are non-physical properties like 'moral goodness', 'beauty', 'goodness of songs' objective or subjective? It would be great to find out.

So the distinction between objective and subjective is grammatical. — Michael

(EDIT 2017-10-01): The distinction is not dependant on grammar, but on who or what is the subject, object, and property in the given statement. In S1, the subject is me, the object is 'the food', and the property is 'good taste'. In S2, the subject is still me, but the object is now me (I observe myself), and the property is 'enjoyment of the taste of this food'.

Although if we're being proper, in the first statement the subject is "this food", whereas in the second it's "I". — Michael

Not according to the definition in epistemology. The term 'subject' is ambiguous, and I think you are using the definition as per the study of logic: subject vs predicate, where in the statement "A is B", A is the subject and B is the predicate. In epistemology, the subject is the observer, thinker, speaker, etc; and the object is the thing observed, thought about, spoken about, etc. Ironically, the subject in logic is really the object in epistemology. I expressed my frustration about this in a previous post here.

I agree for the most part. But to be very picky, it is possible to say something subjectively false, as such: say I really like a song, but for some reason, I say "this song suck".

Interesting discussion. Here is my take on it. Consider the following statements S1 and S2:

S1: "This food tastes good"
S2: "I enjoy the taste of this food"

For both statements, I am the subject, the message is roughly the same, and both are true. But in S1, the object is 'food', and the property is 'goodness'. In S2, the object is "I", and the property is 'enjoyment'. S1 is subjective because not all subjects will agree that the food is good. S2 is objective because all subjects, upon observing me, would agree that I enjoy the food.

Conclusions: 'Goodness in taste' is a subjective property, not a property of food. 'Enjoyment' is an objective property of the object that is the person experiencing it.

The dead animal smells awful. Most humans would agree. But turkey vultures probably find the smell delectable. Maybe that's more how we humans interpret the olfactory sensation than an actual property of the decaying animal. — Marchesk

Hello. I actually think that goodness of a smell is subjective. Some people love a perfume, and some people hate it. Now I agree with you that the smell of a decaying body is awful to most; but I think this is only due to the association with diseases that could occur if we come in contact with them; and health is objective. In other words, if we could be certain not to fall ill from a rotting body, then we might not find the smell awful.

What about warmth? People can be notoriously picky about the temperature, and there does seem to a degree of relativity involved in whether we think something feels warm or cold. But there's also a temperature range beyond which is cold or hot to all humans (at least in terms of bodily damage). — Marchesk

Good point. I think health and safety is objective, where as comfort is subjective. When we hit degrees of temperature that affect our health and safety, then the 'goodness of temperature' is objective. In between these extremes, the property is subjective. Also, the statement "x is warmer than y" is objective.

How about color? Humans can generally get consensus on colors, with some notable exceptions. But does that make the colors we see objective? Or are they dependant on the sorts of eyes we have? — Marchesk

Indeed, a blind or colourblind person would not see the same colour as others. But I think the relative-objective test would still show that colour is objective, because most people would agree that object 1 is more red than object 2, and although the blind and colourblind may not observe this, they would also not observe that object 2 is more red than object 1.

And is a human majority enough for qualifying something as objective? — Marchesk

Although it is a bit soon to tell, I am hopeful that the relative-objective test is infallible, that is, it is not possible that, if a property is objective, some would observe object 1 to have the highest degree, while others would observe object 2 to have the highest degree of it.

Is whether or not a property is objective or subjective difficult to determine? Is it often controversial? I bet you and I could agree for almost any property. — T Clark

Hello. I often hear people say "it's just a matter of opinion" on things that seem objective, such as immoral acts on the grounds of religion or culture. Conversely, I see people who judge others on things that seem subjective, such as the way they dress, their taste in music, hobbies, etc. My goal is to come up with a coherent way to talk sense into such people (and myself if I happen to be wrong on some properties).

I'm sure we could develop an objective measure of how much I like blue. Then we could compare it with other colors and determine what my favorite color is. — T Clark

This is true, but that would be a measure of your own preference, not a measure of goodness in the colour blue. It may sound odd, but "I like blue" is an objective statement where the object is "I"; where as "Blue is a good colour" is a subjective statement where the object is "blue".

Orange by the way. [...]" — T Clark

How barbaric...

"Turtles"?

I like finding the essence of things, even when the thing in question is nothing. Also I agree that 'nothing' is synonymous with 'zero'. Here is why.

What is the essence of 0? We know the essence of 3 is "III", 2 is "II", 1 is "I", therefore the essence of 0 is " ".
What is the essence of nothing? That which has no properties. In other words, " ".
Therefore the essences of 'nothing' and 'zero' coincide.

I agree that our desires, which we are not necessarily in control of, can influence our actions, and even our decision making. That said, while these can remove our ability to act, they cannot remove our intentions to act. E.g. If I had an addiction so strong that I cannot control myself and I don't have the ability get rid of it, I can still have the intention to get rid of it.

As you said, "Willing deals with motivating factors of which we are not in full control of and at times wish we could be free of". This 'wishing' is tied in with our intentions. I.e, we would not be wishing to be free of these factors if we did not intend to be free of these factors. Thus these factors cannot influence our intentions.

I think it is important to clarify what will is, and what it is not. Will is synonymous with intentions; it is not synonymous with desires. Will comes from within, from inside, and one is always in full control of it. Desires come from without, from outside, and one is not necessarily in control of that.

Remember those cartoons where the protagonist has a moral choice to make, and then pops a good angel on one side and a bad angel on the other, and the protagonist listens to both sides and makes the choice? This symbol represents the three parts of the soul, first introduced by Plato I think. (1) the protagonist, (2) the good angel, and (3) the bad angel represent in that order (1) the will, (2) the reason/conscience, and (3) the desires/appetite of the soul. Frequently we make moral choices such as (2) helping the needy, or (3) relaxing and watching TV; and that choice is decided by (1) the will.

Hello.
Yes, power of intentions or power of will is the same thing. If one is forced to do something without their consent, it is called "against their will"; and it is a self-contradiction to say "Their will is changed against their will".

Let's differentiate between moral good/evil and physical good/evil. The moral good is about intentions, and the physical good is about events. If your OP "Why Good must inevitably lose" refers to the true moral good, then it is entirely in our power, since the moral good is based on intentions and we have absolute power over our intentions (though we have zero power over the moral good of others). If it refers to the physical good, then you are possibly right. I am personally optimistic that if we are somewhat rational, our good intents will result in good events most of the time, but I could be wrong.

the road to hell is paved with good intentions. — TheMadFool

I have heard this before, but it is false relative to the christian definition of hell. Hell is not a physical place but a state of relationship between the individual and moral goodness or God (for moral goodness is part of the essence of God). That state of relationship is due to the heart or intentions of the individual; and a good heart leads to heaven, not hell. Therefore hell would not result from good intentions. Maybe by 'hell', the author means 'physical evil', although I dispute this as well, for this hell is still more likely to result from evil intentions than from good intentions.

We can ignore intentions but not consequences. For instance, x intends to harm y and pushes y. In the process a bullet misses y. In this case, y should be thankful to x, despite x's intent. Even legally, y has no basis for a case against x. — TheMadFool

Attempted murder is more punishable than accidental homicide, although you are right that if there is no evidence, then x cannot legally be charged. In truth however, x is guilty of having harmful intentions.

However, if x intends good for y, but in the process harms y, then y is clearly justified, legally, to charge x for any loss or injury. — TheMadFool

It still depends if the harm was reasonably foreseeable or not. Say x plants a tree in y's yard as a gift. One day, y crashes his car into it and gets injured. Objectively, x is one of the causes of y's injury; but legally and morally, x is not guilty. I will concede that professional liability seems to fit what you describe. But even then, a professional is liable only to things he has (or should have) knowledge about.

According to the Bible, God judges the heart of men; and 'heart' in that sense means intentions. Unfortunately, as you said, this info is inaccessible to us (except for our own intentions), and so our justice system must rely on acts and other facts to determine intentions based on probable or reasonable cause.

As a good person the onus is on you to consider ALL the consequences of your actions. — TheMadFool

Not all. Only those consequences that are reasonably foreseeable, because it gives ground to suspect dishonest intentions. If a man dives in front of my moving vehicle and gets killed, then my act of driving is one of the causes of his death, but I am not guilty because I could not have foreseen it, thus there is no ground to suspect dishonest intentions on my part.

Back to my cure example. I agree with your manslaughter idea, but it does not contradict my point because my moral theory can explain it. If I fail to foresee the side effects when these were reasonably foreseeable, then yes, I am guilty, because I chose not to take the best possible course of action; and this translates to not-fully-honest intentions. On the other hand, if I fail to foresee the side effects when these were not reasonably foreseeable, then I am not guilty, because I took the best possible course of action; and this does not translate to dishonest intentions.

To sum up, I claim that my moral theory is compatible with the legal justice system, and that both are based on intentions, not on acts. The act may be the trigger, but the intention is the decisive factor.

But you can't deny our moral system is imperfect, which means it's more likely you err. That translates to evil. — TheMadFool

Good point. But I can show that our moral compass is perfect, by the nature of morality and honest intentions.

We can err in the sense of a rational mistake, but logically, the mistake is either honest or dishonest. A dishonest mistake is immoral, but an honest mistake is not. As stated previously, honesty is a matter of intentions, and I can never be mistaken about my own intentions. As such, we can never err in the sense of morality. Example: I invent a cure for diabetes and share it with the world for free. We later find out that this cure has the side effect of giving cancer. Clearly, I made a rational mistake. But I did not know that at the time I shared the cure; and had I known that, I would not have shared it. Thus it was an honest mistake, thus it was not an immoral act.

I think there is a confusion of categories. The opposite of truth is untruth or falsehood. The opposite of lie or dishonesty is honesty. One can be untruthful, and yet not lie. Truth and untruth belong in epistemology. Honesty and dishonesty or lies belong in morality.

I agree with your argument that it is more probable to uncover untruth than truth. This is why the onus of proof is on he who makes the claim. But I disagree with your argument that it is more probable to have dishonesty (lies) than honesty. These are acts of the will and we are in full control of it at all times. I can never be mistaken about my intentions. Now, will the moral good win over the moral evil? I think that is entirely up to the individual.

Interesting point on economy. I agree with you that a good economic system is one that results in a net benefit to its society, where real demands are satisfied by exchange of products and services. Playing devil's advocate, maybe what the reporters meant is that since the hurricanes are going to destroy things anyways, we might as well look on the bright side and believe that the economy will not only satisfy the new demands (ie rebuilding things) but might also perhaps result in even greater benefits in the end. [It could also be that I don't know what I'm talking about.]

Understood. I will go with yes then; because in your scenario, the act of altruism is good for one's salvation in some case, and harmful for one's salvation in another case. And if we cannot know when it is the case, then we cannot know how to help one's salvation. Maybe to be safe, just make everyone suffer equally, including yourself.

I do have one remark about proposition 9 in your scenario: So altruistic conduct is helpful for her. (because Jody never has a chance of reaching salvation). If she never has a chance of reaching salvation, how is altruism (or anything else) helpful to her?

I'm afraid I have to disagree with nearly everything you have said.

None of those questions make any difference to the only relevant question, which is whether more human suffering can be alleviated by giving locally than by giving in sub-Saharan Africa. [...] we know we can relieve suffering by giving to carefully chosen aid agencies, and that more suffering is relieved in that way than by giving locally. — andrewk

I do not know that in any obvious way, and it is improbable for it to always be the case. Thus the point of these questions is to find out when it is the case. If in doubt, my personal advice is to give locally because of direct experience of the problems and outcomes; others don't have to agree with me. Regardless, this disagreement is on facts, not on the goal of abiding to the GCB ethics.

Yet most people don't. — andrewk

Still unconvinced. I could not tell you if being charitable is a trait found in the majority of people, but it is not an uncommon trait by any means. And for those who are not, it is possible that they cannot.

So the evidence is powerful that your GCB principle is not innate to them. — andrewk

Even if you happen to be right about everything else, this conclusion still does not follow. We cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. The GCB ethics is backed up by an innate knowledge of duty, not by acts. Your claims are compatible with the existence of the ethics, and in which case, it would follow that these people are unethical. Does that really sound surprising? Even without the GCB, surely you have heard of the Golden Rule, which "occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition." (Source). Would you not want to receive help from others if you were in need?

I don't know much about Buddhism, but I thought the goal of Buddha in creating his eightfold path was to cease suffering; where as it sounds like you are saying that suffering is necessary for salvation. Maybe these propositions can be reconciled, but how so?

Also, what do you mean by "Only some people have a chance to reach Salvation"? Why is that, and how do we know which ones?

If what you say about the needy in Africa is true, then it follows that we ought to provide as much help as we can offer before considering our personal pleasures, in accordance to the GCB ethics. The one obstacle I (and I think many others) have, is matters of facts about the problem: Is there a real lack of resources, or a bad distribution of it? Are there not people within their own country that can help out, and if so, why don't they? Will giving money provide a long-term solution, or is it missing the root cause? The further away it is, and the harder it is to know the real facts about the problem, the cause, the best solution, and even about the charities we are giving money to.

But I want to reiterate that, if we could have certainty on efficiency, then that is what we ought to do.

What do you think about trying to become the best? — 12paul123

If you want to reach a consensus, it is best (sorry) to define the term 'best'. Here is my attempt:
Best is ranking #1 at quality X, relative to others also having this quality. We can derive a few things from this definition:

1. Best is a relative term only, and says nothing about absolutes. You don't necessarily need to be good at X to be the best at X.
2. It is fully dependent on others having that quality.
3. It is competitive. There can only be one #1. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it can be if it starts to fail the Golden Rule of ethics.

My take: Trying to become the best at X is not necessarily bad and can be a good motivator to be better at it, but we must remember to also become good at X in the absolute sense.

Hello.
I think you are using the term 'bliss' incorrectly in that expression.
'Bliss' is close to 'blessedness' which means 'moral goodness', not 'subjective contentment'. Under this new definition, here is why it is true:

If a needy is at your doorstep and you can help him, then you should help him, out of duty; and you are a morally bad person if you choose not to, therefore not 'bliss'. But if you don't know that a needy is at your doorstep, then it is not your duty, because you cannot have any duty over what you don't know. Therefore ignorance is bliss.

Hello. I will try to turn this paradox into a syllogism for clarity.

P1: One's suffering is necessary for one's salvation.
P2: Altruism creates suffering in the emitter and removes suffering in the receiver.
C1: Altruism helps the salvation of the emitter but harms the salvation of the receiver. It is therefore selfish because it benefits only the altruist in the end.
But altruism is by definition an act of selflessness. This contradicts C1.

The argument is valid, but I dispute P1. A heartless man is not likely to receive salvation, even if he happens to suffer a great deal. Much like said, what is necessary for salvation is a good will, and suffering is only an effect of this, not a necessity.

Man that was a lot of technical terms, but great summary of its history.
If, as I suspect, the GCB hierarchy is innate knowledge, a first principle or an eternal truth, then it can be rediscovered over and over again from its roots, without having to worry about its bumpy evolution throughout history.

I know you've said it was your last response, and I am just leaving this for completeness of the argument.

Then you need to argue in favour of utilitarianism. Regarding the rest of the paragraph: special pleading. — Πετροκότσυφας

I agree that utilitarianism is compatible with this GCB ethics; the difference being that instead of the subjective happiness found in utilitarianism, the evaluation criteria is on the amount of good done to a being, with more weight given to higher beings in the hierarchy. You keep calling special pleading, but never explained why.

Except that: We're not talking about the law of excluded middle, Samuel. We're talking about the GCB hierarchy, which of course is indubitable only to you. — Πετροκότσυφας

The claim that the feeling of duty is indubitable only to me is again unfounded. And whatever reason comes up to debunk indubitable thoughts, watch that does not accidentally debunk the indubitable thoughts that are the laws of logic along with it, or else it is my turn to call special pleading.

Homeless people or other needy humans do not simply disappear if they're not at your doorstep thus making it fine to violate your hierarchy by privileging other animals over them. If you're going to introduce other criteria (like proximity or quotas of care) which, at times, take precedence over your hierarchy, you have to provide an explanation as to how that's possible - since your axiom, by itself, does not warrant such exceptions. — Πετροκότσυφας

The goal is optimize the net outcome, and you are forgetting such factors as efficiency of care and law of diminishing returns. It is less efficient to give to the needy that are far away; and once the needy in proximity have received the basic care, then any additional marginal amount of care diminishes. In fact, they might not even want too much charity at some point. And yes, if you give absolutely nothing to the needy when you could have, it follows that you are an unethical person according to the GCB ethics.

The problem is that being unable to doubt what you're out to defend, does not make it necessarily true. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes it does. The highest kind of proof is logical proof, where the contrary of the conclusion entails a contradiction. Can you prove the law of non-contradiction to be true? No, we cannot logically prove logic to be true. But it is strong because, and only because, it is indubitable. So if you deny that an indubitable proposition is necessarily true, then you must also deny that the laws of logic are necessarily true.

No, it doesn't. Humans care for animal life besides its utility and every instance of such care is care that could have been provided to humans but it wasn't. There's no escaping this. And this difficulty pervades every ring of your chain. — Πετροκότσυφας

I already addressed this issue here. Let's put it another way. It would be unethical for me to use all my money to buy a pet if a poor person was at my doorstep begging for food. But if I give a reasonable amount of money, then it seems correct to keep some money to buy a pet. Don't you agree?

If you can't doubt it, you can't genuinely entertain alternatives, and if you can't do that, there's no contrast. — Πετροκότσυφας

That sounds right. So what? If indubitable, then it is necessarily true, then you cannot disagree.

If you cannot even doubt it, it can't be reached through argument. — Πετροκότσυφας

Can you explain why?

Since it also shows that there are countless cases where humans care for animals while they could have cared for humans instead. — Πετροκότσυφας

Aside from their ontological values, humans also care for plants and animals because they benefit humans as a means to survival like for food, transport and clothing. So it all abides to the GCB ethics.

Pets (and other animals) are not mere pleasure. — Πετροκότσυφας

Indeed. This works in favour of the GCB hierarchy which claims that animals have ontological value of their own.

So, it is indeed an axiom, not a conclusion reached through argument. — Πετροκότσυφας

It is indeed an axiom or first principle, but it is found through argument. The whole point of the thought experiment is to demonstrate that the GCB hierarchy is innate.

The money you spent on your pet could very well be spent for people who don't have food, shelter or access to doctors. — Πετροκότσυφας

That is a good point. Where is the right balance between duty towards others and personal pleasure? Using common sense alone, it seems too extreme to spend all our money on our own pleasure, and also too extreme to spend all our money to help others with nothing left for our own pleasure. The right answer is somewhere in between and I don't know it. But I don't think it really harms the GCB ethics, it only makes it complicated to apply in some cases.

Even if we would all answer that we'd save the human, even if in practice we would all save the human, that would still not entail innateness. It could still be learned behaviour. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes. One way to check this, as Pascal and Descartes say, is that "we cannot doubt natural principles [or innate knowledge] if we speak sincerely and in all good faith". I personally cannot doubt that it is my duty to save the human first, and cannot imagine that it is my duty to save another first (given the conditions established before). To clarify: I can imagine myself behaving otherwise, but not out of duty.