I don’t think it would be excessive if I asked for English — Average
Nevertheless, if you can dumb it down for me, maybe I can follow the logic of your topic. If not, I'll bow out — Gnomon
exactly. Far from being a reason of no free will as you think, metacognition and qualia is the pinnacle achievement of sentience in providing sentient beings with objectified existence disassociated from the matter which it executes upon/within, thus having the property of self-determination path within any given set of constraints. So, our definitions would seem to diverge far more that you say, including b/c we end up with opposite conclusions and reasons.it doesn’t seem any way free will would simply appear at some point in ...these brains. But the feeling we have about ourselves, the others and animals that they have free will is so strong. — Rotorblade
they did not simply get better and better or more complex. Far more than that, in fact. They created ever more hierarchical, objectified, and disassociated layers, leading, at some point, to metacognition and qualia.If we accept the theory of evolution and we see how from simple mechanisms, lifeforms got more complex then developed a nervous system for centralized coordination then they simply got better and better ... — Rotorblade
If the expectations are unfounded and they are ultimately baseless what good do they do as a metric? — Average
What guarantees that the agent isn’t misguided or simply deceived? — Average
Because the agent must invest its energy and time into acquiring and transforming The information and knowledge in its own terms and in its personal Life path. So, if the agent does not have a good expectation that the knowledge would be practical then it would invest last effort/time in pursuing or integrating such knowledge. We do this all the time, so it is kind of obvious to me.Why would the agents own expectations be a good indication of the practicality of knowledge? — Average
But "information" is "knowledge" . . . and much more. — Gnomon
In my DIKW definition framework, I expect generating the Platonic Forms are more about knowledge than information, as they are generic (ideal) knowledge about how to structure and constrain and use a category of imperfect yet very similar objects. Thus, Platonic Forms are very much like ideal models and general templates of expected/experienced objects.Information is Generic in the sense of generating all forms from a formless pool of possibility : the Platonic Forms. — Gnomon
But I have a more general & pragmatic usage in mind. The concept of "Generic Information" can be applied to just about any philosophical question. But it's not formulated for use in chemistry or physics experiments. — Gnomon
"the difference that makes a difference". — Gnomon
You invite criticism then insult anyone who dares criticize. — Wayfarer
If you say 'I have some information', the first question I'm going to ask is 'what information?' or 'what about?' 'Oh, nothing. It's just information.' Makes no sense. — Wayfarer
Of course information is real, but the question is, whether it is fundamental or derivative, the result of other processes. I’m inclined to think of it as derivative and specific. — Wayfarer
Again, ‘generic information’ is an incoherent concept. — Wayfarer
As I said, I believe information is always specific..., and I'm sceptical of the effort to make 'information' a fundamental or foundational category. — Wayfarer
It's meaningless to talk about 'generic information' — Wayfarer
I assume the referenced question is about "how the mechanism of organism works". And your "definition" makes the most obvious distinction between Mechanism and Organism : Mechanisms are passive media through which energy passes, while Organisms are active agents that turn some of that energy to their own personal purposes. — Gnomon
Yes. I was led by my exploration of the Enformationism thesis to conclude that something like a Divine Creator -- or First Cause of our space-time sequence of secondary causes -- is reasonable to assume; perhaps even necessary to believe. But the very generality & universality of Information in the real world, does not specify any particular traditional deity concept. Nor does it imply any humanoid characteristics, such as motherly love or fatherly commandments. — Gnomon
A Philosophical framework & definition of "Information" would be fine, but I read your comments in that thread and could not find any clearly stated definition of "Information" at all, just allot of arm waving about Enformationism, Teleological Attractors, etc. So, I tend to agree w/ @Wayfarer where he responded to you:If you have any interest in a Philosophical framework & definition of "Information", the linked thread below discusses the Epistemological & Ontological status of that traditional & technical term. — Gnomon
Well, all due respect, I don't think you've really clarified it. — Wayfarer
one measure of potential utility (a kind of practicality) would be if the information/knowledge is expected to be useful in creating, or bridging to, any wisdom the agent would expect to be valuable. A measure of 'practicality' might be the degree that the information increases the agent's (expected or actual) negentropy or total potential energy, maybe after working out obvious/monotonic implementation/contextual problems.How do we measure the practicality of knowledge or the suitability of pathways? — Average
optimization is typically done to do the classic "smaller, faster, better, cheaper" , or less errors, more efficient/effective, less harm to others, more morally pure, etc. Wisdom level 'optimization' generally is the optimal balance of identifying and achieving a goal that is most aligned with the agent's areas of concerns, desired affordable costs/efforts, and desired gains in potential energy or getting closer to a truth.This definition strikes me as impractical. Maybe it’s just the way it was worded but it’s not clear what optimization actually means in this context. — Average
Yours lives more room for interpretation in the sense you define something that may be possible although I don’t see how it could do it, I can’t exclude it with certainty. — Rotorblade
It seems a better definition. At least mine doesn’t make room for free will./quote]
not sure what you mean. why are you apparently arguing that free will does not exist in the brain? My definitions are completely based on "free will" and enacting it in a way that is consistent with and predicts all known observations. — Rotorblade
So you mean the brain as a machine creates the thoughts but then these thoughts can cause nature to veer off it’s normal course? — Rotorblade
Since these "energies" have not been found by Physical Science, the names must refer to some Meta-physical power. In the Frankenstein novel, even the raw power of lightening was imagined as the vitalizing force. But nobody knows exactly how the "mechanism of organism" works. It seems to be related to the phase change from a collection of parts, to a single unified organic biological Whole.
I can't specify all the transitional steps from Matter to Life to Mind, but it seems to be merely a highly-evolved kind of Phase Transition --- like liquid to gas to solid. — Gnomon
If you have any interest in a Philosophical framework & definition of "Information", the linked thread below discusses the Epistemological & Ontological status of that traditional & technical term. — Gnomon
to clarify my prior point on the 'free will' thread, I should also point out that call conscious decisions must be based on data and information, which according to my above definitions necessarily must be "the result of the interactions between the fundamental constituents the brain is made of or whatever makes the thought possible", which contradicts your definition approach. So, my proposed definitions would seem to perform better than yours.To me free will is the claimed ability to take a decision without this decision being the result of the interactions between the fundamental constituents the brain is made of or whatever makes the thought possible. — Rotorblade
not really. what you are talking about is in pure quantum states which have no action on the real world. As Feynman discovered in his QED theory, all those pure quantum random paths that deviate from the PLA cancel out to collapse only into the classical PLA path of action we observe.Any particle can deviate from the minimum action path, so everything has what you call primitive free will. The deviation is random — Rotorblade
To me free will is the claimed ability to take a decision without this decision being the result of the interactions between the fundamental constituents the brain is made of or whatever makes the thought possible. — Rotorblade
This would also be unpredictable in practice. The question is whether both the robot and the human are fundamentally predictable, but very hard to practically predict, or whether there is something about life that's fundamentally unpredictable.
You assert the latter, but your argument doesn't actually support that conclusion. — Echarmion
In your glider example, one could easily replace the human pilot with a robot that operates the gliders to land at a random, suitable point, the randomness provided by some form of random number generator. — Echarmion
Your definitions simply sidestep the core problem — Echarmion
, which is how do we know what happens inside the intelligent system is not just another physical process, following the standard laws? — Echarmion
I am curious, is this your personal theory about animate matter, or did you read it somewhere? — SophistiCat
Here is a random example from the literature:
This paper proposes a theory for understanding perceptual learning processes within the general framework of laws of nature — SophistiCat
Once you define your Lagrangian (a mathematical object), then the definition of action follows straightforwardly from that. But how the Lagrangian is cached out in physical terms is going to vary from one theory to another. It is one thing in non-relativistic classical mechanics, another - in relativistic classical mechanics, yet another in quantum mechanics, etc. — SophistiCat
Obviously it does apply, or else PLA is simply wrong as a description of the physical world, of which viruses are a part. — Echarmion
I disagree with that in general terms. That is, an example of "intelligence" includes the molecular program of the virus, which is otherwise inanimate matter but for that molecular program.Obviously inanimate matter cannot employ "intelligence", whatever that means. — Echarmion
Why not? Clearly we can predict how viruses act generally to for medical purposes. From a physical perspective, a virus is of course very complex, but why would it be unpredictable? — Echarmion
And that's not going to happen with the language you're using and how you use it. But here I leave you to it. — tim wood