• Talk about philosophy
    Yeah, that was my reaction, too. How about trigonometry as a sport?Sapientia

    :joke:
  • Talk about philosophy
    Philosophy as a science. Lol. Yeah, no. Philosophy is inherently unparadigmatic. It might even be considered proto paradigmatic in certain cases. The sciences on the other hand, require a paradigm for there to be any form of normal science at all. So there's that.
  • Fear
    No, and I've been trying for over 18 years now.

    Protip: Check if you're smoking an Indica or Sativa and check the thc/cbd ratio if possible. CBD has anti psychotic properties while THC on it's own has the possibility to induce the more negative effects of a cannabis high. So what you're looking for is a strain with balanced thc/cbd ratio's if you're looking for a high that's not likely to turn into an ordeal.
  • Radical doubt
    Skepticism is a problem for philosophy because there is no absolute certainty in it.TheMadFool

    Maybe the problem is the notion of "absolute certainty", not scepticism.

    How does one overcome it?

    I don't. I retooled to scepticism years ago.

    Do we fall back on pragmatism or do we just ignore it?

    We become sceptics and attain ataraxia. It's not particularly hard.
  • Radical doubt
    m not an expert but was it Decartes who approached philosophy, life, with complete doubt?TheMadFool

    No, that was Pyrrho of Elis. He's considered the first Greek sceptic. He met several wise men (gymnosophists, magi) in the east during his travels with Alexander the Great which inspired him to live a life free from doxa. As such, scepticism has connections with eastern philosophy. Ataraxia, the mental state advocated by sceptics, should be regarded in that way imho, as a meditative attitude. That ataraxia is central to scepticism is further outlined in book 1 of the "Outines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus:

    "Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or alternando appearances to judgements, -- in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End.""
    -Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch.4

    "Our next subject will be the end of the Sceptic system. Now an "end" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appentency." We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the skeptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgment on the sense impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
    The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, -- namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, --the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition "suspension of judgment in investigations."
    "
    -Ibid. ch.12
  • Are we running out of time to resolve issues of conciousness and free-will?
    You've made quite a leap there from what a single, rather fringe, computer scientist thinks to two very firm statements about what is the case.Pseudonym

    Yeah I'm sure some internet rando like yourself knows more about these matters than someone actually active in the field. Bye now.
  • We are all in agreement; disagreement is simply our inability or unwillingness to see that
    Don't try to shift the burden of proof. You made the controversial claim, you prove that we are all supposedly in agreement. And no, you didn't do that in the first post. If A is to be determined, then "A because B" is an argument. "B because A" would be an after the facts explanation, and that second one is what you did in the OP. Not playing ball, here.
  • Are we running out of time to resolve issues of conciousness and free-will?
    We now, however, face the problem of increasingly intelligent AI and the question of whether it needs to be controlled in some way. If free-will is an illusion and conciousness is simply something available to any sufficiently complex computational system, then absolutely nothing will distinguish us from AI apart from the fact that they are several thousand times more intelligent than us.

    If conciousness and free-will is something unique to humans then there's no threat from AI, but is it safe to pin the future of humanity on some fragile metaphysical constructions, are those who believe in free-will and conciousness (as a uniquely human trait) willing to stake the future of humanity on it?
    Pseudonym

    Well, we don't have any working definition of what a thought is or what an idea is, on a neurological level. According to Jaron Lanier.



    So talk about hard AI as if it's a thing is like talking about nuclear fusion in the living room. Maybe possible in the future after some or the other huge breakthrough, but banking on such issues is science fiction at this point in time.

    [edit]
    Great. No timestamp on the youtube vid. Here's the link with timestamp:
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-3scivGxMI&feature=youtu.be&t=1991
    [/edit]
  • A complete newbie on Philosophy
    ...but what would be a good way to get introduced to the discipline?WolvesAtMyDoor

    Well, it pays when you know philosophy is mostly about problems, so I suggest diving straight in with an easy one. The problem of the historical Socrates is a good place to start off since it doesn't require much reading to get a somewhat educated view on the matter. All it requires is some reading of Plato ("Apology", "Crito" and "Phaedo") and Xenophon ("Apology" and "Memorabilia"). Those two authors paint a different picture of Socrates, and knowing both allows you to piece together some understanding of the actual man on your own.
  • Relationship between Platonism and Stoicism
    Okay, so then on ethical matters, do you agree more with the Platonists or the Stoics?Agustino

    Classical scepticism/daoism. I'm basically against prescriptive ethics, dualistic value judgement systems etc. 8-)
  • Relationship between Platonism and Stoicism
    What about, for ex. Plutarch?Agustino

    Uh, sure. I don't know much about that dude so didn't mention him. :)
  • We are all in agreement; disagreement is simply our inability or unwillingness to see that
    No matter how you prefer to explain it, the more that I hear/see people interacting intellectually, the more apparent it becomes to me that we are all basically in agreement while nitpicking and splitting hairs over superficial differences.WISDOMfromPO-MO

    No, we're not.
  • Relationship between Platonism and Stoicism
    One question that interests me, is why did the Platonist school, even though it was more widespread than Stoicism, didn't produce important historical figures like Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and the like. Would it be because of the overly theoretic aspect of Platonism?Agustino

    Well, apart from the people I already mentioned (Arcesilaus and Karneades where scholarchs of the Academy), Cicero also went to the Academy during his time in Athens. Cicero wasn't exactly a platonist though.
  • Science is just a re-branding of logic
    That is a very contentious proposition, and in any case, I don't see how it bears on warrant. No one denies that we do think - and behave - inductively (except maybe Popperians).SophistiCat

    Umm, no. Popperians wouldn't claim so either:

    Block of text
    "I had become interested in the problem of induction in 1923. Although this problem is very closely connected with the problem of demarcation, I did not fully appreciate the connection for about five years.

    I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified. He held that there can be no valid logical arguments allowing us to establish 'that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience'. Consequently 'even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience'. For 'shou'd it be said that we have experience' --experience teaching us that objects constantly conjoined with certain other objects continue to be so conjoined--then, Hume says, 'I wou'd renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience'. In other words, an attempt to justify the practice of induction by an appeal to experience must lead to an infinite regress. As a result we can say that theories can never be inferred from observation statements, or rationally justified by them.

    I found Hume's refutation of inductive inference clear and conclusive. But I felt completely dissatisfied with his psychological explanation of induction in terms of custom or habit.

    It has often been noticed that this explanation of Hume's is philosophically not very satisfactory. It is, however, without doubt intended as a psychological rather than a philosophical theory; for it tries to give a causal explanation of a psychological fact--the fact that we believe in laws, in statements asserting regularities or constantly conjoined kinds of events--by asserting that this fact is due to (i.e. constantly conjoined with) custom or habit. But even this reformulation of Hume's theory is still unsatisfactory; for what I have just called a 'psychological fact' may itself be described as a custom or habit -- the custom or habit of believing in laws or regularities; and it is neither very surprising nor very enlightening to hear that such a custom or habit must be explained as due to, or conjoined with, a custom or habit (even though a different one). Only when we remember that the words 'custom' and 'habit' are used by Hume, as they are in ordinary language, not merely to describe regular behaviour, but rather to theorize about its origin (ascribed to frequent repetition), can we reformulate his psychological theory in a more satisfactory way. We can then say that, like other habits, our habit of believing in laws is the product of frequent repetition--of the repeated observation that things of a certain kind are constantly conjoined with things of another kind.This genetico-psychological theory is, as indicated, incorporated in ordinary language, and it is therefore hardly as revolutionary as Hume thought. It is no doubt an extremely popular psychological theory--part of 'common sense', one might say. But in spite of my love of both common sense and Hume, I felt convinced that this psychological theory was mistaken; and that it was in fact refutable on purely logical grounds. Hume's psychology, which is the popular psychology, was mistaken, I felt, about at least three different things: (a) the typical result of repetition; (b) the genesis of habits; and especially (c) the character of those experiences or modes of behaviour which may be described as 'believing in a law' or 'expecting a law-like succession of events'.

    A. The typical result of repetition--say, of repeating a difficult passage on the piano--is that movements which at first needed attention are in the end executed without attention. We might say that the process becomes radically abbreviated, and ceases to be conscious: it becomes 'physiological'. Such a process, far from creating a conscious expectation of law-like succession, or a belief in a law, may on the contrary begin with a conscious belief and destroy it by making it superfluous. In learning to ride a bicycle we may start with the belief that we can avoid falling if we steer in the direction in which we threaten to fall, and this belief may be useful for guiding our movements. After sufficient practice we may forget the rule; in any case, we do not need it any longer. On the other hand, even if it is true that repetition may create unconscious expectations, these become conscious only if something goes wrong (we may not have heard the clock tick, but we may hear that it has stopped).
    B. Habits or customs do not, as a rule, originate in repetition. Even the habit of walking, or of speaking, or of feeding at certain hours, begins before repetition can play any part whatever. We may say, if we like, that they deserve to be called 'habits' or 'customs' only after repetition has played its typical part; but we must not say that the practices in question originated as the result of many repetitions.
    C. Belief in a law is not quite the same thing as behaviour which betrays an expectation of a law-like succession of events; but these two are sufficiently closely connected to be treated together. They may, perhaps, in exceptional cases, result from a mere repetition of sense impressions (as in the case of the stopping clock). I was prepared to concede this, but I contended that normally, and in most cases of any interest, they cannot be so explained. As Hume admits, even a single striking observation may be sufficient to create a belief or an expectation--a fact which he tries to explain as due to an inductive habit, formed as the result of a vast number of long repetitive sequences which had been experienced at an earlier period of life. But this, I contended, was merely his attempt to explain away unfavourable facts which threatened his theory; an unsuccessful attempt, since these unfavourable facts could be observed in very young animals and babies-- as early, indeed, as we like. 'A lighted cigarette was held near the noses of the young puppies', reports F. Bäge. 'They sniffed at it once, turned tail, and nothing would induce them to come back to the source of the smell and to sniff again. A few days later, they reacted to the mere sight of a cigarette or even of a rolled piece of white paper, by bounding away, and sneezing.' If we try to explain cases like this by postulating a vast number of long repetitive sequences at a still earlier age we are not only romancing, but forgetting that in the clever puppies' short lives there must be room not only for repetition but also for a great deal of novelty, and consequently of non-repetition.

    But it is not only that certain empirical facts do not support Hume; there are decisive arguments of a purely logical nature against his psychological theory.

    The central idea of Hume's theory is that of repetition, based upon similarity (or 'resemblance'). This idea is used in a very uncritical way. We are led to think of the water-drop that hollows the stone: of sequences of unquestionably like events slowly forcing themselves upon us, as does the tick of the clock. But we ought to realize that in a psychological theory such as Hume's, only repetition-for-us, based upon similarity-for-us, can be allowed to have any effect upon us. We must respond to situations as if they were equivalent; take them as similar; interpret them as repetitions. The clever puppies, we may assume, showed by their response, their way of acting or of reacting, that they recognized or interpreted the second situation as a repetition of the first: that they expected its main element, the objectionable smell, to be present. The situation was a repetition-for-them because they responded to it by anticipating its similarity to the previous one.

    This apparently psychological criticism has a purely logical basis which may be summed up in the following simple argument. (It happens to be the one from which I originally started my criticism.) The kind of repetition envisaged by Hume can never be perfect; the cases he has in mind cannot be cases of perfect sameness; they can only be cases of similarity. Thus they are repetitions only from a certain point of view. (What has the effect upon me of a repetition may not have this effect upon a spider.) But this means that, for logical reasons, there must always be a point of view--such as a system of expectations, anticipations, assumptions, or interests--before there can be any repetition; which point of view, consequently, cannot be merely the result of repetition. (See now also appendix *X, (1), to my L.Sc.D.)

    We must thus replace, for the purposes of a psychological theory of the origin of our beliefs, the naïve idea of events which are similar by the idea of events to which we react by interpreting them as being similar. But if this is so (and I can see no escape from it) then Hume's psychological theory of induction leads to an infinite regress, precisely analogous to that other infinite regress which was discovered by Hume himself, and used by him to explode the logical theory of induction. For what do we wish to explain? In the example of the puppies we wish to explain behaviour which may be described as recognizing or interpreting a situation as a repetition of another. Clearly, we cannot hope to explain this by an appeal to earlier repetitions, once we realize that the earlier repetitions must also have been repetitions-for-them, so that precisely the same problem arises again: that of recognizing or interpreting a situation as a repetition of another.

    To put it more concisely, similarity-for-us is the product of a response involving interpretations (which may be inadequate) and anticipations or expectations (which may never be fulfilled). It is therefore impossible to explain anticipations, or expectations, as resulting from many repetitions, as suggested by Hume. For even the first repetitionfor-us must be based upon similarity-for-us, and therefore upon expectations--precisely the kind of thing we wished to explain.

    This shows that there is an infinite regress involved in Hume's psychological theory.

    "Hume, I felt, had never accepted the full force of his own logical analysis. Having refuted the logical idea of induction he was faced with the following problem: how do we actually obtain our knowledge, as a matter of psychological fact, if induction is a procedure which is logically invalid and rationally unjustifiable? There are two possible answers: (1) We obtain our knowledge by a non-inductive procedure. This answer would have allowed Hume to retain a form of rationalism. (2) We obtain our knowledge by repetition and induction, and therefore by a logically invalid and rationally unjustifiable procedure, so that all apparent knowledge is merely a kind of belief--belief based on habit. This answer would imply that even scientific knowledge is irrational, so that rationalism is absurd, and must be given up. (I shall not discuss here the age-old attempts, now again fashionable, to get out of the difficulty by asserting that though induction is of course logically invalid if we mean by 'logic' the same as 'deductive logic', it is not irrational by its own standards, as may be seen from the fact that every reasonable man applies it as a matter of fact: it was Hume's great achievement to break this uncritical identification of the question of fact--quid facti--and the question of justification or validity--quid juris. (See below, point (13) of the appendix to the present chapter.)

    It seems that Hume never seriously considered the first alternative. Having cast out the logical theory of induction by repetition he struck a bargain with common sense, meekly allowing the reentry of induction by repetition, in the guise of a psychological theory. I proposed to turn the tables upon this theory of Hume's. Instead of explaining our propensity to expect regularities as the result of repetition, I proposed to explain repetition-for-us as the result of our propensity to expect regularities and to search for them.

    Thus I was led by purely logical considerations to replace the psychological theory of induction by the following view. Without waiting, passively, for repetitions to impress or impose regularities upon us, we actively try to impose regularities upon the world. We try to discover similarities in it, and to interpret it in terms of laws invented by us. Without waiting for premises we jump to conclusions. These may have to be discarded later, should observation show that they are wrong.

    This was a theory of trial and error--of conjectures and refutations. It made it possible to understand why our attempts to force interpretations upon the world were logically prior to the observation of similarities. Since there were logical reasons behind this procedure, I thought that it would apply in the field of science also; that scientific theories were not the digest of observations, but that they were inventions--conjectures boldly put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they clashed with observations; with observations which were rarely accidental but as a rule undertaken with the definite intention of testing a theory by obtaining, if possible, a decisive refutation.
    "
    -Karl Popper, "Conjectures and Refutations", p. 55-61
  • Relationship between Platonism and Stoicism
    The stoics traced their lineage back to Socrates: Zeno of Citium was a student of Crates of Thebes, who supposedly studied under Diogenes of Sinope who supposedly studied under Antisthenes who was a student of Socrates. By the time stoicism was in full swing, the platonic Academy was taken over by the sceptics with guys like Arcesilaus and Karneades openly attacking the tenets of stoicism in their writings.
  • The Socratic attitude and science.
    Then my question is, with the advent of science and all the various technological achievements, and the improvement in living standards and so on has the Socratic attitude become illogical or even detrimental to living in the modern day world?Posty McPostface

    No. Why? Problem of induction and black swan events.
  • Do you consider yourself a Good person?
    Do you consider yourself a Good person?Andrew4Handel

    Neither good nor it's supposed opposite. Those concepts are meaningless to me in regards to self evaluation. By what measure do you judge someone or yourself to be good/bad, anyway? And by what mean is that measure justified? And what means justify that measure? Ad infinitum (Regress problem).
  • Philosophical Starting Points
    Something Antisthenes said:

    "Take your most solid arguments and build a castle on them".
  • How To Counter a Bad Philosophy - Nicely????
    How to deal with bad philosophy? You moonwalk away without breaking eye contact.
  • Confusion over Hume's Problem of Induction


    The problem of induction is most clearly stated by Sextus Empiricus imho, and he was writing well before Hume:

    "It is also easy, I think, to find fault with the inductive mode of inference. For when the Dogmatists attempt to lend credence to a universal by induction from the particulars, in doing this they will consider either all the particulars or only some of them. But if they consider only some, the induction will not
    be firm, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may refute the universal; while if they consider all, they will be working at an impossible task, since the particulars are infinite in number and unbounded. So that either way, I think, the induction turns out to be shaky.
    "
    -Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 2, ch. 15

    As for how science progresses in light of the problem of induction, well, that's investigated in "Conjectures and Refutations" by Popper.
  • The downwards trajectory of Modern Music
    "Hexagram 1, nine in the third place means:
    All day long the superior man is creatively active.
    At nightfall his mind is still beset with cares.
    Danger. No blame.

    A sphere of influence opens up for the great man. His fame begins to spread. The masses flock to him. His inner power is adequate to the increased outer activity. There are all sorts of things to be done, and when others are at rest in the evening, plans and anxieties press in upon him. But danger lurks here at the place of transition from lowliness to the heights. Many a great man has been ruined because the masses flocked to him and swept him into their course. Ambition has destroyed his integrity. However, true greatness is not impaired by temptations. He who remains in touch with the time that is dawning, and with its demands is prudent enough to avoid all pitfalls, and remains blameless.
    "
    -"I Ching", Wilhelm translation.
  • What is Scepticism?
    If I told you, I'd be telling.
  • The potential of psychedelic drugs.
    Are psychedelics useful? Well, if you're philosophically inclined, sure. Not so sure about if you're not, though. What people can get through psychedelics is much the same as what one can get out of so called ordeal rituals (think sweat huts, dancing to induce a trance state, poison from rainforest frogs, etc), that is, an "outside-in" perspective on ones own life. Such ordeal experiences can lead to getting your priorities straight. That's why certain hallucinogens can help with addictions. Now, what's more interesting is the philosophical application (as opposed to the previously mentioned psychiatric application) of psychedelics. Psychedelics are philosophically relevant because they can help purge the last remnants of naive realism from ones system. Being a representationalist on an intellectual level is one thing, but having the phenomenological symmetry of ones lifeworld break right in ones own mental theater is something wholly different.
  • Philosophyforums.com refugees
    I sometimes post on here, too. Currently busy playing Overwatch though, so there's that.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    Do you think we are passive conduits of experience to our self, that the act of presentation is something that we only can experience as an observer. Or do you think that our experiences are representative and that we are in some sense responsible for what we experience as that which we represent to our self.Cavacava

    While I think sensory apperception is a thing, I don't think cognitive apperception is: When one of our senses receive an impulse, there is a moment where information exists only as activity in ones nerve system. I don't think this information is perceived though (we are talking milliseconds, here), because the action potential didn't reach the relevant processing centers in the brain yet.
    When sensory information reaches the brain, it passes through a region of the midbrain called the optic tectum. This region is responsible for object location. Then it moves further along the brain, to reach a region called the visual cortex, which is responsible for object identification. Object identification relies on our previous experiences, and as such, it's necessarily based in ones own subjectivity.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    Physicalism assumes that all mental phenomena is strictly mechanical, if intentionality is a mental phenomena then it is also, by default, a physical phenomena.
    This means there is some effective mechanical procedure.
    m-theory

    I'm not saying anything about physicalism one way or the other. What I am pointing out however, is that the distinction between physical and mental phenomena is peculiar to Brentano and (some) members of his school.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    "Intentionality", eh? Let's see about that:

    "Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.
    Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.
    These examples may suffice to illustrate the differences between the two classes of phenomena.
    "
    Franz Brentano, "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint", p. 60, 61.

    "What positive criterion shall we now be able to provide? Or is there perhaps no positive defnition which holds true of all mental phenomena generally? Bain thinks that infact there is none.* Nevertheless, psychologists in earlier times have already pointed out that there is a special affnity and analogy which exists among all mental phenomena, and which physical phenomena do not share.
    Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
    This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.
    "
    -Ibid. p. 68.

    So, in short, intentionality isn't a characteristic that helps one to distinguish phenomena from the physical world, rather, it's a property of a specific class of phenomena, to distinguish them from other phenomena. All mental contents. Brentano states so himself at the start of the chapter these quotes come from:

    "All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena. We spoke of this distinction earlier when we established the concept of psychology, and we returned to it again in our discussion of psychological method. But what we have said is still not sufficient."
    -Ibid. p. 59.

    So how do physicalists explain intentionality? Well, they don't. They tend to not make the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. The distinction between mental and physical phenomena is a non-issue to them.
  • A question about English expressions for martial arts
    I guess. You hear it often enough in commentaries.
  • Psychology, advertising and propaganda
    The Century of the Self:
    Reveal

    Sut Jhally - Advertising & the Perfect Storm:
    Reveal
  • Main Idea and Philoshophy of Yin and Yang, and Key Points of Chinese Therapy
    In your view, is all this talk about strength/weakness—as the terms are interpreted in western cultures—historically accurate?javra

    "This hexagram is made up of broken lines only. The broken lines represents the dark, yielding, receptive primal power of yin. The attribute of the hexagram is devotion; its image is the earth. It is the perfect complement of THE CREATIVE--the complement, not the opposite, for the Receptive does
    not combat the Creative but completes it . It represents nature in contrast to spirit, earth in contrast to heaven, space as against time, the female-maternal as against the male-paternal. However, as applied to human affairs, the principle of this complementary relationship is found not only in the relation
    between man and woman, but also in that between prince and minister and between father and son. Indeed, even in the individual this duality appears in the coexistence of the spiritual world and the world of the senses.
    But strictly speaking there is no real dualism here, because there is a clearly defined hierarchic relationship between the two principles. In itself of course the Receptive is just as important as the Creative, but the attribute of devotion defines the place occupied by this primal power in relation to the Creative. For the Receptive must be activated and led by the Creative; then it is productive of good. Only when it abandons this position and tries to stand as an equal side by side with the Creative, does it become evil. The result then is opposition to and struggle against the Creative, which is productive of evil to both.
    "
    -"I Ching", Wilhelm translation, hexagram 2.
  • Main Idea and Philoshophy of Yin and Yang, and Key Points of Chinese Therapy
    Yin and Yang refer to "heaven" and "earth", "the creative" and "the receptive", chapters 1 and 2 of the "I Ching". Ancient Chinese cosmology was based on that text. People like to act like the yin/yang symbol just stands for duality. Those people are wrong. Those people have too many dragons up their yin/yang.

    "The master said: 'Ch'ien and K'un may be regarded as the gate to the I Ching'.
    Ch'ien represents what is of the yang nature (bright and active); K'un what is of the yin nature (shaded and inactive). These two unite according to their qualities, and there comes the embodiment of the result by the strong and weak lines. In this way we have the phenomena of heaven and earth visibly exhibited, and can comprehend the operation of the spiritual intelligence.
    "
    -Ta Chuan, section 2, chapter 6, "On the General Nature of the I Ching".

    wu-ji-tai-ji-10-000.gif
  • Tao Te Ching appreciation thread
    ↪Ying

    Hey, thanks! Great responses and insights. You get to pick the next chapter to discuss! (Y)
    (Well, actually anyone can pick any chapter they want. But a good answer deserves a prize.)
    0 thru 9


    Well, I particularly like chapters 5 and 11:

    "Heaven and earth do not act from (the impulse of) any wish to be benevolent; they deal with all things as the dogs of grass are dealt with. The sages do not act from (any wish to be) benevolent; they deal with the people as the dogs of grass are dealt with.

    May not the space between heaven and earth be compared to a bellows?'Tis emptied, yet it loses not its power; 'Tis moved again, and sends forth air the more.
    Much speech to swift exhaustion lead we see;
    Your inner being guard, and keep it free.
    "
    -Daodejing, Legge translation, ch. 5.

    "The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty hollowness, that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the empty space (within), that its use depends.

    Therefore, what has a (positive) existence serves for profitable adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) usefulness.
    "
    -Ibid. ch. 11.
  • Is sex as idolized elsewhere as in the West?
    never understood the fascination with sex in the West despite being from the West myself.

    Why is sex so idolized in the West? It seems nowadays that almost every film produced for adults has to have at least one sex scene. The internet is awash with pornography. I find it disturbing that people are so mesmerized by it.

    I've never had sex myself and frankly don't want to. I want to go through life not indulging in it; but, the struggle is real with sex being advertised and promoted almost everywhere you go.

    It's quite saddening.
    Question


    It's not so much about sex as it is about selling things. Sexual imagery merely is a means to an end in that regard. Not really meant to arouse in itself but to make some or the other trinket more exciting. We don't live in a society that idolizes sex imho. We live in a society that reinforces economic materialism through constant repetition. On an atomic level, it's innocent enough. Some idiot trying to hawk his wares. On a larger scale, advertisements become an ubiquitous part of our behavioral environment. This is great if you happen to be a capitalist; capitalism and economic materialism go hand in hand...
  • Congress is filled with morons.
    Have you heard that song by the Fugs (1960s) "Wide Wide River"?Bitter Crank

    I have, now. :D