So you don't use logic to know if you have experiences or not? — m-theory
So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena? — m-theory
Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method. — m-theory
No, do you? How does that work? You form an argument and then experiences pop out with the conclusion? — Marchesk
There's a logical argument for what constitutes mental phenomena, but that I experience seeing red, etc is not an argument. — Marchesk
"Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation.
Then you cannot actually claim you are logically certain you are having them. — m-theory
But there is no logical argument for the raw fact that you have experiences. You just have them, and then at some point, encounter different arguments for why and what they are. And then maybe make your own version of them. — Marchesk
My entire point here is that physicalist do have an account for mental phenomena, and that the skeptics can disagree with that account to be sure, but what they would be in error if they said that mental phenomena is inexpiable for the physicalist and the physicalist has no account for them. — m-theory
Yes that does not address the issue of your knowledge of mental phenomena that simply are.
How to you know they simply are? — m-theory
Again how do you know you are having them?
How can you be sure? — m-theory
Descartes has already demonstrated that there is a logical method for being sure you exist. — m-theory
If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist.How do I know I exist? How can I be sure? — Marchesk
How do I know that I think? What makes thinking any different than experience with existential questions?
I experience therefore I am. That's just as good. — Marchesk
But like I said there is no reason to assume that there can be no full or complete account, or rather it is not logically necessary to assume this. — m-theory
If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist. — m-theory
To doubt entails that something must that doubts. — m-theory
Subjectivity is abstracted from a necessary objectively existent dichotomy. — m-theory
If you are not then you have no well formed logical method to define self. — m-theory
That doesn't mean that we have something like a blueprint of how exactly intentional content works yet. But of course, stances that posit intentional content as something nonphysical don't have anything like a blueprint of how exactly it works yet, either. So if not having a blueprint were a sufficient reason for you to reject a stance, you certainly couldn't embrace dualism.
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