all physical objects are simply an arrangement of atoms/quarks, and the individuating of the object occurs when an individual perceives an arbitrary collection of these quantum objects as a distinct thing in and of itself. — finob

I don't think that individuation occurs due to perception. If you do believe that these elementary particles exists independant of the mind, then the basis of individuation is also set independant of the mind. For instance, the table is indeed composed of molecules and atoms and so is air, however, they are differentiated not due to perception but due to the manner in which their constituents compose them. The particles in the table are packed tightly whereas that of the air are loosely packed.

However, what does seem artbitary is the manner we perceive such absolute distinctions. The colour blue and the colour red are distinguished objectively based on the wavelengths of the light, however, the way we distinguish them, owing to the primary distinction, can be arbitary. I could find the colour blue to be darker than colour red whereas it could be the opposite for you. Nevertheless, we both would still agree that red is darker than blue simply because we have assigned them meaning on basis of our perception, which conveniently, remains consistent.

It appears fairly obvious that pictured here are an apple and an orange. But consider this: a term used to describe specifically an apple and an orange together – an applorange. This new conception may appear fairly ridiculous at first and you may say that it is indeed not and applorange because I’ve just made it up, but the creation of this concept in my mind is one just as arbitrary as any object inn any mind – in the same way that the object on the right to you is “obviously” an apple, the conception of these two things together can just as obviously be an applorange to me. — finob

I dont follow. If you do come up with the term - applorange and if it is indeed convenient to use that term, we both would agree that the picture is an applorange. Your argument only shows that we disagree about what terms to use for the picture, however, it is clear to both of us that the picture is indeed an apple and an orange, that I would choose to refer to as 'A PIcture Of Apple And Orange Together' and you would choose to refer to as 'A picture of applorange'.

The fact that my individuation of something as a distinct “thing” is completely arbitrary, means that the “presence” or “absence” of that thing is already a moot point: that “thing” as an individual concept does not exist outside of my perception to be present or absent in the first place. — finob

Indeed, the distinction can be arbitary. Howeverm certain distinctions are better than others. Consider this for example. Suppose I present infront of a abnormal person, what I call an apple and what I call a sample of huma blood. Further, suppose that this person can only distinguish things based on colour because he has abnormal perception of some other properties such as shape and rigidity. Hence, owning to the same color, the sample of blood and the apple are the same object to his eyes. However, if we present to him a electron microscope, with the aid of which, he is able to see the arrangement of the molecules, he will indeed realise those objects are distinct.

Hence, the better basis of distinction, is the one that is consistent across observations.

Again, I could be misunderstanding your point here so please do correct me.

Yes, that is exactly what I meant when I said:

If someone believes in god because it makes him a better man, then the act of believing is justified, however the belief (that god exists) itself does not become true. In other words, reason alone is not the criteria for justifying the act of believing in something, however it is the only criteria for determing the truth of that belief. — StarsFromMemory

Merely pointing out that why someone believes something is not as important as what and how one believes (ie. enacts the belief). — Pantagruel

I would agree. However, if practicality and not reason is the primary motivation for a belief, then such a belief cannot be justified as true. If someone believes in god because it makes him a better man, then the act of believing is justified, however the belief (that god exists) itself does not become true. In other words, reason alone is not the criteria for justifying the act of believing in something, however it is the only criteria for determing the truth of that belief.

People's reasons for believing are ultimately their own business and their own responsibility. What you do with your beliefs is the measure of their merit. So if belief in a god makes someone a better person and benefits others, who is to argue with that? — Pantagruel

Okay, I think you misunderstood me there.

So, you can choose to believe that god exists because it explains a lot of the world for you. However, you cannot hope to establish god's existence based on those grounds (faith + pragmatic reason) unless there is some other valid reason. — StarsFromMemory

I do hold that everyone can choose their own belief system and we are no one to question that.
My post was not directed at belittling people who have faith in god. Rather, I was trying to argue for why faith has no place in a philosophical discussion of a trascendental god because I felt that Pfhorrest's argument was a inadequate in the case of said discussion.

I think that faith can be used to justify a belief in god but not the existence of god. If faith and thus a belief in god makes someone a better person, that belief is entirely justified. What is not justified is saying on that basis that god exists.

I say so simply because faith is a matter of interpretation and personal experience. If someone is brought up in tough conditions, it is likely he will lack faith. Interpretation of religious text and indoctrination by society also determine the severity of faith. Hence, it has no place in a philosophical discussion because it can establish nothing objective.

Okay, initially I didn't intend to use this thread to discuss purpose.

First - you are advocating for the presence of a universal purpose for all humanity. May I ask on what grounds are you making that claim? Also, do you know anything about the nature of this purpose? Is it only meant for humans? or is it for all life on this planet?

Second - How can you possibly justify presence of a universal purpose knowing how insignificant a place humans occupy in this universe?

If we accept that nothing happens without a cause, then your birth most certainly did contain a purpose - it happened for a reason. — Antidote

What do you mean by 'cause'? All births occure due to the fertlisation of two gametes followed by developement of an embryo . Where does purpose come into all this?

If you were born without a purpose, then there was no cause for your birth, in which case, you shouldn't be here. — Antidote

What do you mean 'shouldn't be here' ? There is no choice nor does the fact that 'I am here' entail a purpose for my existence. Bacterias are here too, do they also have some universal purpose? Rocks are here too. What is your point?

One could say, because it is difficult find our purpose — Antidote

'Our' refers to humans? or to all living creatures? or to everything in existence ? On what grounds do you assume that only humans have a universal purpose, if you are making such an assumption that is?

Do you think bacterias and viruses and bats have a universal purpose? Or are we the lucky ones?

In short, there is simply no reason to believe in the existence of a universal purpose and if there is no reason to believe in it, there is no reason to look for it. Might as well look for unicorns.

Okay I see how you interpreted it.

I didn't say 'I don't believe in THE universal purpose'. I said 'I don't believe in a universal purpose' which should translates to 'I don't believe in the existence of universal purpose'.

Regardless, I apologise for any confusion I would have caused. BIt of a newbie to philosophy so still haven't gotten used to the jargon and sentence structuring yet.

"If we pick our initial opinions arbitrarily — which, as I have said, I think is fine, and as I elaborate elsewhere in these essays, even unavoidable — we then have a very high chance of those initial opinions just happening to be wrong. If we go on to hold those arbitrary opinions (that we just happened into for no solid reason) to be above question, which is the defining characteristic of fideism as I mean it here, then we will never change away from those wrong opinions, and will remain wrong forever. Only by rejecting fideism, and remaining always open to the possibility that there may be reasons to reject our current opinions, do we open up the possibility of our opinions becoming more correct over time. So if we ever want to have more than an arbitrary chance of our opinions being right, we must always acknowledge that there is a chance that our opinions are wrong."

I was just wondering how appeals to faith can be rejected, based on the grounds that you suggest, in the case of a trascendental god. Any opinion regarding the existence of a trascendental god is truly beyond question/reason. Ofcourse, I am not talking about the biblical god. We do have some reason to reject its existence (the problem of evil). However, any opinion you hold regarding the existence of a trascendental entity is simply a matter of faith or the lack of it.

I think that any belief, that you intend to propagate or make universal and not merely use as a coping mechanism, should be based on reasons other than pragmatic ones. So, you can choose to believe that god exists because it explains a lot of the world for you. However, you cannot hope to establish god's existence based on those grounds (faith + pragmatic reason) unless there is some other valid reason.

If you cannot know anything about it, you cannot talk about it let alone establish it's existence.

I agree with everything else in the OP especially the bit about free will.

If you believe there is no purpose, then you wont look for one. This is sometimes called a "life spectator", refusing to start the race for fear of there being no point. However, the belief means there definitely wont be any point because you didn't look for it. Fortunately, rebirth gives us another opportunity to try again... and again... and again! — Antidote

I mentioned I don't believe in a universal purpose. We just don't have to look towards God for purpose while justifying his existence based on phenomena that seem strange and mysterious. Everyone I know of, myself included, has sudden bouts of extreme devotion towards god and a sense of amazement towards 'his' creations. This is by no means any evidence of anything at all.

However, what I didn't say was that we should not be looking for any sorta purpose whatsoever. I think we should be finding our own individual purposes, something that is perhaps unique and satisfying to us and acceptable to others. This is only to cope with the dread of a universally meaningless existence.
Just because we weren't born with a inherent purpose doesn't mean we cannot create one for ourselves.

Good point. Actually I find the opposite true. Considering the study of, say, both theoretical physics and cognitive science, the overwhelming evidence suggests a purpose behind conscious existence. — 3017amen

That is where I disagree. I believe there cannot be any universal purpose (one that applies to all humans) kinda like an existential nihilist.

It's the extreme polarization, from both sides, that's dangerous. The extremist views have clouded the mind's of many smart people. — 3017amen

Indeed. People don't think for themselves and often reject the conclusions they deduce themselves if it does not match with the 'Smart People Worldview'.

This suggests that animals are corrupt. Are they? (Wars happen when humans become corrupt and wars happen when the animal nature of humans reigns supreme.) — god must be atheist

I am not implying that animals are corrupt by nature. They simply don't have the means to be corrupt. Their desires and behaviour are strictly based for survival. However, when the superficial desires of humans (superficial in regards to survival) combines with his/her primal nature, the product is death and destruction but not for the sake for survival or because it was necessary, but to fulfill the superficial desires.

Animals will engage in fights strictly when it is necessary or aids in survival. Humans will engage in violence when it is necessary (justifiable) or simply in pursuit of their wants (corrupt nature)

Ofcourse, it is not an easy task to discern a neccesary fight from a unnecessary one, but it is common sense that such a distinction exists.

Okay I apologise, I misinterpreted the article. Thanks a lot of pointing that out.

I get what you mean about inverted qualia being incoherent now.

Functionalism does seem to explain consciousness rather neatly and it also explains the response of the people in the inverted goggles experiment perfectly.

One last question. When a functionalists says that the function of pain is to produce negative thoughts, a flight-fight response etc, on what basis is pain assigned to those particular functions?

Is it simply because we value our own lives and hence those are the functions of pain that aid our survival?

Isn't supposing pain has a function which is to help us know of and escape terrible situations already assuming that I have a inbuilt/hard-coded will to survive?

Would the function of pain in an organism for whom survival is not of prime importance be vastly different than the function of pain in us?

It seems to me we are describing functions of mental states by taking the human viewpoint in which survival is the most important thing.

There isn't a clear distinction between mentally flipping their perception and flipping their body movements to compensate for their flipped perception: — Pfhorrest

There should be a distinction. One would mean changing perception to ensure no change in behaviour is required, and the other would be changing behaviour to ensure no change in perception is required.

However, I think what you meant was, that we cannot empirically know which one it is.

That would be accurate but like I argue in my previous post, that first scenario (changing perception back to normal) is only plausible when the behaviours corresponding to the normal perception have already been formed and the normal perception has already been adapted to. The people had already adapted to seeing their world like we do and had formed behaviour patterns for this normal perception. However, when the perception changes to upside down view, it could happen that the brain corrects this upside down perception to the normal perception because the behavioural habits corresponds to the normal view. It could also be possible that the brain changes the behavioural patterns. Both are possible and empirically indistinguisable. It does seem easier to change the behaviour to match perception rather than change the entire perception to match behaviour. Hence, it is more plausible to believe that it is the behaviour that is changing. (Imagine how much inversion at each step is to take place to invert the perception back to normal)

I don't think so

The author accepts the possibility that there might be an inversion, however the author also maintains that the inversion, while possible, does not necessarily follow.

To justify this, the author presents two possibilities based on the following argument :

If p1 and p2 receive different inputs (r-cones in p1 and g-cones in p2) and yet respond in the same way by saying something like 'that is red colour', then the processing of the input must be different on some level.

The two possibilities he presents are :

• The processing is different before the experience of the sensation
• The processing is different after the experience of the sensation

Then the author goes on to say that if the processing is different before the qualia becomes conscious (i.e before the person feels the sensation), then there may be a scope for correction of that qualia in the pseudonormal person. Hence, no inversion will take place and the green sensation p2 was supposed to experience will be converted to red. From then, since the sensation is of red, his output will be the same as p1 (p1 did not require any correction of qualia)

The second possibility means that p2 does experience green sensation itself, however, his behavior is same as p1 (who experiences red) because their higher level processing is different (the processing done after qualia is conscious and felt). In this case, p2 does indeed experience green and yet since the further processing of this sensation is different, he reacts the same way as p1 who experiences the colour red. Hence, in this case, colour inversion does take place and functionalism is challenged.

Hence, the author says that colour inversion does not necessarily follow from the experiment since it could be possibility one.

The key point here is that both the possibility are derived assuming 'Cartesian theater theory' because the narrator assumes the following sequence of events :

Input
Low level processing (Either this can be different in brain of pseudonormal people)
Sensation
High Level Processing (Or this can be different in brain of pseudonormal people)
Output


Hence, both the possibility the author derives rests on a widely criticized philosophical presupposition. If the Cartesian theatre theory is not true, then the possibility of qualia correction does not even arise and hence qualia inversion must follow. (if sensations don't accumulate in one place to be processed)

Also, 'Mary's Room' thought experiment demonstrates the existence of qualia almost perfectly. The thought experiment is described in the entry. So I do recommend reading it

Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.

Taken from the below entry:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia

Read the entry if you would like to know what we are referring to when we say phenomenal experience or qualia.

It “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know. To put it mildly, panpsychism is irrelevant and pointless. — Zelebg

If that was truly the case, then panpsychism would indeed be irrelevant and even stupid. However, panpsychism does explain human consciousness. If we stick to its principles, we are forced to conclude that everything has some sort of experience caused by interaction with environment. No one is saying that trees have thoughts or they are aware of their inner mental state or anything like that.

I'm only talking about response / reaction, any reaction, as opposed to contemplation / imagination. — Zelebg

Do you have a point you want to make using the case of such reflex action?

Sure, in some cases behaviour does precede the mental state but that does not violate any concept of panpyschism or functionalism. It would help if you could state what you are trying to prove using those examples.

I thought it was settled that not all experience comes with some sorta delay. Most are caused by mental states or a combination of mental states. Only in certain primitive reflex responses, where the brain is not involved in decision making, does the experience come later.

I was not aware of those scientific findings, but as I started reading that PDF's description of them my immediate reaction was the same one that that author came to by the end: the conclusion that inverted qualia have been shown possible by those results hinges on a bunch of philosophical presuppositions. — Pfhorrest

Yes, but those philosophical presuppositions are entirely justified while the presuppositions required for the correction of qualia before it becomes conscious have been widely abandoned. The author only wanted to show that even this is not a purely scientific hypothesis.

Just quoting the author here :
"However, this position presupposes that there is a clear-cut boundary between the levels
of conscious sensations and reactive dispositions, an assumption having come under
heavy attack during the last few years, in particular since Dennett (1991). In his book,
Dennett criticizes what he calls the 'Cartesian Theater' theory of consciousness, according to which all sensory inputs of a given moment come together at a certain area of the
brain (the Cartesian Theater) where a conscious 'picture' of the world is formed from
them, this picture then giving rise to later reactive dispositions.Dennett raises a lot of empirical issues in his book, but I think that one main point is essentially philosophical. Prior to the question whether there is a clear-cut boundary between the levels of conscious sensations and reactive dispositions, one could ask if there can possibly be such a boundary. A positive answer would amount to the thesis that there is a sensible concept of pure sensation, i. e. to the assumption that one can sensibly imagine a sensation existing without any connection to reactive dispositions:after all, if the existence of a sensation were necessarily connected to the existence of a respective reactive disposition, one could never exclude the possibility that the disposition has an influence on the qualitative character of the sensation. However, this is a highly controversial point in philosophy. To quote an authority from the past, Kant seems to deny the existence of pure sensations by saying that sensations without concepts are "blind", i. e. that a sensory input must at least be subsumed under some (perhaps very general) concept in order to become a conscious sensation. "

Besides, a functionalist would agree that a concept of pure sensation/qualia does not make sense because a sensation is defined by its relation to reactions and other mental states.

One other thing I have problem apprehending is how the author concludes that the processing in the person 1 and person 2 must be different and which leads to him to the possibility of the correction of qualia before it becomes conscious. To quote the author again :

But now notice that relevant parts of the brain of a pseudonormal person p1 must differ from those of a normally sighted human being p2 if they are assumed to produce different reactions to the same 'input' and the same reaction to different inputs. Suppose p1 and p2 both look at a ripe tomato. In p1, the average activation of G-cones in the respective area exceeds that of the R-cones, whereas in p2 the average activation of the Rcones exceeds that of the G-cones. So the inputs at level 4 are different. But they are both disposed to utter sentences like "This tomato is red", "This tomato looks red to me" etc., so that the outputs of the further processing are the same. This may also be true of
the emotional reactions being caused by the sight of the color red. It follows that the processing in p1 must differ from that in p2. Suppose further that p1 is looking at a ripe tomato, whereas p2 is looking at an unripe (green) one. The relevant input at level 4 is the same, but the behavioral output is different: p1 will be disposed to say things like "This tomato is red", whereas p2 will say that is looks green to him. Again, it follows that the processing in p1 must differ from that in p2.

In the peculiar case of colour, even if the input and the lower level processing (that gives rise to the qualia) is the same, the output can still be different. Let us assume that both p1 (normal vision) and p2 (pseudonormal vision) look at blood. Also, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the sensation of blood red, leads to experience of fear and disgust and a tendency to look away. Now the input in the case of p1 would be his r-cones firing (colour is red so r-cones fire in normal people) whereas the input in case of p2 would be his g-cones firing (colour is red, so g-cones fire in pseudonormal people).

Let us assume that now this input is processed in the same way in both people leading to a sensation of red in p1 and a sensation of green in p2. However, since p2 has learned to associate this sensation of green with the feelings of disgust and fear and sentences like 'yuck, blood red', he will still react the same way as p1 who has learned to associate the sensation of red with disgust and fear and sentences like 'yuck,blood red'. In other words, the lower level processing of the vision need not be different so as to give rise to same qualia 'sensation of red' in both people so that they can react the same way.

Indeed, would it be wise to even consider that the lower level processing is suddenly different because of an genetic anomaly in the cones of the eye? Consider p2 (pseudonormal vision) as a baby and seeing blood (red colour) for the first time. If his processing is same as other people, he would experience sensation of green. Concluding that somehow his lower level processing has changed would mean that the brain already knew that blood gives rise to red sensation and hence changed the green sensation to red. That makes no sense. Besides, a genetic change in the eyes has no effect on the brain just like genetic change in my limbs does not affect my heart.

What does make sense is that this pseudonormal baby learns to associate the sensation of green with all things we associate sensation of red with. Hence functionalism can't really account for this.

so too on my account there would be slightly different phenomenal experience going on within the functionally different sub-components of the person with inverted color cone pigments, but the phenomenal experience of the whole person, who remains functionally the same on that whole-person level, would remain the same. — Pfhorrest

Yes, there would be a difference in the experience of the r-cones and g-cones, however, the overall experience is also different

Okay, If that does not sound strange to you, that is fine but let me propose two more arguments I came across. Again, these are not mine, I am merely exploring the philosphy of the mind.

The China Nation Argument :

I suppose you have already heard of this but let me detail this one out.

Assume that there is an artifical interface or an artiicial body that has all the senses a human has. These senses convey information to the entire population of china all of whom have a cell phone to receive and transmit information. These individual humans behave as neurons for the artifical body and can control it's action. So each chinese person sends message to many others and similarly recieves messages from many others as well and all of these processes that are analogous to the processes performed by neurons give rise to human like behaviour of the robot.

Now a functionalist would be forced to conclude that the entire nation of china is conscious in fashion similar if not same as humans

Does it sound strange now?


The inverted qualia argument

Now I would really like to hear you respond to this. This is perhaps the most challenging problem functionalists face at the moment . Would love to hear your views on this one.

First let me just say that according to functionalism every psychological/mental state is completely determined by the causal relations it bears to (1) a certain "sensory input", (2) other psychological states, and (3) a behavioral output.

The inverted qualia argument proposes that it is possible for two humans to experience two different qualia even if they are in the same mental state and observe the same object.


A common version would be colour inversion. What if someone experiences the qualia I attribute to the colour red when they see the colour green? That is when they observes green apples, their experience would be similar to mine when I observe red apples (Their green is my red)

Let us for a moment entertain this possiblity of inverted colour experience and see how it breaks functionalism.

Let us say p1 is has normal vision has sees red like we all do while p2 sees what we would call green when he sees red. However, he will still call the colour red and not know that his experience is different.
(See private language argument if that sounds strange)
P2 is has pseudonormal vision

This colour inversion implies the possibility that there can be two psychological states s1 and s2 in two persons p1 and p2 so that s1and s2 completely resemble each other with respect to their causal roles but are nevertheless psychologically different. For example, s1 and s2 may both be caused by the perception of a ripe tomato and for their part cause the same beliefs, emotions, desires, behavior, etc., but whereas s1 is a sensation of red, s2 is (p2 being pseudonormal) a sensation of green. So if the inversion is conceivable, it seems possible that there are two different psychological states with exactly the same causal roles, which contradicts the conceptual functionalist's assumption that psychological states are defined by their causal roles.

Most functionalist argue that such inversion of qualia is incoherent and simply not possible. Afterall can such inversion take place of pain and pleasure (hedonistic inversion) ? Obviously not. Hence they argue that such inversion for colour, while seems possible, is not actually possible.

The only issue is that such a inversion actually exists for colour. This qualia inversion is no longer a philosophical possibilty but a scientific possibilty too with one scientist figuring one in 14,000 people undergo this qualia inversion for colour.

I don't know if you are aware of this problem so here is a link if you want to read about the 'Qualia Inversion Hypothesis'

http://www.home.uni-osnabrueck.de/uwmeyer/Paper/Pseudonormal.Vision.pdf

I would recommend reading the pdf if you are not already familiar with Nida-Rümelin argument that I have highlighted in bold above.

Experience is a synthetic virtual representation of the physical state of the body. This simulation processing takes time, so it is only natural that physical reaction comes first and mental re-imagination of it second. — Zelebg

I think that would be correct if we only look at reflex actions. It is true that when we touch a hot object, we move our hand before we experience the pain because this particular action is controlled by the spinal cord which intercepts the message before the brain can.


However, what happens when you see a sad movie. You obviously don't start crying before processing its content and experiencing the mental state of 'sadness'.

I see, a tree is conscious even if all of its parts are already conscious on their own. So I am conscious and my brain is conscious, but so is my elbow and my nose, my eyelash, my pimple, my socks, and my bubblegum. How cute, and is there any actual reason, any reason at all, that makes you believe that? — Zelebg

Not a single reason, other than the fact that it explains certain aspects of consciousness. It is not without problems though.

Look at it this way, we have absolutely no clue how consciousness works and so everything is considered.

Besides, just because it doesn't make intuitive sense, doesn't mean we shouldn't consider it.

As a side note : The brain is conscious and so is everything else, but not in the same way. No panpyschist will tell you that rocks and coffee mugs are conscious, just that there is some form of proto consciousness present in the fundamental particles. The exact nature of this proto-consciousness and how it combines to form consciousness as we observe in humans is still unknown.

Also, I never said I believe in panpyschism. But it is worth considering.

That system is not completely functionally identical because its components have additional functions that the components of a real brain would not. Those differences in behavior (the things the homonculi do besides just emulating neurons) correlate with the differences in experiences that the system as a whole undergoes. The similar behaviors (of the system as a whole) would still bring with them correlatively similar experiences too. — Pfhorrest

That is the conclusion. That this system would be conscious just like we are (For simplicity, let us assume the homonculi perform no other function ).

That is indeed a strange conclusion that we are forced to accept.

Evolution is simply the accumulation of gradual changes in an organsim. These changes can be facilitated by natural selection or can happen due to other processes.

One other process is genetic drift, you are probably aware of this already but here is a simple example :

In a small population of beetles, consisting of red and green beetles, you would expect that the number of red and green beetles remain fairly same given no advantage is confered by any of the colour.

However, if ,lets us suppose, an elephant comes by and stomps the bushes where the beetles reside leaving, by pure luck, more red beetles dead than green beetles; then we would see that the subsequent generation of beetles would more likely be green because so few red beetles were left alive after the accident.

There was no natural selection, yet the beetles evolved into solely having the green colour.

The fact that is not impossible that a P-Zombie can exist — StarsFromMemory

Okay, it is not a fact, but consider the following argument proposed by David Chalmer I think :

Suppose a population of tiny people disable your brain and replicate its functions themselves, while keeping the rest of your body in working order ; each homunculus uses a cell phone to perform the signal-receiving and -transmitting functions of an individual neuron. Would such a system be conscious?

Now initially he proposed it to argue for a P-Zombie which experiences nothing at all. However, since we are considering panpyschism, let us say this is not a P-Zombie.

Now pansychism holds that the tiny people would be conscious because they are in turn made out of particles that are conscious in some sense. However, would pansychism neccesarily imply that the system formed by these tiny people is also conscious exactly like humans are and thus undergoes the same mental states that humans do? Probably not. All a panpsychist can claim is that this system too will undergo some phenomenal experience, but it is not definite that these phenomenal experiences will be the same as human phenomenal experience.

The point here is that, it is likely that this system formed by tiny men is not conscious in the same way as humans are and undergoes no/ basic mental states even though the system functions exactly the same way as a human experiencing advanced mental states like fear.

Hence it looks as if the function is same but the corresponding mental state does not exist.

This is not exactly a P-Zombie since it can have some basic phenomenal experiences.
But it may or may not have experiences exactly like humans do and yet it functions in the same exact way. Wouldn't you agree that such a system poses a challenge to functionalism because you would have to argue that even this system is conscious in the exact same way humans are.and undergoes all the states a human does like fear, pain and so on.That seems unlikely and unintuitive but it is possible.

so it would make no sense to talk about something that is functionally identical to a human except it has no phenomenal consciousness, a philosophical zombie, because everything has phenomenal consciousness (a first-person perspective) that depends on its function, so something functionally identical to a human has the first-person experience of a human. — Pfhorrest

Again while trying to refute the possibiltiy of the existence of P-Zombie, which poses a serious challenge to your view, you assume that your view is right and hence P-Zombies cannot exist.

Indeed only one of the two is possible, If P-zombies can exist, there are major flaws in your view or P-zombies cannot exist and your concepts are fine.

Saying that P-Zombies cannot exist because "because everything has phenomenal consciousness (a first-person perspective) that depends on its function" does not lead us anywhere because P-Zombies challenge that very view
can everything has phenomenal consciousness that depends on its function.?

There is nothing reasonable in what you are saying, so I'm asking you for the fifth time to explicitly name it. Leaf, branch, tree, forest.. what is conscious? — Zelebg

If you go by panpyschism or functionalist panpyschism, then all of those are conscious.

My reason for rejecting the possibility of philosophical zombies is my direct awareness of my own phenomenal consciousness plus anti-emergentism leading to my functionalist panpsychist conclusion whereby everything has some experience, and things with the same function have the same experience, so something functionally equivalent to a human would have the experience of a human. — Pfhorrest

The fact that is not impossible that a P-Zombie can exist is a challenge to your functionalist conclusion. P-Zombie are defined as humans with same behaviour but no inner experience and the possibiltiy of such a creature is a challenge to your functionalist view. Saying they cannot exist because of functionalism would be assuming that functionalism is true and any objection to it is a case of faulty reasoning.

You would have to provide other reasons for why you think P-zombies cannot exist.

The bottom line I think is, P-zombies challenge the concept of functionalism and you cannot invoke concepts of functionalism to refute the possibilty of P-zombies.

What is a product of evolution that is not a product of natural selection? — Txastopher

Anything that evolves from mechanisms other than natural selection is a product of evolution but not of natural selection.

As I've alluded to previously I certainly understand the psychological damage people have experienced...not to mention all those who've perished from religious wars throughout history... — 3017amen

I think the problem is not with religion but with the masses who will blindly follow one interpretation of a religious text and glorify it as the only correct one. But then, you can't really blame humans for being humans.

I guess, all of this, religion, war is simply a reflection of how corrupt humans are and while we may have been gifted with rationality, our animal nature still reigns supreme sometime.

99% of everything comes down to our ego, for better and worse. It is bad to have an exaggerated self worth, and also to get your sense of self worth from your conviction in unprovable beliefs like the EOG. Although I’m certainly guilty of this myself at times. — Pinprick

Indeed, I know many people who simply choose to not believe in god because they think it makes them more rational and even smarter than others who do.


That probably stems from many scientists choosing to not believe in god. Since scientists are 'smart people' , many just follow to derive this sense of self worth you speak of

The advantage of illusionism over outright eliminativism is that it acknowledges we do very much seem to have these rich phenomenal experiences, leading to the concept of qualia. But our introspection is unreliable. Colors, sounds, feels, etc. are useful fictions consolidating an overwhelming amount of information and processing into something an organism can easily act upon. And this is why consciousness seems to be so hard to explain. — Marchesk

This is what I would choose as an alternative to functionalism and panpsychism ; that consciousness arises from the processing of huge amounts of information in the brain. It is intuitive and won't lead us to conclude that everything has some essence of consciousness. The obvious problem however, is that we don't have the slightest of clue how such a process results in the experience of qualia

Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box deserves a shout out here as well. — Marchesk

Good to know about this analogy. I had always thought of the subjectivity of experience, mostly of colour and that there was no way to deduce that my image of colour green is remotely similar to someone else's image of the colour green.

If so, the problem we face is delineating a set of behavioral criteria which can help us unambiguously identify the conscious from the non-conscious. What would such a criteria look like? Thinking? Not observable. Goal-directed behavior? Bacteria move towards light. Language in a broad sense? Bacteria use chemical signalling. I have a feeling that we will fail to identify a behavior or even a group of them that can help us determine the presence/absence of consciousness because every behavior humans are capable of has a parallel in non-human organisms and I'm going out on a limb here but even in bacteria. So, either we must conclude that all organisms are conscious or that no organism is conscious. — TheMadFool

True, that we must identify some characteristic behaviours, however consider the following :

Let's assume that bacterias do have consciousness due to certain behaviours. However, all behaviour of a bacteria is a simple input - output function ,that is, it senses a stimulus and initiates a series of physical reactions that cause a certain movement (output). If such a simple organism can posses conscious then there is no reason to limit ourselves to the realm of the living. Many man made equipments also produce a output given a input (not going to say stimulus as stimulus is for the living). Hence, if a bacteria has consciousness in any sense , then many inanimate equipments must have consciousness too in the same sense.

If behavior is all we have access to and we do, continually, infer consciousness from it when it's other humans then what reasonable objection could be raised against inferring consciousness from the "behavior" of other organisms?

That said, consciousness may not be an all/nothing phenomenon but may come in degrees; bacterial consciousness may not be at the same level as human consciousness. — TheMadFool

I think we should consider that consciousness is a product of information integration by a complex nervous system. I am not really convinced by this but it can be seen as a source of consciousness.

What would it mean for a human to be more conscious than other organism? Like someone rightly pointed out, only the degree of sensory input can vary, however consciousness seems rather same that is, there is nothing to say that birds have less intense experience than us, less detailed perhaps, but not less intense. Again someone else in this thread pointed this fact out.

On the first point, reflexively, you should be able to answer your own question. On the second, I was unaware that I had opined on birds self-consciousness. — Txastopher

So, birds do have self awareness?

And I don't seem to find a reason for why consciousness gives me a survival advantage over an ameoba, which you say has no consciousness. I suppose there are none, but you could help me find some and establish your point.

As a side note, when I began this thread, I too hoped to prove that consciousness is a product of evolution. But even then, I was fairly sure it was not a product of natural selection.

Okay, I did read your essay (nice read) and I have a couple of question :

"I think nothing wholly new emerges out of nothing like magic when physical things are arranged in the right way, only abstractions away from the lower-level, smaller-sccale physical properties that ignore the many details that are irrelevant on a higher level or larger scale."

What about properties like fluidity or rigidity that don't exist on the small scale but exist when the individual particles combine in a fixed way?

I understand that emergentism has major flaws and is not widely accepted, however, I don't think your objection is justified. What is objectionable is that emergentism claims irreducibility of those properties. That is simply unjustifiable to believe in.

Also, why don't you consider the possibilty that phenomenal experience arise from the processing of sensory input by the brain as detailed by 'The Integrated Information theory' and Global Workspace theory?

They do hold some principles in common with panpychism.


Also, what do you make of the Combination Problem that threatens the idea of panpychism and the conceivability of a P-Zombie that experiences the same physical states without any mental states. You do state that you think they are not possible, any concrete reasons for that belief?

I am unsure that consciousness can be anything but self-consciousness. — Txastopher

Also, the thought experiment 'Mary's Room' does establish the existence of phenomenal experiences

I meant entirely, since Txastopher didn't seem to believe in phenomenal conscious experiences.

You either are aware of your existence, or you are not. Hence, birds are either conscious or not.(If only self awareness is considered)