If so, the problem we face is delineating a set of behavioral criteria which can help us unambiguously identify the conscious from the non-conscious. What would such a criteria look like? Thinking? Not observable. Goal-directed behavior? Bacteria move towards light. Language in a broad sense? Bacteria use chemical signalling. I have a feeling that we will fail to identify a behavior or even a group of them that can help us determine the presence/absence of consciousness because every behavior humans are capable of has a parallel in non-human organisms and I'm going out on a limb here but even in bacteria. So, either we must conclude that all organisms are conscious or that no organism is conscious. — TheMadFool

True, that we must identify some characteristic behaviours, however consider the following :

Let's assume that bacterias do have consciousness due to certain behaviours. However, all behaviour of a bacteria is a simple input - output function ,that is, it senses a stimulus and initiates a series of physical reactions that cause a certain movement (output). If such a simple organism can posses conscious then there is no reason to limit ourselves to the realm of the living. Many man made equipments also produce a output given a input (not going to say stimulus as stimulus is for the living). Hence, if a bacteria has consciousness in any sense , then many inanimate equipments must have consciousness too in the same sense.

True, that we must identify some characteristic behaviours, however consider the following :

Let's assume that bacterias do have consciousness due to certain behaviours. However, all behaviour of a bacteria is a simple input - output function ,that is, it senses a stimulus and initiates a series of physical reactions that cause a certain movement (output). If such a simple organism can posses conscious then there is to no reason to limit ourselves to the realm of living. Many man made equipments also produce a output given a input (not going to say stimulus as stimulus is for the living). Hence, if a bacteria has consciousness in any sense , then many inanimate equipments must have consciousness too in the same sense. — StarsFromMemory

You must follow the path to wherever it leads...the destination may surprise you.

So, birds do have self awareness? — StarsFromMemory

I imagine so, but quite how it would be I have no idea.

And I don't seem to find a reason for why consciousness gives me a survival advantage over an ameoba, which you say has no consciousness. I suppose there are none, but you could help me find some and establish your point. — StarsFromMemory

Maybe it doesn't. Not every mutation confers an advantage. However, I suspect it does and I suspect that consciousness plays a key role in imagination, creativity, forward planning, deduction, abduction, induction, empathy and all sorts of other human qualities that allow us to shape our environment to ensure our survival.

If, like algae, our survival depended on little more than propelling ourselves towards sunlight, then it is hard to see why consciousness would be advantageous, but we are not like algae and the complexity of our life-cycle requires a cognitive complexity in which consciousness probably plays an executive role.

As a side note, when I began this thread, I too hoped to prove that consciousness is a product of evolution. But even then, I was fairly sure it was not a product of natural selection. — StarsFromMemory

What is a product of evolution that is not a product of natural selection?

Emergentism claims that consciousness is more than the sum of its parts. Or put another way, that the parts are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for (self) consciousness.

Panpsychism claims that the parts (or a part) are sufficient for consciousness, but in order to make this claim its proponents need to redefine consciousness as two different things; phenomenal and access. Phenomenal consciousness being a necessary condition of access consciousness. Or, put another way Access, or self-consciousness, emerging from phenomenal consciousness.

Put this way there seems to be little or no difference between the two positions apart from the convoluted terminology required in order to argue for panpsychism.

Yeah.

When we talk about consciousness aren't we really talking about self-consciousness? After all, what could non self consciousness possibly be?

There is “self” as a system that is having mental states and there is “me” as a content of mental states. “Self” is a physical entity, “me” is a virtual entity / representation.

Feeling of “me” can be dissolved, but there always has to be that “self” that is experiencing / memorising whatever the feeling is, even if the experience itself can deny it. For example there are people who think they are dead or do not exist, but the “self” who is experiencing such mental state of course still exists.

Okay, I did read your essay (nice read) — StarsFromMemory

Thanks!

What about properties like fluidity or rigidity that don't exist on the small scale but exist when the individual particles combine in a fixed way?

I understand that emergentism has major flaws and is not widely accepted, however, I don't think your objection is justified. What is objectionable is that emergentism claims irreducibility of those properties. That is simply unjustifiable to believe in. — StarsFromMemory

Fluidity and rigidity are those kinds of abstractions I have no problem with. If you just model the mechanical interactions of molecules, you end up modeling a system that exhibits rigidity or fluidity etc automatically; you don’t have to have your model add something new to certain arrangements of molecules.

Also, why don't you consider the possibilty that phenomenal experience arise from the processing of sensory input by the brain as detailed by 'The Integrated Information theory' and Global Workspace theory? — StarsFromMemory

When factoring in functionalism about access consciousness I basically do. Phenomenal consciousness generally is the processing of information (that every physical thing does in at least a rudimentary degree). The kind of complex phenomenal consciousness that we have arises from the complex information processing functionality that we (our brains) do.

Also, what do you make of the Combination Problem that threatens the idea of panpychism and the conceivability of a P-Zombie that experiences the same physical states without any mental states. You do state that you think they are not possible, any concrete reasons for that belief? — StarsFromMemory

I’m not familiar with that problem by name. My reason for rejecting the possibility of philosophical zombies is my direct awareness of my own phenomenal consciousness plus anti-emergentism leading to my functionalist panpsychist conclusion whereby everything has some experience, and things with the same function have the same experience, so something functionally equivalent to a human would have the experience of a human.

Any developed panpsychist view needs an answer to the combination problem. Micropsychists are particularly targeted: how can lots of individual conscious atoms combine to form a larger conscious entity? Do the individual atoms lose their consciousness? Or are there lots of conscious entities all overlapping? Are their experiences all separate, or do they bleed into one another? As Searle puts it, "What are the units supposed to be?" How is the panpsychist to come up with a plausible story here that isn't just made up and arbitrary?

That, and everything else. Panpsychism fails to make any empirically useful statement, it’s no less pointless than to claim god did it. It means nothing in particular, it explains nothing at all. Panpsychism is worse mysterianism than mysterianism itself, for mysterianism has some reasoning behind it.

Have you read any panpsychist literature?

Yes. What now?

Oh right, that problem. I didn't recognize it by name before; I think the capitalization threw me off, maybe. Anyway, I gave my answer to that above:

The functionality of things is what groups them. The way information flows through systems, the causal connectedness or isolation of them. — Pfhorrest

It's precisely analogous to how the behavior of things groups together, because they are two sides of the same coin, that coin being function. Phenomenal experience is the input to the function of any thing, physical behavior is the output of it, and the specifics of the thing's experience and behavior are both determined by that function. All of the properties of the thing, of which the thing is merely a bundle, are behaviors, or functional dispositions to behave in a certain way; whatever cluster of functions makes those behaviors appear bundled into a single object, from the third person, also make the experiences seem bundled into a single subject, from the first person.

Panpsychism fails to make any empirically useful statement — Zelebg

As I said before, it's precisely as useful a statement as naturalism is. To a necessitarian naturalist (of which I am also one), any object cannot help but be natural; it doesn't make any sense at all to talk of supernatural things. Everything is natural. So "natural" is not a distinguishing feature between any two things, and it really means nothing, in that sense. But it clarifies what otherwise might be a point of philosophical confusion: to be an object at all is to be an object of experience, something connected to the network of phenomenal interactions that is the universe, and a supernatural object, an object that has no observable properties at all (that outputs no behavior that feeds into the input of anything else in that network of interactions) is no object at all; it doesn't exist.

Similarly, panpsychism like mine (I obviously can't speak for everyone) just says that the point of philosophical confusion that might give rise to notions like philosophical zombies is as nonsense as supernaturalism. All there is to account for besides the third-person observable behavior that is output by the function of a thing is a first-person account of exactly that same function -- that's all that phenomenal consciousness consists of, the having of a first-person experience -- so it would make no sense to talk about something that is functionally identical to a human except it has no phenomenal consciousness, a philosophical zombie, because everything has phenomenal consciousness (a first-person perspective) that depends on its function, so something functionally identical to a human has the first-person experience of a human.

The thing that makes useful distinctions between objects is not whether they are natural or not, but what they do, the specifics of the output of their functions, their behavior. And the thing that makes useful distinctions between subjects is not whether or not they have a first-person experience at all (their phenomenal consciousness), but what it's like to be them, the specifics of the input to their functions, their experience.

The functionality of things is what groups them. The way information flows through systems, the causal connectedness or isolation of them.

Can those words produce some examples? Leaf, branch, tree, forest... each grain of sand or the whole beach - what is conscious?

Sure, anything that can reasonably be considered an object can also be considered a subject of experience.

What can or cannot reasonably be considered an object is in general the open question that mereology studies, but that has nothing to do with questions of consciousness specifically.

What is a product of evolution that is not a product of natural selection? — Txastopher

Anything that evolves from mechanisms other than natural selection is a product of evolution but not of natural selection.

Sure, anything that can reasonably be considered an object can also be considered a subject of experience.

There is nothing reasonable in what you are saying, so I'm asking you for the fifth time to explicitly name it. Leaf, branch, tree, forest.. what is conscious?

My reason for rejecting the possibility of philosophical zombies is my direct awareness of my own phenomenal consciousness plus anti-emergentism leading to my functionalist panpsychist conclusion whereby everything has some experience, and things with the same function have the same experience, so something functionally equivalent to a human would have the experience of a human. — Pfhorrest

The fact that is not impossible that a P-Zombie can exist is a challenge to your functionalist conclusion. P-Zombie are defined as humans with same behaviour but no inner experience and the possibiltiy of such a creature is a challenge to your functionalist view. Saying they cannot exist because of functionalism would be assuming that functionalism is true and any objection to it is a case of faulty reasoning.

You would have to provide other reasons for why you think P-zombies cannot exist.

The bottom line I think is, P-zombies challenge the concept of functionalism and you cannot invoke concepts of functionalism to refute the possibilty of P-zombies.

There is nothing reasonable in what you are saying, so I'm asking you for the fifth time to explicitly name it. Leaf, branch, tree, forest.. what is conscious? — Zelebg

If you go by panpyschism or functionalist panpyschism, then all of those are conscious.

so it would make no sense to talk about something that is functionally identical to a human except it has no phenomenal consciousness, a philosophical zombie, because everything has phenomenal consciousness (a first-person perspective) that depends on its function, so something functionally identical to a human has the first-person experience of a human. — Pfhorrest

Again while trying to refute the possibiltiy of the existence of P-Zombie, which poses a serious challenge to your view, you assume that your view is right and hence P-Zombies cannot exist.

Indeed only one of the two is possible, If P-zombies can exist, there are major flaws in your view or P-zombies cannot exist and your concepts are fine.

Saying that P-Zombies cannot exist because "because everything has phenomenal consciousness (a first-person perspective) that depends on its function" does not lead us anywhere because P-Zombies challenge that very view
can everything has phenomenal consciousness that depends on its function.?

I said all of those things count as phenomenally conscious. None of them count as access conscious.

The fact that is not impossible that a P-Zombie can exist — StarsFromMemory

Is that a fact? Show me something that is definitely a p-zombie.

In any case, if you read my essay as you said then you already know my reasoning. There are three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities: nothing has phenomenal consciousness, only some but not all things have it, or everything has it. I know first hand that I have it, so the first one of those is out. A physicalist ontology leaves only emergentism as a possibility for the second, so arguments against emergentism leave only the third as a possibility, and that is what panpsychism is. If panpsychism then no p-zombies, therefore if at least I am phenomenally conscious and physicalism is true and emergentism is false then no p-zombies.

The fact that is not impossible that a P-Zombie can exist — StarsFromMemory

Okay, it is not a fact, but consider the following argument proposed by David Chalmer I think :

Suppose a population of tiny people disable your brain and replicate its functions themselves, while keeping the rest of your body in working order ; each homunculus uses a cell phone to perform the signal-receiving and -transmitting functions of an individual neuron. Would such a system be conscious?

Now initially he proposed it to argue for a P-Zombie which experiences nothing at all. However, since we are considering panpyschism, let us say this is not a P-Zombie.

Now pansychism holds that the tiny people would be conscious because they are in turn made out of particles that are conscious in some sense. However, would pansychism neccesarily imply that the system formed by these tiny people is also conscious exactly like humans are and thus undergoes the same mental states that humans do? Probably not. All a panpsychist can claim is that this system too will undergo some phenomenal experience, but it is not definite that these phenomenal experiences will be the same as human phenomenal experience.

The point here is that, it is likely that this system formed by tiny men is not conscious in the same way as humans are and undergoes no/ basic mental states even though the system functions exactly the same way as a human experiencing advanced mental states like fear.

Hence it looks as if the function is same but the corresponding mental state does not exist.

This is not exactly a P-Zombie since it can have some basic phenomenal experiences.
But it may or may not have experiences exactly like humans do and yet it functions in the same exact way. Wouldn't you agree that such a system poses a challenge to functionalism because you would have to argue that even this system is conscious in the exact same way humans are.and undergoes all the states a human does like fear, pain and so on.That seems unlikely and unintuitive but it is possible.

That system is not completely functionally identical because its components have additional functions that the components of a real brain would not. Those differences in behavior (the things the homonculi do besides just emulating neurons) correlate with the differences in experiences that the system as a whole undergoes. The similar behaviors (of the system as a whole) would still bring with them correlatively similar experiences too.

Anything that evolves from mechanisms other than natural selection is a product of evolution but not of natural selection. — StarsFromMemory

Like?

Evolution is simply the accumulation of gradual changes in an organsim. These changes can be facilitated by natural selection or can happen due to other processes.

One other process is genetic drift, you are probably aware of this already but here is a simple example :

In a small population of beetles, consisting of red and green beetles, you would expect that the number of red and green beetles remain fairly same given no advantage is confered by any of the colour.

However, if ,lets us suppose, an elephant comes by and stomps the bushes where the beetles reside leaving, by pure luck, more red beetles dead than green beetles; then we would see that the subsequent generation of beetles would more likely be green because so few red beetles were left alive after the accident.

There was no natural selection, yet the beetles evolved into solely having the green colour.

That system is not completely functionally identical because its components have additional functions that the components of a real brain would not. Those differences in behavior (the things the homonculi do besides just emulating neurons) correlate with the differences in experiences that the system as a whole undergoes. The similar behaviors (of the system as a whole) would still bring with them correlatively similar experiences too. — Pfhorrest

That is the conclusion. That this system would be conscious just like we are (For simplicity, let us assume the homonculi perform no other function ).

That is indeed a strange conclusion that we are forced to accept.

If the homonculi truly perform no other function, then they are just synthetic neurons, and I find nothing strange that a synthetic perfect copy of a brain should have the exact same subjective experience of a real brain.

Nor for that matter, that a perfect copy of the functionality of a human brain (such that that brain-program they execute reports that it has feelings and memories and things just like a real human brain would), executed by a bunch of tiny thinking feeling beings (who each have their own independent functionality but, as a small part of that other independent being, also execute that brain-simulation function), would actually have the feelings and memories and other experiences that it reports having.

The tiny people who are part of making it happen would also all have their own experiences that (we're stipulating) don't factor into their execution of that brain-simulation, and so the simulated human has no awareness of them. And the whole larger brain-simulation function doesn't factor into the independent thought and feeling functions of the homonculi, so it's not like they each feel a little bit of the pain of the whole brain-simulation.

The whole setup is weird, of course, but the conclusion about what would happen if it were instantiated doesn't seem strange at all to me.

"Where do we draw the line? At vertebrates? The nervous systems of insects may not be as complex as ours, and they probably do not have as rich an experience of the world as we do. They also have very different senses, so the picture that is painted in their minds may be totally unlike ours. But I see no reason to doubt that insects have inner experiences of some kind. — StarsFromMemory

If having physiological sensory perception is equivalent to having an experience... the Venus Flytraps and slime molds have them.

It takes more than that.

If you go by panpyschism or functionalist panpyschism, then all of those are conscious.

I see, a tree is conscious even if all of its parts are already conscious on their own. So I am conscious and my brain is conscious, but so is my elbow and my nose, my eyelash, my pimple, my socks, and my bubblegum. How cute, and is there any actual reason, any reason at all, that makes you believe that?

Also, you don’t run from a bear because you’re scared. You get scared when your body starts to run. Reaction first, experience second, or it might be too late. It’s also why people often do or say things they don’t “really” mean. — Zelebg

I can promise you even people who stay and don't run from the bear are still scared, its not that simple.

I can promise you even people who stay and don't run from the bear are still scared, its not that simple.

Experience is a synthetic virtual representation of the physical state of the body. This simulation processing takes time, so it is only natural that physical reaction comes first and mental re-imagination of it second.

I see, a tree is conscious even if all of its parts are already conscious on their own. So I am conscious and my brain is conscious, but so is my elbow and my nose, my eyelash, my pimple, my socks, and my bubblegum. How cute, and is there any actual reason, any reason at all, that makes you believe that? — Zelebg

Not a single reason, other than the fact that it explains certain aspects of consciousness. It is not without problems though.

Look at it this way, we have absolutely no clue how consciousness works and so everything is considered.

Besides, just because it doesn't make intuitive sense, doesn't mean we shouldn't consider it.

As a side note : The brain is conscious and so is everything else, but not in the same way. No panpyschist will tell you that rocks and coffee mugs are conscious, just that there is some form of proto consciousness present in the fundamental particles. The exact nature of this proto-consciousness and how it combines to form consciousness as we observe in humans is still unknown.

Also, I never said I believe in panpyschism. But it is worth considering.