However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. At this point in time, Jack could readliy admit to having once believed that that particular clock was working, and that that particular clock was broken at that time, so he had once believed that that particular broken clock was working. — creativesoul

This is obviously in tune with the point I've found myself obliged to make a few times recently, that ethics begins not when one considers oneself, but when one considers others. — Banno

Anyway, I'm linking to the Arendt essay in order to ask again her question: What is freedom?, and to give a space for considering her essay. Given the "freedom convoy" that trickled into Canberra yesterday, and the somewhat more effective equivalent in Canada, It seems appropriate. — Banno

Maybe regardless of any specific card game, but the challenge here is to express the propositional content of that image (something that an image can share with sentences, different propositional attitudes, different languages): so is the propositional content of that image rendered by “this is a seven of diamonds” or “this is a seven of diamonds in standard 52-card deck” or “this is a card of diamonds different from a 1 to 6 or 8 to 13 of diamonds” or “this is a seven of a suit different from clubs, hearts, spades” or “this is a card with seven red diamond-shaped figures and red shaped number seven arranged so and so” or any combination of these propositions? All of them are different propositions which one is the right one? BTW “this” is an indexical, and shouldn’t be part of the content of an unambiguous proposition: so maybe the propositional content is “something is a seven of diamonds”? And so on.
At least this is how I understand the philosophical task of proving that images have propositional content, but I'm neither sure that others understand this philosophical task in the same way I just drafted, nor that this task can be accomplished successfully. — neomac

But what about this? — frank

What I do not understand is the move to set (that broken clock) outside of the scope of Jack's belief and replace it with (that clock) when the example hinges upon the fact that the clock is broken but Jack believes what it says. Jack does not know it is broken, so he cannot believe that it is broken. I grant that much entirely, but there's no reason to say that he cannot believe that broken clock. — creativesoul

Jack believed that a broken clock was working.
— creativesoul

Is there a point? I don't understand how it is that you don't understand.

(Jack believed that a broken clock was working) is ambiguous.

Is (the clock is broken) within the scope of Jack's belief? Then you have Jack believed that: ((The clock is broken) & (the clock is working)); Poor old Jack needs help.

Or is it outside the scope? Then you have: The clock is broken and (Jack believed that: (the clock is working))

No problem. In both cases the belief is presented as a propositional attitude. — Banno

I don't know. What do you think? — frank

Just jump right in there and answer. — frank

What does a language that you don't know look like? And when describing what a language you know looks like, are you describing the language or your knowledge of the language? — Harry Hindu

First of all, I'm neutral on the question. I'm just exploring the implications.

I'm starting with the assumption that my beliefs are limited by the limits of my language.

Why some fucker would assert that is a different topic. Maybe we could start a thread:

Why do some fuckers believe the limits of their languages are the limits of their worlds? — frank

Why some fucker would assert that is a different topic. Maybe we could start a thread:

Why do some fuckers believe the limits of their languages are the limits of their worlds? — frank

If someone says "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" is this assertion self contradictory?

What is the pov of the assertion? I'm asking you because you're mentally flexible. You could probably see it better than me. — frank

Yep, this is correct if we take strings of characters, independently from any pre-defined linguistic codification. The difference is that with words (notice that the term “word” is already framing its referent, like an image, as a linguistic entity!) — neomac

You can have all kinds of sets of rules (e.g. the codification of traffic signs). Concerning the problem at hand, one thing that really matters is to understand if/what systems of visual codifications disambiguate an image always wrt a specific proposition: think about the codified images of a deck of cards. Does e.g. the following card have a propositional content that card game rules can help us identify? What would this be? — neomac

I totally agree there is an objective truth. I even know what it is at the physical fundament. Still, it's a story. — Cornwell1

Yes, it is my opinion that you are wrong, firstly on your assertion that truth and accuracy are synonymous and your assertion that paradox is useless. — universeness

You seem to assign some priority to what you decide is useless to you regardless of its usefulness to others. God is a useless concept to me but I respect its usefulness to others and its status as fundamental to some. — universeness

I have never once claimed that 'all truths are subjective,' I stated the posit as part of a paradox. I don't agree with your claim that there is a logical position that exists, within which, it's impossible for an individual to be wrong. The best that can be achieved is paradox, neither true nor false. You say this is a useless state. I think it's an intriguing state. You say I am not making sense, I say I am. So we reach panto stage. so hey ho, who cares? I will still dance with you, if you want to keep the music playing. — universeness

It's confusing because it is confusing. All people, or more realistically, groups of people, see a reality which they think exists separately of them. Individuals can change it and the group reality influences the individual. Is there an all embracing reality, capturing and directing all these realities? No, because that would be a new reality believed to exist independently of us. Which is a justified belief, as anyone wants his beliefs to be objectively true. But this is only a story we tell, like the story of God being the one and only Truth. — Cornwell1

Confusing indeed... — Cornwell1

Let me add this. You can add everything to the story we tell without the need of proving it, as is asked for in the scientific story. I saw a discussion on this forum about the reality of electrons in the double slit experiment. Their reality as a particle. They can't be seen directly and it was conjectured that there were only lightening unicorns traveling between the emitter and screen and they don't like to be observed. Which is actually a pretty good description! — Cornwell1

Great job denouncing shit that I've not said. — creativesoul

No, I’m talking about images. Images are visual entities like strings of letters written on a paper, yet we can take images and strings to represent something (again intentionality is a presupposition here for understanding images and textual strings as representational). If we were to describe with sentences what images can represent, we would notice that there can be many descriptions that could correspond to the same image (this is particularly evident in the case of so called “ambiguous images” - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguous_image), yet they do not share the same proposition. And so on with the other remarks I made. Don’t forget that my brainstorming was about the propositional nature of images. — neomac

There will be agreement and disagreement. There is no overarching world bubble which is the same regardless of all subjective bubbles. — Cornwell1

Of course, all subjects will think their own bubble is a measure for all. And rightly so. I want my theory to have objective existence. I want to know how reality looks like. But it will always be a theoretical picture. It's hard to leave the idea of one true reality, an idea that was formed in ancient Greece and found its way in western society. I think it's a dangerous idea. Of course, I have my ideas about the universe, where it came from, the triplets of massless particles giving quarks and leptons, etc. And I think these things really exist, also when I'm not there. But that by itself is a subjective idea. It's hard to give in to such relativism, but I think that's how it is, objectively...

Which doesn't mean that just every fantasy is right, considering science. At the moment there is no proof for quark and lepton sub-structure. But still I see it, because it offers great perspectives. — Cornwell1

Our discussion is in general a quite minor issue. You suggested T Clark saw no difference between the term accuracy and the term truth and your comment about T Clark was:

But in saying that conceptual models are accurate TClark is saying they are true. "Accurate" is a synonym for "true".
— Harry Hindu

I think you are being inaccurate when you say 'Accurate is a synonym for True.' I think there is a difference between them. I explained why I thought this in my examples about 'measurement' and 'paradox' That's what started our exchange and we have simply been expanding on our positions since. Its general importance is very minor. — universeness

What part of this proposition, "Neil Armstrong is the first human to walk on
the Moon.", is subjectively true and which part is objectively true? — Harry Hindu

The proposition is not true in the sense that you cannot prove it to be absolutely true. No matter how hard you try, a skeptic will find a way to question this proposition. Maybe Apollo 11 was fabricated; Buzz Aldrin was technically the first one to meet the criteria of walking; perhaps Neil Armstrong wasn't a human; someone had done this before Neil and kept it in secret; and so on.

The proposition is objectively true in the sense that you're referring to a specific event that objectively happened.

The proposition is subjectively true in the sense that it is grounded in your subjective assumptions. You're referring to a specific Neil Armstrong and not any other person with the same name. You're referring to a specific moon. You have a specific idea of what it means to walk on the Moon, in oppose to stepping on a lunar meteorite found on Earth, standing barefoot on a celestial body, or perhaps walking all the way from Earth to the Moon on foot. — pfirefry

Really? What does a language that you don't know look like? And when describing what a language you know looks like, are you describing the language or your knowledge of the language? — Harry Hindu

If the limits of my language mean the limits of my world, it means I do not have freedom of thought. It means there are things I'm bound to believe simply because that's how my language structures my world.

If all that is true, what is a philosophical debate? What's actually happening with philosophy? — frank

What is the content of a proposition? And is it propositional?
— bongo fury

What is the colour of a proposition? — Banno

Language is more than scribbles and sounds, ya know. — frank

The risk exists, but I think we can explain what we see. We can talk and articulate what we think we see. We are all people who look at a world. Nò world stands separate from other worlds. People don't exist as isolated entities. — Cornwell1

Did you see that movie Arrival? If you haven't, I won't spoil it, but it's related to this question.

“the limits of my language mean the limits of my world”. What does this mean to you? — frank

I disagree. Saying that you are choosing to ignore the paradox state is a comment about your choice not your understanding of paradox. — universeness

No, I don't take that as problematic to my premise. I find something that is not true or false, intriguing.
You find it useless. The Universe continues regardless.
There are many other paradoxical scenarios presented in propositional logic. I'm sure you are familiar with many of them, the barbers paradox, the liars paradox etc. If they or they're like do not stimulate your idea of 'useful' or 'meaningful,' then that's your prerogative. I feel no responsibility for that. — universeness

Some do some dont. Some believe in god(s) because they have been told to and are too scared not to. — universeness

I have little interest in metaphysical musings. I have no confusion. I have already stated I support a democratic system, so it follows that I would listen to minority views, dissenting voices. You are stating the obvious. A republic is described as "a state in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives." The term 'elected representatives' indicates a democratic system. — universeness

One person's rationality is another person's irrationality. People reports based on the 'same observations can vary wildly. People are emotional creatures. Some people are highly emotional. Emotions are not necessarily rational but they can be just as powerful and useful as logic. A combination of the two makes the psyche of most individuals. — universeness

Of course. Everybody wants his theory to be objectively true. Or be constantly falsified by observations. Or established in research programs. We observe the theory though. The theory is subjective. So what we observe is dependent on theory. There is no theory independent reality pulling the theory in the right direction. Well, there is, but only after the theoretical reality has been introduced in the first place. Where some see quark like point particles, I see triplets of geometrically extended structures. — Cornwell1

I would say the the utterance of a sentence expresses a proposition. I don't know what the second question means exactly. We might use sentences to identify propositions, or it's the object of a that clause: "It's true that..." — frank

No, I wanted folk here to explain and clarify what they mean by "content". — bongo fury

An all too common error; the conflation of meaning and causality.The former requires being meaningful to something or someone, whereas the latter does not. — creativesoul

The conflation is the basis for many who claim that clouds mean rain even when there is noone around to take notice... — creativesoul

This weed isn't helping your philosophy skills. Change to a different strain. — frank

Right. It doesn't refer anymore than the world refers to something else. Russell wanted to picture it as: a proposition is a state of affairs. The snag there is that there are false propositions. — frank

But what's the case depends on your theory. Or better, is your theory. Observations are not theory-laden, the observations are the theory. — Cornwell1

Do you both agree with this proposition: "In believing opposite propositions we both can't be right, but we can both be wrong." — Harry Hindu

I never claimed I was attempting to educate you about anything. — universeness

To me, you are simply ignoring the propositional logic state called paradox. — universeness

All I can say about the state 'paradox' is what you yourself know 'its not true or false.'
I know that does not satisfy. Trying to explain something by stating what it is not, often does not satisfy but I for one, currently, can't do any better. — universeness

I think we agree that evidence assists in declaring a posit right or wrong, I think most people do.
Some people, don't need evidence, some theists for example. — universeness

Majority support as a democratic method is practical whether or not it's a logical fallacy. — universeness

What's your alternative?
I'm sure you would agree that a purely logical approach to every circumstance is, a flawed strategy.
Our exchange was based on the difference between 'accuracy' and 'truth.'
I maintain the position that there is some difference.
You have not changed my mind on that by what you have typed so far.
I'm sure my typings have not altered your position either.
We can both accept that without so much as a flutter. — universeness

My point was that images are ambiguous in 2 senses: 1. they can match different descriptive sentences that do no share the same proposition. 2. Propositions - differently from sentences - are supposed to be unambiguous, however images can be not only ambiguous but also be ambiguous in ways that no descriptive sentence can render (image ambiguity does not match sentence ambiguity).
These observations are relevant b/c if we are supposed to take propositions as correlates that different sentences, different languages, different propositional attitude can share, we can wonder if propositions can be shared across different media (images vs linguistic expressions) — neomac

OK let’s start again. I remember you claiming “When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to”. Now, I understand your comment as implying the truth of the following conditional: if translation consists in replacing statements from at least 2 different languages co-referring the same state-of-affairs, then the French translations (I provided in my example) could translate the English sentences indifferently, because they all are referring to the same state of affaires (at least to me). But the consequent of that conditional is false, so it should be false also the conditional. — neomac

My central claim is that semantic relations can not be reduced to sequences of mind-independent causal chains. You seem to do the same (due to the relevance of the notion of “mind” in your argument), but you are also developing your discourse over aspects that simply widen the scope of that central claim (e.g. with the reference to art works), which is fine but I'm more interested in arguments that support or question the claim: semantic correlations (between sign and referent) can not be reduced to causal chains. To support that central claim, one could for example argue that while art works are ambiguous in some sense, any causal chain involved in the intentional production/experience/understanding of a piece of art work can not be qualified as "ambiguous". While to question that main claim one could argue that indeed ambiguity can be reduced to some probabilistic feature of causal chains involving psychological states, etc.
In any case, I'm not interested to deal with this specific task in this thread. So I'll leave it at that. — neomac

In your past comment, you wrote “The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it”. This looks as an identity claim to me, and I don’t support such identity claim. For me belief exceeds both experience and episodic memory. Maybe you wanted to say that an act of memorizing a given experience always results from believing in that experience. Even if this was true, it would be just an empirical fact, namely something that doesn’t exclude the logical possibility of believing a given experience without memorizing it and memorizing a given experience without believing in that experience. Besides there are actual counter-examples: I remember a dream but I do not believe in that dream, I do not take whatever seemed to happen in that dream to be the case. Maybe you want to claim that while dreaming I was believing whatever was experiencing, and that resulted in me memorizing it. But that we believe in our dreams while dreaming can be acknowledged for all our most common dreams, yet we do not seem to remember all of them either.
The correlation between usefulness, memory, experience and belief you are pointing at, again looks empirical to me, not logical (which is the part I’m more interested in), and even more slippery because what counts as useful is no less controversial than what counts as memory, experience, and belief. — neomac

I don't see why this should be the case. Every truth is both subjective and objective. There is objectivity in each truth, and there is an element of subjectivity in truth as well. — pfirefry

But on their own they make little sense. It's more appropriate to combine them. Every subjective truth is seen as objectively true by the people believing in it. — Cornwell1

To me, you are simply ignoring the propositional logic state called paradox.
'Every truth is subjective as an objective truth' is a state of paradox, which demonstrates that the state 'true' and the state 'false' are not the only two logical states in existence. It's got nothing to do with truths that we don't know are true.

My point is that they aren't saying anything when they do. They're just making sounds with their mouths and drawing scribbles artfully.
— Harry Hindu

Merely your opinion — universeness

If I say the Earth is round and another says it's flat, then we will both have our supporters and dissenters. Who would you support? whichever choice you make, would mean that you are calling the other group wrong. Someone being declared wrong by majority vote is good enough for me. If new evidence comes to light then perhaps the vote will change. — universeness

Two is a prime number.

The above is an utterance of a sentence. It expresses a proposition, specifically that two is a prime number.

Jim, pointing to a 2 written on a white board, said "It's a prime number."

Jim expressed the proposition that two is a prime number.

What this example (straight from a famous philosopher) shows is that discerning the proposition expressed by the utterance of a sentence is context dependent. — frank

We know it isn't a sentence because multiple sentences can be used to express the same proposition.

It's not an utterance (sounds or marks) for the same reason. Distinct utterances, same proportion.

It's not a mental object because...same thing. You and I can think of the same proposition, but my mental state can't be identical to yours. — frank

In my judgement, the original SCM was not adequate to make the kind of decisions needed. — T Clark