You obviously haven't been reading what I have wrote.

Like I said, time is an illusion. They don't go forwards or backwards in time. They simply change. — Harry Hindu

I can only speak for myself. I read and attempt to understand the philosophers whose work interests me because of what I can learn from them. Their work does not come with an expiration date. Unless you have some understanding of a philosopher you are not in a position to judge whether his work is useful. — Fooloso4

What information do others (philosophers or not) have that you don't when it comes to understanding the mind and it's relationship with the world? It seems to me that we are all stuck in the same predicament with no one having any special place in trying to explain it. I am more interested in what you have to say about your own perceptions of your own mind which includes its thought, beliefs and knowledge and the forms they take, without any influence from others.

What are you pointing at when you say that you believe, or know, such-and-such.
— Harry Hindu

That depends on what it is I say I believe or know. The statement may be about me or what I say I believe or know or both. — Fooloso4

Prove it to yourself that you believe something, and tell me how you did it.
— Harry Hindu

I don't know what you are getting at. Why would I prove to myself that the things I believe are things I believe? What role do you think proof plays here? — Fooloso4

Yes, but there must be some similarity between your various beliefs for you to identify them all as beliefs, no? What is the similarity that all your beliefs have that you point to when you say "I have a belief"? What form do beliefs take so that you can identify them as beliefs?

How do you measure time? By comparing one change (the movement of the hands of a clock) with another (the rotation of the Earth). Time is the measurement, not what is being measured. This is what naive realists do - confuse the measurement with what is being measured.

I don't think you know the meaning of "doubt", Harry. It signifies an uncertain state of mind. Therefore your assertion that a person must decide to doubt is directly contradict to the nature of "doubt", as deciding signifies a form of certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

It just doesn't make any sense to assert that doubt is fundamental. If it were, then how could we ever store any information in our brain? How is it that we have memory? What is memory for if not to store valid and useful information that can be relied on for similar situations in the future?

Now you are misusing the word "decide". Many, in fact most, actions performed by living beings are not produced from a decision. Biologists don't really know the true impetus behind most living actions, but we can surely say that the majority of them are not derived from decisions. So your question here is derived from the false premise, that an act of an organism proceeds from a decision, when in reality most of these acts do not derive from decisions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seemed to be berating scientism in the other thread, but here you are embracing it. All I know is that when I decide to do something I can often times take time to simulate different actions and predictions of their outcomes of those actions and then choose the one that has the best predicted outcome. It can also involve comparing what is presently observed and integrating it with a vision of how I would like things to be and applying the best action to achieve that goal. So the way I am using "decide" is such that computers can make decisions to. It's simply a matter of being able to process sensory information (input) and then producing actions (output) based on one's programming (instincts and learned behaviors).

I agree, knowing how to use language is completely different from knowing how to run. But notice that the question here concerns knowing that oneself is running, which is completely different from knowing how to run. In order for a person to know that oneself is running, I think It's quite obvious that the person must know what "running" is. Otherwise it is more likely that the person would misjudge oneself as running, because the judgement would be nothing better than a guess, when the person doesn't know what "running" signifies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well yeah, running isn't the scribbles, "running". It is an observable action. You know you are running because 1) you decided to run and 2) you can observe yourself running. If you decided to run but you are not running, then there is something wrong with your muscles, nervous system, etc. You don't need language to know you or anyone else is running. You simply need eyes and a brain.

When you were born and while you were an infant did you doubt anything your parents, or anyone in a position of authority, told you?
— Harry Hindu

Of course. This is just more evidence that you do not understand the meaning of "doubt". — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems to me that you have a strange notion of "doubt" and "fundamental".

That's where virtual particles come in. Their name is a misnomer. They go back and forth in time all the time. Before real particles came into existence, there were only these VPs. — EugeneW

Like I said, time is an illusion. They don't go forwards or backwards in time. They simply change.

That's the problem with apokrisis' metaphysics, it gets the temporal relation of cause and effect backward. But that's just the manifestation of a deeper problem, inherent within scientism in general, a complete misunderstanding of the nature of time. When physics represents fundamental processes as reversible, it's obvious that they are employing a misrepresentation of time. This is the "denial of the obvious" I refer to above. When we deny the obvious, we can produce a very simple model of reality which appears to avoid all the hard problems, such as the causal role of the free will of the individual. But then instead of having an unbridgeable gap within the theory (dualism), there is an incompatibility between the theory and the fundamentals of experience. The theory does not correspond with basic observation. This is the manifestation of a failure to respect the difference between past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I never understood how scientists could say that processes are reversible - as if while the rest of the universe moves forward, some other processes could move backward in time. It seems to me that the whole universe would have to be moving backward, not just different processes within it. Time is the illusion. Change is fundamental. When something changes, there is no sense of forwards or backwards. Everything changes relative to everything else.

Neurons aren't any different. There is a frequency (Hz) at which neurons send, receive and process sensory data. Compared to a computer's CPU it's very slow, but the difference lies in the parallelism, where we have billions of CPUs where the computer has one with 6 or 8 cores by today's standards. Taking two computers with difference CPU speeds and running the same software will produce noticeable difference in how the computer processes input and displays output.

How brains process sensory data is dependent upon the relative speed at which it processes that data vs the speed at which what is observed changes. Instead of trying to track every change in the world, the brain creates the illusion of static, physical objects (like brains). Just as QM has theorized that the outcome of a measurement depends on the measuring device being used, so does the way the world appears is dependent on the sensory devices that are used to observe it (dark and bright, bent straws in water, mirages, etc.). In this sense, physical brains and their functions are not the cause, but the outcome. They are the measurement, not what is measured.

Phenomenology ain't the destination even if it seems the starting point. It might correctly identify the embodied and intersubjective nature of human experience. But as an academic thread of thought, it wanders away into no clear conclusion. It winds up in PoMo plurality and "disclosure of ways of being. Nothing of any great interest results. — apokrisis

It's the only point from which you know anything about the world, including brains. When you talk about brains and their functions you can't help but talk about them from your own starting point. A valid conclusion is that the world is not as it appears in the mind, but the mind is as the world is in the sense that it is not physical, but informational.

Hardly. One is an easy mistake to make - a high level act of interpretation. The other is found to be constitutive of interpretations themselves.

You can unsee the mysterious figure. But you can't unsee the Mach bands. And having noted this interesting difference in your qualitative experience, you would then look to its separate causes. — apokrisis

Can you unsee the empty space around you that isn't empty at all? Can you unsee colors that scientists claim doesn't exist outside of your head? When scientists claim that the world isn't as it appears, what does that say about how "brains" (other minds) appear?

A textbook example of Dunning-Kruger in action. The less folk know about brain function, the more they feel confident the Hard Problem is a slam dunk. — apokrisis

I know plenty about brain function, but nothing about how brain functions create the conscious feeling of say, depth perception. How do neurons create the sensation of empty space?

In all the literature I have read, none of it explains how it is that when I look at your mental functions I perceive a brain, but when I look at my mental functions, I perceive a mind. You only know of brains and their functions by it's appearance in the mind. I don't I experience the same thing when looking at everyone else's mental functions as I do when looking at mine.

Consciousness is the brain operating to allow for wakefulness and awareness. There is no "where." It's a made up idea. There is just the brain and its functions. Consciousness is itself a made-up term used to describe something people had no clue about before the past few decades. — Garrett Travers

Yet you use the term to describe what the brain emits or produces. It's not my made-up idea. It's yours that I'm trying to understand based on what you have said and the terms you are using.

Then consciousness isn't emitted by the brain, but is the brain operating in certain ways. You aren't being consistent.
— Harry Hindu

There is no distinction between the two, Harry. The brain emits, generates, or otherwise enables consciousness, just as it does sight, through its operations. Individual networks of the brain are responsible for certain functions, that when operating in tandem with others, produce the awareness that you use the term "consciousness" to describe. — Garrett Travers

The brain does not enable sight on it's own. It needs eyes to be able to do that. Eyes are not the brain, but are connected to the brain.

Light bulbs emit/produce light. Light is not part of the bulb once emitted. The bulb changes states between off and on and when on it emits light and when off it doesn't. The bulb projects light out into the world. So the terms you are using is describing the brain and consciousness like a light bulb and light. Yet you then contradict yourself and say that consciousness is the brain. If the latter, then the electrified filament inside the bulb would be more like consciousness as being (part of) the brain and not something that is produced or emitted. So which is it?

What form does the awareness that is produced by the brain take if not just the brain in a certain state? How would you know that someone is aware by looking at their brain? How do you know that you are aware? Can you know that you are aware without looking at your own brain? If so, then what form does your own awareness take as opposed to the form that other people's awareness takes from your own perspective?

As Wittgenstein uses the term 'proposition' it is not its expression. According to the Tractatus a thought with a sense is a proposition (4). It does not become a proposition when it is expressed. The belief is not the cause of a proposition. The belief or thought is the proposition, it is expressed in symbols or words or scribbles or pictures. — Fooloso4

I really couldn't care what Wittgenstein says because it isn't useful. There is too much of a dependency on what dead philosophers have said with no regard to what we know now. Some people on this forum treat Witt like he was some kind of prophet.

I never said the belief is the scribble. I said it is the cause of the scribble. What form does your belief take if not visual imagery, sounds, feelings, etc.? How do you know that you are believing or knowing anything at any moment? What are you pointing at when you say that you believe, or know, such-and-such. You don't need to prove it to me. Prove it to yourself that you believe something, and tell me how you did it.

I really don't see your logic Harry. Why do you think that when a person is doing anything, doubting for example, the person must be certain of what oneself is doing? Do I need to be certain that I am running, in order for me to be running? The person who doesn't even know the word "running" would still run, and it would be impossible for that person to know oneself to be running. Likewise, the person who doesn't know the word "doubt" would be doubting without the possibility of being certain that they are doubting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is ridiculous, Meta. A person or animal decides to doubt, to run, or whatever. How can an organism decide to do something without knowing it's doing it?? When you raise your arm you have to decide to do it prior to it raising. Doing so may be simple and effortless now,, but it required a lot of practice when you were an infant to control your limbs - to bend them to your will. A person doesn't need to know language to know it is running. Knowing how to use a language and knowing how to run are two different things.

I can't grasp your question here. When I ask someone to justify something, then, generally I am doubting that person. What this says about my own belief is that I believe that I ought to doubt others. It doesn't mean that I am certain that I ought to doubt others. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. You could be asking a question because you simply don't understand what they are saying. There is a lot of word salad on these forums. You can't doubt something you don't understand. In a sense you're not doubting what they said yet. You are doubting your own understanding of what they said.

When you were born and while you were an infant did you doubt anything your parents, or anyone in a position of authority, told you? Do you doubt everything everyone says, or are there some that you trust more than others, like your family and friends?

Consciousness is the brain operating to allow for wakefulness and awareness. There is no "where." It's a made up idea. There is just the brain and its functions. Consciousness is itself a made-up term used to describe something people had no clue about before the past few decades. — Garrett Travers

Then consciousness isn't emitted by the brain, but is the brain operating in certain ways. You aren't being consistent.

So neurologists are not conscious of the brains they are testing? When neurologists provide explanations of brains and how they function, are they talking about their conscious experience of brains, or how brains function independent of their conscious experience (observation, empirical evidence)?
— Harry Hindu

...? — Garrett Travers

Well? Are neurologists conscious of brains or not? If so, then what form does them being conscious of brains take? How would they know they are conscious of brains? What form does empirical evidence of brain functions take, and in talking about empirical evidence, are you talking about your conscious visual experience of brains, or how brains are independent of your visual experience of them?

One can tell if someone is unconscious if they are unresponsive. The man acting unconscious is still conscious. He wouldn’t be able to act if he was unconscious, though he may deceive us. — NOS4A2

You can yell my name and I won't respond. Deceiving you is a successful act of acting like you are unconscious.

I don’t think the fact of being conscious is silly, but the notion of “consciousness” is. By adding the suffix “ness” to the adjective “conscious” we fashion a thing out of a descriptive term, which in my mind is an error in philosophical discussions. This is true of terms such as “awareness”, “happiness”, “whiteness”. Descriptive terms serve to describe things, but they aren’t themselves things, substances, or forces, and they shouldn’t be treated as such in any careful language.

When speaking about and analyzing things that exist, the human organism exists. This human organism is what we study and analyze to better understand his activity. “Consciousness”, however, doesn’t exist, and we should abandon the term. — NOS4A2

What I am gathering from what you are saying is that conscious is a descriptive term of other's behaviors. But that isn't what I'm talking about when I use the term. I'm talking about the form my awareness of other people's behaviors takes.

So, it would have to be brains that produce consciousness, as there are no structures of consciousness that can be tested for brain production, but the opposite is tested daily, as I have demonstrated with the research I have posted. — Garrett Travers

So neurologists are not conscious of the brains they are testing? When neurologists provide explanations of brains and how they function, are they talking about their conscious experience of brains, or how brains function independent of their conscious experience (observation, empirical evidence)?

"How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction. By produce, I mean emit, generate, or otherwise enable. Much like eyesight is produced by the brain, so too is consciousness. — Garrett Travers

I don't see how complex networks of neurons can produce experiences of things that are not neurons. If brains emit consciousness, where is consciousness - once emitted, relative to the brain?

Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions. — Fooloso4

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs. — Fooloso4

And a symbol can be a scribble, picture, or behavior to represent the belief of the one writing scribbles, drawing pictures and behaving in certain ways. Propositions are those effects (written scribbles, drawn pictures and behaviors) that we observe that we then use to get at the causes of these effects - which is the beliefs of the one causing the scribbles, pictures and their body to move in certain ways, which can include making sounds with your mouth.

You're not making sense Harry. To doubt a certainty is contradiction. The fact that you are doubting it means that it is not a certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain. To be certain of something is to be free of doubt concerning it. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that you are doubting anything? Can you be certain that you are doubting? As I have said before certainty and doubt go hand-in-hand. It seems to me that you cannot doubt without the certainty that you are doubting. If you doubt that you are doubting, then you are doing something. What are you doing if not exhibiting a certainty of what you are doing whether it be doubting or not?

I don't see why you believe that it is required to have certainty prior to having uncertainty (doubt). Obviously human beings are evolving creatures, and human knowledge has come into existence as have human beings. Therefore, if certainty is knowledge, as you propose, uncertainty is prior to certainty, as the form of animalistic belief prior to knowledge. It makes no sense to say that uncertainty (doubt) requires an underlying certainty, or else knowledge would have to come into existence from some form of certainty which is prior to knowledge. But this undermines your proposition that knowledge and certainty are the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see that we may be more likely to doubt knowledge coming from others than we are in doubting our own knowledge. This is why we have rules of logic about pleading to popularity and authority. In using these rules of logic, are we doubting the propositions of others or becoming more certain that what they are saying is wrong and you are right?

We must understand how a term or symbol is being used in order to understand how it is being used to represent a state of affairs. The same term can be used in the representation of different states of affairs.

The proposition: 'it is raining' is not used only to convey meteorological information. It can be an expression of exasperation or pleasure or surprise. — Fooloso4

You missed my point which was that we use scribbles to convey information about states-of-affairs that are not just another use of scribbles, to others that are not aware of said states-of-affairs. Using scribbles to convey meteorological information or mental information is not useful if the other person is already aware of the meteorological or mental states. So it appears that while we use things, it doesn't necessarily mean that we accomplished our goal (that it was useful). We are simply wasting our time and energy using scribbles to inform others of what they already know.

If use is the scale by which we judge metaphysical factors, then it seems to me that the scales would be epistemological in nature, as in existing in our minds only and not the way the world is actually divided.
— Harry Hindu

I think that's true too. — T Clark

Why should you represent reality into the physics-chemistry-biology-cosmology division in the first place?
— EugeneW

As I indicated in my OP, I think that's a metaphysical division. It's useful, so we use it. — T Clark

Wait, I thought you agreed that the division of these scales was epistemological, not metaphysical. So physics, chemistry, biology and cosmology are merely epistemological explanations of scales that only exist in our minds, and not real in any sense in the world beyond our minds. So I fail to see how they are useful if they are not representative of what is the case outside of our minds.

You seem content to remain in the bubble of your mind - to live only in the map, and not in the territory while at the same time implying that you are talking about states of affairs outside of your mind. When talking about the world, I'm not interested, not do I find it useful, to talk about your epistemological states. You seem to be confusing epistemology and metaphysics.

How does this fit into your military metaphor? You talk about constraints from above. How do the feedback loops constrain the chemistry? Are the products of the enzymes the soldiers? So chemicals evolve into structures that control how they behave. — T Clark

Above what? If the scales are epistemological then there is no metaphysical above or below. We are simply talking about the same thing from different views. In other words we are confusing the map with the territory. The constraints from above or below are only figments of our imagination, ie explanations that are useful, but not representative of anything real in any sense outside of our minds. Constraints would only come from the sides - meaning things on the same "scale" (there would only be one scale, so the term becomes meaningless when describing the world outside of your mind) as the thing we are talking about. This is akin to natural selection where forces on the same scale constrain other forces on the same scale, like how predators constrain the evolution of prey and vice versa.

I would just add

For the PRC Taiwan is basically the last remnants of the Civil War where the Kuomingtang retreated. It would be like if during the US Civil War the Confederacy would not have surrendered, but had retreated to present Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and held high their flags on those islands to this day. — ssu

That's weird that you put it that way because I see China as more like the Confederacy and Taiwan as more like the North. After all, China is the one segregating their population by means of the type of treatment the various groups receive, with some of the treatment bordering on genocide. China sees the capitalism and freedom that makes up the Taiwanese society as a threat to the Communist party, just as Russia sees the same type of representational, western-leaning societal engineering going on in Ukraine as a threat to the One-Party regime in Russia.

There is the problem of how the information Putin had about the kind of resistance he would go up against in Ukraine was inaccurate and China may be wondering the same thing about Taiwan, and the longer it takes for Russia to conquer Ukraine may inspire more in Taiwan to more fervently resist any invasion by China. It is to early to tell. I'm hoping for a rebellion in Russia given the declining economy, government crackdown on media sources and the death of many thousand Russian sons in a senseless war against their Ukrainian cousins.

I am not dismissing the importance of habitual behaviour, or the role of certainty. What I am saying is that it must be the case that uncertainty, doubt, is necessarily more basic or fundamental than certainty. This is due to the fallibility of certainty. Since a living being can still be wrong, even in instances when that individual has the attitude of certainty, then there must be a mechanism whereby we doubt even the most basic certitudes, or else we'd all die from our mistakes. Some of us do not doubt our fundamental certitudes, and some of us die from our mistakes. Some of us do doubt our fundamental habits and certitudes, and since this trait often saves us, it is selected for in evolution.

The conclusion therefore, is that the beliefs are fundamentally not certainties, because the living being who holds a belief is conditioned through instinct and genetics, to naturally doubt the belief. This is an evolutionarily beneficial trait which has been selected for. So positing something like hinge propositions, as fundamental beliefs which are somehow beyond doubt, is simply an incorrect representation. The evolutionary process has ensured that beliefs do not actually exist in this way. The propensity to doubt, is fundamental to, and inherent within all belief. The condition of certainty, I suggest, is added to the belief afterward, therefore not fundamental to belief. It is layered on, as an attitude toward belief, not actually part of the belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. If doubt were fundamental then what would you be doubting if not some certainty? It seems that in order to doubt you must have some certainty to doubt prior to doubting it.

Personally, it don't like the terms being used to explain what you are trying to explain. I think of certainty and knowledge as the same thing. And I think of knowledge as a set of instructions that we go by. These instructions are dynamic - capable of being updated with new (sensory) information. In other words, knowledge can change with new information.

The instructions we use aren't much different than instructions in a computer language. Given some goal, reference the instructions we have for attaining that goal. If we don't have instructions then acquire them through learning (observe someone with the same goal and how they do it or trying instructions that we already have that are used for similar tasks and observe the results and then modify as needed and try again).

Doubt stems from our knowledge (certainty) that the world is complex and changes constantly and that we acquire new information by the use of our senses, and that any set of instructions may need to be updated, given new information.

Can you find the section you are referring to? He rejects the idea that meaning is a picture or representation of reality, in favor of the idea that meaning is determined by use. But the issue here is about the relationship between beliefs and propositions. Sam's contention is that non-verbal beliefs are not propositional, on the assumption that propositions are are verbal statements, and so pre-verbal beliefs are not propositions. — Fooloso4

If meaning is determined by use, then something is used to accomplish some goal. What is being used if not our representation (knowledge) of reality, and what is the goal? In using propositions we are using scribbles and sounds, or pictures, to communicate (represent) some state-of-affairs that isn't the use of scribbles and sounds, or pictures to others that we believe do not possess the same knowledge (representation) of reality that we do.

In telling someone it is raining, we only do so because we believe the person we are using a proposition with isn't aware that it is raining. If we believed they already knew it was raining, then what use would it be in telling them?

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains. — NOS4A2

Yeah, but how do you explain the difference between someone being knocked out and someone being awake? Where is the difference? You might point the person's behavior, but I can act like I'm knocked out so how do you tell the difference between someone acting like they are knocked out and someone who is actually knocked out? And how would the person that goes from being awake, to knocked out to awake again describe the difference, and would there be a discrepancy between the two descriptions (yours and theirs), and if so why? If we can act, or lie with our actions, then there must be some difference between our behaviors and what we are presently aware (conscious) of.

“Consciousness” is a silly concept, anyways. Nothing called “consciousness” moves from one area to another, so saying that it “comes from” the brain is nonsensical. Neither is it “produced” by the brain, as if the brain was a qualia factory. — NOS4A2

I agree with everything except the notion that consciousness is a silly concept. How do you explain dreams, or the fact that I can act in some way that is contrary to my present knowledge?

In defining consciousness as a silly concept then you are defining empiricism and observable evidence as silly concepts because the only way we know the world is via consciousness. It is the only thing we have any proof of, but that isn't to say that is the only thing that exists, nor does it imply that consciousness is fundamental. It's only implication is that it exists. I think, therefore I am.

When you think, how do you know that you are thinking? What form does your thinking take - entangled electrified neurons or entangled colors, shapes, feelings and sounds? Why would your thinking take the form of electrified neurons from my view but take the shape of colors, shapes, sounds, feelings etc. from your view? How would we know that we're talking about the same thing?

That’s where the hierarchy of scale comes in. It represents an artificial division of the universe into manageable pieces. The division is made based on the usefulness of the distinctions made at each scale. As I’ve written many times, usefulness, rather than truth, is the measure by which we judge metaphysical factors. Metaphysical questions can not be answered empirically. To me, the hierarchy of scale is a metaphysical entity. By that standard, I choose the level on the hierarchy most useful in describing and understanding a particular phenomenon in a particular situation. — T Clark

Any knowledge we glean from other scales than the one we find ourselves living in are only useful in the scale we find ourselves living in. We only use states at other scales to explain the behavior of objects on the scale we live in - hence the issue of trying to integrate QM with classical physics. We are trying to use the behavior of objects at the quantum scale to explain and predict the behavior of macro-scale objects.

If use is the scale by which we judge metaphysical factors, then it seems to me that the scales would be epistemological in nature, as in existing in our minds only and not the way the world is actually divided.

When using a microscope to look at a drop of blood and viewing red blood cells, aren't we still looking at the drop of blood - just from a different view (at a smaller scale)? The world is only divided into scales when we take different views of the same thing.

Any attempt to define consciousness as some sort of illusion just pulls the rug out from under all the empirical "evidence" one has for the existence brains.

There are numerous well-known theories that explain that the way we perceive the world is "inaccurate", or not the way the world is. The theory that color only exists in our minds, and not in the world is one of those theories. What does that say about how we perceive brains? How do we get any "accurate" information about the world to survive for any length of time if we can only access our consciousness and consciousness isn't suppose to be an accurate representation of reality?

I think that we do get accurate information about the world via consciousness, but there are many who confuse the map with the territory. The territory is process. The map is static models of processes - hence brains are confused to be the real thing (the map (static models)) and minds (the territory (process)) are relegated to the status of illusions or as subordinate to the static model. It's as if scientists are forgetting about the very nature of observation itself and the role it plays in how we think about things.

Do you have an example of integrated information in the brain?
— EugeneW

No. — Garrett Travers

Consciousness is integrated sensory information - where information from the eyes, ears, nose, skin, etc. all come together to produce the model of the world we experience.

Yep, that's exactly my point. And it is the brain doing so, as far the evidence is concerned. You have something that suggest otherwise, present it. I'm not here to discuss opinions. — Garrett Travers

The only evidence anyone has is of consciousness itself. Any evidence you have of brains is by means of consciousness/integrated sensory information/empiricism. So is it brains that produce consciousness or consciousness that produce brains? And that is only part of the question. The other part of the question is how does one "produce" the other? What exactly is meant by "produce" in this context?

Here's an example of what I am saying. We can represent the certainty as the basis for the habitual activity. I know that the act X will have the outcome of Y, so act X for the purpose of Y becomes habituated, and I tend to proceed with very little doubt. The light turns green, I walk across the street, for instance.

However, before I cross the street I glance around to see if anyone is running the red. This is "the check", which is a manifestation of the fundamental uncertainty. The check has to be more fundamental than the certainty, in order that it might at any time overrule the certainty. The habit can be broken. If the check is allowed to be overruled by the certainty, then eventually I will step in front of an errant vehicle.

One might model the certainty as more fundamental than the uncertainty, as is the case when hinge propositions are modeled as free from the tendency to doubt, but this is a false model. It is proven false, because those who do not perform the check get the Darwin award, and this trait of relinquishing the check, is not maintained. So the uncertainty of the check is supported by evolution, and its overruling the certainty of habit, as a more fundamental aspect of living beings is verified in this way. And the check as an uncertainty based activity cannot be modeled as a habit because it is different (habit being similar) in every field of activity yet common to them all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I get what you're saying but I think that it can be argued that habitual behavior has also been selected as a trait conductive to surviving. For me, it is one of those yin/yang relationships. Certainty has no meaning without doubt.

Right, the reason for posting here is to submit my ideas to the criticisms of others. My ideas are forever evolving, because of my uncertainty, and the role that others play in changing my mind.
— Metaphysician Undercover

To state something as a proposition, is to make a proposal. It does not imply 'I am certain of what I wrote'. This is your misinterpretation, derived from, (and a very good demonstration of), that faulty notion that actions are based in certainty. That you interpret my proposal as an indication that I am certain of the truth of what I write, shows that you are committed to this faulty way of understanding. I write in my habitual way, but this does not mean that I am not ready, willing, and actively looking for reasons, to break the habit if necessary. I walk across the street right after the light turns green, and it appears like I am certain in that act, if you do not notice the more subtle act of me looking around before crossing. In the case of writing, the more subtle act occurs within my mind, as thinking, so it's even more difficult to notice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. So here on a philosophy forum, discussing topics that are on the fringes of human knowledge, there would be a higher degree of playing devil's advocate - in proposing ideas that you don't necessarily believe but would like to see if there are any rebuttals to. The forum does have it's fair share of fundamentalists that you find in the religious and political discussions where what people say, they really mean, or "know" is true. And then there is the every-day-talk where most of what people say, they believe because we talk about each other, the events of the day, the world, etc.

One topic that denizens of TPF seem to be under the impression that empirical research has left the door open for the discussion of philosophers to "speculate" about. This would be the topic of consciousness, and the nature of its presence here on Earth, and in the human race. — Garrett Travers

No. It's actually that you have completely ignored the very nature of empiricism and how the way things are observed influences how we think about brains and their accompanying conscious. You seemed assert that brains and consciousness exists without having ever seen them, but only heard about them.

In the other thread I mentioned that neuroscience an QM need work together to provide a better explanation of consciousness, but you called that unscientific and woo mysticism, and then continued to berate others, so excuse me if I don't think you're intellectually honest enough to engage in this type of conversation.

What you, many others in this thread, and Wittgenstein himself, fail to recognize, is that doubt and uncertainty is what underlies human actions, as inherent within them, essential to them, and impossible to remove. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you typing and submitting your post is evidence of your underlying uncertainty? You seem certain of what you say, but if your admitting that your certainty of what you are saying is an illusion and that you know its an illusion I would have expected a lot less of telling others what they fail to realize (as if they are wrong and you are right) and more humility on your part. Are you certain that certainty is just an illusion?

Ask yourself: why is the above laughable rationalization more important to me than being friendly and somewhat accomodating to transsexuals? Why don't I want to be friendly and somewhat accomodating to transsexuals?

You don't care if all the transsexuals think you're a dick - and they do. They do and that's fine with you. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It seems to me that you are more concerned about what people that you don't know and have never met, and probably never will, think of you.

The fact that you and Hanover dismiss my example is just evidence of what I am saying - that you easily dismiss the claims of anyone that says that they are something that they aren't except if it were sex. How do you and Hanover know that my claim is "not to be taken seriously, but are meant as mockery and are contemptuous."? How do you know a trans-gender person isn't doing the same - mocking social roles in a society where it is a law to wear clothes and that we have agreed that certain sexes behave in certain ways so that we can tell who is who when playing mating games?

What would gender be in a society where there are no clothes, or social roles expected by the sexes?

The critical difference between your example and that of a transsexual is that your claims of dysphoria are in bad faith. In fact, they're not meant to be taken seriously, but are meant as mockery and are contemptuous.

So, there's that. — Hanover

No. It's an example of a slippery slope. Your faith in transgender's claims are what is being questioned here. It is very possible that some of them make their claims for attention. Some people crave attention and don't necessarily care whether it is good or bad attention - just that they are getting attention (many celebrities come to mind). This isn't to say that there might be some that actually have a condition that they can't help, just like anyone with delusions. What I'm saying is that we're going about addressing the problem the wrong way, like reinforcing the ideas a person with anorexia has by agreeing with them that they do look fat and should loose more weight.

Is a schizophrenic mocking and being contemptuous when making claims stemming from their delusions? How do you know that I'm not delusional or schizophrenic? You'd be mocking a person with a biological condition that they can't help.

I could have used a host of other examples as a slippery slope. People can identify as another race, or even species. Again, what makes sex so special?

Transsexuals are dysphoric, meaning they're at unease with their physical state of being because their mental state tends to the feminine, and so they attempt to bring alignment of their mind and their body. There is (again) a critical distinction to be made. They are not delusional, but are dysphoric. If they were delusional, a man might actually think he was indistinct from a woman and then go about calling himself what he clearly was not. That would be like if you thought yourself a Sith, the problem wouldn't be a dysphoria, but it would be a delusion, meaning you had lost touch with reality.

To the extent there is actually a person out there who is dysphoric and so intimately identifies as a Sith that he insists upon being referred that way, then you might have an analogous situation, but the thing is, that's not really a thing. It's just the joke you wanted to tell, and so you told it. — Hanover

How would a person of one sex know what the mental state of the other sex is like? You seem to be confusing the wide variety of behaviors of humans with specific behaviors of the sexes. Men can behave in feminine ways but still be men. Not only that, but how did they come to believe that their mental states are the opposite sex? Were their brains transplanted at birth like MIchael and Joshs believes? Or were they raised by parents that wanted a child of the opposite sex so they raised their child as if they were the opposite sex? In other words, are the causes biological or cultural?

Are you kidding me? If I were to snap my fingers and change your gender-related brain dynamics, you would be astonished at the huge variety of ways in which your perceptual-affective style of processing your world , including but far exceeding sexual attraction, would change in an instant. You would still be you, but a significant aspect of your personality would undergo a shift. — Joshs

Who is kidding who here? How does this answer my question? Both you and Michael seem to be saying that trans-genders had brain transplants at birth. Are you both conspiracy theorists?

Yet you accepted that someone who is XX male is male and so clearly it's false to say that "in humans, XY is male, XX female". It may be that incidentally 99.9% of men have XY chromosomes, but given that there are men who don't have XY chromosomes it follows that having XY (or XX) chromosomes isn't a measure of biological sex. It certainly may influence biological sex, but the reality of genetics is that other things can influence it as well, even if they don't occur as often.

There are people who have XX chromosomes (which you admit is possible for men), that have high levels of testosterone and low levels of estrogen, do not have breasts, and do have facial hair. What determines whether or not such a person is a man or a woman? Does it depend on them having a penis and testes? What if they lost them in an accident? — Michael

YOU were the one that used the term "male" to refer to someone with XX chromosomes:

Would you refer to someone with XX male syndrome using "he" or "she" (or both or neither)? — Michael

Why did you use the term "male" if ONLY having XX or XY makes one a female or male? It's a combination of these attributes and not necessarily all of them, but most of them, that one possesses that makes one a female or male. Since YOU were the one to label someone with XX chromosomes as "male", what would YOU refer to them as?

People are born with abnormalities. Some people can be born with extra fingers, or missing fingers, or born with a tail, etc. All of these cases are very rare. They are outliers. This is not to say that they don't deserve the same rights as everyone else. It is only to make the observation that these cases are uncommon or rare. We don't then create new categories of hands with or without 10 fingers, or categories of people with or without tails. We're only trying to do that with sex. Why? What makes sex so special? Who is it that is really concerned about what is in who's pants here? It seems that the left are the ones with a fetish for sex.

An easy way to think about it; if your brain were transplanted into a body with breasts, a vagina, a womb, ovaries, etc., would you identify as a man or a woman? I'd still identify as a man. — Michael

Is that what transpeople are saying - that their brain was transplanted into another body?

There are a few problems with your example, not to mention how outlandish it is and your use of Wikipedia to support your claims.

You seem to be missing the part of how hormones affect the processes of the brain and is why some trans-people take hormone treatments so that they're brain operates more like the opposite sex. So I find it hard to believe that you would still identify as a man if you had estrogen in your system and you observed your body as that of a woman. Have there been any studies that show that trans-people have the body of one sex and the brain of another? If that were the case, then why would trans-people need hormone treatments to feel more like the opposite sex if they already felt like the opposite sex?

Not only that but this flies in the face of your example above because now you're saying that having breasts, vagina, womb and ovaries is a body of a woman, while your brain is a man. You seem to be adding a characteristic to what makes one a man or a woman - the structure and functioning of the brain.

And in your example, you have memories of being a man. Transgenders don't have prior memories of being one sex that conflict with their actual sex. They claim to have always had these feelings. So you seem to be saying that doctors transplanted their brains just after birth.

Sex is distinct from gender, which can refer to either social roles based on the sex of a person (gender role) or personal identification of one's own gender based on an internal awareness (gender identity).[1][2][3][4] While in ordinary speech, the terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably,[5][6] most contemporary social scientists,[7][8][9] behavioral scientists and biologists,[10][11] many legal systems and government bodies,[12] and intergovernmental agencies such as the WHO[13] make a distinction between gender and sex. — Wikipedia

The two types of gender described above are contradictory. One describes a social construction, which is an agreement between two or more people to fulfill expectations of the others in the group by abiding by the roles that were agreed on (wearing a dress if you're a woman and wearing pants if you're a man). Because we have to wear clothes, we need ways to identify the sex of others when performing mating games.

This is the complete opposite of a personal feeling - one that isn't agreed upon with the rest of the group when playing mating games. Not only that, but they are identifying as the opposite sex, not a different sex than the two we know. So they are reinforcing binary gender roles by stating that wearing a dress makes you a woman or wearing pants makes you a man. If gender neutrality is the goal, this is not how we reach it. The goal is realized when we stop expecting women to wear dresses and men to wear pants. Men can wear dresses and still be men. Wearing a dress doesn't make you a woman. That would be sexist and abandoning the goal of realizing gender neutrality.

But appearances are changeable, and so a man that wants to look like a woman can do that and she can call herself "she" and her friends can do that as well, and you can cross your arms and refuse, and they can call you a dick and you can say "fine," and they can say "fine" back. That's where this goes. I'm just wondering why that's your preference. — Hanover

Well, yeah. Free speech and all that. Your rights to do what you want stop at infringing on my rights to do what I want. We've all been called names we don't identify with. Get over it.

And I can dress like a Dark Sith Lord and demand that you address me as "My master". What is so special about sex/gender that people can identify as a sex they are not, but identifying as something else you are not, well that's just crazy?

So it's one's physical appearance that determines whether or not one is a man or a woman (rather than one's genes)? — Michael

Like I've said twice in this thread:

Biological sex is based on a combination of traits:

- chromosomes (in humans, XY is male, XX female)
- genitals (penis vs. vagina)
- gonads (testes vs. ovaries)
- hormones (males have higher relative levels of testosterone than women, while women have higher levels of estrogen)
- secondary sex characteristics that aren’t connected with the reproductive system but distinguish the sexes, and usually appear at puberty (breasts, facial hair, size of larynx, subcutaneous fat, etc.)

Using genitals and gonads alone, more than 99.9% of people fall into two non-overlapping classes—male and female—and the other traits almost always occur with these.
You seem to be focused on the XX chromosomes and not the rest of the characteristics.

You said that pronouns refer to sex. In modern usage pronouns refer (also) to gender. — Michael

The problem is that you haven't defined gender in such a way that makes it useful to use if it's not related to sex. What is gender if not sex? And why do trans genders attempt to change their physiology if gender doesn't have to do with physiology?

When pronouns, "he" and " her" are a reference to one's sex, not gender - whatever that is if it's not the same as sex.
— Harry Hindu

According to who or what?

How we actually use language determines what words mean and pronoun-usage in the modern age is more complex than it may have been historically.
— Michael
You say "complex", I say "confused". — Harry Hindu

How is it that "gender" became part of a discussion on changing "sex" if they aren't both related or the same thing?

1. If you dont experience other people's mental states then how do you know about them? What form does your knowledge of other people's mental states take?
— Harry Hindu
I don't know about them. Other people have to tell me about them. Same as everyone. — Garrett Travers

If you don't know about mental states, then doesn't that pull the rug out from under your arguments? How can you talk about something that you don't know?

I am not confined to my experience of my brain. Like I said, I don't experience my brain. I experience a sensory model of the world. I experience brains when looking at other people's mental states.
— Harry Hindu

This is mystical woo. You only ever experience what your brain produces for you as experience. Absolutely nothing else, ever. This sensory model of the world is actually data accrued and organized by the brain it recieved from the world. And no, you don't look at other people's mental states, that would be telepathic. What you experience is the presence of other humans WITH mental states just like yours, but to which each is exclusively bound to, respectively.

Experience: practical contact with and observation of facts or events.

This is not something applicable between mental states. This is the sensory data recieved by the brain to create that model of the world of yours. — Garrett Travers

Now I'm disappointed. I thought you were going to provide some links to the research of how brains produce mental states. Instead I get an ad hominem. Please don't let my name fool you into thinking that I'm a mystical woo person.

What is "you" and where is "you" relative to your brain?

The issue here is that you can't seem to explain how a physical brain produces mental states, or even clarify what you mean by such a statement. You aren't even sure that mental states exist because you claim to not know about mental states, yet assert that they are produced by the brain. In what way are they produced?

If you only experience what your brain produces for you to experience, doesn't that mean other people's brains? How do you get at the states of the world via what your brain produces (mental states)?

Personally, I think it is wrong to imply causality to brain and mental states, as in they are produced. Instead, it's more helpful to think of brains and mental states as the same thing - just from different views (one is viewed and the other is the view - viewing the view, or thinking about thinking, or knowing that you know are sensory feedback loops (cartesian theatres).

I believe the answers will come from an amalgam of neurosicence, quantum physics and process philosophy. QM needs to get it's grip on explaining the observer effect.

This person is intersex, as it says on the wiki. People with abnormal or mixed-sex characteristics/traits have always been "intersex". Intersex is uncommon and a fact. Just like male and female. There are males, females and then intersex. This is the only time the 'they/them' pronoun makes any form of sense outside of arbitrary made-up identities. I respect the intersex and they must be protected. The other arbitrary trivial identities are just that. — Cobra

Intersex people do not have an equal amount of male and female characteristics. They have mostly one or the other, therefore they would fall into one of two clusters I mentioned in my post to Michael.

Would you refer to someone with XX male syndrome using "he" or "she" (or both or neither)? — Michael

Easy. Male = he/him

When pronouns, "he" and " her" are a reference to one's sex, not gender - whatever that is if it's not the same as sex.
— Harry Hindu

According to who or what?

How we actually use language determines what words mean and pronoun-usage in the modern age is more complex than it may have been historically. — Michael

You say "complex", I say "confused".

That you are paying undue attention to the contents of other folk's underwear is terse, but right on point. It's not your business. — Banno

So... ask. — Banno

Exactly. So it is our business in certain contexts and it's not really that it isnt our business in other contexts. It's just that we don't care in other contexts because it's irrelevant.

Another situation it is relevant, besides mating, is in sports.

What determines someone to be a man or a woman? — Michael

Biological sex is based on a combination of traits:

- chromosomes (in humans, XY is male, XX female)
- genitals (penis vs. vagina)
- gonads (testes vs. ovaries)
- hormones (males have higher relative levels of testosterone than women, while women have higher levels of estrogen)
- secondary sex characteristics that aren’t connected with the reproductive system but distinguish the sexes, and usually appear at puberty (breasts, facial hair, size of larynx, subcutaneous fat, etc.)

Using genitals and gonads alone, more than 99.9% of people fall into two non-overlapping classes—male and female—and the other traits almost always occur with these. If you did a principal components analysis using the combination of all five traits, you’d find two widely separated clusters with very few people in between. Those clusters are biological realities, just as horses and donkeys are biological realities, even though they can produce hybrids (sterile mules) that fall morphologically in between. — Harry Hindu

When pronouns, "he" and " her" are a reference to one's sex, not gender - whatever that is if it's not the same as sex.

The rules we abide by for having the sexes behave a certain way is so that we can identify the sexes in a society where it is a rule that you wear clothes in public.

I have read many papers on the topic, but none of them address the question I asked you. If you could direct me to some paper that does, I'd be grateful.

Even with that said, it seems like you're missing my point or are a p-zombie.

1. If you dont experience other people's mental states then how do you know about them? What form does your knowledge of other people's mental states take?

2. I am not confined to my experience of my brain. Like I said, I don't experience my brain. I experience a sensory model of the world. I experience brains when looking at other people's mental states.

Maybe it would help if you define "experience".