Your questions show that you haven't even tried to understand what I'm trying to describe. I don't expect agreement, but the ideas are not difficult.

Let's you and me not interact with each other from now on. — T Clark

Ok, Snowflake, it's actually the other way around. My post was an attempt to understand what you are trying to say and your response is thinly veiled ad hominen because you are unwilling to try and understand my questions to clarify your position.

This is a philosophy forum for crying out loud - where most OPS and posts in general need clarification because of all the wild ideas that are propagated and terms that are misused. If you dont understand that then maybe you should not interact with anyone at all.

Besides, my responses to you aren't necessarily for you, who is obviously scared of continuing the conversation when the questions get difficult, but for readers to see that your ideas aren't all they are cracked up be. Your lack of a response is quite telling in itself.

I was more brainstorming about Agent Smith’s question: “Are pictures/images propositions?”
The problem is that propositions are not supposed to be ambiguous, while images are.
Sentences can be ambiguous, but (not surprisingly) there are rules to systematically disambiguate them wrt to the propositions that they are supposed to represent (at least in the case of declarative sentences), that’s not the case for images. — neomac

In what way are images suppose to be ambiguous? The only images and words that are suppose to be ambiguous is art. By describing your images and words as "art" you are informing others that the images and words are intended to be ambiguous. If not, then it is assumed that the images and words you make refer to real states-of-affairs, or are meant to inform others of real states-of-affairs.

If what we need are rules for images to not be ambiguous, what rules would they be?

> So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thing.

Because B1 not only matches with what A1 says (about Alice’s love for Jim) but also with how it is said by A1 (passive form) — neomac

When I say "how it is said", I'm referring to the scribbles used. Using different scribbles to say the same thing is saying the same thing differently.

> So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent).

That is the point I’m making as well: what enables us to single out semantic relations between signs and referents out of a causal chain of events is “a mind” with intentionality. If we talked only in terms of causality and effects, we would end up having a situation where, in a causal chain, any subsequent effect be "a sign of” any preceding cause. — neomac

I'm not clear of where we are agreeing or disagreeing here. There are a probably an infinite number of causal relations any of which could be useful to single out depending on our goal. This is simply saying that not all meanings (causal relations) are useful in every given moment. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects and the time between some cause and effect is a product of our own minds, and what meanings are useful are also a product of our goals.

> Imaginary concepts have causal power.

That is a very problematic statement to me: we should clarify the notions of “concept” and “causality” before investigating their relationship. But it’s a heavy task on its own, so I will not engage it in this thread. — neomac

I can only say that would there not be books about Hobbits (effect) if someone did not imagine them (the cause) prior.

> Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).

Not sure about that: e.g. we may remember things without believing in them (e.g. dreams). To my understanding, belief can interact with experience and memory in many ways, yet the latter cognitive skills come ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to any doxastic attitude. — neomac

We're clearly talking past each other. It's not useful to remember/believe that you dream, or to remember/believe you know the difference between dream and reality?

agreed. So you agree, Level of truth(accuracy) and TRUE can be different, in concept. — universeness

An example - I go to work on a property where surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations. A previous investigation collected and analyzed three samples from the effected area. I create a SCM showing the area where soil is contaminated based on that data. Looking at the distribution and the number of samples, I decide that I don't have enough data. I find historic maps and aerial photographs that show where lead was used on site. Based on that, I revise the SCM and decide that 10 additional samples should be collected. I collect and analyze the samples and then revise the SCM again.

In my judgement, the original SCM was not adequate to make the kind of decisions needed. Based on additional data, I revise it. The final SCM is more accurate than the original one. The original SCM wasn't false. The new one isn't true. One is more accurate than the other. — T Clark

If "a property's surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." was the conclusion after the original SCM and is the same conclusion reached after the additional samples were taken, then the conclusion is no more or less accurate. You just have more justification for that conclusion. You're confusing accuracy with justifications. The conclusion is either accurate/true or inaccurate/false regardless of how many samples are taken. More samples are taken to satisfy your skepticism of the conclusion.

If the original conclusion wasn't enough for the decisions needed, then the additional samples were necessary to reach a different conclusion for the decisions needed, not that the original conclusion was less accurate.

Either "a property's surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." or "a property's surface soil has NOT been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." One is not more or less accurate than the other statement. One is either completely true or completely false.

Someone else might not think that 10 samples would be enough and would rather see 20 to be more accurate. Someone else may want 100 to be even more accurate. If we can only attain degrees of accuracy, then how is that any different from saying that we have degrees of truth, or degrees of certainty of whether some statement is true or not?

Yes. But everyone thinks their truth is objectively true. — Cornwell1

No its not because 'every truth is subjective' may not be true. Paradox is neither true or false.
To me, this just means that in propositional logic there are three states, true, false and paradox.
Nothing more exciting than that, at least for now. — universeness

You're confusing what is true and what we know to be true. Propositions can be true and we don't know it. It is either true that "Every truth is subjective." or it is true that "Every truth is not subjective". One of those statements must be true and one must be false. Both cannot be true.

It is objectively true precisely because what is objective is separated from our own personal feelings and knowledge of what is the case (subjective). What is objectively true is true regardless of what we know or feel about it.

playing with words,
— Harry Hindu
Agreed, but it's something humans do regularly. The fact that such activity annoys some people, will not prevent it from happening. — universeness

The point wasn't to prevent people from playing with words. My point is that they aren't saying anything when they do. They're just making sounds with their mouths and drawing scribbles artfully.

Well if we all did that then conversation/debate would reduce. I don't think that would help.
The fact you might find something useless to you does not make it useful to all unless you are electing yourself a speaker for all in the same way you suggest I include you, due my deliberations. — universeness

No, that's what I'm saying the one that is making any claim about the world in which we live is doing. Sure, I'm doing it to, and you too. Every time you make an assertion about the world we live in you are implying that what you are saying is the case regardless of what I, or anyone else perceives or knows about it. In other words, you would be saying that I was wrong. How can anyone be wrong if every truth is subjective?

Right and wrong only make sense in a realist world where there are states-of-affairs that are the case and what we say about those states-of-affairs is something else and they either represent what is the case or don't, regardless of whether we know it or not.

The only distinction I can think of is in measurement. 'I can measure some things.'
That statement is true and is accurate but.
A measurement can never be true, it can only ever have a level of accuracy.
I think this is probably just the same as asking is there an objective truth or is every truth subjective? and I think there have been many threads on that.
I like all the fun paradox's in this area.

"The only true fact is there are no true facts!".... yeah.....that's a true fact....that there are no true facts!
Fun stuff! — universeness

Making contradictions is playing with words, not stating facts. Is it objectively true that every truth is subjective? In describing the world you're describing a shared world - one in which I exist as well, so what you are defining is what I am part of and would be describing not just you but me too. So if every truth were subjective then keep your truth to yourself because it wouldn't be useful to me in any way.

If a measurement can have a level of accuracy then that is the same as saying a measurement has a level of truth, which I would agree with. There are degrees by which some concept or proposition can be accurate/true based on how well it represents what is the case or not.

Conceptual models are not true or false, they are accurate or inaccurate. — T Clark

But in saying that conceptual models are accurate TClark is saying they are true. "Accurate" is a synonym for "true".

That is the problem of putting visual content into propositional form. Images can be ambiguous in a way that is not captured by any related descriptions.
Besides one and the same image can correspond to many possible descriptions, whose number is arguably higher than any limited mind can conceive of. — neomac

Were you asking me to describe the image, or what the image is about? The image isn't about anything because it is ambiguous. The image is ambiguous, therefore it's not about anything, but the words, "this image is ambiguous" is about the image. One might say that art is intentionally ambiguous - meaning that art isn't about anything itself, rather it is meant to play games with images, or words in the way of poems or music. Also the image isn't about tigers and bears, only rabbits and ducks. So it's limited in its ambiguity.

When we translate, we take into account precisely how things are said, otherwise it wouldn’t be a translation.
So you can not use an active form in your native language to translate a foreign sentence in passive form, if you want to translate literally the foreign sentence of course.
That is why, in the examples I listed, B2 is a correct translation of A2, and not of A1, despite the fact that all 3 statements are about the same state of affaires. — neomac

But using a different language is itself a difference in how things are said from how it is said in another language. Different symbols and rules are used to refer to the same thing. This is what I meant when I said that symbol use is arbitrary. I can use different symbols, even in the same language, to mean the same thing.

A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice — neomac

So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thig. How is that so?

Still I disagree on this. My conviction is that linguistic meaning presupposes intentionality and intentionality can not be understood in causal terms for several reasons.
Here I limit myself to 3 and will leave it at that:
1. Causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events, so in this chain of events start and end of a meaningful correlation (say between a sign and its referent) are identifiable only by presupposing the constitutive correlates of intentional states: namely subject (who would produce linguistic signs ) and object (which would be the referent of the linguistic sign).
2. “reference” between signs and referents is grounded on rule-based behavior that presupposes intentionality with its direction of fit, while causality has no direction of fit at all.
3. a sign can refer to things that do not exist, and things that do not exist can not cause anything — neomac

I agree that causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events. All of these prior events can be discovered by correctly interpreting the effect. Your use of words not only informs me that you have an idea and the intent to communicate it, but also your level of education in English and what part of the world you are from based on your accent and dialect. So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent). Is it to know where you are from, or to know what you intend to say? If I really wanted to I could use the effect of your scribbles to even show that it is evidence of the Big Bang, as you would not be here putting scribbles on a screen if the Big Bang did not occur, nor if stars did not fuse heavier elements together and then scatter them across the galaxy in a supernova.

A sign never refers to things that do not exist. The question is where it exists - out in the world, or in your head. Imaginary concepts have causal power. Just go visit the Sci-Fi / Fantasy section of your favorite book store and think about some of the movies made from some if those books and you will see what I'm talking about.

In reading the book, The Lord of the Rings and watching the film trilogy, The Lord of the Rings, both are different ways of telling the same story. The narrator's words in the book has been replaced by images of non-verbal behaviors and events in the movie, and the latter is what you think about, or picture in your mind, when reading the narrator's words in the book.

Unlike Banno, I believe that language use is not a game, but games can be played with words, which is what art typically does in the form of poems and musical lyrics. Language was initially used for relaying information in the same way as observing others' behaviors relays information, but once humans had enough time on their hands from not having to worry about where the next meal is coming from, they began to play games with their words (write poems and do philosophy).

Belief can be based on one or multiple observations, agreed. But this seems to contradict instead of supporting the idea that belief can be taken “in the form of their visual experiences”. Perceptual beliefs exceed the related visual experience: they are attitudes, but visual experiences are not attitudes. This should be true for both men and animals, to my understanding. — neomac

I think I understand what you are saying is that the justification (observation) is not the belief. The attitude seems to occur with the initial observation as useful observations are remembered. Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).

Like I said:

I had a compassionate feeling for creative
— ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question
— Harry Hindu

I told you I was muddling through and following along. I considered that a confession of ignorance. Yet you continued your imperious questioning.

I don't have clear answers to the bulk of the questions that came to light in this thread. Your off-putting tone made it easy (and likely wise) to ignore you.


At any rate, I'm ready to move on if you are. — ZzzoneiroCosm

My tone hasn't changed yet here you are not ignoring me.

It was a simple question, much simpler than the other questions in this thread that you attempted to muddle through in answering. The only way to move on is for you to muddle through answering my question, if you can stop contradicting yourself long enough so that I might actually take you seriously.

I don't remember writing that I had already addressed your question. Please remind me. — T Clark

I think you've missed the point of my part in this discussion. How much of this thread have you read? — T Clark

I asked you to remind me of your part of the discussion that answered my question you couldn't do so.

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" . — Eskander

Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game. — Joshs

Or in which "God" has not been properly defined by those that are using the term. If the users of the term don't know the rules then how do they expect to teach others how to play the game?

It's not just the term,"god", but also "exists", of which both the religious and non-religious know the rule for using the term. All conclusions reached by all domains of knowledge (religious, science, philosophy) must be integrated. So the rules for playing the religious game must not contradict the rules in the science game if we're talking about the same reality.

I would like to focus on the premises that the brave officer on the one hand was conscious of his having been flogged, when he took the standard, and on the other hand he had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging, when made a general. And I would like also to focus on the part of Mr. Reid's conclusion "that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general". — Stoycho

It is also possible that while not being conscious of being flogged while made general, he may be conscious of being flogged at some later time.

We shouldn't forget that we forget things and knowledge of that entitles us to believe that while we may not be conscious of every moment of our past, we have enough memories of our past to build an identity.

I wasn't being defensive, I was being dismissive. — T Clark

Then you weren't accurate when telling me that you had already addressed the question I asked. Being dishonest and dismissive is the result of you feeling defensive.

this thread is not about behavior, it's about knowledge. How we know things. — T Clark

Yet this is what you wrote in your OP:

As a pragmatic epistemologist I assert that the primary value of truth and knowledge is for use in decision making to help identify, plan, and implement needed human action. — T Clark

What is decision making and human action if not behaviors? What is use if not a type of behavior? It appears that this thread is just the behavior of moving goalposts.

Not sure about that. Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

I agree that all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs so we are agreeing that all four statements are translatable with the other. In saying that all 4 statements are about the same state-of-affairs you are saying that they are all translatable with each other. You can even have two different sentences in the same language that mean the same thing (A1 and A2), meaning that translating isn't necessarily between two or more languages. It is between two or more symbols (scribbles).

Synonyms are different words that mean the same thing. So you can create two different sentences in one language that mean the same thing and when translated to another language that also has synonyms that mean the same thing as the other two sentences. You can say the same thing different ways. The point is what you are saying, not how you are saying it. In other words none of these statements used is an example of people talking past each other.

The idea that “a mind” is causing “scribble means” doesn’t sound right to me.
“Scribbles” may be the kind of entities that can be caused, but “means” are not caused, nor can be rendered in causal terms. — neomac

I didn't say means are caused. I said meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Causes leave effects and when we look for the meaning of the effect, we are looking for the cause. Examples would be a criminal investigator using the crime scene (effect) to find the identity of the criminal (cause) so this fingerprint means Crooked Joe Smith committed this crime, or tree rings in a tree stump where the rings (effect) are caused by how the tree grows throughout the year (cause) so tree rings means the number of years the tree has existed.

Scribbles are the effect. What they mean is the relationship between the scribbles existing and what caused them, which is an idea and the intent to communicate them and then the act of typing them and clicking Post Comment. If none of those things happened, scribbles would not appear on this screen.

What are you asking for when you ask what does X mean?

I’m inclined to agree with you in general, but the devil is in the details. So, I agree that animal cognitive skills and consequent behavior are much more constrained by their experience than human cognitive skills are. Yet it doesn’t sound right to me to claim that animals’ beliefs are “in the form of their visual experiences”. The problem is that experience (visual or other) doesn’t seem to be enough to grant belief (see the case of optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion [1]: the 2 arrows keep looking different in length even if one correctly believes that they have the same size), therefore animals’ beliefs too are not necessarily nor tightly coupled with their experiences.
Besides the claim that human’s beliefs are “in the form of propositions” does sound right, at least in part. However I would complement it by saying that a belief in propositional form is just a belief that is expressed through a declarative sentence, i.e. through a specific linguistic behavior, that doesn’t imply that humans are equipped only of propositional beliefs. — neomac

Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site.

Beliefs are not necessarily true. Someone that holds a belief may have some degree of certainty in maintaining their belief, which is to say that they have some reason or justification, but usually isn't logically justified, only justified by observation. A bent straw in a glass of water is a good example. When observing a bent straw in a glass of water one might believe the straw is bent with their reasoning being their own observation for believing it. But when you integrate it with other observations (like taking the straw out of the water and integrating the knowledge that we see light and not objects) and logic then beliefs can be disbelieved or justified even further into knowledge. The straw is not bent. The light is bent.

In the example of your lines, one may believe that one line is longer until you get out the ruler.

So beliefs would be an idea that something is true based on one observation, while knowledge would be something is true based on multiple observations that are integrated with logic.

Animals, since they lack human-like languages, may think in pictures/images. Picture theory of meaning?

If so,

1. Are pictures/images propositions?

or

2. Are (some) beliefs nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

Good question. Here is another one: if all propositions can be rendered in linguistic form, then what proposition would correspond to the following image? — neomac

What are propositions if not images of scribbles? So to think in propositions is to think in visual images, or sounds if you're talking to yourself in your head.

What form does a language you don't know take if not visual scribbles and sounds? In hearing a language you don't know are you able to distinguish subjects from predicates, or even just the ending of one word from the beginning of the next?

"This is a picture of a duck or a rabbit, depending on how you look at it." The picture would be an example of "ambiguity".

This is why I don't engage. You have no sense of charity and your posts are unpleasant. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yet look at all of the posts you have created since my last post. You're willing to engage but only if you dictate the topic, which is off the topic of this thread that you want to avoid so that you don't have to address my points.

It's the tone of your insistence. It's off-putting. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question then abandoned it and would now rather waste thread space with your ranting. Your behavior is off-putting by not being intellectually honest.

His heart is in it. He feels he's created or uncovered something devastating or catalytic to the history of philosophy. That foments a profound experience of life-meaning: wakefulness, inspiration, excitement, a superior feeling,* a sense of domination - of philosophical material and of philosophical opponents. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Sounds like you're describing an emotional attachment to me. My only goal in being here is to learn from others by asking them questions and to subject some of my own ideas to criticism. You aren't willing to do either and only seem to be willing in entertaining the ideas of someone with delusions of grandeur. Good luck.

Many philosophers take the technical notion “abstract entity” to mean something that is not the result of some mental operation (“abstraction”). According to them “abstract entities” are to be contrasted to “concrete entities”: indeed both of them are real (i.e. mind-independent) entities , the difference (at least according to many) is that abstract entities are not located in space and time, and they are causally inert, while concrete entities are located in space and time (or at least, in time) and are not causally inert. Propositions, numbers, sets are often taken to be some common cases of abstract entities by those who believe in their existence. So for example, while a sentence is a concrete entity, the proposition that the sentence is meant to represent would be an abstract entity of the sort I’ve just described. Frege seems to have proposed this view. — neomac

Thank you for the example.

So in the example, the sentence would be the written scribbles or spoken sounds and the proposition would be the state-of-affairs the scribbles/sounds are meant to represent? To me, the proposition and sentence are one and the same.

A sentence/proposition is a string of scribbles that refers to some state-of-affairs that is not just another string of scribbles. The reference, or the mental act of referencing, scribble with state-of-affairs would be abstract in the sense that we could use any scribble to refer to the same state-of-affairs as you showed when using three different languages to mean the same thing. When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to. The scribbles/sounds we use are arbitrary, which is why there must be an agreement to the rules on what scribbles and sounds to use and how to use them.

This is also what it means for some proposition/sentence to be true in that the string of scribbles is true if what it refers to is the case.

Meaning, however, is not arbitrary. It is the relationship between cause and effect. What some scribble means is what caused it to exist on the paper or on the screen. It is caused by a mind that possesses an idea and the will to communicate it, or else the scribbles would not exist. "Hello" refers to the idea and intent of someone to begin a conversation with someone else.

Since propositions are the arbitrary scribbles we use to refer to what is the case and scribbles are experienced visually just like most other things, like houses, hammers, grass and fish, then learning a language is not much different than learning how to use houses, hammers, grass and fish, which is done without language and done simply by observing the behavior of others around such items. This is no different than animals, just a different degree.

So non-language creatures have beliefs in that they learn by making observations and what they learn is what they believe to be the case in other similar states-of-affairs. Their beliefs are not in the form of propositions, but the visual experiences they had. The same goes for scribble-using humans, and is how they learned a language in the first place by believing that scribbles can be used to refer to what is the case or not. You have to believe that before you can begin using scribbles.

I engaged them up to a point. Until further engagement seemed futile and there was no fun puzzle to solve.

I didn't see a fun, interesting puzzle in your post. Just your insistence and insistence is no fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:lol: What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself.

Sure, difficult questions that, when answered, point out your contradictions can't be much fun. That's why you don't answer the question. And not being fun isn't an argument against anything that I've said. It's just a thinly veiled ad hominem.

All this time you've spent with me now could have been more constructive if you just answer the question.

Yes it does. — neomac

Thank you, neomac for answering my question.

Asking a question is not biased or emotionalized. Avoiding them is.

That's why I don't engage with them fully. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So you'd rather engage them half-assed? Sounds like a waste of time to me.

You're view here is odd to me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS was even more odd as you even admitted that he was wasting his time, yet you spent more time addressing his waste of time than my "odd" view. :roll:

I would refer you to the recent thread on 'doing good.' — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why when there is no objective morality or ethics? What good would your notion of good do for me?

No. The point of my post was to avoid a polarized position on either end of the Real - Ideal spectrum.
I'm not a true anything. As noted in the post, my personal philosophy is BothAnd. As a relative Realist, I accept the evidence of my eyes as plausible facts, upon which to build my personal model of Reality. But as an amateur philosopher, I also accept that vetted ideas are also useful bricks for my model. Your mental model of Reality may be different from mine, but on this forum, we can share our biased views, in order to see our differences and our agreements. That is not likely to result in a "true" view of the world. But it's better than being blind in one eye. :cool: — Gnomon

You seemed to have overlooked this part of my post:

Any time you attempt to explain how reality is not just for yourself, but for others, then you are a realist that is making the case that you have an objective view of the world - of how it is not just for yourself, but for everyone, even if they aren't aware of it or disagree. — Harry Hindu

So again, here you are explaining how things are for everyone, not just yourself. So again, you are projecting your ideas about how things are independent of yourself, and how things are even if I were to disagree or not be aware of these "facts" that you are asserting.

Is it true that there is such a thing as a forum where we share ideas, or that we have ideas to share, or that you and I are separate entities that share ideas? If not, then your whole post is just a lot of scribbles. If it's not a true view of the world then how can it be more useful than being blind in one eye? Are you saying that the information received through your eyes is true, accurate, or what?

I'm not wasting my time. I'm trying to help creative see he's wasting his time. And also enjoying the puzzle. This kind of philosophy is just a popcorn exercise to me. Great exercise, though. — ZzzoneiroCosm

My point was that it is a waste of your time when it's obvious CS doesn't care about wasting his. That was obvious several pages ago. Yet you avoided the the tough exercises and the tastiest popcorn.

Seems to me that for something to be useful there needs to be some element of truth. Have you provided an example where a falsehood was useful? — Harry Hindu

I think you've missed the point of my part in this discussion. How much of this thread have you read? — T Clark

The whole thread up to the point where I made my first post and all you've done is repeat yourself saying:

Conceptual models are not true or false, they are accurate or inaccurate. — T Clark

How does that answer my question? Seems to me that your level of conviction woukd indicate that you'd be able to easily come up with an example instead of becoming defensive.

Just to restate my rebuttal concisely: — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS is obviously being purposely obtuse regarding your rebuttal (and mine), yet you continue with wasting your time trying to restate it, when there are more pertinent points in this thread to address. :roll:

creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), — neomac

As well as Banno's and ZZz's because they've have an emotional attachment to their beliefs about beliefs.

The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. — neomac

Agreed. But that is difficult to do when people maintain their grip on their understanding of propositions with their emotions and don't respond to questions about what propositions are when the questions get tough.

1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German) — neomac

Yes, how can three different strings of scribbles mean the same thing?

As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. — neomac

Mind independent abstract entities seems to be a contradiction. Abstractions are defined as existing as an idea and not as physical or concrete. So how can something that is abstract be mind independent?

My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think. — neomac

This sounds like what I was hinting at here:

What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

In what form do the rules present themselves if not the visual and auditory experiences you have when learning how others use language? This is no different than learning the rules of anything else, like object permanence - the realistic notion that entities continue to exist even when they do not exist in the mind - like the mouse that ran behind the tree.

Uncompromising Realists are assuming that they can observe the world from an objective perspective, which eliminates the subjective biases of the observer. Although, objectivity is the ideal goal of Science, it's an unattainable perfection. Objective purity would require decontaminating the body of its "selfish genes" and the mind of "acquired beliefs". And the same goes for inflexible Idealists.

However, even polarized Realism vs Idealism or Objectivism vs Subjectivism philosophical positions are peculiar personalized belief systems. They are not obtained from a privileged universal all-seeing point of view. That's why we have to occasionally purge our erroneous beliefs by comparing them to other partial perspectives, as on this forum. The result will not be Purity, but it may be de-polarized and homogenized. From that broadened perspective, we may be able to see both Matter and Mind. :smile: — Gnomon

Spoken like a true realist.

Any time you attempt to explain how reality is not just for yourself, but for others, then you are a realist that is making the case that you have an objective view of the world - of how it is not just for yourself, but for everyone, even if they aren't aware of it or disagree.

This thread has not been about pragmatic behavior, it's about pragmatic approaches to knowledge. As I noted, in pragmatism "the primary value of truth and knowledge is for use in decision making to help identify, plan, and implement needed human action." — T Clark

Seems to me that for something to be useful there needs to be some element of truth. Have you provided an example where a falsehood was useful?

I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true
— Harry Hindu

Read the opening and second posts in the debate. — creativesoul

There is no part in the entire debate that explains the difference between holding something to be true and holding a belief.

Who decided that it would be a good idea for you and Banno to debate this topic? There is no debate when the debaters constantly talk past each other.

The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.

The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true. — creativesoul

:roll: Look up the definition of "believe", creative, and you will find that it means to hold something to be true which means that propsitions are not necessary to hold something as true.

What use is holding a belief?

Do we agree that scribbles are images? If you can hold some images to be true, why not other images - like a mouse behind the tree? You're making a special case for certain images as holding truth. Why?

They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. — creativesoul

Which contradicts what you said above. If it is impossible believe in a falshood then believing is always holding something to be true.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
— Harry Hindu

Correlations. — creativesoul

What form do correlations take? Correlations between what?

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words?
— Harry Hindu

Yes. — creativesoul

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.

What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true. — creativesoul

You're confusing the belief with the report/statement of the belief. Are we checking if the belief is true, or the report of the belief is true? Do we believe a belief is true, or do we believe a report of a belief is true?

What does it mean to believe something if not to have some degree of certainty (that something is true as opposed to false)? What does it mean to hold a belief - that you acknowledge that the belief exists, is true, have it in your hands, or what?

Saying that there is a difference is different than showing the difference. I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true? Can you hold things to be true that are not beliefs? If so, then describe the difference between holding beliefs to be true and holding other things to be true.

All I'm getting from you and Banno is a lot of words but no examples to show what you mean.

No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.

A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true. — creativesoul

Thinking does not require language. It requires images, sounds, feelings, etc., of which language is a part of (scribbles and voices). You need language to report a belief, not check a belief. You need observations to check a belief.

Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:

I've said:

The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.

and


A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.

In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc

But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It would help if you just stopped avoiding my question and answer it. What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But I thought you were asserting that a proposition is a subject and predicate. I've been saying that a proposition is scribbles or the sound of spoken words, or braille, or the movement of hands in sign language. It's like we're arguing whether or not the table is made of atoms or molecules. What is the table made of - atoms or molecules? What is a proposition made of - scribbles and sounds or subjects and predicates?

I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.

In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You can contribute an answer to my question above that I've asked several times now and you've avoided it. It makes me think that you aren't interested in being intellectually honest.

Does a table take the form of an arrangement of atoms, or is the content of the table an arrangement of atoms? What state-of-affairs are you trying to show is the case? Is there a difference?

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think you're confusing the form the subject-predicate (proposition/statement) takes with the form the belief takes. Going back to what you said about beliefs being put into the form of a proposition, I explained that there is a temporal separation between the belief as it exists and the proposition as it exists, and that one is not the other. Instead one is the cause and one is the effect. Can you put into propositional form a belief that you don't have?

I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.

Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.

Nevermind the attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if belief and proposition are the same thing, the belief has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if you are agreeing that words are a particular type of image (scribbles), then the cat can believe the mouse is behind the tree using some other type of imagery and sensations. Therefore, propositions are not useful in describing beliefs because beliefs can be in the form of imagery that is not in the form of a proposition (scribbles).

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
— Harry Hindu

This seems to be you answering your question. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I was asking you to see if you agree. It appears that you do - that beliefs take the form of many types of sensations, not just sensations of scribbles and the sounds of spoken words. And that scribbles and sounds refer to those other images and sensations that are not scribbles and sounds, but are images of it raining outside and of a mouse running behind a tree.

I was really looking forward to an answer to this - the question that made Banno abandon our conversation and that you avoided:

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language?

As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so. — creativesoul

Then the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true, but you've only explained the truth value of the statement, not the belief.

Propositions are in the form of scribbles or sounds and are determined to be true if the scribbles represent what is the case.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. Like ZzzoneiroCosm, you are only describing how you can put beliefs into a propositional form after the fact of having a belief.

I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.

The fact that propositions are scribbles and sounds and obtained visually and audibly, how did the cat obtain the state-of-affairs of the mouse being behind the tree if not visually and audibly (saw it run behind the tree and it can hear it behind the tree)?

So i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.

What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language? If so, then you can hold beliefs as true prior to knowing how to create propositions.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. — creativesoul

I'm not sure that I see the difference. To hold a belief would be the same as the act of believing. I'm sure that we can agree that there are beliefs that we acknowledge as existing without holding them as true (believing). In these cases we would hold them as false (disbelief) or indifferent (we just don't know if the belief is true or false). The reason why we have debates is because we agree in the existence of many beliefs, but their truth value is what we are debating.

I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Redundant and not helpful. Then it appears that, like Banno, you have no idea what you're talking about either when you say that belief is an attitude towards some proposition or something that can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

I'm not sure what to do with that word 'attitude.' I know I don't like it. And it doesn't seem to be necessary. I think it's okay to just drop it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yup.

You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language). — ZzzoneiroCosm

So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. I'm just trying to reconcile what you are saying now with what you have said before.

I'm not sure if even this is helpful. Are there any thought, emotional and behavioral patterns that are not beliefs? If so, then what kind of thought, emotional and behavioral patterns are beliefs compared to ones that are not beliefs? How would I tell the difference between a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that is a belief and a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that isn't a belief?

Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate. — ZzzoneiroCosm

And what form do subject-predicates take, if not scribbles or sounds?

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds). — ZzzoneiroCosm

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? To say that they are held in the mind or reflected upon just means that you're talking to yourself in your head. You hear a voice saying the words and the sound is the form the proposition takes in your mind.

It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, it is much easier to symbolize complex experiences for thinking and especially for communicating. We can think of democracy without words. It would be picturing in your mind people voting, candidates making promises for your vote, counting votes, etc.

This is also how using words can be redundant. If you and I are staring out the window at the rain, you can say, "It is raining." Because I can see that it is raining, hearing you say it would be redundant information. So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.

by "individual itself" do you mean the object of perception? How would you distinguish that from the willing subject? — KantDane21

I'm asking you what you meant by "individual" in your OP. You described an individual as being both the willing and knowing subjects. In what way does the subject know the individual as it is?

Another thing that gets me is this philosophical assertion of this unhinged skepticism of knowing how things are, while at the same time declaring how things are - like how we are somehow limited in our knowledge of how things are. In either case, you are always stating how things are. At some moments you are certain while in other moments you are uncertain. In those moments you are uncertain, are you not certain that you are uncertain. In other words, you are always certain of something.

You described the individual as being both something embodied and disembodied, both in the world and outside of it. This is nothing but world salad that creates a contradiction and isn't useful.

this is the problem, and the passage you cited. If thing-in-itself is totally demarcated from human experience (in the way Kant says-- and Schopenhauer repeatedly stated will is Kant's thing-in-itself, how can we get nearer to the thing-in-itself? is it not an all-or-nothing type existent? — KantDane21

Think of writing a type of function in a program called a loop where you start with some input (an observation) that is processed (observation integrated with stored responses) in the loop and the output (the outcome of some behavior) then becomes the input for the next iteration of the loop. Now think of another function that monitors the process and interjects before some behavior is executed to prevent an error or mistake.

In a sense, I have described your willing subject (the loop) and your knowing subject (the monitoring process). Now we have to explain how we know that we know. This could be explained by turning the monitoring function into a loop itself, where it is monitored by its own process, where the knowing subject turns itself back on itself. It's just a causal loop where you think of something, then you think about what your were thinking about. You must first think of something to then know you're thinking of something and to then think about thinking.

An individual is the pure knowing subject.- that is, a disembodied subject, not an object in the world, but perceives the world ‘from outside’; the world of spatio‐temporal objects that are totally distinct from itself.
BUT
An individual is also a willing subject.- an embodied subject, subject that wills (desires, needs, wants, etc.)

Schopenhauer thinks that willing subject and knowing subject are identical. The identity of the willing and knowing subject, Schopenhauer claims in this work, is “the knot of the world” and therefore “inexplicable”. — KantDane21

You've described what an individual is as being both a knowing and willing subject. If the individual is an object in the world then the knowing subject is also in the world and not outside it. How do you know that the knowing subject is perceiving the willing subject and not the individual itself?

Scholar Julian Young states that Schopenhauer thinks (1) willing subject is known by being an object for the knowing subject, and (2) nothing which is an object for the knowing subject can
be identical with it, the willing subject cannot, according to Schopenhauer, be identical with
knowing subject.

In his above quote Schopenhauer, Young states, is suggesting that essentially "logic can be suspended, and two distinct things can be identical."

However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21

Logic does not have to be suspended if you think of it as a causal feedback loop, where cause and effect create a loop of causation and cause and effect loose their identity as individuals because the effect becomes the cause and the cause becomes the effect.

We are similar and dissimilar from most animals. But do we have any qualities that make us special? We might argue it's our intelligence and at least some ability to defy any instincts we might have. But we assess our intelligence and abilities ourselves, and not against anything more objective. What makes us better? — TiredThinker

Special and dissimilar are two different things. All animals are dissimilar from one another. In that respect humans are not dissimilar or special compared to other animals. "Special" is a value term that has no objective reality outside of one' own head. Something is special based on some value that has been projected onto it - like humans' differences being valued more than other animals. I'm sure the elephant thinks it's trunk is more special than the internet or smart phones.

So we don't have any qualities that make us special in an objective sense, only a subjective human perspective of our own qualities that we find necessary to live as humans compared to trying to live while possessing the qualities of other animals. So of course humans are going to think that they are special. Humans have thought that since they started existing (Earth is the center of the universe, created in the image of god, etc.)

What if we find other (intelligent) animals (aliens) on other planets. How special would humans be then?

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true. — Harry Hindu

Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.

The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.

*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined.

Youre saying the cat has a belief prior to it being put into the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is), which means beliefs are not the propositional attitude but are something that can be put into the form if one. The objective here is to define beliefs, not what form they can be put into after the fact. So youre not explaining what a belief is. You're explaining that beliefs can be referred to with propositional attitudes (whatever that is). I want to know what form the cats belief is in prior to some human putting it in the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is).

To say that it would be weird for a cat to put a belief in the form of a propositional attitude is a strange thing to say when it appears that the cat doesnt need to do so in order to have a belief per your own explanation.

What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which has been shown to not be helpful in the slightest.

Banno injected truth into the equation:

Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat". — Banno

If the attitude is certainty, as certainty is the attitude that some belief is true, then animals certainly behave as if they are certain of what is the case is - like a wolf is nearby - sometimes better than humans as they may have better hearing or smelling than we do.

Was "propositional", "proposition" and "attitude" ever defined in this discussion?

Are there attitudes that are not propositional?

Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which is to say that Banno doesnt know what he's talking about. Is his lack of consistency and clarity a characteristic of the propositions he makes or his attitude?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno

This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. What is the difference between mentioning and use? Is not mentioning a type of use? What is the difference between speaking about and with?

Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use. — Banno

Then describe the beginning of how a new word is used. If we run the risk of talking past each other because we are using names differently then that seems to show that there is a mental aspect of associating a name with what it is about and THEN sharing that relationship with others. Agreement comes after use.

Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles. — Banno

Thats what you would say if i was speaking a different language. What does Arabic and Russian look like to you, compared to English? What do they sound like to you compared to English?

Sign language is adopting hand movements instead of scribbles to refer to things. How can a hand movement mean the same thing as a scribble when their use is different?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.

If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions, then you would be begging the question.

It seems to me that in saying "P" if P is somehow projecting the very words we are using out into the world, as if names exist independent of minds. The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.

Belief is a relation between an actor and a statement, such that the actor takes the statement to be true.
Knowledge might variously be understood as a justified true belief or a capacity to perform some action. — Banno

Then both beliefs and knowledge can be acted on. The only difference is that knowledge is justified. But then what attitude does one have of some proposition that is true if not justification, which leads to certainty given more justification (successful uses)? Seems to me that one needs a reason to believe in anything. The amount of reasons is what is the difference between beliefs and knowledge.

A justification would be a stored memory of some past event which warrants the belief. The memory of the past event coupled with the belief in causation - that similar causes lead to similar effects - is what makes a belief a belief. Beliefs would be useless if causation wasn't the case. There would be no beliefs without causation.

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille).
— Harry Hindu

No, they re not They are composed of predicates and subjects. — Banno

Which are composed of scribbles and sounds.

Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do. — creativesoul

Yet names are part of the belief. If your beliefs don't refer to anything in the world, then your beliefs aren't useful to anyone else. A false belief and a belief without a reference are one and the same. There is a difference between some proposition being understandable and being useful. We can put words together in such a way that follows the rules of some language, but if it doesn't agree with the facts, or state what is the case, then it is useless. Take for instance, "Joe Biden is the first president of the United States." The proposition follows the rules of English, but doesn't agree with the facts. So in what way is the proposition useful?