Thats the definition if time that works for me. Nothing else is needed. Why dont you tell me what I'm missing.

Therein lies the rub. We don't experience ourselves directly as brains - we're told we're brains. — Agent Smith

Then there is a difference between awareness and experience? What is the difference?

What the clock measures.

Basic idea = Something that can't be broken down into simpler ideas. Ergo, is undefin(ed/able). — Agent Smith

What the clock measures is change. The measurement of change is time, like the measurement of space is length. Clock is to the ruler as time is to length.

We are not conscious of these dynamic, complex and layered processes. We are only aware of their consequence. For example, when we pat a dog, we may experience seeing the dogs tail wag and feeling the texture of its coat.

We do not experience the light meeting our retina, travelling to our optic nerve as an electrical signal and into the brain structure and IT cortex where 16 million neurons activate in different patterns and register seeing a dog.

Nor do we experience the simultaneous chemical changes in the brain that may alter our mood and the firing of neurons in the somatosensory cortex that create a response that registers as ‘feeling dog hair’.
When we think about the dog, we do not experience the electrical activity of neurons in the visual and auditory cortexes, the prefrontal cortex or the activation of the motor cortex in preparation for saying ‘good dog’. — Brock Harding

Sure we do. Our experiences are what it is like to feel light entering the eye and the chemical changes in the brain. An experience is not the thing experienced but is about the thing experienced. Every thing is a consequence of prior causes. Things are not their causes.

Where is the illusion? Is there not really a dog wagging its tail when i experience a dog wagging its tail?

Just replace "dog" and "tail wagging" with "brain" and "neurons firing" and you have the same problem. By asserting that your mind is an illusion you undermine all of your experiences and knowledge, including those of brains and their neurons. The experience of seeing an MRI image of your brain would just be another of these consequences.

And none of this explains how brains can create illusions or how the substance of the illusion is created by the substance of the brain.

Assume R = Time is real

If R is true then there must be a proof (call it ϕ1ϕ1) that R.

The proof ϕ1ϕ1 implies that we can construct a reductio ad absurdum argument (call it ϕcϕc) to prove R.

ϕcϕc assumes the negation of R i.e. ~R = Time is unreal.

If ~R, there can't be contradictions (re definition of contradiction); no contradiction, no ϕcϕc; no ϕcϕc, no ϕ1ϕ1.

Conclusion: Impossible to prove time is real. — Agent Smith

This is a convoluted way to try and prove whether time is real or not. How about starting off with a definition of time and then we can discuss whether or not your definition refers to something real and consistent with observation.

So you can become aware of something by reading a book and not necessarily by experiencing "directly".

There's no point to this discussion: my neural network (brain) is not aware that it is a neural network (brain). Case closed! — Agent Smith

Then how is it that you can say that you have a neural network if youre not aware of it? You dont read other peoples posts and just keep repeating yourself.

You might think that is a hard problem, but it is not the so-called "Hard Problem". I don't think it is a hard problem at all; it seems obvious to me that you intimately know you are aware because you are yourself, and do not know others are aware in the same way, because you are not them. — Janus

Then I think that we are talking about different hard problems. Is it not the type of evidence that we have for recognizing our own self-awareness vs recognizing other's self-awareness, and how to reconcile the differences, what the so-called "Hard Problem" refers to?

If you recognize your own self-awareness using some evidence, but you can't use the same evidence to recognize other's self-awareness, then is the evidence you have for either really evidence at all for self-awareness?

There are all sorts of different relations, and some are not between objects, like the relation between hot and cold. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, there is the relationship between hot and cold, and then there is the relationship between your body temperature and the air's temperature. The difference is what you feel as hot or cold. Hotter bodies will feel cold, while colder bodies will feel hot. Everything is a relationship.

No that's not what I meant. I meant what I said. The word refers to the state, or condition of a certain type of unity. The type of unity being marriage, and the condition, that it has been ended. And if you cannot understand this without seeing it as a contradiction, I don't think it's worthwhile to say anything more. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ask any individual that has been divorced and they won't use the word "unity" to describe their current status, or relationship, with their former partner. If I can substitute the word "unity" with the word, "relationship" and it not take away from or unnecessarily add more to what you are actually saying, then we are both saying the same thing. It is now up to you to show how the two words have different meaning in what you are trying to say.

Suppose, arguendo, the mind = brain.

I'm now thinking about my mind. When I do, I don't see my brain. In other words my mind doesn't see itself as it truly is, assuming mind = brain. — Agent Smith

As I've been trying to show, mind and brain are the same, but appear different because you are observing from different viewpoints, or measurements. In one view point you are using reflected light to observe/measure minds/brains, from the other you are using qualia to observe/measure your mind/brain.

Why would the amount and type of light in the environment affect how you see brains if light was not part of the equation? So are you seeing the brain as it truly is when the lights are out?

Again, you seem to be confusing the image of a brain with the brain. What I've been trying to tell you is that the mind is capable of perceiving itself - as a mind. An image of a mind would be a brain. Just as the word "mind" is not a mind but a word, an image of a mind is not a mind but a brain.

The popular idea seems to be just that: that we can correctly see others "as they truly are".
It's why a formulation in the form of "You are x" isn't merely shorthand for "I think you are x". — baker

It seems to me that only x can say what they are and everyone else can only see it - which means using the way light reflects off of x as a means of knowing what x is.

Yes, it matters. Are you not scared by the proposition that you're trapped in indirectness? — baker

But are you not directly accessing your own mind and is your mind not part of the causality of the world? What would it be like to directly access something vs. indirectly.? Access is a term that implies indirectness, as something that is accessed by an accessor. How does the accessor access the accessed, if not indirectly - by accessing the effects x has on y (world on mind and mind on world)? Information takes time to travel from accessed to accessor.

It would seem that you have direct access to your mind with direct meaning that you are your mind, and indirect access to the world via light's effect on the eyes.

The divorce does not separate them, it still describes a unity, but it also puts a temporal constraint on that unity by saying that it has ended. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why not just agree that divorce and marriage are relationships so that you don't contradict yourself in saying that a divorce is a type of unity. What you mean is that it is a type of relationship.

People do not 'measure the space' between things, they measure the distance between them. So yes, by measuring the distance between them you are establishing a relationship, and this is inherently a unity between them. You are making them both one predicate of the same subject (which is the unity of the two) by saying that the two exist with such a distance between them. Measuring the distance between them is not to posit a space between them which is being measured, it is to posit a principle of unity between them, the act of measurement unites them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Every time you say "unity" you mean relationship. Every time you say "distance" you mean space. We are both saying essentially the same thing, but using different words. With our different words, we are pointing to the same thing. Thanks for agreeing. :smile:

Is there any experience without acquaintance with nature, or any acquaintance with nature without experience? I think experience is just a word to denote that we have awareness. To my way of thinking the so-called "hard problem" is a kind of illusion based on thinking that what matter is is clearly understood; that it is something like "dead" particles that could not, according to our conception, possibly give rise to what we think of as "immaterial" subjective experience. The hard problem then seems to me to be an expression of incredulity based on ignorance. — Janus

The hard problem is trying to explain why there is a difference in the evidence used to assert that you are aware vs.asserting that others are aware. How you come to know that you are aware vs. knowing others are aware is totally different.

Might have once read something about government gaining legitimacy through the consent of the governed. — Ennui Elucidator

For most of human history governments have gained legitimacy through lies and fear. The governed may appear to be consenting (North Korean citizens proclaiming their love for their precious leader is a good example), but they only do so out of fear. In this sense they are not consenting, they are coerced.

When power-hungry elitists gain control of government and consolidate their power (outsider, non-politicians are not welcome in their group), and much of what they do is behind closed doors and what they say is all generalizations and plurality, then is this what the goverened has consented to, or are the goverened merely preoccupied with celebrities and themselves (making themselves a celebrity) on TikTok and Facebook to give a damn? Dumbing down the governed is one way to make it look like the governed are giving consent when in fact the governed are just to dumb to know that they arent, or wouldn't, if they really knew what was going on in the government.

Self-awareness: x sees x via an image of x that x is capable of generating. — Agent Smith

I dont know what this means. I describe self-awareness as a sensory information feedback loop, like the visual or auditory feedback you get when pointing a camera at its monitor or a microphone to its speaker. When you think about your "self" (one problem that we need to resolve is what is a self and where is it relative to the mind, brain and body), you are creating an information feedback loop - of the mind minding itself.

Come to us, humans, now. When I engage in self-reflection, I don't see myself as a brain. Physicalists insist that the brain is the mind. Ergo, the brain is incapable of self-reflection (it doesn't see itself as it truly is, a mushy mass of meat). Consciousness is an illusion? — Agent Smith

Im not a physicalist (i dont even know what "phyisical" means), nor do i believe that consciousness is an illusion. I do agree that the distinction between mind and brain needs a good explanation. I think that the mind and brain are one and the same - just from different views, like photons can be both waves and particles, depending on the measuring device being used. The sensory-brain system (mind) is a measuring device. But be careful not to confuse the measurement with what is being measured.

Separates" and "unites" are somewhat opposed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The definition in the OP is wrong. Scientists have described space as a thing that can expand or contract. Put a wall between you and I and an object, not space, separates us.

These are both types of relationships. A couple can be married (unites) and then divorced (separates) and both are types of relationships between them. You could be sitting right next to me or across the country and that is a relationship between you and I.

In measuring the space between individuals are you not establishing a relationship between them? Thats what a measurement is - a relationship.

An agreement is in no way an object or an entity, so it's not even worth your while arguing that an agreement is a non-spatial "object" or "entity". And since it is a relation between a plurality of individuals, it is in no way an "individual". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet it only takes one individual to break the agreement, or relationship.

Is not space a relationship between individuals?

I'm not satisfied with your replies. Have a good day. — Agent Smith

It wasn't replies, but questions that I asked that you need to answer for me to better understand your position. I'm not satisfied with your answers (or lack thereof). Have a good day.

Metacognition: The mind forms and image of itself. This image, last I checked, is definitely not a brain. — Agent Smith

Well no, an image is not the thing the image is of. You seem to be confusing the thing with an image of the thing. Is the image of the thing seen as it truly is?

If you don't see your brain as it truly is how can you say that you see other brains as they truly are? How is it that you have true sight of other people's brains but not of your own when you only have access to the image and not the thing itself?

If you are able to know about things by only accessing an image of those things, does it really matter that you don't have direct access to those things?

The camera captures itself, right but neither single neurons nor neural networks see themselves as they truly are, neurons or neural networks; in other words, they (neurons/neural networks) can't make themselves objects as they truly are. — Agent Smith

What do you mean, "see as they truly are"? Do you see anything as it truly is? Does the mind "see" itself as it truly is?

Ain't it the matter on which zeroes and ones are formed that occupies space? — Raymond

What else are numbers if not scribbles on a page, which occupies space?

Even if the records of the mortgage disappeared, the obligations remain - they just cannot be proved.

Same as keeping a verbal promise. — Banno

What is it that keeps the agreement intact? If at any moment I can make an agreement, at any moment I can cancel the agreement. It takes more than one to make an agreement but only one to break the agreement. If I decide not to abide by the agreement then I don't need to pay my mortgage?

No, Harry. The mortgage is an agreement. But this sort of thing has been explained to you before, by many folk. — Banno

I've also been told by many folk that God exists and wants me to be saved by him. Does that make it true? You're not appealing to popularity are you?

Then if you remove one of the members of the agreement, you remove the agreement? Then agreements are composed of members of the agreement and therefore occupy space.

Since the brain isn't capable of making itself the object of its own study like it can with other things like a table or a person, the ability of the mind to self-reflect is physically inexplicable. — Agent Smith

Connect a camera to a monitor and then turn the camera back to look at its monitor. The visual feedback in the monitor is the camera's view of itself - the camera-monitor system. This is like the infinite regress you experience when thinking about your self.

Thinking about thinking is what blurs the boundary of subject and object. In thinking about thinking object and subject are one and the same.

The normal definition for "will" in psychology/psychiatry is "the independent faculty of choice", in other words, "volition". Though better by characterizing the deliberate aspect of "will", I still find this definition wanting. — Michael Zwingli

Then came Schopenhauer, who, building on the ideas of Immanuel Kant, revolutionized the term. For him, the "will", as is so eloquently described on the Wiki, seems to have been "a blind, unconscious, aimless striving devoid of knowledge, outside of space and time, and free of all multiplicity". In this view, the will becomes less a faculty, less an ability or power, and more a source of constant impulse...from the biological perspective, an "instinct" (in the sense derived from it's constituent Latin etyma, "an inner prodding"), if you will. — Michael Zwingli

Occam's Razor comes to mind here.

I don't see much of a difference between these two descriptions other than the number of words in the description. If we accept the idea that computers make decisions based on their programming, and finite information stored in them to use to make decisions with, then it follows that computers make these decisions instinctively, as in that is how they were designed and programmed to respond to some input which isn't much different from organisms. Organisms are programmed by Natural Selection and possess limited information in their heads for which to make decisions with - instinctively.

If we're going the academic route, we define our context and our aim and justify a definition that suits, usually with the aid of some authority, whether historical or contemporary. Without context, the appropriateness of any specific definition is unresolvable. — Baden

In the context of understanding reality we don't necessarily need language or definitions to do so. Just an understanding of the relationship between things, like the an observation of the way thing currently are, the will (intent or the idea to change how things currently are) and what is intended (or what new conditions you would like to see).

Cool. I'll delete the contents of the hard drive and then my mortgage is gone. — Banno

Like I said, it was a COPY of your mortgage agreement. You'd have to hack into the bank's computer and delete it there too for your mortgage ro be gone.

If that be true than whether the morgage is stipulated in Word or in PDF would make a difference to the motrgage, since it will occupy a diffferent amount kilobytes of space on my hard drive. However, it does not. Likewise if Banno's morgtgage would somehow be eradicated from his harddrive and from the hardrive of the company he has a mortgage from, that would somehow destroy Banno's obligation to pay. That however is false. — Tobias

Word and Adobe add extra information that is not part of the mortgage information and that is what makes the difference. If there us no record that Banno has a mortgage then he is not obligated to pay something that doesn't exist. If you ask the bank for evidence that you have a mortgage, what do you think they will show you? If they can't show you any information of your mortgage then you effectively don't have a mortgage. If you are talking about his memory of his mortgage, then we are still talking about information that occupies the space in his head.

If everyone forgot that Paris is the capital of France, would Paris be the capital of France?

What space is occupied by your Mortgage?
What space is occupied by Philosophy forums?
What space is occupied by three hundred? — Banno

These are all examples of information. Information occupies space. If you don't believe me, look at the contents of your hard drive on your computer. Does not the signed copy of your mortgage agreement occupy kilobytes of space on your drive? This forum occupies space in the cloud. Type 300 in a text document and you can see that the text occupies space and the document occupies space in RAM until saved to your hard drive's space. For something to exist and for you to be aware of and talk about it, it must occupy space.

An object being something with finite extent in at least one of its properties (a particular entity); space being that which separates distinct objects. — Daniel

Using these definitions of object and space, objects and space would be the medium of change.

Another way of looking at it would be objects and space are the means by which minds model change (or process) which would mean that change/process would be fundamental and objects and space would be a mind's (which itself is a process) way of perceiving and knowing change/processes.

I haven't given any examples because I've assumed that most people know, that any use of a word in a sentence, is an example of how it's used. So, if I'm talking about epistemology for example, and I say, "I know John is guilty of murder," then the sense of the word know, (namely, how it's used in this sentence), is that I'm justified in some appropriate way. Another use or sense of the word know that is common, is to use it as a kind of emphasis. The emphasis on know would reflect a conviction, i.e., how one feels about the belief their expressing. Wittgenstein pointed this out in OC, where he says this kind of use can express itself in tone of voice. These are two specific examples of different uses of the same word. An epistemological use, and a use that expresses my subjective conviction. However, don't confuse a use that expresses the subjective, as a use that gives the word meaning. — Sam26

Exactly. Words are used to point to states-of-affairs that are not just another use of words. To know is to both be justified and to reflect a conviction because it is justified. Why would you reflect conviction unless you were justified in doing so? So it seems to me that your use of "to know" points to the same state-of-affairs and you're unnecessarily complicating the meaning of "to know" as being used in two or more separate states-of-affairs, when it is really being used in just one way - to point to one's justified conviction (a redundancy).

And, even if you're under the spell of a mass delusion, it doesn't follow that your words have lost their sense. It just means that you're convinced of something that's false, among other things. — Sam26

In today's world, is the phrase "The Earth is flat" of any use? Does it make sense to say such a thing? No, because it doesn't point to any state of affairs that exists outside of our heads. It can only point to an idea, or a delusion, and that is what it pointed to a 1000 years ago when people used that phrase. The difference between today and a 1000 years ago is that today, most of us now know that it only points to an idea, not to a state-of-affairs that exists outside of our heads.

The idea that it's you (emphasis on the subjective) that's convinced, gives people the false idea that it's you that gives meaning to the word. Again, the difference between understanding an expression of the subjective, and understanding how meaning comes about within a social context. — Sam26

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Intent precedes the use of words. The idea that I intend to convey is what my words point to. My ideas, in turn, either point to some state-of-affairs that exists outside my head or they don't. So depending on how accurate my ideas of the world are will determine how useful my words are to others. The meaning of words comes about within a social context only after they are deemed useful in pointing to actual state-of-affairs that exist outside your head.

Just look at all the conversations on this forum in which words are used in ways that are confusing and require the user to define how it is that they are using it (what state-of-affairs the words point to outside one's head) for the readers to understand what it is that they are actually saying. Some people use words ("consciousness" and the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" are prime examples) in ways that they think that they know how they are using them (the way that they learned to use it from others in a social context) only to find that when their way of using it isn't consistent with the other things that they have said or that we know, hence their use of words are not useful.

We do not need to evoke images to describe the difference between how the dog sees and how the human sees, is what I meant. — NOS4A2

Images are a type of information and is what is evoked to describe the difference.

Is there really that much of a difference if TV screens with images of birds can trigger the same type of behaviors in dogs as if they had seen a real bird? If we can use a trick of light to make humans and dogs see birds that aren't there, then isnt there some similarity between how we both see birds?

Evolution is not "goal-directed". The consequence (i.e. increased reproductive fitness) of adaptive mutations via natural selection is called "survival". — 180 Proof

I said earlier tha behaviors are goal-directed, not natural selection. NS is the means by which goal-directed behaviors come to exist in organisms. So instincts and habits (behaviors) are goal-directed.

NS is simply the process by which other processes adopt attributes that allow them to persist through time.

Goal-directed behaviors are attributes that allow certain things to persist through time by integrating stored information with live (sensory) information.

I didn't see much in these articles about memory being dynamic. I found this interesting article though: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02523/full

It seems to suggest that memories can be dynamic yet also suggest memory as a type of storage. If memories are reconstructed (still not sure what this means), then they must be using a template to reconstruct from, or else it doesn't really qualify as a reconstruction. If memories are not stored information and not reconstructed from a template, then does it even make sense to call them memories instead of imaginings?

To say that memory is "dynamic" means that memories change and therefore would no longer qualify as a memory, but as an imagining.

Erik Rietveld
"Enactive approaches to cognitive science aim to explain human cognitive processes across the board without making any appeal to internal, content-carrying representational states."
But it is the scientists' internal, content-carrying representational states that inform scientists of the way brains work. What other means do scientists have of being informed about the human cognitive processes?

"A challenge to such a research programme in cognitive science that immediately arises is how to explain cognition in so-called ‘representation-hungry’ domains. Examples of representation-hungry domains include imagination, memory, planning and language use in which the agent is engaged in thinking about something that may be absent, possible or abstract. The challenge is to explain how someone could think about things that are not concretely present in their environment other than by means of an internal mental representation. "
The challenge is solved by merely understanding that if thoughts are about things, then thoughts must be representations of those things. In the case of imaginings and dreams, they are simulations of behaviors and their outcomes that we can use to streamline our behaviors in the world when the moment arrives. We can use the memory of a simulated outcome to change our behaviors just as we can use the memory of a real event that happened to change our behaviors. Computers run simulations and the outcome of those simulations are used by humans to understand the world better. So representation-hungry domains are really about certain aspects of the world, or else they would be useless in the world.

Patently false assumption (e.g. reflexes, habits). — 180 Proof

So you're saying that reflexive and habitual behaviors didn't evolve to achieve some goal - like survival?

Re: blindsight – Perception (like volition or cognition) is primarily (mostly) an 'unconscious yet functional' process; therefore, "intentionality" might only be an ex post facto metacognitive illusion: thus, unknown knowns (i.e. unknowingly knowing). — 180 Proof

I'm not sure what to make of this. If intentionality is part of the same system (the whole body) then why can't we say that we always behave with intent? All of our behaviors are goal-directed.

It seems like you keep trying to separate the various functions of the brain apart from our self. What is the self - the brain, the mind, the body? If we are our bodies does it make sense to say that we don't operate with intent? Intentionality is only an illusion if intent existed apart from our bodies. So if I perceive that my conscious intent as the source of action, and my perceptions are models of what is really happening, then my model shows that the intent came from my self (my body). If I assume that my body is the source of my intent and that my consciousness is only a model of the world and my body's relationship with it, then my conscious content informs me of what I (my body) intended to do and it makes no sense that we have an illusion of intent. It's only an illusion if you're a naive realist and believe that everything you consciously perceive is the way the world is, rather than a model of the way the world is.

Blindsight is essentially when a person doesn't perceive anything in front of their eyes due to brain damage, yet better than chance they can "guess" what is there somehow. Surely all of our knowledge isn't gained strickly from perceptions from our senses? Perhaps we can gain knowledge from things we can't even perceive is there? — TiredThinker

They can't describe in detail what is there. They just know something is there. This is the difference between p-zombies and non-p-zombies. The assumption that p-zombies can behave the same way as humans is wrong. Blind-sight patients are unsure about what it is that they are aware of and won't behave in the same way as a human who perceives consciously.

If I say a word has a use, then I'm saying that it has a use within a particular language-game or a particular social context. There may be many uses of a word, so your question, "Used for what?" isn't taking into account that there may not be any one use, but many uses. — Sam26

Ok, but what other uses? That is what I'm asking. Strange that you can't even provide any examples of what it is that you are trying to say.

However, the sense of a word is never the result of your subjective view. We can use words to communicate a subjective view, but we learn to use the words, and the meanings of words, in social contexts apart from the subjective. Not only is this the case, but as far as I can tell, it's necessarily the case. — Sam26

So you've never heard of mass delusions, or ideas that propagate within a group that are just wrong - like the Earth being flat?

Oh, I get it Harry, you're joking, right? You're trying to be funny, because I can't make any sense of this apart from a joke. — Sam26

If words have meaning apart from the subjective and is necessarily the case, then how did you misconstrue my intent as being funny when that wasn't my intent?

Then what's the difference between imagining and remembering - neurologically and phenomelogically?

All of this can be put simply a "Spider hallucinations look like spiders" - no use of "qualia"!

What's relevant about an hallucination of a spider is that thereis no spider. Hence, as you point out, characterising some event as an hallucination presumes realism. — Banno

What does it mean for hallucinations to look like the real thing? How can something that isn't real look like something that is?

And what does it mean to say that the hallucination isn't real? Are you saying that hallucinations themselves aren't real, or that they don't represent anything that is real? If the latter, then aren't we talking about representations (qualia) vs what is represented (spiders)? And are the representations real things themselves?

To even talk about hallucinations and compare them with other things must mean that you think that they are real and have real effects in the real world, and can be compared to real things. How can you compare something that isn't real with something that is?

To be sure, realism is the view that there is stuff in the world that is independent of the mind, so the claim that what is real is stuff in the mind would not count as realism. — Banno

But "real" in what sense? You seemed to agree earlier with the statement, "we are our minds". Are you saying that "we" and our "minds" are not real?