And please, no gratuitous, unargued Dennett bashing. — Janus

:cry:



This is clearly one place in which @Joshs is at home and can teach us many things (agree with him or not) as he usually does.

My simple-minded take would be that speaking in terms of subjective and objective, while fine in our ordinary dealings with the world, can be problematic in this area of philosophy.

For there is a clear sense in which what we experience and try to analyze is subjective, it is "object knowledge", available to subjects.

There is another sense in which it is objective, you see these letters here and so does everyone else who may be reading them, likewise you can see your laptop (or phone or Ipad or whatever) and hence there is no rooms for reasonable disagreement.

I understand introspection as focusing on what my mind is doing, try to find "depth" in this "blooming buzzing confusion", but I think (some) phenomenology, at least, is carefully attending to and revealing what objects look like to us, much in a way an artist can do with her art.

Then we notice some aspects we took for granted. It's good in so far as people find this informative. I do. Others don't.

Can we define subjective as false and objective as true? Everything is subjective in that it's filtered through the mind, and true ideas are objective. So it seems to me that truth characterizes whether something is objective and this will always be a personal truth such that error would be a private error

Phenomenology is as legit an approach as any other that describes itself as objective. You don't consult a physicist on matters of personal relationships (love and its associates). Agreed, there are different levels of organization of matter & energy $(physics \rightarrow chemistry \rightarrow biology \rightarrow ?)$ and the immediate (knee-jerk) reaction is to look for an explanation of phenomena in one tier in the tier below it (reductionism). However, this fails to do justice to the unique aspects of each tier, populated by tier-specific entities following their own set of, again, tier-specific, rules. Phenomenology begins when this fact is acknowledged in full.

The takeaway: There's something nonchemical about biology and there's something nophysics about chemistry, so on and so forth.

And please, no gratuitous, unargued Dennett bashing. — Janus

From the first paragraph of Zahavi's paper:

Dennett makes it clear that his goal is to explain everymental phenomenon within the framework of contemporary physical science. More specifically, the challenge he has set himself is to construct a convincing andadequate theory of consciousness on the basis of data that are available from the third-person scientific perspective.

I have said time and again that this is what Dennett says, and every time I say it you tell me I'm attacking a straw man version of his ideas (e.g. here, here, and many other examples.) But, prima facie, I say that claim is sufficient reason not to discuss him further, so I'll bow out.

Phenomenology is interested in the very dimension
of givenness or appearance and seeks to explore its essential structures and
conditions of possibility. Such an investigation of the field of presence ~Dan Zahavi — Janus

Yeah, formal descriptions of percepts. But to what end? Apparently not Dennett's, so what's Zahavi's (or your) point, Janus?

... as a supposed corrective he proposes a discipline he names "heterophenomenology", which is the "third person" recording, analysis and critique of the reports of others about what they take to be the nature of their consciousness.

Dennett repurposes "phenomenology" for analysis of (folk)concepts used in cognitive neuroscience, which is not any more of a "misunderstanding" than e.g. Heidegger or Levinas, Merleau-Ponty or Derrida misunderstood Husserl.

Objective truth can interfere with subjective truth when the latter is faith. Does it matter if all is material when faith can lead to states that don't seem physical? Does phenomenology imply faith?

...speaking in terms of subjective and objective, while fine in our ordinary dealings with the world, can be problematic in this area of philosophy. — Manuel

Yep.

Objective truth can interfere with subjective truth when the latter is faith. Does it matter if all is material when faith can lead to states that don't seem physical? Does phenomenology imply faith? — Gregory

Have you ever seen one idea collide with another in such a way that momentum was conserved? The mind world has its own thing going on, quite distinct from physics & chemsitry.

The mind world has its own thing going on, quite distinct from physics & chemsitry. — Agent Smith

Except claiming the subjective as ‘quite distinct’ from the objective is precisely what phenomenology is arguing against.

Except claiming the subjective as ‘quite distinct’ from the objective is precisely what phenomenology is arguing against. — Joshs

Wordplay. People say the darndest things these days.

Objective truth can interfere with subjective truth when the latter is faith. Does it matter if all is material when faith can lead to states that don't seem physical? Does phenomenology imply faith? — Gregory

There are religious approaches within phenomenology , but both these and the non-religious versions avoid splitting apart the subjective and the objective.

Dennett repurposes "phenomenology" for analysis of (folk)concepts used in cognitive neuroscience, which is not any more of a "misunderstanding" than e.g. Heidegger or Levinas, Merleau-Ponty or Derrida misunderstood Husserl. — 180 Proof

It is a gross misunderstanding of Husserlian phenomenology, an error that neither Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty nor Derrida ever made.

Yeah, formal descriptions of percepts. But to what end? — 180 Proof

There are many important implications for psychology of demonstrating that the third person perspective is parasitic on the first personal stance.

What is the or a main argument in favor of phenomenology?

It is a gross misunderstanding of Husserlian phenomenology, — Joshs

A novel use of a tool to perform a novel task is not, itself, "a gross misunderstanding". Mere ad hominem at best, a projection of your "gross misunderstanding" of Dennettian heterophenomenology otherwise.

... demonstrating that the third person perspective is parasitic on the first personal stance.

If the basis (host of) ... is only a "first person stance", then it is necessarily undemonstrable (i.e. not publically accessible or corroborable). Idealist incoherence (e.g. transcendental ego).

What is the or a main argument in favor of phenomenology? — Gregory

That the world we experience is an appearance provided by our mental faculties. You can trace the arguments for this back to Kant. And Kant was responding to Hume's skepticism, which was based on his empiricism. The meaningful world we experience is provided by reason, which makes sense of the sensory streams. That's why we believe in causality set inside a spatio-temporal world of material objects. So we could even go back to Plato or Heraclitus. What makes sense of the ever changing world? What gives it form? Why is our experience comprehensible? Why do we believe the future will remain intelligible?

What makes sense of the ever changing world? What gives it form? Why is our experience comprehensible? Why do we believe the future will remain intelligible? — Marchesk

Ecologically-nested embodiment of psychosocially acculturated, large forebrains. (à la Hume re: "customary habits of mind") Nothing "transcendental" required.

Except claiming the subjective as ‘quite distinct’ from the objective is precisely what phenomenology is arguing against. — Joshs

Please ignore the previous reply. I was in a hurry and didn't read your post carefully enough. My sincerest apologies.

To my knowledge, phenomenology isn't as much about the subjectivity-objectivity distinction as it is about what I have described as tier/level-specific/restricted phenomena. Even on the off chance that thoughts are reducible to chemical reactions, thoughts themselves don't actually obey any conservation law like chemicals do, the very idea is N/A or a category mistake.

Would you say those nested forebrains are good at organizing sensory impressions into meaningful categories of things?

Where there is phenomena there is the possibility for its -ology.

The takeaway: There's something nonchemical about biology and there's something nophysics about chemistry, so on and so forth. — Agent Smith

Of course, there is something "non phenomenological" about phenomenology, which is really why phenomenology rules the day at the presuppositional level of analysis: In the presence of things qua presence, the lack of foundational discovery undermines knowledge claims of all kinds, and here lies the most profound revelation of our being human.

Phenomenology is often charged by it's critics to be a matter of mere introspection, since it is understood to be dealing, not with publicly available data, but with "subjective contents" supposed to be accessed by "looking within" the mind. — Janus

You're right, and it confuses me. Here are some definitions of "phenomenology" from the web:

• A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.
• Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. (SEP)
• Phenomenology (from Greek φαινόμενον, phainómenon "that which appears" and λόγος, lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. (Wikipedia)

These sure sound like they are talking about introspection, maybe self-awareness. But when you start digging, you find the whole thing is just another western philosophical mountain of words. They seem to want to discuss human experiences without talking about the experiences themselves.

My personal way of seeing things focusses on self-awareness and the experience of the world. This is why I find eastern philosophies so attractive. Seems like I should be attracted to phenomenology too, but it leaves a bad taste in my mouth.

To my knowledge, phenomenology isn't as much about the subjectivity-objectivity distinction as it is about what I have described as tier/level-specific/restricted phenomena. Even on the off chance that thoughts are reducible to chemical reactions, thoughts themselves don't actually obey any conservation law like chemicals do, the very idea is N/A or a category mistake. — Agent Smith

I think you and I agree, but this is a subject I'm still working on. Have you read "More is Different" by Anderson.

When I talk about mind or consciousness I use words like "feeling," "thought," "memory," or "imagination." When I talk about biology and neurology, I use words like "neuron," "neurotransmitter," or "synapse." To say this use of different language shows that the two phenomena are not the same thing is not to deny that they are intimately related.

Exactly. If they weren't, they (we) wouldn't be here.

To my knowledge, phenomenology isn't as much about the subjectivity-objectivity distinction as it is about what I have described as tier/level-specific/restricted phenomena. — Agent Smith

Could you elaborate a bit? I do t see phenomenology as restricting itself to some special category of experience( subjective vs objective). On the contrary, it claims to
ground all forms of experiencing.

A novel use of a tool to perform a novel task is not, itself, "a gross misunderstanding". Mere ad hominem at best, a projection of your "gross misunderstanding" of Dennettian heterophenomenology otherwise.

... demonstrating that the third person perspective is parasitic on the first personal stance.
If the basis (host of) ... is only a "first person stance", then it is necessarily undemonstrable (i.e. not publically accessible or corroborable). Idealist incoherence (e.g. transcendental ego). — 180 Proof

Matthew Ratcliffe writes:

Dennett, in describing his own conception of phenomenology, appeals to the Sellarsian contrast
between scientific and manifest images, and proposes that:

What phenomenology should do is adumbrate each individual subject‟s manifest image of what‟s going on with them. The ontology is the manifest ontology of that subject. It can be contrasted with the ontology that is devised by the cognitive scientist in an effort to devise
models of the underlying cognitive processes. (2007, p.250)

However, each subject‟s experience is not simply „subjective‟ but involves being part of a shared experiential world. A subjective manifest image is not to be contrasted with the manifest image. The „manifest ontology of a subject‟ includes a sense of its not just being an ontology for the subject but a world shared with other subjects. Consciousness was never a matter of some idiosyncratic, subjective view of the world, estranged from all other such views and from the objective world as described by science. Consciousness is not just a matter of having a subjective perspective within the world; it also includes the sense of occupying a contingent position in a shared world. From within this experiential world, we manage to conceive of the world scientifically, in such a way that it fails to accommodate the manner in which we find ourselves in it. Hence the real problem of consciousness is that of reconciling the world as we find ourselves in it with the objective world of inanimate matter that is revealed by empirical science. It should not simply be assumed from the outset that a solution to the problem will incorporate the view that science reigns supreme.”

There are many important implications for psychology of demonstrating that the third person perspective is parasitic on the first personal stance. — Joshs

How do phenomenologists conceive of the hierarchical nature of interpersonal relationships?


Normally, when people communicate, the implicit assumption is that the person who holds a position of more power is objective, while the one in the position of power is not objective. For example, when your boss reviews your work, he does it in a language of providing an objective image of your work performance, as opposed to just his opinion of your work.


Or, to give another example, somewhat loaded, for clarity:
Tom says, "Dick is an idiot".
Why doesn't Tom say "I think Dick is an idiot" or "I can't stand Dick"?

People generally prefer the objective form (A is x), rather than first-person statements.
First person statements being formulated as the objective form qualified with "I think" and similar qualifiers of subjectivity, or I-statements.

How do phenomenologists explain these uses?

From within this experiential world, we manage to conceive of the world scientifically, in such a way that it fails to accommodate the manner in which we find ourselves in it. Hence the real problem of consciousness is that of reconciling the world as we find ourselves in it with the objective world of inanimate matter that is revealed by empirical science. It should not simply be assumed from the outset that a solution to the problem will incorporate the view that science reigns supreme.” — Joshs

Kind of like having a map of the territory without including the map's location on the map. The map is as much a part of the territory (the world) as the rest of the world. Why exclude the map when making a map of the territory - if you want an accurate representation of the territory? There are some that think the map isn't important to represent on the map, as we aren't interested in the map - just the territory. Now, if we were talking about cartography and not geography, then the map would be more important than the territory. The same goes if we are talking about psychology vs physics.

The thing to remember though, is that all great theories can be integrated with the conclusions discovered in other fields. All knowledge must be integrated. The way we talk about brains shouldn't come into conflict with how we talk about minds and vice versa. Any good theory will be able to account for them both without the need to assert that one is an illusion to make their own explanation work.

Normally, when people communicate, the implicit assumption is that the person who holds a position of more power is objective, while the one in the position of power is not objective. For example, when your boss reviews your work, he does it in a language of providing an objective image of your work performance, as opposed to just his opinion of your work. — baker

I'm assuming the boss is using statistics that were produced by a computer, not feelings the boss has about their performance. The computer statistics would be more objective because the computer doesn't care, or bears no responsibility, if the employee is fired or not. The boss could have ulterior motives, or even subconscious biases that they could be applying to the decision to fire or hire.

The distinction between subjective and objective is simply where unrelated reasons and assumptions are used in the process of interpreting sensory data compared to not using unrelated reasons and assumptions to interpret sensory data. Computers don't seem to have that problem of using unrelated reasons to reach a conclusion because they are programmed with a strictly defined and limited work flow and access to information, as well as no goals to use the data they display for personal reasons.

Matthew Ratcliffe writes:

Dennett, in describing his own conception of phenomenology, appeals to the Sellarsian contrast
between scientific and manifest images, and proposes that:

/.../
However, each subject‟s experience is not simply „subjective‟ but involves being part of a shared experiential world. A subjective manifest image is not to be contrasted with the manifest image. The „manifest ontology of a subject‟ includes a sense of its not just being an ontology for the subject but a world shared with other subjects. Consciousness was never a matter of some idiosyncratic, subjective view of the world, estranged from all other such views and from the objective world as described by science. Consciousness is not just a matter of having a subjective perspective within the world; it also includes the sense of occupying a contingent position in a shared world. From within this experiential world, we manage to conceive of the world scientifically, in such a way that it fails to accommodate the manner in which we find ourselves in it. Hence the real problem of consciousness is that of reconciling the world as we find ourselves in it with the objective world of inanimate matter that is revealed by empirical science. It should not simply be assumed from the outset that a solution to the problem will incorporate the view that science reigns supreme.” — Joshs

How would such a view be reflected in how people communicate with eachother?

Could you please illustrate this with two short dialogues on the same theme, in one version, using the usual manner in which people talk (ie., mostly objectivist/objectivizing you-statements), and the other one that would be consistent with the above view presented by Ratcliffe?

Please see the added example with Tom and Dick.

Normally, when people communicate, the implicit assumption is that the person who holds a position of more power is objective, while the one in the position of power is not objective. For example, when your boss reviews your work, he does it in a language of providing an objective image of your work performance, as opposed to just his opinion of your work. — baker

Husserl says that we can passively give in to group
consensus assumptions concerning the relative legimacy of an individual’s authority. Or we can take our own position on the matter.


“What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and addressed to me, as a demand, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in him.”(Ideas II, p.281))“