I agree that "unnatural" is an incoherent term. If it is part of the universe, and the universe is "natural", then anything that happens within the universe is natural - including everything that humans do and create. Humans and their societies and inventions are natural outcomes of natural forces.

Natural selection would promote any behavior that led to more offspring in the next generation. Some members of early human tribes probably abstained from heterosexual competition and formed their own homosexual bonds for their sexual needs. They still participated in the tribe and helped care for the children or hunting. It could have developed as a way of establishing a hierarchy within the male group. There could be a number of reasons why homosexuality could have naturally developed and not be filtered out completely by natural selection.

The problem is more about free speech. It is about rejecting the idea that I have to live in your bubble and use your meaning of words, and that feelings are more important than logic and facts.

For me, knowledge is not something formal or logical. Just like all my other mental experiences, it has thoughts, feelings, perceptions, memories all mixed together. I rarely just know something. The knowing is almost always in the context of action, of figuring out what to do about something. Normally, the only times I have known things in isolation are while taking tests, arguing here on the forum, and playing Trivial Pursuit. — T Clark

Well, taking tests, arguing on the forum and playing Trivial Pursuit are all actions too, but it seems to me that I can just sit here and know things - like Paris is the capital of France, or the acceleration of Earth's gravity is 9.8 ms^2. When I hear a news story about something that happened "in Paris", I can establish that connection with France, which is then another connection to a location on the planet - thanks to my geographical knowledge. It is about having categorical relationships established in the mind. I can recall this information, so knowing, or knowledge is more like memories of prior patterns that produced fruitful outcomes - whether it be getting an answer correct in Trivial Pursuit, tying one's shoes, fixing a computer, or understanding relationships (like knowing what someone means when they say "in Paris").

Knowledge seems to come in degrees as there are some with more knowledge in a subject than others, but does that mean that the others really don't know the subject?

What does it feel like to have thought you have knowledge of something but now realize that you were wrong? How do you "know" that you ever possess "knowledge"?

That's not true. When you predict that something will happen, and it does, this does not mean that the thing is deterministic. This conclusion would require a further premise which states that something can only be predicted if it's deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. It requires a definition of determinism that implies prediction-making.

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determinism

Determinism: a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws.

Predictions can only be made if occurrences that we observe are consistently determined by prior causes. If they aren't then we can't make predictions. Because they are consistent, we can make predictions both forward and backwards in time. We can predict the causes of some occurrence or predict the occurrence of some causes. Because the causal relationship is consistent, we can predict the cause or the occurrence. If it weren't we could never establish any kind of reliable predictions for very long. Our knowledge would be even less reliable than it is now - to the point of being useless.

Neither is this true. Minds can predict things which are not deterministic by many different means, like chance, by some system of statistics and probabilities, or through vagueness in terms . I can predict the outcome of a coin toss. If I am right, I've successfully made the prediction. I can also predict that if I flip the coin 100 times half will be heads and half tails. If the score is 51 to 49 I can employ vagueness to claim that it's close enough to count as half and half, therefore my prediction was correct. For a prediction to be correct, it is not required that the thing predicted is deterministic, nor that the thing follows any logical pattern, it only requires a successful strategy by the predictor. — Metaphysician Undercover

Chance and probabilities are ideas in the mind that relate to our lack of knowledge of some system. When we use these terms, we are emphasizing that we don't fully understand the causal relationships, or that the causal relationships are too complex, or there is too much information involved for our minds to make predictions about. This is one purpose that we have given computers - create simulations with massive amounts of information of causal relationships so that we may better predict the behavior of hurricanes.

The existence of free will demonstrates that the universe, as we know it, is not a deterministic system, nor closed system. To say that there are multiverses which comprise a closed system is nonsense, indicating that you do not know what a "system" is.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. A system is an assortment of interacting parts - like neurons, people or universes. Free will is an illusion.

The fact that human beings can identify the problem after the fact, and repair it by replacing the worn parts, does not make the system deterministic. After all, human beings built the system in the first place, and it is the fact that the machinery will break down which makes it non-deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you predicted that it would break down, and it eventually does, then that is deterministic. Deterministic means that the outcome of some system is capable of being predicted by some mind. It follows some logical pattern. It is logical.

Complete prediction is not possible from within the closed system. See Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability. — ChrisH

Right. So, complete prediction of the closed system in not possible, but that isn't to say that the universe isn't deterministic in that the states-of-affairs in local areas aren't predictable, and that is all we really need. Do we really need a complete prediction of the closed system to accomplish what we want at any given moment? NASA can still get spacecraft to Pluto without knowing where every atom in the solar system is. And if we could acquire the motion and position of most of the particles in the universe would that allow us to narrow down the possible futures of the universe so that we can at least eliminate contradictory predictions?

A completely deterministic system would be a completely closed system, which is impossible to construct, and even if it does exist somewhere naturally, it couldn't be observed. There is no such thing as an absolutely "fixed", or determined system, so it makes no sense to talk about what does or does not exist within such a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

The universe would be the closed system. If there are multiple universes, then the Multiverse would be the closed system. In other words reality itself is the closed system. Determining the motion and position of every particle within the universe would allow you to predict the future of the Universe and everything inside of it - something that may be beyond the ability of the human brain but maybe within the power of a computer.

Now, if the universe is infinite in space and time then that would make it impossible for the universe to be deterministic on large scales of space and time. We might be able to make predictions on small local scales, but our predictions become less reliable the larger and further we try to reach.

You and I (and several others) have gone back and forth on this quite a few times in this thread. I think we've taken it as far as we're going to get. — T Clark

Sure, if you can't make a coherent distinction between the two causal events then I guess we are done here.

Yeah...., well...., no. — T Clark

Sure it is. You can't make a good argument as to why you believe other minds exist but not other things that arent minds when the only evidence you have for other minds is other things - like organisms.

As I discussed previously - I'm not talking about flipping a coin and trying to predict the outcome. I'm talking about flipping the coin numerous times and predicting the exact sequence of heads and tails. — T Clark

Again, there is no difference between predicting the outcome of 1000 coin flips or 1000 billiard collisions. We are still talking about predictions based on the forces involved with each event.

Maybe it would be solipsism if I were to write "Only in the sense everything only exists in my mind as imaginings", but that's not what I wrote or meant. — T Clark

Then you'd be inconsistent because other minds could be just as imaginary as everything else. You have just as much evidence for other minds as you do for everything else that you claim is imaginary. There is no coherent middle ground (ie idealism). It's either realism or solipsism.

Not so. That is contradicted by the wave equation which is precisely a distribution of probabilities. — Wayfarer

Equations are derived from and exist only inside minds - just like probabilities.

There is not an objectively-existing particle lurking undiscovered. — Wayfarer

Then solipsism?

"Empirical" predictability - billiard balls.
Probabilistic predictability - coin flips — T Clark

I don't see a difference between an outcome between two billiard balls colliding and the outcome between your finger colliding with a side of a coin. They are both predictable in the same way - by knowing the motion and force applied to all particles involved.

Only in the sense everything only exists in the human mind as imaginings. — T Clark

Like I said before: you are arguing for solipsism.

Possibilities only arise as a result of our ignorance. If we knew the outcome, their is only one "possibility".

Two problems with this. 1) I'm talking about physical determinism, you're talking about logical determinism. Not the same thing at all. — T Clark

Only if you're a dualist. For a monist there is no difference. It's all causal.

2) I've made it clear that I'm talking about complex systems. I used an example, billiard balls, where a case can be made for predictability and determinism. You don't have to go much up the ladder of complexity before direct empirical predictability is lost and we are left to deal with probabilities. I'm using the words "direct" and "empirical" to mean predictability made possible by actually tracking the positions of particles and calculating future conditions. I'm not sure if those are the right words to use. — T Clark

Yeah, this went over my head. Can you give an example? It seems to me that our predictions are either confirmed or rejected empirically.

Good point. I've tried to make the case that, in all but the simplest systems, empirical predictability is not humanly possible. If I flip a coin 1,000 times, there are 2^1,000 possible combinations of results, each with equal probability. That''s about 1 x 10^300. Web says there are about 1 x 10^80 atoms in the visible universe. That's what I mean by "outside the scope of human possibility." — T Clark

Again, your confusing probabilities with reality. Probabilities only exist in the human mind as imaginings.

There is a point....where "completely outside the scope of human possibility" turns into "not possible even in theory."
— T Clark

At that point, in my, and others, opinions, it stops being deterministic. — T Clark

It seems to me that if you are making the case that something is the case because something else is the case, then you are making the case for determinism.

If something is completely outside the scope of human possibility and that makes it not possible in theory, and that makes the case that there isn't determinism, then you just made the case for determinism. If there are cases that logically follow other cases, or that there are reasons that you point to for your ideas, then you are making the case for determinism. It seems to me that in order to be logical, you can't escape being deterministic.

Possibilities are ideas in someone's head that can either be reflective of actual states of affairs, or not (imaginings). What exactly is outside the scope of human possibility? How would we know such a thing?

If I were to write a complex computer program for the behavior of a human-like robot, there would most likely be bugs that would need to be worked out after the initial release. The program is so complex, and its interactions with the world so varied, that I can't predict the outcomes of every type of interaction that may occur. This isn't because the world is indeterministic. It is because my knowledge and memories are limited.

That was one of the points I was trying to make. In my opinion if something is so difficult to predict that it is and will never be possible to do so, it doesn't make sense to call it deterministic. To me, that would be the same as saying even if only God can predict it, it's still deterministic. I think that's what people are saying, and I don't agree with it. — T Clark

So, what can be the case is only what you can understand, or know, it to be? Sounds like solipsism to me.

Before God created humans, the universe was deterministic but when he created humans, the world became indeterministic? God isn't a god if it's omniscience is erased with the creation of humans. It doesn't make sense. It seems to me that it is entirely possible that the world is a certain way that is different than our knowledge of it (indirect realism).

Our knowledge is fallible. Randomness is the result of a lack of knowledge of some system. Once we acquire the necessary knowledge the system becomes predictable. Predictions and randomness are ideas that exist in one's head as a result of one's knowledge. What may appear random to you is predictable to me because we both have different knowledge of the system.

Whether we manage to find ourselves there or not, each of us is one floating around others. Identity is always singular and never constrained. The contradiction is to think the accidental was ever given by a property. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This doesn't account for the instances where we can be wrong about our identity. There are no accidents in a deterministic world. Genetics AND upbringing are the primary contributors to the essence of one's identity.

There's perfectly a coherent metaphysics of sex, gender or sexual orientation. People just have to realise they aren't talking about the fact a penis exists. Or that any instance of anatomy exist. Or the fact of someone being attracted to the opposite sex. That sex, gender or sexual orientation is it's own fact about a person itself. A truth not given by properties (e.g. "I'm a man because I have a penis"), but rather one given in itself (e.g. "I am a man") which occurs alongside their properties (whatever those might be, be they a penis or a vagina, burly or scrawny, short hair or long, etc.) — TheWillowOfDarkness

If someone isn't referring to some physical property about themselves that distinguishes them from "not-man" when they say "I am a man", then what use does the word, "man" have? What would it mean?

For those who insist on finding case studies of empirical evidence of hate speech causing undue and unwarranted violence, I offer the example of Nazi Germany. The Jews and the Christians reluctantly had mulled about doing their own business, and more-or-less had strived within the situation of multi-religious nations. Then came a hate speaker, and as a direct result of his efforts, six million Jews were brutally executed, or horribly tortured or both. This is a direct result of having a single solitary person spewing out hate speech. If you need any more evidence than this that hate speech is effective, then first drive a dagger through my throat. — god must be atheist

The problem wasnt hate speech. It was the abolishment of free speech that allowed a particular ideology to gain hold and fester in the German mindset. When you outlaw Free Speech you outlaw free thinking. When you have no power to speak out against what is being said then that is how hate speech becomes violence by whole culture against another.

So, not only should hate speech be allowed but reasonable speech that argues against the emotion of hate speech should be allowed and not prohibited. Allowing certain hate speech and then preventing free speech is how hate speech becomes violence on the scale of nations.

Science is based on logic and empirical data - the same things that you use to figure out the answer to every problem you ever had. What other method of determing truths do we have? How would you support any conclusion you have - whether it be religious, philosophical, or whatever - without some logic and empirical evidence? It's just how our minds work. So you could say that science is founded on the way our minds work and solve problems.

Yes, relating to one's sex, but you're stretching that to absurdity when there's no need. They relate to cultural conceptions of sex in terms of image, behaviour, desires, and so on. Without overthinking it, if you were asked to think of a woman, it's more likely than not that you'll think of something pretty close to the stereotype. That's just how our brains work. It's like how a lot of people would think of the red heart symbol with two curves at the top if they were asked to think of a heart, instead of thinking of any actual heart which looks very different. It's not a category error, just two different ways of thinking. — S

You keep referring to our cultural inclination to think of the sexes in a certain way which is no different than how one thinks about the existence of gods. Just because we've been culturally conditioned to think a certain way doesn't mean that thinking is correct. What is being stretched is the idea of sex beyond what it is. Sex is not how you wear your clothes or your hair. Sex is physiology.

But it's not about inherent qualities or sexual physiology. It's not on that basis that we talk about feminine hair, jewellery, and clothes. Of course it doesn't make sense in that respect, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't make sense in other respects. — S

That isnt how "masculine" and "feminine" are defined. They are defined as relating to one's sex.

But they're not simply human behaviours. They are predominantly more masculine or more feminine. Of course, there's nothing inherent about length of hair, for example, that makes it masculine or feminine. — S

Exactly. There's nothing inherently more masculine ir feminine about how someone wears their hair or what jewelry they wear or what kind of clothes they wear. Those are human behaviors that are not inhibited by one's sexual physiology.

but it's nonsense to think that there would be nothing feminine about wearing your hair in lengthy pigtails, large hoop earrings, and a pink dress. If you don't believe me, then just give it a try and see how people react. That it exists on a cultural level, rather than physical reality, is not that there's no such thing or that it doesn't exist at all. — S

But that is what I'm getting at - the incorrect cultural notions that they are governed by ones sexual physiology, thereby labeling them as masuline and feminine. Im not saying that peoples reactions don't exist. Im saying that their reactions are wrong - a category error.

In Gender Nihilism she (ey?) sort of implies that experience of being female is ultimately negative and that gender needs to be abolished altogether. — thewonder

That is subjective. If she expects others to respect her views, then should respect others that may not share her view that being female is ultimately negative.

Gender can only be abolished by abolishing sex.

It sure is strange making demands of others when what you are arguing against is others making demands of you - like conforming to some way of dressing, behaving, or speaking.

Hypocrites.

Again, relationships are such as "to the left of," "is the parent of," "is similar to" etc. — Terrapin Station

Your car, which a relationship between a combustion engine, wheels, tires, drive train, etc. is to the left (another a relationship) of your body, which I already said is a relationship between your various organs.

Now your turn, explain what a particular particle is without using relationships.

You said "Just dynamic relations." But it can't be relations(hips) of relations(hips) because there needs to be something to have any relation(ship) in the first place.

For example, take "x is to the left of y from reference point a." "Is to the left of" is a relation(ship), but we can't have that without having two somethings to be situated in the specified way with respect to each other.

Adding relationships doesn't help. "To the left of to the right of" or "To the left of the parent of" or whatever relationships don't make any sense sans things to be related however they are. — Terrapin Station

And those two somethings are other relationships. How is that any different than saying that there are two particles that make up another particle? There are two somethings. You call those two somethings, "particles". I call them relationships. Both particles and relationships are made up of other particles or relationships. The only difference is that you never get at any particles if particles are actually relationships between other particles that are themselves relationships.

You don't have any particles without relationships. You might say that I don't have relationships without particles. I disagree. I can have relationships with other relationships. You, however, can't do without relationships to define particles. I just need other relationships to define other relationships.

I never said it was relationships of nothing. Pay attention. I said its relationships made up of other relationships. Particles and objects is your mind digitizing an analog signal. It is how your mind categorizes those relationships. The objects/particles are those mental categories of the those relationships.

The current understanding is that particles are perturbations of the quantum field. In that understanding they are not "objects", like microscopic billiard balls, but intensities that interact in lawlike ways. — Janus

The current understanding is that all particles are made up relationships between smaller particles. The particle that is your body is made up of a relationship between organs. Your organs are the relationship between molecules. Your molecules are the relationship between atoms and your atoms are the relationship between protons and electrons and a neutrons, Etc.

It's particles in dynamic relations (as are qualia and everything else). — Terrapin Station

No, its just dynamic relations. Every "particle" you point at is a relationship.

Mind is identical to a subset of brain functions. So the "particles of mind" are the same as the particles of brains. — Terrapin Station

Feelings aren't made of particles. The mind is made of qualia, which are the most fundamental parts of mind. Particles don't even exist. What we refer to as "particles" are actually relationships between other particles, all the way down. We never get at particles. We can only get at relationships. The idea of "particles" is incoherent.

Saying that everything is physical is saying that everything has properties like location and extension, that things are comprised of particles which are in dynamic relations with each other, etc. etc. — Terrapin Station

What would be the particles of the mind? What would it mean to say that the mind is extended?

Personally I've never been able to make much sense out of what it's supposed to be positing, exactly. It's always rather struck me as one not wanting to be a dualist, while also not wanting to assert either physicalism or idealism, so one just posits some hand-waving "something or other" that's somehow neither mental or physical, but somehow constitutes both. Kinda like going "hibbidy-jibbidy woo" and waving a wand then saying, "There--that solves all of the problems of philosophy of mind, doesn't it?"

Basically it seems like extremely vague fence-sitting/trying to please/not offend anyone. — Terrapin Station

How is asserting that everything is either "physical" or "mental" not just hand-waving themselves? What does it mean to say that something is "physical" or "mental"? What are the differences between "physical" and "mental" things, and then how do they interact?

It seems simpler to me (boring to some, but then the truth was never guaranteed to be interesting or consoling), to just say that it's all one substance. At that point, does it really matter what we label it?

The people in the green world would still experience dark and light areas, or else how would they distinguish objects from the background, or from each other? What color do they experience when they close their eyes? If they still see green then how do they know if their eyes are closed or their eyes are open? This seems to be just another silly philosophical question about impossible situations that we cant learn anything useful from.

Perception is about the things causing the perception. One doesn’t directly apprehend the thing in itself. One perceives things. A lot is lost in perception (for example, do you perceive atoms when looking at a chair?), and the mind constructs a “story” about the object that is perceived but not directly apprehended. — Noah Te Stroete

Well, I'm an indirect realist, so I would agree that we don't directly apprehend, but we do apprehend. How would we be able to even posit and confirm the existence of atoms if not for some observation? It seems to me that we don't just look, we interpret. It's just a matter of interpreting correctly what it is you are seeing (a mass of atoms). But we don't see atoms. We see light, which is why a mass of atoms looks bent when submerged within another mass of atoms. If something is lost in perception it seems to me that we would never know and not be able to posit the existence of those things or properties.

“Reference” implies a referring to something. Can something refer to something else without conceptualization or perception? That is what I can’t figure out. I’m leaning towards no. — Noah Te Stroete

Then how can we get at causes by observing only effects? Were the tree rings in a tree stump caused by how the tree grows throughout the year independent of some perception of the tree growing? How is it that we can determine the age of the tree by the number of tree rings if it wasn't for how the tree grows independent of my perception of its growth?

Do you not understand the difference between causation and subject matter/representation? When I talk to you my speech is caused by my body (lungs, vocal chords, mouth, etc.) but those words aren’t (always) about my body. When I flip a switch on a wall it turns on a light but that light isn’t a representation of me flipping the switch.

There can be an external world that stimulates whatever it is that I am in such a way that it elicits in me a certain kind of experience without it then following that such an experience is representative of or about that external world cause.

The tree we experience isn’t the atoms and photons that cause the experience. It’s a coherent, non-solipsistic, anti-realist account of trees. — Michael

I didn't use the word, "representation". I used the term, "about". "About" as a preposition is defined by the Cambridge dictionary as "on the subject of; connected with".
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/about

Any effect is temporally connected with prior causes.

Those sounds coming from your mouth are the effect of all the causes that lead up to you making sounds with your mouth, which goes all the way back to the Big Bang. If the Big Bang never occurred, would you be here making sounds with your mouth? If Big Bangs are a necessary cause for the subsequent existence of bodies that make sounds (determinism), then you making sounds is an indication that a Big Bang happened sometime in the past. Every effect carries information about every cause leading up to it. It's just a matter of which particular chain of causes that you want to talk about or focus on in any particular moment. Hearing you speak informs me that you have a mouth, what your native language is, your knowledge of your native language, as well as the ideas in your head. Which particular cause did you want me to focus on? When we use language it is generally understood that we are meant to focus on the ideas in someone's head.

If there was no tree or light, how is it that you would have a visual experience of a tree?

Of course. I was talking about whether reference points are inherent in the world absent minds or not. — Noah Te Stroete

I'm not so sure. Is time and space an illusion - a product of how our minds parse the world?

Time is just relative change. If the mind is a process, then it functions at a particular frequency of change relative to the frequency of change in other processes, like trees and oranges. How those things appear will depend on how fast or slow the frequency of change is relative to how slow or fast the brain processes the information about them. So, fast processes will appear as a blur, or may be missed completely, while very slow processes will appear as stable, persistent "objects" in space. Think about how reptiles need heat to warm their bodies and improve their response times. When a lizard is lethargic, its brain is functioning at a slower frequency relative to the rest of the environment. It can't respond to fast changes quickly enough. When it warms up, it can. Our brains have similar states.

How would you think that the properties of an orange (or anything else) don't change? You wouldn't be able to have orange trees flowering, some of the flowers turning into fruit, the fruit developing, eventually ripening, falling, decomposing, etc. — Terrapin Station

Well, yes those are changing properties of oranges and orange trees, only one of which has to do with location - "falling". The others are properties of the orange that do not change when you change your location, like "ripeness". Ripeness is a property of the orange that changes. Ripeness does not change with location. Thought is a property of me that changes. Ripeness and thoughts are properties (that are not spatial properties) of different things in the world that interact and produce taste and smell of ripe or rotten oranges. The taste and smell of oranges would be about that interaction between ripe oranges and gustatory and olfactory sensory organs.

Consider this. Everything is in constant motion. I suppose that my wife sitting on the couch and me sitting in the recliner are both at rest relative to each other, but we are flying through space on this planet. If I get up and go into the kitchen, then my reference point relative to everything else in the house is constantly changing as long as I’m moving. When I stop in the kitchen, I’m at a different reference point to my wife. One always has to pick a particular reference point on an or in an object (such as in the house) in order to perceive or conceptualize what is moving and what isn’t — Noah Te Stroete

The only property that is changing between you and your wife and everything else is location. That's it. Your wife is still a human being. None of that changes when you change your spatial location. Your wife does not cease existing as a human, or an organism, when you change your location.

Even if your experience isn't about an external world it doesn't then follow that there isn't an external world, which is why there is a middle ground. There is an external world that is causally responsible for your experience but these external world things are not the objects of perception and are not represented by the objects of perception — Michael

This is incoherent. If there is an external world that our experience isnt about, then what does it mean for our experiences to be caused by the external world?

The properties of the orange do not change at different reference points. The perception of the orange changes at different reference points. — Noah Te Stroete

Exactly. If the properties of the orange change, then how can we keep calling it an orange? It seems to me that it would be a different object at different reference points if what TP says is accurate.

A relationship between two or more reference points can change if just one reference point changes and not the others. So it seems to me that there could still be constants in reality even though appearances change.

Right, so the point is that properties of objects vary at different spatio-temporal locations, including spatio-temporal locations on/in/etc. the objects themselves — Terrapin Station

There are properties that vary at different spatial-temporal locations but not all of them. Color and texture of the orange doesn't change as I move around it or if I were to move it relative to me. The location changes, but not the color or texture.

You had just written "A reference point is a location [in] space-time." And yes, that's correct. That's what I'm talking about. Spatio-temporal locations. (It's just that I'm stressing that properties are unique at each spatio-temporal location.) — Terrapin Station

Ok, then those properties are what we are talking about, which include the object's location in space and time. Objects have other properties than just spatial-temporal locations. There is more to the world than just reference points.

When looking at an apple and an orange sitting on a table next to each other there is a difference in location, not in time. They both exist in the same point of time but not in space. There's also difference in color texture and shape. All of which are not reference points if reference points are just spatial-temporal locations.

For example, Mars and the Eiffel Tower would have very different answers as to where all the possible reference points for each are located relative to each other, because of the different spatial arrangements, etc. — Terrapin Station

Mars and the Eiffel Tower don't have eyes and a brain. They don't have subjective experiences. How would they have reference points?

Are you saying that when I look at objects, I'm merely looking at other reference points? How is a reference point different than an object as it is, or are they the same thing? If a tree is a reference point, then why do I perceive it as an object that is part of my reference point rather than experiencing the reference point of the tree? The tree is only part of my reference point. So what is the reference point like for the tree and how is it different than the tree in my reference point? In other words, when I perceive a tree, I'm not experiencing another reference point (which would probably be like reading someone's mind), I experience the tree as an object.

When talking about the tree, are you talking about your reference point, or the tree's?

You can argue that the objects of perception are identical to qualia but also argue that external world things exist and are causally responsible for the experience. It's not solipsism because it argues that things other than oneself exist and it's not indirect realism because it argues that qualia aren't representations of these external world things – they might be caused by them but that's where the relationship ends. — Michael

If there is nothing but objects of perception, then solipsism is the case. If there is more, then realism is the case. It's really that simple.

And this thinking that idealism entails that qualia are identical to objects of perception is a false one. Think of the relationship between printed words and the story they tell. There is a logical distinction even if in terms of ontology there's just ink on paper. — Michael

I never said that is what idealism entails. I have said that there is no coherent middle ground between solipsism and realism (ie idealism). My experience is about an external world, or it isn't.