We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause. — Michael

Then both direct and indirect realism are the case?

I would need to know what "we" is and it's relation with an experience. Is access to the we, or the I, direct or indirect?

Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of the cause of my experience. The part of the world that is my experience isn't the part of the world that is the apple. I'm directly aware of the former, and through that indirectly aware of the latter. — Michael

The part of the world that is the table is not the part of the world that is the apple. When the apple sits on top of the table, is it directly or indirectly accessing the table?

Is the "we" a different part of the world than the experience? If so, then "we" indirectly access our experience, but then what would the medium be by which the "we" access the experience to say that it is indirect? If not, then is the "we" and "experience" the same thing and it wouldn't make sense to say that we are directly aware of the effects (experience). We are the experience. Then we must ask, how does the experience access the body? If the experience is not the body, then by what medium does the experience access the body? Indirect realism seems to create an infinite regress where there must always be a medium between the perceiver and the perceived and in turn requires another medium for the perceiver to access the medium, the medium of the medium, etc. which ends up creating an infinite chasm between the perceiver and what is perceived.

What does it mean to be "aware"? Is the apple aware of the table in sitting on it? What does it mean for the "we", or "I", to directly be aware of the effects? Isn't the "effects" awareness of their causes? Does it make sense to say that "we", or "I", is directly aware of the awareness of the causes?

It seems to me that both direct and indirect realism are nonsensical.

Hmmmm... Atman = Brahman?

"Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular". — RussellA

If you apply this to the word, "word", then it makes the whole argument nonsensical.

Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case (which could be knowing that it is raining or what some scribble or utterance means)- meaning that words refer to things that are not necessarily other words.

If I am aware that it is raining outside, then me hearing you say it is raining outside would be redundant and not useful. That useless redundancy shows that words do not refer to other words, but what is the case that isn't necessarily another use of words.

If I hear you say it is raining outside, and I don't know what "raining" means, I might look it up in the dictionary. I would find something like this:
Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops.

I would only continue to look up words if I didn't already know what they referred to. If I know what "Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops" refers to and it's not just another use of scribbles or utterances, then I don't need to look up any more words. I would then know what you are saying is the case, which isn't you using more words, but would be about the weather conditions outside.

Facts and states of affairs are much the same. Relations, not so much. Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"?

What is a proposition without the sign? Where is this projective relation if not part of the totality of the world as a fact?

Have a look a 3.1 and thereafter. What you call a "scribble" may be what Wittgenstein calls a "propositional sign". — Banno

Probably. But then is he saying we think in scribbles and sounds? How is that any different than a language-less entity that thinks in colors, shapes, and sounds? A scribble is a colored shape.

Harry, despite this sentence being marks on a screen, you are aware that it is addressed to you. How is that? — Banno

Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier.

You accuse me of being intellectually dishonest and yet expect me to help you understand what you clearly do not. — Fooloso4

No. It's more like, I'm accusing you of being intellectually dishonest due to your inconsistency and hypocrisy. Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. You're right. I don't understand an interpretation that is contradictory.

Here is what you said, emphasis added:

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.
— Harry Hindu


I am not going to point out the ways in which this differs from what you say now. — Fooloso4

I gave an example of what I was saying in using you interpreting Witt's writings requires that Witt wrote something down. If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. You seem to be focused on future events that you have no knowledge of (hence my point that you are talking about your ignorance of what is necessary), while I am pointing out that present events (you interpreting Witt's writings) are necessarily dependent on prior events (Witt writing something). So if I have shown that present events are necessarily dependent on specific causes (prior events), then why would it be a different relation between present events and future events?

All you have been able to do is show that there are many possible future events based on current conditions, but you're talking about your ignorance, not what is necessary. Possibilities stem from our ignorance of the conditions between now and a particular future event. You are simply pointing out that we are ignorant of other necessary factors that would lead to a different future event than what we predicted. All you did was point out necessary causes for alternate futures, thereby undermining your own argument.

I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered.
— Harry Hindu

And in return I asked you why you think they do. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty. I provided an answer to why I think they do but you ignored it just like you ignored my question and didn't answer it. If you are unable to answer my question and you are not satisfied with mine, then where does that leave us? To think that you hold the higher ground in this instance when you weren't even able to attempt to answer my question just shows that you are unwilling to be intellectually honest.

Let me ask you a few related questions:

Do you think that things could have turned out differently? — Fooloso4

Only as a result of other necessary conditions, which you seem to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently.

Is there some necessity that things can only turn out as they do? — Fooloso4

Yes. Prior conditions determine subsequent events which you seemed to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently than was predicted.

Can the same conditions support different outcomes? — Fooloso4

No, which you seemed to agree with because you never were able to point out an outcome that didn't have a necessary cause. All you did was point out that there could be other outcomes but ignored the fact that for there to be other outcomes there would need to be other necessary causes.

and in which I responded here.

What does scientific realism and [in]direct realism say about the [visual or auditory] experience itself and access to it?

Another question: is there a fundamental difference between sight and echolocation? Obviously sight involves light and a visual experience whereas echolocation involves sound and an auditory experience, but in both cases it is just a case of some "foreign" force (light or sound) interacting with and being changed by some other object (a wall) and then this affected force stimulating some organism's sense receptors and producing the associated experience.

Does echolocation involve the "direct" perception of a wall? Are the features of the auditory experience mind-independent features of the wall? Presumably echolocation involves the experience of such things as pitch and tone and pace? Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. So why would sight be any different?

As I said in the other thread, I think people are just bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences. It confuses them into adopting the naive view of perception which modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael

But that's the thing - how did scientists show it to be wrong if they can only indirectly experience the environment? If you can show something to be wrong regardless of whether or not you have direct or indirect access, then what is the problem? It seems to me that you must directly experience something and by that direct experience you logically work your way back to the original cause which is an object reflecting light. What is missing with indirect access because either way you have access to accurate information? And if you can show what you're missing with indirect access when you only have indirect access, then again you are still able to show what is the case without anything missing.

You want to participate in a discussion of Wittgenstein but refuse to read what he said. Read him and see if my interpretation follows from what he said, and then you might have a better chance of following my interpretation. — Fooloso4

No. I have read what he said, as well as what you are saying. I am then going on to ask questions about what both you and he said and you are unable to be consistent with your explanation, or refuse to address the points I am making. I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered. When you are inconsistent and intellectually dishonest then that is my reason to not trust your interpretation. These are not "gotcha" questions. These are questions that I am asking to better understand your interpretation. Contradictions and hypocrisy leads to more confusion, not a better understanding of what Witt, or you said.

Common usage also includes:

2. an event that happensby chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

How is that any different than how I've been using it, or the definition I provided here:

An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause. — Harry Hindu

I have pointed out several times now that in trying to show that we cannot predict some outcome, you provide different reasons as to why there would be a different outcome, thereby defeating your own argument. If we understand this particular definition the same way, then we would both realize that there would not be a reason for anything - that reasons would be meaningless. The problem is that I don't think you are thinking about the implications of what you and Witt are saying. You just say them and expect others to sit in awe of what you said. It seems that you have emotionally invested yourself in the things Witt has said, and that Witt (and by association you) can never be wrong about anything.

Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it.
— Harry Hindu

What is the case prior to interpreting a text, is the text itself. The irony is that you have declared my interpretation wrong without even looking at the text itself. In addition, you declare Wittgenstein wrong based on claims of what he said that you pulled out of who knows where. — Fooloso4

I pulled it out of the dictionary.

I haven't declared anything wrong - just incoherent.

For you to read some text, the text has to already be available, no? - meaning someone had to write it down, right?

That is a lot of potential for accidents ...
— Harry Hindu

Yes, Wite-Out was a much used product. It is still sold but not used as much since we can easily fix typos with a word processor. — Fooloso4

You're still missing (or ignoring) the point and committing the same error that undermines your own argument. Here you have just provided reasons as to why we use White-Out, why it's not used as much now, etc. Not to mention that you ignore all the times we don't need to use White-Out, or the backspace key on the keyboard. My point was that every case was an accident, then there would be no consistency between typing a letter on the keyboard and seeing the letter you typed. The fact that the right letter appears on the screen MOST (99%) of the time poses a problem to your position.

I don't know exactly which other squabble you're alluding to, but bear in mind that when someone opposes "world" to "language" they often mean the less encopassing "fact" and "proposition" respectively. — bongo fury

This doesn't explain the nature of the opposition or distinction. What does it even mean to say that the world is the totality of facts and not of things, if not that the world is a relation of facts? If facts don't stand in relation to other facts, then each fact would be separate from the world and not be part of the totality that is the world in the same way that the world is distinct from language. Language use requires a medium and that medium is the world.

What is a fact? Saying that a fact is what is the case or a state of affairs isn't saying anything about the nature of what a fact is. What is the case, and what is the state of affairs if not events, or relations between things?

It seems to be a vague use of terms. It's more meaningful to think of the world as the totality of information with information being the relation between causes and their effects. So the world is the totality of causes and their effects and their relation is a fact.

Hence relations do not cause changes to the facts. Relations are in the picture of the world, not in the facts. The relations form the picture of the facts. — Banno

So humans and their relations do not change the world as a result of those relations? Then I guess racism is not something that can change the facts of discrimination, nor could the relations Trump showed ever have changed the outcome of the election so there was never any reason to worry or waste time and taxpayer dollars with a committee to investigate what Trump showed and how it might cause a change in the facts.

If facts are not relations then how did anyone come to understand that the world is composed of facts, or even what a fact is, if we can only show relations with pictures and words?

You mistake what you take the terms 'accident' and 'necessity' to mean for what the terms mean in their various uses. — Fooloso4

All I've been doing is trying to follow your interpretation of Witt. You have been unable to make a sensible case of your own interpretation. It's not how I take the terms, but how most people take the terms:

accident
ăk′sĭ-dənt, -dĕnt″
noun
An unexpected and undesirable event, especially one resulting in damage or harm.
An unforeseen event that is not the result of intention or has no apparent cause.
An instance of involuntary urination or defecation.

necessary
nĕs′ĭ-sĕr″ē
adjective
Needed or required: synonym: indispensable.
Unavoidably determined by prior conditions or circumstances; inevitable.
Logically inevitable.

It is you that are taking the terms to mean something other than their various uses, so it is incumbent upon you and Witt to lay out the way you're using the terms when not using them the way most people use them.

Many scholars recognize the value of hermeneutics. — Fooloso4

Then you should be finding value in many different interpretations. Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it. You keep making the same mistake and when I point it out, you ignore it.

For what reason?
— Harry Hindu

You assume there must be some reason why things happen as they do. Wittgenstein rejected this assumption. So do I. The issue is not as settled as you assume. This is not the thread to discuss it but see, for example: Sean Carroll:s On Determinism — Fooloso4

No. I was asking for what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do. The reason why I accept the idea that there are reasons things happen as they do is by experience, like right now, when I'm typing this post my fingers are tapping the keyboard and scribbles appear on the screen. Look at all the letters on this screen and each one was typed prior to it appearing on the screen. That is a lot of potential for accidents, yet we all are able to type each letter in the correct sequence to form a word, sentence and paragraph without much of a problem. If what you are saying is the case, then one would expect that this page would be filled with blank posts, random scribbles, etc. but it isn't. Why?

Once again you want to stipulate the meaning of terms. Logical necessity has a very specific meaning in the Tractatus, and what it says is not what you claim. — Fooloso4

It is you and Witt that want to stipulate the meaning of terms too. The problem appears to be that we don't want to agree on the usage of the terms, so there ends up being no communication. I cannot picture your meaning if we are not agreeing on their usage. That is what I've been trying to do - just to find out where we differ in our usage and what you are actually saying if you don't mean "accident" and "necessity" in the same way most people do. You are free to use other words if they capture the meaning of what you are trying to convey. Use them.

The conditions may be there but those conditions might support both A and B or A and N, all of which may be possible under those conditions. — Fooloso4

Using the term, "possible" just shows that you are confusing what is the case with our ignorance of what is the case. How would you know what is possible if not by referring to what the prior conditions are?

Nonsense! That is not what he asserts. Read the book. Then we can discuss it. — Fooloso4

I have and it makes as much sense as the Bible does. It is open to personal interpretation, so anyone's interpretations is just as good as anyone else's. I prefer a good science book on language. Steve Pinker is a much better read than Witt.

Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs,
— Banno

Yes. Fact = state of affairs = relation. — bongo fury

and is it a fact that the relation shows the state of affairs, and as such is part of the world and not distinct from it?

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations. — Banno

The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. — Banno

Only in a warped sense. "Distict" and "of" are relations, so it seems that relations are primary and the world and pictures are part of a relation. If pictures only show relations, then what are you showing when you use the scribble, "facts", if not that facts are relations too? The attraction to Witt's ideas are similar to the attraction to the Bible or Koran's ideas - in that they show that humans are distinct from nature, hence in an important sense "special".

Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? — Richard B

The problem here is that Witt failed to apply his own arguement to the rules of language use, which would end up pulling the rug out from under his own arguement.

Language is composed of scribbles and sounds. If everyone had a different "beetle in their box" when reading the scribbles on this screen then we would never be able to communicate, or play a game. The rules for playing the game would be different for each person, just like the "beetle in the box".

The world is the box and we, along with beetles, are all in the same box. People are similar enough that we experience the world similarly, or else we'd never be able to communicate or play the game using the same rules.

Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident. — Fooloso4

Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. I'm taking issue with his improper use of language.

Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected — Fooloso4

For what reason? And by giving a reason you end up proving my point that reasons are necessary to accept or reject any assertion of what the case is. Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation.

5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former. — Fooloso4

Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. The same can be said of Witt having written his books. Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. Did he not infer that others would read his book only after he wrote it? Did he think that others could read his book if he never wrote it? Seems like you and Witt believe that others can read Witts book if he never wrote it.

Yet he is asserting a belief in the causal nexus of reasons and conclusions. Again the relationship between reasons and conclusions are as much a part of the world as any other causal relation. Everything is process, relations, or information. In this sense, there is no difference between reasons and conclusions (logical necessity) and any other causal relation. By rejecting one you reject all the other relations. By accepting one causal relation and rejecting all others youd be exhibiting a form of favoritism. There would be no reasons for any conclusions. As a matter of fact reasons are based on observations of what is the case and their conclusions are inferred based on prior observations. So I don't see how you could have any reasons to infer some conclusion if you didn't make any observation.

No one is saying that we can predict everything, or that knowledge has a monopoly of truth, or is even related to truth. Every event is unique, but that does not mean that they arent similar, or else we wouldn't be able to make any predictions at all. Also our predictions are tied to our goals. Much of the time, any prediction we have is tied to the goal at hand which isn't always necessary to know everything to make a successful prediction.

Much in the same way that Fitch’s paradox shows that the knowability and non-omniscience principles are incompatible, direct realism and scientific realism are incompatible: if the mind-independent world is as the Standard Model says it is then it isn’t as we ordinary perceive it to be and vice-versa.

So pick your poison: either indirect realism or scientific instrumentalism. — Michael

The distinction between direct vs. direct realism is non-sensical when you include the experience as part of the world your experiencing, and understand that effects carry information about their causes. The (right or wrong) interpretation of that causal relationship is what creates the distinction between direct and indirect. A mirage is exactly what you'd expect to experience given the nature of light and and it's interaction with an eye-brain system when you arrive at the correct interpretation and not the false one (interpreting it as a pool of water).

Direct realism doesn’t appear to work under any scenario. — Michael

Do you not have direct access to your experience and isn't your experience part of the world as much as what your experience is of?

You still seem to know what the case is even though your experience is indirect. So what's missing? What's the difference between indirect and direct if you are still able to know what the case is in either case if not the interpretation itself?

Why is it the words and not the events that inform us?" ?

Or "why are the words still about the events?" ?
— bongo fury

The former.

There seems to be chain of causality - events -> (various perception processes) -> (various executive process) -> writing words to convey the events -> looking at words conveying the event -> (various perception processes) -> (various linguistic process) -> (various executive processes) -> (working memory storage) -> (more executive functions and long term memory processes - collectively called 'learning').

There seems a lot of stages between words and learning, so if stages between is what leads to the charge of indirectness, then the we indirectly learn from the words too. — Isaac

Right. Reading words informs us as much as reading someone's behavior, or the color of an apple, or the sound of waves crashing, etc. Scribbles and utterances (can be) just as informative as any other visual and auditory experience. The "philosophers" on this forum tend to separate language from the world much like theists separate humans from the world. That is a mistake.

My experience doesn’t show me the nature of the world independent of experience, the Standard Model and other scientific theories do. — Michael

But how if all you have is your experience? How did we come to have scientific theories of how the world is independent of experience if not by some experience? You seem to be saying that you have knowledge of the world independent of experience. How is that possible unless you're omniscient?

Scientific realism isn’t a given, and even if it were true, the world as described by the Standard Model is very unlike the world as seen in everyday experience, — Michael

How do we know the difference between our experience of the world and the way the world is independent of our experience? You must have had some experience to even make this claim, so there must be some experience that has informed you how the world is independent if your experience. Or your experience is sufficient to know how the world is independent of your own experience. There must be something in your experience that informs you of how the world is unlike your experience, but how could that be if not by some experience?

Seems to me that you've misused language.

There are two philosophical points here. The first is that, since the "unseen" world causes what we see, we can and have used those causes to grasp the nature of that unseen world. Science did what Kant imagined to be impossible. — Banno

Yup. Effects, like a visual experiences, carry information about their causes, like the object and the light reflected off the object and into your eye. Information is the relationship between cause and effect.

I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time. — Fooloso4

Which was my point that there would be other necessary, non-accidental conditions that led to different conditions. You're proving my point, not yours.

You're confusing what was, is, or will be the case with your ignorance of what was, is, or will be the case.

Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do. — Fooloso4

But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? If there were no other conditions preventing you from doing it, wouldn't you be doing it? If not, then you never intended to do it in the first place. Do any of your posts appear on this screen without you having intended to post them?

What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically — Fooloso4

How would you know what is possible if everything that is the case is an accident? What is not the case isn't necessarily possible. What is not the case is just as much probable as improbable, because you have no evidence to support the probability nor improbability. There is no evidence for what is not the case. So if what you mean by "logical space" is "imaginary" then I guess we agree.

Entities are patterns of properties.
— Harry Hindu

At a stretch. Ok. If mental entities include linguistic conventions, then no one counseled dispensing with them. — bongo fury

Not at all. You recognize entities, like your pet or your friend, by their pattern of properties - patterns of sensory properties - their color, shape, the sound of their voice, the feel of their touch, their smell, etc., just as you are able to distinguish between coffee and water, but the pattern of color, smell, taste, etc.

My question was simply what is left if we can dispense with mental entities, and you've ended up showing that we cannot dispense with mental entities. Linguistic conventions are patterns of scribbles and sounds - mental entities.

Note 'extraspatiotermporal' which in plain language means 'not in time and space'. So these kinds of 'objects' are not existent in the sense that phenomena are existent, as phenomena exist in time and space. — Wayfarer

but it does exist as a phenomena of your imagination and your imagination is just another fact of the world, or what is the case.

Ok, so in a limited (physicalist) sense you could say that extraspatiotemporal objects are not determinate, but in a general (mathematical) sense they are just as well-defined and hence determinate as spatiotemporal mathematical objects. — litewave

Like I said, they know what the edges are and what is fuzzy.

An indeterminate thing is a thing with no definition - not worthy of contemplating (even if you could), much less talk about - so a misuse of language.

Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.

"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to.

What about:
"The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts.

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case"

It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts.

It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. Imaginings and lies are what are not the case. All facts determine only what is the case. The totality of facts could only determine what isn't the case when minds evolved to imagine and lie.

What is the relation between language and real, nameable objects? This is the question of the basis of the concept of an object or category of objects. Doesn’t the mathematical determination follow upon the linguistic-semantic determination? Are you assuming that language is referential: we assign a semantic meaning and then associate it with a linguistic token? How do I know that my token means the same thing as your token? Is there a fact of the matter that will settle such disputes of meaning and sense? Do the empirical facts of the world ( or dictionary definitions) intervene to settle these matters? — Joshs

It seems to me that whenever anyone uses language they intend to convey information to others. The fact of the matter is the relation the speaker or writer has between the sounds and scribbles they make and the idea they intended to convey. What that might be is anyone's guess, but if you speak the same language as the speaker or writer, somehow, your chances of interpreting that relationship is substantially better than if you didn't speak their language. This must mean something, or else I can speak Italian and say that it's Vietnamese without any fact of the matter to stop me - if my intent was to cause confusion. If my intent was to communicate, then it would help to know the language of my audience.

lol, what did you mean by quoting Wittgenstein? For you to quote Witt, Witt had to write something that you found meaning in an wanted to share with us. So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen?

Not an entity, that's the thing. A linguistic regularity. A pattern. — bongo fury

Entities are patterns of properties.

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity. — Fooloso4

"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. So it is necessary to use the appropriate terms if your goal is to communicate your ideas efficiently. It would also seem necessary to learn a language before you can use it. If those are necessary causes for communication to happen then why wouldn't other relations in the world not be causal in the same way? What's so special about language use when language use is simply another process in the world?

Convention? — bongo fury

...a mental entity

Thought has a transcendental logical structure. You cannot think illogically (3.03) The relations of simple objects share this logical structure. The movement of tectonic plates is accidental.

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.

:up:
Even when philosophers say that things are fuzzy around the edges, it seems that they have determined what edges are and what is fuzzy.

Language, art, music, etc.
— bongo fury

How are language, art and music NOT mental entities? Dont you mean ink marks, paint blotches and oscillating air molecules? It seems that those would be the non-mental entities and language, art and music would be the mental intenties as that is what certain ink marks, paint blotches and oscillating air molecules are arbitrarily interpreted as being. Arbitrary interpretations are mental entities.

For instance, how do we non-korean-speaking people know that Korean is a language? It just looks like scribbles and strange sounds being made by some people to us. How can you explain the difference in how different people interpret different scribbles and utterances if not by referring to mental entities?

It seems to me that if Witt were alive today he'd contradict himself again just as his Investigations contradicted his Tractus. One could argue that philosophy is simply language use and if language use is a game then philosophy has been relegated to a game of Scribbles (not Scrabble). It does seem that way when reading many of the posts on this forum. I'm more interested in what you're referring to with scribbles, or what is the case in the world. If that isn't how you're using your scribbles, then you're really saying anything useful.

and being that thoughts are part of the world thoughts are what is the case as much as any other part of the world. The question is how are thoughts, which is one case, be about another entirely different case (not thoughts), like the movement of tectonic plates, if not by some form of causation (energy transfer, information transfer, etc.)?

If they're about things in the world, they're fine. It's mainly philosophy that tries to comment on the world from a vantage point external to it. — Tate

So does science. Science and Philosophy are about things. Is the idea of multiple universes and dark matter in the domain of philosophy or science? Are they mental entities as bongo put it, or something else?

The difference seems to be in the amount of observable evidence there is and its predictive power.

If evidence and predictive power are not mental entities then what are they? Are they something in the world?

That metaphysical claims are nonsense. — Tate

Depends on the claim. Maybe the issue is saying that you can claim any metaphysical position. Seems that you can only ponder or hypothesize metaphysical positions. A claim would change it from being metaphysical to scientific, no? Are scientific claims nonsense? Why?

That's the kind of reason I (and I claimed also W) counselled dispensing with mental entities.

I was going along with it (entities included) out of interest, while I thought I could follow. Awareness too, and I'm out of here. — bongo fury

If we dispense with mental entities then what is left?

I wonder what role does awareness play here. Is awareness a feeling or thought? In being aware of your feelings and thoughts are you feeling your feelings and/or thinking your thoughts?

It gained traction with advancements in the natural sciences which heavily depended on observation and repeatability as a ground for establishing fact verses hypothesis or beliefs. — Benj96

And then lost traction when science discovered that the world is not as it appears and that observers might actually influence what is observed.

To my mind, methodologically speaking, materialism (facticity, data) is a subset of physicalism (modeling) which is subset of naturalism (explanation). — 180 Proof

So physicalism, materialism and naturalism are concepts. How are concepts physical, material or natural? How do physical things and concepts interact, or how do physical things come to possess concepts?

As a metaphysics, it's arbitrary, even scientistic. However, as a methodology (criterion) for eliminaing "nonphysical" concepts from the construction of explanatory models of phenomena, physicalism is demonstrably more useful than any non/anti-physicalist alternative. — 180 Proof

Sounds circular. What does it even mean for a concept to be physical vs. Non-physical? Are you talking about the ontology of concepts, or what the concepts are about? If the latter how do concepts come to be about anything? Is aboutness physical or non-physical?

Interesting argument. I didn't ask or answer any such questions in 4th grade. I think most of us live unexamined lives, derive value systems unsystematically through experience and socialisation, holding onto views that are an amalgam of fallacies, prejudices and models of reality which can't be justified. I think the point is ignorance is bliss, truth seeking doesn't ususally make any real difference to survivability or prosperity and people have no idea how much of what they think is deficient. — Tom Storm

Everyone examines their lives at some point - usually in the late teens - early twenties. They question their existence and their purpose. The real question is how much of an examination does your life need before you can get on with just living it? Philosophy seems to have shown that you can never know anything, or that you have to start with some assumptions. So it would be pointless to keep asking questions for which you will never get an answer.

Philosophers are the ones that don't seem to realize that as they attempt to re-ask the same questions we asked and solved in the 4th grade.
— Harry Hindu

What are those questions? — Jackson

What are propositions? What is a language? What is science? What are numbers? etc.