I think that making use of the grammar of first order logic helps here, in obliging us to take care as to what we mean by "exists". — Banno

For sure, and there's a great deal to be said for clear and minimal ontological commitments. Analytic philosophy does some excellent work by taking predicate logic as a kind of model of good grammar for philosophers. Probably the things I'm worrying about in this OP only arise when one begins to question whether the world reflects these same commitments, and whether formalisms necessarily capture everything we want to say, philosophically.

Which leads to some of @Leontiskos's reservations. See my next post.

it would apparently be completely against the spirit of this thread to bracket all questions about being and ontology. — Leontiskos

If by “bracket” you mean “declare them out of bounds when discussing predication,” then yes, there wouldn’t be much left to say about whether predication might reveal parallels between existence and truth. But I think it’s fine to get clear on what the standard commitments are, and why they’re so useful. Particularly useful for those of us like me who hated actually doing logic.

A lot of my Kimhi-inspired concerns are very much contrary to the postulates of Fregean philosophy. Part of why I like his book so much is that he makes me take such a radical position seriously. (Robert Hanna subtitled his review of Thinking and Being as “It’s the end of analytic philosophy as we know it, and I feel fine!”*) Your suggestion that we try to bring Frege and other predecessors into the conversation is a good one. I’ll work on something brief and hopefully lucid that would contrast Frege with Kimhi on a couple of key questions . . .

* Let me add that I think Hanna’s piece is ill-considered and shallow, full of careless reading, and a terrible place to start if you’re interested in Kimhi.

Perhaps Kimhi recognizes this, but the idea is that to recognize the notion of the true requires a second act of the intellect, a kind of back-folding of the intellect, or the trough and the crest of the selfsame wave of apprehension. — Leontiskos

Yes, Kimhi believes this is important. He calls it an act of self-consciousness that follows an act of consciousness, and claims that it applies to any thought that p, not just the thought ‛p is true’:

‛I think p’ can be called a spontaneous self-clarification of p. I call it self-clarificatory because it brings out the content of consciousness without adding anything to it or determining anything about it. I call it spontaneous because the clarification is immediately available through the display of the judgment that p. — Kimhi

Part of what’s confusing in Kimhi is that he often uses ‛I think p’ to mean ‛I judge that p’, as you can see in the above passage. But of course ‛I judge that p’ is even closer to what you’re calling “the notion of the true,” and Kimhi is certainly pointing to a second act of the intellect which makes self-conscious what has been initially thought or judged.

If by “bracket” you mean “declare them out of bounds when discussing predication,” then yes, there wouldn’t be much left to say about whether predication might reveal parallels between existence and truth. — J

Right.

But I think it’s fine to get clear on what the standard commitments are, and why they’re so useful. Particularly useful for those of us like me who hated actually doing logic. — J

Sure, I agree.

“It’s the end of analytic philosophy as we know it, and I feel fine!”* — J

Hah, I like that quote. I have a love-hate relationship with analytic philosophy. I was trained at an analytic school that strongly emphasized Thomism, and after a long time I began to see the downfalls of analytic philosophy, as well as the idea that a reduction of Thomism to analytic philosophy is an impoverishment. At the same time, Thomism is conducive to analytic philosophy, and can form a bridge between analytic philosophy and more substantial approaches to philosophy.

Analytic philosophy ought to be a transparent frame that can represent all different kinds of thinking, but it turns out to be pigeon-holed in certain directions. But I digress.

Part of what’s confusing in Kimhi is that he often uses ‛I think p’ to mean ‛I judge that p’, as you can see in the above passage. But of course ‛I judge that p’ is even closer to what you’re calling “the notion of the true,” and Kimhi is certainly pointing to a second act of the intellect which makes self-conscious what has been initially thought or judged. — J

Yes, exactly. Clearly Kimhi is interested in using a finer scalpel than Thomas, but there may be a disagreement insofar as Thomas thinks apprehension of being and apprehension of being-as-true are two subtly different things, and that this represents one of the subtle ways that being and truth are separable. Given what you say, it is not clear to me whether Kimhi sees there to be any apprehension of being that is (metaphysically) prior to an apprehension of truth. Or in other words, does Kimhi see the fundamental "act of consciousness" as already bound up with truth?

It may be that while Aquinas is interested in comparing being to truth, Kimhi is interested in comparing being to the superset of truth called "thinking." For Aquinas being and truth are not the same thing, and yet it requires great subtlety to discern and describe in what way they differ. Nevertheless, if we set aside the very fine scalpel for a moment, it seems that their difference has to do with the difference between apprehension and judgment. For Aquinas there is a subtle way in which being precedes truth, and also apprehension of being precedes apprehension of truth (and certainly judgment of truth).

When we think about formal predications being and truth seem to always go hand in hand, because in formal predication truth is being taken for granted, and as Aquinas points out, being is always taken for granted. For this reason I don't see how the two could separate in that formal context (and by "formal predication" I am not necessarily talking about anything more complicated than things like, "The grass is long."). If we want to test their separability we must move out of that context.

- Yes, good.

The expression "p is true" says no more than "p" — RussellA

This is a little tricky. Doesn't it depend on exactly what we mean by "say 'p'"? I can write 'p' in this sentence, as in fact I do, and we know that it's meant to stand for a well-formed proposition. But is this the same kind of "saying p" as in "I tell you p" or "I judge that p" or "I assert p"? Probably not, especially if we follow Frege. Some kind of assertion or force is missing.

So maybe we need to put it this way: "The expression 'p is true' says no more than 'p', PROVIDED that 'saying p' in this context means asserting p or judging p." But quite often, "saying p" doesn't come with any assertoric force -- we can name or mention 'p' without asserting it. That is the circumstance under which saying 'p is true' would give us a new predication. And let's not forget that asserting p, or saying 'p is true' doesn't make it true. That requires something else, maybe the Tarskian model you describe.

This is a little tricky. Doesn't it depend on exactly what we mean by "say 'p'"? — J

As you wrote:

I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

Yes, the expression "p is true" says no more than "p".

I agree that "says no more" is a figure of speech, but is intended to have the same meaning as your "adds nothing".

Consider the sentence "there are a hundred thalers on the table is true".

Because the word "true" is internal to the sentence, it cannot be making a judgment or assertion about either i) the other parts of the sentence it is within or ii) the sentence as a whole.

For the word "true" to be making a judgment or assertion about the sentence "there are a hundred thalers on the table" it will have to be external, such as "it is true that "there are a hundred thalers on the table"".

In other words, a sentence cannot be "self-conscious", using another figure of speech.

Given what you say, it is not clear to me whether Kimhi sees there to be any apprehension of being that is (metaphysically) prior to an apprehension of truth. Or in other words, does Kimhi see the fundamental "act of consciousness" as already bound up with truth? — Leontiskos

I don’t know. On questions like this, I find Kimhi at his most obscure. Typical statement: “The critical insight -- that any unity in consciousness is essentially self-consciousness of that unity -- is recognized to coincide with the insight that the consciousness of logical activity is inseparable from the capacity to manifest this activity in language.” Even in context, it’s hard to make this out. He is clear that he opposes what he calls “psycho / logical dualism”: “a theory of judgment as involving a subjective act and a truth-evaluable content – the unity and complexity of which is external to the judging subject.” In short, he doesn’t accept the Fregean picture that assertoric force is separate from whatever semantic content will determine truth value. But the “psycho / logical monism” that he does accept is (for me) very difficult to understand. I’ll take my best guess and say that, unlike Aquinas, Kimhi sees the “fundamental act of consciousness” as either affirmation or denial – what he calls a two-way capacity, borrowing from Aristotle. Propositions are affirmed or denied by acts of consciousness, not by predications – a kind of “full context principle.” Does this amount to truth being fundamental somehow? Maybe.

He also has this interesting observation, which harks back to the QV discussion, and to @banno’s reminders here about logical form and ontological commitment: Kimhi calls Frege’s logic a functionalist logic, and says moreover that it’s extensionalist, “insofar as the truth-value of a proposition depends only on the extensional identity of its components and the manner of composition. Among other things, that means that logical principles are not about propositions (thoughts) but about what gets quantified.” (my italics) This is a pretty concise way of framing the problem. Because if you oppose this view of logic, as Kimhi does, then you seem to be saying that “propositions (thoughts)” can be the subject of logical thinking without committing to “what gets quantified,” which in turn would mean that existence can – would have to be – more than just “the value of a bound variable.” I dunno, maybe I’m reading too much into it, but that’s what it says to me.

Looks like this has to be personal.

...but everyone in the thread proved incapable of these metalogical distinctions. — Leontiskos

Well, as one of those who participated, I'd characterise the interaction differently. You were unable to set out clearly what it was you wanted to show.

That, of course, does not mean that your point, whatever it was, was wrong, but that it could not be addressed.

It was also pretty clear that there were a few points of logic that you did not accept. That does not bode well for a thread such as this.

I am of the opinion that Banno at least somewhat derailed your thread on QV by immediately shifting it away from Sider's ontological realism and towards pure logical formalisms which intentionally avoid questions of ontology. — Leontiskos

It's discourteous to mention without linking.

Formalism seeks clarity in otherwise opaque discourse. In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. (?)

But you want to play with archaic logic again, a topic in which I have little interest. Enjoy.

obably the things I'm worrying about in this OP only arise when one begins to question whether the world reflects these same commitments, and whether formalisms necessarily capture everything we want to say, philosophically. — J

Formalism just obliges good grammar. It shows us how to set things out more clearly.

And of course there is the further issue of whether we can indeed say all the things we want to say - philosophical or not.

Formalism seeks clarity in otherwise opaque discourse. In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. (↪J?) — Banno

It's a direct answer, certainly. I was curious to learn more about what philosophers have said concerning the parallels between "truth" and "existence" as predicates, in the light of some concerns raised by Kimhi. I know I haven't given nearly enough of Kimhi's thought here (or perhaps too much :wink: ), but based on what's been discussed so far, do you think his reservations about Fregean predicate logic can be definitively shown to be misguided? I'm not sure whether you think you've answered the OP in the sense of putting my doubts to rest. I'd be very interested to hear more along those lines.

Just saw this after posting my latest. Thanks, makes sense.

Cheers.

I don't have Kimhi's book, so I can't answer any issues raised there directly. In any case it seems what is needed is a thesis, or a series of theses, rather than a thread.

I suggested that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. The obvious response is to ask what "about" is doing here. And so we move to talk of sense and reference, intension and extension, and so on, and the supposed rejection of Frege. The classical solution was, roughly, that an extensional understanding of logic is preferable simply because it is simpler. But there are intensional logics, which as I understand it tend to treat the intension of individuals as propositions; or more recently as algorithms. Speaking roughly, the extension is the thing we are talking about, the intension is the thing we are doing with it.

All this by way of saying that if the point is to improve on Frege, then that's pretty much what logic has been doing; and if the point is to show that Frege is mistaken, then it's somewhat closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.

So where does that leave us?

Typical statement: “The critical insight -- that any unity in consciousness is essentially self-consciousness of that unity -- is recognized to coincide with the insight that the consciousness of logical activity is inseparable from the capacity to manifest this activity in language.” — J

Depends what he means by "manifest". From Merriam Webster, a synonym of "manifest" is "show".

As Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, one can show logic but not say it.

Kimhi will have a hard time in arguing for a psychological/logical monism, and against the dualism of psychological saying and logical showing. Language can be said, but the logic within language can only be shown.

it seems what is needed is a thesis, or a series of theses, rather than a thread. — Banno

Yeah, I'm trying to work up something like that for a fresh OP.

if the point is to show that Frege is mistaken, then it's somewhat closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.

So where does that leave us? — Banno

The simple answer would be, "Providing some carrots and sticks to entice the horse back." I think that's what Kimhi is trying to do, though what you say about intensional logics also fits with some of his concerns. In any event, I don't think that's such a bad place to left in. At worst, we'd discover that Fregean principles are solid, and can withstand even the most careful and creative criticism. At best, we might get a genuinely fresh concept of how philosophical logic can be related to ontological concerns.

That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

It seems to me that it adds nothing because it would be redundant. In making statements about things, you are implying that the things you talk about exist and that your statement is true. If not, then you are lying. When lying you don't say, "It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table." as it is already implied that what you are saying is true and that thalers and the table exists. This is why people are fooled by false statements because they assume that the statement is true without the liar having to actually declare it is true as part of the statement. To show whether or not your statement is true, we need to make an observation.

As this thread has shown, it's complicated. A great deal depends on whether the statement "There are a hundred thalers on the table" occurs in a context where it's reasonable to assume it's also being asserted. Lying is not the only thing that could call this into question. I might be genuinely mistaken about the thalers, though of course I'd still be asserting it. Or I could be merely mentioning the statement, or pointing out something about it, or asking for a discussion of its semantic content. In such a case, the information/predicate that the statement is also true can be provided outside the context of an assertion, so that it isn't redundant. This all goes back to the basic Fregean question of whether we can "say" a proposition, or at least understand it, without asserting it, that is, separate semantics and truth-value from assertoric force. So I think my statement from the OP that you quote was too hasty. I should have written, "I can say 'It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table' but this adds nothing to the semantic content of the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’.

As to how we ascertain the truth of a statement, that's another story, and usually involves some combination of observation, as you say, and correct use of a language. The exact combination has been disputable and I'm sure will continue to be.

As Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, one can show logic but not say it. — RussellA

Hmm. Not quite sure I get this. Can you refer us to some passages in the Tractatus?

Hmm. Not quite sure I get this. Can you refer us to some passages in the Tractatus? — J

Wittgenstein argues in the TLP that propositions cannot represent logical form, that logical form cannot be expressed in language.

Logical form can only be mirrored in language, shown in propositions.

TLP 4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.

TLP 4.12 Propositions can represent the hole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.

TLP 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.

TLP 4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said

As a practical example, given the proposition "the apple is on the table", how can the logical constant "on" be expressed in language?

The Merriam Webster defines "on" as "used as a function word to indicate position in contact with and supported by the top surface of". It then defines "top" as "the highest point, level, or part of something". It then defines "high" as "an elevated place or region". Any attempt to express "on" in language becomes either infinite or circular.

If logical constants cannot be expressed in language, then there is a dualism between language and its logic.

Khimi, however, believes that there is a psychological/logical monism.

He is clear that he opposes what he calls “psycho / logical dualism”: “a theory of judgment as involving a subjective act and a truth-evaluable content – the unity and complexity of which is external to the judging subject.” In short, he doesn’t accept the Fregean picture that assertoric force is separate from whatever semantic content will determine truth value. — J

This strikes me as an important truth, and one that is missed on TPF (and in analytic philosophy generally). Granted, I do see a measure of separability between assertoric force and semantic content, and this is especially useful in a pragmatic or functional sense, but it seems pure fantasy to claim that they are entirely separate.

A metaphor for this thread could be the truck in the mud. The Fregian paradigm does fine in many types of mud, and folks like Banno seem to think that it can handle any kind of mud whatsoever, but Kimhi is introducing mud pits that such folks have never seen or even conceived. I would even say that the failure of Fregian logic in certain contexts is demonstrable, and was already demonstrated in the QV thread by folks like Sider and Simpson. The most honest answer from the Fregian would apparently be something like, "Our system cannot and does not address these questions, but we are not interested in the questions anyway."

But the “psycho / logical monism” that he does accept is (for me) very difficult to understand. I’ll take my best guess and say that, unlike Aquinas, Kimhi sees the “fundamental act of consciousness” as either affirmation or denial – what he calls a two-way capacity, borrowing from Aristotle. Propositions are affirmed or denied by acts of consciousness, not by predications – a kind of “full context principle.” — J

I was thinking of bringing the question of affirmation and denial into the thread as well, as it seems central. For those who view logic as bound up with human reasoning and human mental acts, the foundationalness of affirmation and denial cannot be ignored. This is why Aristotle, Aquinas, and presumably Kimhi are interested in those acts. It has never been clear to me how so many on this forum fail to recognize that logic is bound up with human reasoning and human mental acts, and especially how they manage to insulate logic from mental acts, including analyses of assertoric force, existence-predications, predication of truth beyond mere consistency, intellection of terms as opposed to mere discursive arranging, etc. In practice metalogical concerns are simply ignored, but they become the elephant in the room.

This has been on my backburner for some time, and I will look at Aquinas (and also Aristotle), but my sense is that Aquinas would say that affirmation and denial are the foundational linguistic and logical acts, but that they are the crest after the trough of the wave of apprehension, and that trough is apprehension of being. So affirmation always does follow upon apprehension of being, but the two are not identical.

He also has this interesting observation, which harks back to the QV discussion, and to banno’s reminders here about logical form and ontological commitment: Kimhi calls Frege’s logic a functionalist logic, and says moreover that it’s extensionalist, “insofar as the truth-value of a proposition depends only on the extensional identity of its components and the manner of composition. Among other things, that means that logical principles are not about propositions (thoughts) but about what gets quantified.” (my italics) This is a pretty concise way of framing the problem. Because if you oppose this view of logic, as Kimhi does, then you seem to be saying that “propositions (thoughts)” can be the subject of logical thinking without committing to “what gets quantified,” which in turn would mean that existence can – would have to be – more than just “the value of a bound variable.” I dunno, maybe I’m reading too much into it, but that’s what it says to me. — J

These are good and interesting thoughts, but surely the task is to define an alternative to extensionalism, and then within this process one will end up better defining extensionalism. In particular I wonder if we can discern an alternative without adverting to metaphysics and the very difficult question of being qua being. More simply: does a critique of extensionalism require one to appeal to a metaphysical context, or is the critique also achievable within a physical context?

I do see value in the extensionalism of analytic philosophy, but it also has limitations. On one view extensionalism is a later and inevitable stage in logic, and the preliminary stages involve gaining an understanding of the realities and terms that will be manipulated by the extensionalist framework. It seems that Kimhi is saying that it isn't this simple, and that the paradigm of extensionalism is not even sufficient to make true sense of this later stage of logic. I do think that if we press intelligent extensionalists they will say, "Well yes, I admit that there are simplifications and pragmatic assumptions occurring in our work." Someone like Kimhi is perhaps pressing further, asking for a more precise specification of what those simplifications and assumptions are.

In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. — Banno

How would this be an answer to the OP? The question we are considering is whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism, and it seems a foregone conclusion that they are not. For example:

I was curious to learn more about what philosophers have said concerning the parallels between "truth" and "existence" as predicates... — J

Given that there is no explicit predication of existence (or, I think, truth) within formal logics, how could this question possibly be answered by limiting ourselves to formal logics?

It's a bit like if someone said they wanted to look at the interaction between thunderstorms and tornadoes, and then the lab scientist tries to give an answer without leaving his concrete bunker. The scientific lab in the concrete bunker is very helpful, in large part because it excludes thunderstorms and hurricanes from the environment and makes everything a lot simpler. But if we want to study thunderstorms and hurricanes, or their interaction, then it's no use pretending that the scientific lab within the concrete bunker is going to suffice.

The classical solution was, roughly, that an extensional understanding of logic is preferable simply because it is simpler. — Banno

Simplifications are preferable until they're not. What often happens is that folks forget they are dealing with a simplification, and they forget that there is something beyond these simplifications.

But there are intensional logics... — Banno

Sure, and intentional logic would seem to be a topic that is relevant to the thread. The danger of derailment that I spoke of is not present in a discussion of intentional logic, for that which the thread is premised upon is not rejected in such a case. :up:

Thank you, that gives a good context. I always approach the Tractatus with the (increasingly faint) hope that it will reveal its secrets to me, but it never has. Later Wittgenstein means a great deal to me, but I can never quite get the propositions of the Tractatus to yield the sense that I know many good philosophers find in them.

I don't want to pull us off onto Wittgenstein, so I'l just ask one more follow-up question: Can you say what the difference is between "representing" logical form and "mirroring" logical form? The example of the apple on the table suggests that, while "on" is undefinable without circularity, its logical form can nevertheless be shown through usage. That doesn't sound like the same issue -- or is it?

I appreciate your thoughtful response to this. As I mentioned in an earlier post, I'm going to try to write up a couple of specific examples of a Kimhi-inspired challenge to Fregean philosophy of logic, which will better address many of these questions. That way we can sink our teeth into the details, and have some idea what the arguments would need to show, without having to go read all of Thinking and Being and/or get pulled into too much metaphilosophy.

It may take a while, though. Dusting off my Frege . . .

...there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing — Banno

How would this be an answer to the OP? — Leontiskos

I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. Hence

It's a direct answer, certainly. — J

J apparently can see how it addresses the OP

Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. Not

...whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism, and it seems a foregone conclusion that they are not. — Leontiskos

...which is too general, too glib. I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism".

Similarly, the following shows some misapprehension:

Given that there is no explicit predication of existence (or, I think, truth) within formal logics... — Leontiskos

We have both existential quantification and ∃!. And we have Tarski and all the ensuing work. These are concerted efforts to explore the grammar of truth and existence. First order logic shows that quantification is not a first order predicate, free logic shows the implications of treating existence as a first order predicate. Tarski explicitly makes truth a second order predicate ranging over propositions. Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant.

But you are afeared of formalism:

...how could this question possibly be answered by limiting ourselves to formal logics? — Leontiskos

There is no suggestion that we limit ourselves to formal logic. But you might benefit from making at least some use of it. It seems we are repeating the problem seen in other threads, where a lack of literacy in formal languages leads to an inability to set out the issues clearly.

...intentional logic would seem to be a topic that is relevant to the thread. — Leontiskos

Neither of us, nor I suspect anyone else here, have the background in intensional logic (with an "s", not a "t") that is required. I'll just leave here the intuition that more recent developments in treating intensions as algorithms reinforce treating intension as use, and leave it at that.

This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until @J can formulate a more explicit topic.

I'll keep an eye out for further posts from you. Thanks for bringing Irad Kimhi to my attention.

As this thread has shown, it's complicated. A great deal depends on whether the statement "There are a hundred thalers on the table" occurs in a context where it's reasonable to assume it's also being asserted. — J

...like in everyday language-use because we typically use language to inform others of some state of affairs in the world whether it be what is on the table or what is on this page.

Lying is not the only thing that could call this into question. I might be genuinely mistaken about the thalers, though of course I'd still be asserting it. — J

...which you would be lying to yourself.

Or I could be merely mentioning the statement, or pointing out something about it, or asking for a discussion of its semantic content. — J

...which you would be referring to the scribbles on the page or the sounds coming from your mouth and not actually thalers on the table and would be just as redundant to say that "It is true that I am mentioning the statement" or pointing our something about it (like the statement exists on this page). In other words, it is redundant to make statements about things that we can already see for ourselves.

In such a case, the information/predicate that the statement is also true can be provided outside the context of an assertion, so that it isn't redundant. This all goes back to the basic Fregean question of whether we can "say" a proposition, or at least understand it, without asserting it, that is, separate semantics and truth-value from assertoric force. So I think my statement from the OP that you quote was too hasty. I should have written, "I can say 'It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table' but this adds nothing to the semantic content of the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’.

As to how we ascertain the truth of a statement, that's another story, and usually involves some combination of observation, as you say, and correct use of a language. The exact combination has been disputable and I'm sure will continue to be. — J

In other words, the semantic content involves what you are actually talking about that others can observe for themselves to verify the truth, whether it be thalers on the table or scribbles on the screen. I would say that the difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledge is supported by both logic and observation while beliefs are only supported by one or the other.

Can you say what the difference is between "representing" logical form and "mirroring" logical form? The example of the apple on the table suggests that, while "on" is undefinable without circularity, its logical form can nevertheless be shown through usage. That doesn't sound like the same issue -- or is it? — J

Suppose there are two people in a room, A and B. A has prior knowledge about apples on tables. B doesn't have prior knowledge, but wants to know about apples on tables.

Situation 1) The room is windowless. A describes in words to B what it means for there to be an apple on a table

Situation 2) The room has a window. A points to the window, and B sees through the window that there is an apple on a table.

In 1), the logic of an apple on a table is being "represented", it is being "said"

In 2), the logic of an apple on a table is being "mirrored", it is being "shown"

The problem with 1) is that if B has never previously been "shown" an example of one thing on top of another thing, B will never understand what A is saying, will never understand what is being "said".

Yes, because the word "on" is undefinable without being infinite or circular, its logical form cannot be "said", but its logical form can be "shown".

The question we are considering is whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism.

Within the literature, it seems to me that the words i) assertic force, asserted, force, extrinsic and assertion seem to be synonyms for Frege's "reference" and the words ii) content, semantic, intrinsic and unasserted seem to be synonyms for Frege's "sense".

From the Wikipedia article on Formalism (Philosophy)
Formalists within a discipline are completely concerned with "the rules of the game," as there is no other external truth that can be achieved beyond those given rules.

In these terms, situation 1) is a formalist situation.

But within situation 1), B, never having had prior knowledge of an apple on a table, no matter the words used by A, will never know the truth of what it means for there to be an apple on a table

IE, within a Formalist situation, B can never know the truth of the proposition "there is an apple on the table". True sentences can never be formulable within Formalism.

Thanks, this helps. "Representing" is describing in words, while "mirroring" is more like ostension or making a picture. I'm not satisfied with how this carries over into logical form
(is "on" really a logical connective?), but that can wait till another day.

Within the literature, it seems to me that the words i) assertoric force, asserted, force, extrinsic and assertion seem to be synonyms for Frege's "reference" and the words ii) content, semantic, intrinsic and unasserted seem to be synonyms for Frege's "sense". — RussellA

I would say, not synonyms, but they match up with the distinction that "reference" and "sense" is meant to draw. Semantic content reveals sense, and of course can be unasserted, according to Frege. Assertions and truth-claims about what's actually "out there" depend upon the idea of referring. This thread has mostly focused on how to understand the act of assertion, it seems to me.

*mispost*

I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. — Banno

Okay, I grant that it is a beginning. My point is that formal considerations cannot answer the OP. "There are no true sentences that are not about some thing," is not a formal consideration. It is at best a presupposition of formal logics, not a conclusion. And whether every true sentence in a formal language is about existing things is a contentious topic.

Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. — Banno

As you pointed out:

So generally, existence is not a first order predicate; nor is truth. — Banno

Again, the concepts of existence and truth are presuppositions of formal logic, not things that formal logic handles as first-order predicates. If we are considering and comparing the presuppositions of formal logic, then we have already taken a step beyond the object language.

I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism". — Banno

Even if they could, we know from Godel that not all true sentences can be shown true in propositional logic. By limiting ourselves to a formal context we limit our access to truth.

Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant. — Banno

Claiming that the existential quantifier is equivalent to predicating existence is ignorant, and you know this. Your first post hedged on this sort of thing.

This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until J can formulate a more explicit topic. — Banno

The topic is fine. The problem is your approach which sees everything as a nail, because your only tool is a hammer. If you want a thread on the internal workings of formal logic, maybe you are the one who needs to make a new thread. The idea that all questions can be answered by formal logic is daft, and provably false. It's high time you stopped pigeonholing every thread into your naive paradigm.

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Logical systems are meant to capture correct human reasoning, and although each system fails in certain unique ways, all formal systems fail insofar as they are static and because of this lack recursion or reflexivity. One of the most unique properties of the human mind is its ability to think about its own thoughts, with a kind of infinite reflexivity. Formalized systems lack this "self-knowledge," so to speak. Godel used this fact to prove his incompleteness theorem, but it goes deeper than that. Thinkers who turn their gaze on truth qua truth or being qua being (as opposed to truth qua consistency or being qua stipulation) are using the muscle of the human mind that allows this infinite reflexivity. Trying to do such work while limiting oneself to a static formal system is to presume that the static system can demonstrate true statements about itself in this reflexive manner, and this presumption always turns out to be false. The static system will only ever arrive at faux truth and faux being, for the simplifications that are part and parcel of static systems preclude one from thinking about truth in itself or being in itself.

Thanks, this helps. "Representing" is describing in words, while "mirroring" is more like ostension or making a picture. I'm not satisfied with how this carries over into logical form
(is "on" really a logical connective?), but that can wait till another day. — J

Another day has arrived.

True, prepositions such as "on" are not logical connectives, but rather syncategorematic.

From the Wikipedia article on Syncategorematic term

The distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms was established in ancient Greek grammar. Words that designate self-sufficient entities (i.e., nouns or adjectives) were called categorematic, and those that do not stand by themselves were dubbed syncategorematic, (i.e., prepositions, logical connectives, etc.)

Khimi uses the concept of an a syncategorematic expression, where a syncategorematic expression does not add anything to the sense of any proposition embedded in it.

Therefore, within the proposition "p is true", the expression "is true" is a syncategorematic expression, which adds nothing to the sense of "p".

From the Notre Dame review of Irad Khimi's Thinking and Being

A syncategorematic expression does not add anything (whether content or form) to the sense of any proposition embedded in it. On Kimhi's account, the assertions "Not-p", "A thinks p", "p is true" and, last but not least, "p" itself, do not add anything whatsoever to the sense of "p". None of these expressions stands for a relation. In fact, none of them stands for anything. They all are syncategorematic expressions. That the assertion "p" is itself a syncategorematic unit becomes intelligible once it is realized that the propositional symbol "p" consists in a fact rather than a complex (100).

This means that the proposition "the apple is on the table" is also a syncategorematic unit, meaning that it cannot stand by itself, as not being a self-sufficient entity. In terms of the Tractatus, this proposition is a fact rather than a complex, where a complex would be "the apple is on the table and the table is brown in colour". Complexes derive from facts using truth tables.

I think that I can understand that a Tracterian fact, such as the proposition "the apple is on the table" cannot stand by itself, in the same way the the equally valid proposition "matunda ni juu ya meza" cannot stand by itself, in that any proposition needs a context in order for it to be meaningful.

Syncategorematic expressions need a context.