I think it's perfectly benevolent to allow harm that for all practical purposes will not have existed. — Down The Rabbit Hole

This sounds like excusing away the problem of evil, not dealing with it.

I don't quite see the difference in saying the evil will not have existed "for all practical purposes" and conceding that the being is merely "for all practical purposes" omnibenevolent (aka, isn't omnibenevolent).

Incidentally, my primary argument is that this is the problem of evil, and that you are not dealing with it.

So you're saying that (1) even though the evil would be made up for with the infinite good of the afterlife, the evil still existed (2) which is incompatible with an all-powerful all-loving god? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes.

I don't think 2 follows from 1. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Who says 2 follows from 1?

That evil's existence is incompatible with the three omni's is the problem of evil. The problem of evil doesn't derive the incompatibility from 1; it derives the incompatibility from the three omni's.

The incompatibility is based on the notion that an omnibenevolent being would not allow the harm, that being omniscient he would know about it, and being omnipotent he could prevent it. So the harm should not exist if such a being existed. That the harm exists suggests a failure of at least one of those three omni's.

As Epicurus argued:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? — Epicurus

If that puppy that burned in a house received an eternity of bliss would this make up for it? — Down The Rabbit Hole

The answer doesn't matter. To demonstrate its irrelevance, I'll happily grant it's made up for. In fact, I'll lower the bar tremendously more... I'll grant for the sake of argument that all you need is another puppy to be born, and you made up for it. This grants us a simple numbering scheme summation very similar to your OP; e.g., you're doing this:

-10 + infinite good = infinite good — Down The Rabbit Hole

...and I'm granting this:
-1 + 1 = 0

So there you have it. We made up for the puppy murder with a single puppy birth. The problem here is not the 0 term on the right hand side; it's the -1 term on the left hand side. Add another puppy birth:

-1 + 2 = 1

...and you net positive. That's good, right? Maybe, I'll grant that it's good. But what I'm granting is that the 1 on the right hand side is good. The problem is the same problem... it's not the 1 on the right, it's the -1 term on the left.

-1 + infinity = infinity

...and now it's infinitely good! Okay, I'll grant that. There's an infinity term on the right. There's also an infinity term on the left. But there's still a problem... the -1 term on the left.

The Problem of Evil is not about your sum; it's about the existence of harm at all. The three omni's are inconsistent with there being any negative terms on the left.

If your answer is no, is this because the suffering it experienced burning it the house would still have happened, it cannot be erased? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, you're asking the wrong question. "If your answer is no" demonstrates a misunderstanding of the problem; e.g., I'm granting it is indeed made up for, and you still have the problem. But, yes, it's a problem because "making up" for the negative term doesn't erase it.

Let's add terms:

N + M = T

...and say that N=-1, M=infinity, and T=infinity; i.e., this is the same as above, but we're just giving it labels. What you're asking about is what your "make up for it term" M "adds up to" T. But the problem I'm pointing to is the existence of the negative term N. The problem of evil is about N being there. My point about erasure is that adding your M term doesn't eliminate the problem... the N term. You're treating it as if it does, because you're focusing on the T term on the right... the sum. But the problem of evil is about why there are N terms.

Again, not comparable, as I am talking about individuals experiencing good that outweighs their bad, and not individuals experiencing good that outweighs other's bad. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I'm not sure this is sinking in, so let's spell this out for you. You are presuming to address The Problem of Evil; that phrase, "The Problem of Evil", appears in the topic of this thread. My charge against your presumed answer to The Problem of Evil is that it is an irrelevancy with respect to The Problem of Evil.

So when you say "I am talking about individuals experiencing good that outweighs their bad", that's all fine and dandy, but it doesn't address my charge. It's still irrelevant. If there was one single puppy that burned in one single house, in all eternity, then The Problem of Evil applies, because that one single puppy should not have burned in that one single house in all eternity. If an entity is all knowing, all powerful, and all good, that one single puppy would not have been harmed. Even if we add an infinite amount of infinitely long lived infinitely happy puppies, and that one puppy burned in that one house in all of eternity, then we still have the same problem of evil; it's great that this is "made up for", but why did that one puppy have to get harmed?

That the infinite number of eternal puppies "make up for" the burned puppy is irrelevant even if it does in fact do so, because "make up for" is not the same as erasing. That one single puppy was harmed when there should not be any harmed is the problem.

Your example is not comparable as the black marble does not have an inverse relationship to the white marbles. — Down The Rabbit Hole

How many puppy births undoes a puppy murder?

The finite evil (fire) in the world will always be put out by the eternal good (water) in the afterlife. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Still doesn't work for me. If a single puppy is burned in a house fire, telling me you have an infinite amount of water doesn't make up for it. The amount of water you have is irrelevant; your water does no good unless it puts out the fire before the puppy is harmed.

At least one puppy has died in a house fire. An infinite amount of water doesn't undo the puppy death.

Incidentally, the error you make in your original post is the confusion between some infinite sum of something and "all". The problem of evil is staged with an entity that has the three omni's. A single harmed puppy is all you need to contradict the omni's. That harm can be prevented if the entity is omniscient and omnipotent. The harm should not exist if that same entity is omnibenevolent.

I have two bags. In bag A, I have an infinite number of white marbles, and one black marble. In bag B, I have an infinite number of white marbles, but no black marbles.

I assert the following:
1. Not all marbles in bag A are white.
2. Bag A has more black marbles in it than bag B.

Now, what we talking about?

In each of these branches, Wigner then comes along and measures his friend's results. — Kenosha Kid

Can you at least look it up on Wikipedia or something? — Kenosha Kid

In 1985, David Deutsch proposed a variant of the Wigner's friend thought experiment as a test of many-worlds versus the Copenhagen interpretation. It consists of an experimenter (Wigner's friend) making a measurement on a quantum system in an isolated laboratory, and another experimenter (Wigner) who would make a measurement on the first one. According to the many-worlds theory, the first experimenter would end up in a macroscopic superposition of seeing one result of the measurement in one branch, and another result in another branch. The second experimenter could then interfere these two branches in order to test whether it is in fact in a macroscopic superposition or has collapsed into a single branch, as predicted by the Copenhagen interpretation. Since then Lockwood (1989), Vaidman and others have made similar proposals. These proposals require placing macroscopic objects in a coherent superposition and interfering them, a task now beyond experimental capability. — Many-Worlds interpretation

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

ETA: Just to nip another misunderstanding in the bud, don't assume that my discussion style matches the typical "random internet person"; I'm not out to "win" an argument... my goal here isn't to "prove MWI" to you, or "prove you wrong" (i.e., I'm not "proposing" anything... except that MWI is as I understand it, as far as I understand it). My goal is to simply understand what you're saying. My issue is that your description of MWI makes no sense to me, and doesn't match my understanding of it.

If you agree that what you're proposing is not MWI, — Kenosha Kid

Proposing? What the heck are you talking about? I just described what's not a thing, and had thought you were agreeing it wasn't a thing. But given you think I'm proposing something that isn't MWI, I would say that clearly you're confused.

But as I've told you, Wigner and his friend are not unentangled immediately prior to Wigner's measurement of his friend. — Kenosha Kid

This is a handwaved concept of entanglement. Wigner and Wigner's friend have lots of states that are entangled. What constitutes being "unentangled" to you?

What the Wigner's friend experiment show is that, after entanglement, after the friend has made his measurement, but before Wigner has made his measurement, when we would expect something like (C), — Kenosha Kid

No. We would expect (B). Wigner's friend entangling with the cat's life does not instantaneously make Wigner entangled with the cat's life. If Wigner hasn't done any measurements, there's no reason for Wigner to be entangled.

Wigner is entangled with the lab insofar as communication and coordination about the experiment is ongoing between he and his friend, — Kenosha Kid

I've no idea what "entangled with the lab" means, but it sounds like a fuzzy red herring. Surely Joe, who does a simple double slit experiment (or quantum erasure experiment, if that's what's confusing you), is just as entangled with his lab as Wigner is with his.

Wigner still sees the lab in a superposition: the lab has branched for the friend, but both branches are evident to Wigner, contrary to MWI. — Kenosha Kid

MWI has no objection whatsoever to the universal wavefunction being in a state like (B). Incidentally, (B) implies that Wigner's friend has branched. That live cat in (B) does not know what hydrocyanic acid smells like. But Wigner himself is not branched in (B). The branch is "universal" in the sense that it's a branch in the universal wavefunction (it's right there, in (B)). But it's not "universal" in the sense that Wigner's friend branching implies Wigner branched (he clearly hasn't). Having a person not branch with respect to a wavefunction that is in superposition is not a problem; how else will Joe see an interference pattern?

But that's not MWI, — Kenosha Kid

Nobody is saying it's MWI.

What I'm trying to unwind is what you could mean by this:

that is, once entangled, there can be no interference between the live and dead terms apparent to Wigner. What the recent experiments show is that, even after Wigner's entanglement, those interference effects persist, and Wigner remains as per (B). It is only when Wigner _knows_ his friend's measurement outcome that he himself branches, i.e. the wavefunction is epistemic, not ontic. — Kenosha Kid

Unwinding, (B) is this:

(B) | not measured > X ( | measured live > | alive > + | measured dead > | dead > )/root(2) — Kenosha Kid

...for clarity I've underlined Wigner's state and bolded Wigner's friend's states.

Given this, the above paragraph makes no sense:

• At B, Wigner's friend is entangled with the cat('s life); but Wigner is not entangled
• At C, Wigner's friend and Wigner are entangled with the cat('s life).

To speak of Wigner being entangled (with the cat's life) without speaking of (C) has no meaning to me.

So what do you mean by it? It sounds like you're describing some state where Wigner's entangled with the cat('s life) yet still at (B).

Any branching is universal: it is a branch in the universal wavefunction. — Kenosha Kid

...but you apparently agree the branches are not universal in the sense that Wigner branches when Wigner's friend branches:

After the friend measures:

(B) | not measured > X ( | measured live > | alive > + | measured dead > | dead > )/root(2) — Kenosha Kid

No one is saying that Wigner has to be entangled. — Kenosha Kid

Right?

The equivalent in MWI if what's happening here is that friend measures cat, friend term in wavefunction branches, Wigner entangles with friend, but Wigner can still access both branches. — Kenosha Kid

I agree that this is nonsense, but what you said that I responded to was this:

When Wigner's friend measured the cat, the universal wavefunction would split then universally. — Kenosha Kid

...and there's certainly nothing universal happening in the sense that Wigner entangles with his friend when his friend entangles with the cat.

No one is saying that Wigner has to be entangled. — Kenosha Kid

I'm not commenting on the paper; I'm commenting on the notion that branches are universal. I don't think I have any comments on the paper at this time.

ETA: Or perhaps I'm just misinterpreting what you mean when you say the branches in MWI are universal? What I mean to clarify is that "universe branching" is "subject relative"; what looks like different "universes" to the cat isn't necessarily different "universes" to Schrodinger.

You're not making it up, but it doesn't say what you purport it to say, — Kenosha Kid

You're severely confused here. You're certainly not addressing what I purport. Keep the terms to ensure you're not conflating things.

In MWI, when system A is entangled with system B system S and system B system S branches, system A also branches. — Kenosha Kid

S has the radioactive substance in it. That decays or doesn't decay. A is Wigner's friend the cat; A either survives or dies. Yes, when A measures S, and S branches, A also branches.

You have W1=a living cat (A1) with no decayed element (S1), and W2=a dead cat (A2) with a decayed element (S2).

Observer-dependence tells us something different, that branching may have occurred for B and not for A A and not for B, even though A and B are entangled A and S are entangled. — Kenosha Kid

B is Schrodinger(/Wigner). Schrodinger need not be entangled with the substance or the cat; when not entangled with either, Schrodinger sees W1+W2. Since that's possible, worlds are not universal.

No, many worlds is a universal branching. — Kenosha Kid

No. Many Worlds is a subject relative branching. It's simply part of the universal wavefunction.

When Wigner's friend measured the cat, the universal wavefunction would split then universally.

No. This is described exactly in the introduction of Everett's "The Theory of the Universal Wave Function". Using the terms in the introduction, (A + S) is the object-system for observer B; in terms of Wigner's friend, B would be Wigner and A would be his friend. MWI is the proposal that S is not collapsed when A measures S.

Translating this to Schrodinger's cat (Wigner=Schrodinger, the cat=Wigner's friend), before Schrodinger opens the box, the state (A + S) is in a superposition of a dead cat in the box and a living cat in the box. The dead cat and the living cat are different worlds, but Schrodinger before opening the box sees both worlds in a superposition.

This "universal branching" notion you describe is not a thing.

ETA, this is precisely the alternative Everett entertains, quoted from the paper:

Alternative 5: To assume the universal validity of the quantum description, by the complete abandonment of Process 1. The general validity of pure wave mechanics, without any statistical assertions, is assumed for all physical systems, including observers and measuring apparata. Observation processes are to be described completely by the state function of the composite system which includes the observer and his object-system, and which at all times obeys the wave equation (Process 2).

(underline mine; italics in the paper) ...just to show I'm not making this up. This is the fundamental assumption; the mechanics of branching are the mechanics of the wave function evolving via the Schrodinger equation ("Process 2"), not some new thing Everett came up with.

Where's a .gov link that supports the existence of anything you mentioned. — Cheshire

I think you're falling prey to Poe's Law. To me, this thread is just a bunch of hyperbolic nonsense; I read "This is exactly what the Biden Administration, using the cover of the issue of Covid vaccination, is seeking to accomplish right now in the USA in intimate cooperation with the leadership and censorship activities of Facebook, Twitter, etc." as saying that Biden is Hitler because Facebook won't let me post Covid-19 conspiracy theories on their site.

I wonder if I should report this thread and this site for not complying with the Biden Administration executive orders on freedom of speech restrictions. I'm sure it's just an oversight, but we'll all be nice and happy once the Biden Administration coopts the Facebook/Twitter monopoly to force thephilosophyforum.com (based in San Francisco, CA via Cloudfare) to censor inconvenient opinions in compliance with the current policy of violating fundamental liberties.

So I can imagine to have been born e.g. in India. — SolarWind

This isn't about lack of imagination. I can imagine sqrt(2) being rational as well, as I do when proving it's irrational.

It's not about the triviality of you not being me or anyone else, it's about whether you COULD be someone else in a hypothetical world. — SolarWind

For me to be that person has to mean something, else the entire exercise is pointless. "Same-person" is a kind of relation. I am the same-person as the guy who initially replied to you. I am not the same-person as you. For me to be this someone else, I need to be the same-person as that someone else.

I've described a perfectly viable monist same-person relation, and have worked out that I cannot in fact be someone else in a hypothetical world for the same reason I am not you. In other words, I do not relate to this hypothetical person in India through this same-person relation, therefore I cannot be that hypothetical person in India. This isn't a problem of my lack of imagining being a person in India; it's a problem of same-person not relating me to that person in India.

Sqrt(2) is not rational despite the fact that I can imagine it is. My belief in its irrationality is not due to a lack of imagination... quite the opposite. It's a consequence of my imagining it and working it through.

The monist perspective makes perfect sense here. Your imagined scenario only proves you can imagine the scenario, much like I can prove by demonstration that I can imagine sqrt(2) being rational; it does not prove I actually CAN be the person in India.

The proof that sqrt(2) is irrational starts with assuming it is rational. — SolarWind

And the proof that sqrt(2) is irrational continues by exploring what it means for sqrt(2) to be rational.

I don't put anything into my proof except that it is conceivable to be a different person in a different (imagined) world. Then simply asking what the difference is between WA and WZ. — SolarWind

But then I present that difference, and you ignore it to lecture me on sqrt(2). There's a reason I say I'm not the same person as you. That reason through a monist account when applied to Z in WZ suggests I'm not the same person as Z either. So what's the problem?

ask whether the existence of an immaterial instance can be regarded with my consideration now as proved. — SolarWind

I'm not sure you proved anything on the first go around.

If the monist view is correct, biology provides your pointer. A specific brain encased in a particular skull implements personhood; it's that brain that generates experiences of seeing through the eyes on that skull, and that same brain that generates memories of having seen through those eyes. Subjectively I not only have experiences through my eyes, but recall having had them; I'm a distinct entity from others in this regard, and it can be explained perfectly with this monist pointer. Likewise, I don't have experiences seeing through your eyes, nor do I recall having seen through them; in the monist explanation, that's easily explained because the brain generating the experiences of seeing through your eyes is in your skull. These two brains are islands, disconnected from each other.

Re your OP, there's some present-me A and this is WA. Then, hypothetically, I'm being told there is a WZ in which there is at some point in time a Z (we've yet to define how WA/WZ time relates, so this is the best I can say). I'm to imagine that "I" am Z in WZ, but that doesn't mesh with the monist pointer. The brain in this skull is neither going to see a rabbit in WZ through Z's eyes, nor remember seeing a rabbit in WZ through Z's eyes. A and Z are as much islands as your brain and my brain are.

To get this scenario to make sense, it's necessary to presume that identity is, rather than constructed and generated by a physical construct, somehow fundamental and separate from physical constructs. And that presumption is basically just a presumption of dualism. IOW, as has been discussed 6 months ago, you're simply arriving at dualism from presuming it.

So now that chat mode is done:

Like I say, read it when you can understand it, and then address it. — Bartricks

And like I say, you've got this backwards. It's your job to make a valid and coherent argument, not my job to prove to you that your argument is invalid. Anything I do is gratis.

Your argument for premise 2 is lousy in the first place; you undermine it by that conflict you've yet to address. But to humor you:

2. Our faculties of awareness do provide us with some awareness of something — Bartricks

I take it that any attempt to deny this premise will undermine itself. For if, on the basis of what I have said above combined with a conviction that we are indeed a product of unguided evolutionary processes, you are persuaded that we are not aware of anything, then you will have to admit that you are not aware of that too. Which makes no real sense. — Bartricks

Picking out the logic, here's how this reads.

1. Your pie writing suggests that:
2. If an entity is the product of unguided evolution, and the entity is persuaded it isn't aware, then the entity is forced to admit it is not aware.
3. 2 doesn't make sense.
4. (implied) therefore the entity's faculties of awareness provide the entity with some awareness of something

The biggest problem here is that 3 doesn't imply 4; it's not even logically connected... you are expressing the form "'if A and B then C' doesn't make sense therefore D". In fact, it's so ludicrously disconnected that it's bizarre how you can even think it's an argument for the premise in the first place. It has more in common with the Chewbaca defense than a rational argument.

Even if I pretended it has some semblance of validity, what would this imply for an entity that is bot-built but persuaded it is aware? Would it reach the same conclusions about itself that you do about yourself (and us)? Add this in:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...and we lose the ability to tell if we are aware. Your argument doesn't show that; 4 doesn't even apply to us, since we think we are aware and 2 is just talking about an entity that thinks it isn't aware. How do you know you're not, as you put it, bot built and just dreaming that you're aware?

Introspection is ruled out... not because I ruled it out, but because you did. Your argument for premise 2 not only doesn't follow but doesn't apply to entities that think they are aware. Apparently, by the argument at least, only bot built entities that think they aren't aware must be aware, because something doesn't make sense therefore they're aware or some such nonsense.

I gave an argument in support of premise 1. — Bartricks

So? Still no answer. I'll let you give the last word for now, since this isn't supposed to be a chat room. But it'll probably still not be an answer.

Premise 1 establishesasserts that in order for us to be aware of anything our mental states would need to have feature P. — Bartricks

FTFY.

But:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...means fake belief is introspectively indiscernible from real belief. Hey look there's a squirrel doesn't change what this means.

It's been five pages since you said that. Still no answer to the question of how you know, if not introspectively.

See the defence of premise 2. — Bartricks

Your defense of premise 2 doesn't erase the conflict.

Do you now see that there is no contradiction? — Bartricks

You're stuck again. Try a re-spoon feed:

The contradiction has to do with something being "introspectively X" to an entity that isn't aware. What I'm highlighting here is just a conflict (that you're dodging). — InPitzotl

Did you read it this time?

I can know that I have a real banknote in my pocket even though it is possible for there to exist a visually indiscernible note that is not real. — Bartricks

Sure. You reach in your pocket and boom... there it is. (Of course, that's refutable using lines from your OP, but let's set that aside).

Do you have your awareness in your pocket too?

Here's the thing you're avoiding saying by all means. It's intuitively obvious that we're aware. We can tell we're aware by simple introspection. We don't reach into our pockets to find awareness... we introspect.

You think it does, right? — Bartricks

No. But I think "of course we know" appeals to introspection. And you're way too busy trying to ask me stupid questions to bother answering the one I asked you.

So, here it is again... how do you know you're aware? In particular, how do you know in such a manner that it's obvious that you do? It's not by introspection. Is it by magic? Do you have an awarometer?

That's the only way you could possibly think my claim that we can know we're aware — Bartricks

The contradiction has to do with something being "introspectively X" to an entity that isn't aware. What I'm highlighting here is just a conflict (that you're dodging).

What? You keep doing this — Bartricks

Bartricks... this is trivial.

If 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from belief, and:

If that's correct, then surely this applies to all of the beliefs that one acquires? — Bartricks

...then 'belief' that you're aware is introspectively indiscernible from belief that you're aware.

in this case that your belief that there is a pie in the oven does not constitute knowledge that there is a pie in the oven. — Bartricks

...and 'belief' that you are aware does not constitute knowledge that you are aware.

So:

We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course. — Bartricks

...how do you know you know, given you could just be dreaming you know? Introspection is the wrong answer, because knowing cannot arise from 'belief', and belief and 'belief' are introspectively indistinguishable.

You keep whining about this over and over and over. Ironically, the only reason there's a conflict here is because I'm taking you at your word. I explicitly said a long time ago that you might not really mean what you said and might want to rephrase it. But, hey, if that's what you mean, that must be what you mean.

But it's just a raw hard fact. What you mean leads to this. So if you keep asking me WTH, what else is there to say, but that this is TH?

Incidentally, WTH do you mean by "your work"? Are you not offering an argument? You bit off a burden; it's your job to meet it.

Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality. — Bartricks

Quite the opposite apparently:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...assuming having a 'belief' that you're aware means you aren't aware, we wouldn't even be able to tell, at least through introspection. What other tests of awareness besides introspection can we perform?

So, you asked me how one can have a faculty without having any awareness, yes? — Bartricks

No. Awareness can refer to either a state or an ability; and what I'm asking is specifically about introspection (not generally about faculties). The question is how one can have a faculty of introspection without the capacity of awareness. You've mutated that into how one can have a faculty without a state of awareness, but that was not the question.

So one can have a faculty without having any of the awareness the faculty is in principle capable of giving you. — Bartricks

But not without a capacity. Incidentally your objection doesn't even make sense; are you honestly going with bot built facilities having their introspective eyes shut?

Not really following things are you? — Bartricks

Nice try, but it is never my fault when you fail to make an argument. It's not on me to guess what you mean; it's on you to say what you mean.

It doesn't have a faculty of introspection. It has a 'faculty of introspection' - that is, a faculty that will generate in its possessor states that are introspectively indiscernible from states giving introspective awareness. — Bartricks

Nope... doesn't work. There seems to be some attempt to use quotes here analogous to the p- usage in a Chalmersian analysis, but it collapses in on itself. We have no faculty of introspection, and yet, we have a faculty and we have things being introspectively indiscernible, by means of some 'faculty of introspection'. What?

Again, it's not on me to guess what you mean. If your single-quoting is meant to make some sort of Chalmersian distinction, you need to be consistent so that it's clear. If you're referring to some weird Bartricksian 'faculty' thing you invented and never explained, your argument has yet to be made.

whether two states are introspectively indiscernible or not does not depend upon anyone failing introspectively to discern them. — Bartricks

There's that phrase "failing introspectively to discern them" again. What does that mean? Try working this out by responding to the swatch example.

You can have a faculty of introspection without being aware of anything, just as you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything — Bartricks

Slightly wrong in the vision department, but workable. You can have a faculty of vision without seeing anything (hypothetically), and you can also lack a faculty of vision without seeing anything. The difference between these two things is that a person with a faculty of vision can see.

Analogously, an entity can have a faculty of introspection without introspecting something, and one can also lack a faculty of introspection without introspecting something. The difference between these two things is that the entity with the faculty of introspection can introspect.

So let's suppose there's a bot-built entity:

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...that you're describing here. Either the bot-built entity has a faculty of introspection, or it does not have a faculty of introspection. In the former case, the bot-built entity is capable of awareness. In the latter case, it's meaningless to discuss introspective discernibility.

But anyway, as I keep stressing — Bartricks

Yes, you do, and it keeps being irrelevant.

Yet you persist in pointing out that if no-one has a faculty of introspection, no one will be failing to introspectively discern that which is introspectively indiscernible. — Bartricks

This is still incoherent. Let's call the swatches in China A, B, and C. Introduce Tom, who is totally blind from birth. A and B are the metamers; they're red. C is green.

Tom has no faculty of vision, so Tom is "failing to visually discern" B from C. But as you said:

you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything — Bartricks

...I can have a faculty of vision without seeing B and C. In that case, I too am "failing to visually discern" B from C. So does that make B and C visually indiscernible to me?

what inconsistency? — Bartricks

Already provided. Here's the re-re-spoonfeed of it.

This is the latest post there. — InPitzotl

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties. — InPitzotl

So two is the latest count of the number of times I referred to it again. I even rebuilt the link in this quote for you, so you wouldn't have to be bothered to use your mouse scroll button to scroll up a single screen full. I'm afraid I cannot click that link for you.

But zero is the number of responses so far to that post. I thought you were going to knock its light out?

Get in the ring and get your smacking. — Bartricks

Ah, I see. You'd rather crow than address the inconsistency.

How so? — Bartricks

You just worry about this unresolved incoherency for now. This is the latest post there. We're well over a dozen posts into the reply 1 (before we get back to the original in this line), and you're still as inconsistent as you were then. Knock that light out.

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties.

And your objection is.... — Bartricks

Already stated, multiple times. Your premise does not follow from your arguments.

No, it'd be guided. — Bartricks

Yes; just a typo... corrected.

A peahen is an agent. Peahens have sexual preferences that guide the evolution of peacock tails. According to Bartricks's definition, sexual selection among peahens is guided evolution (as far as I care at least).

Oh, that's soooo clear. — Bartricks

Apparently so. You're just now grasping that I'm not talking about what you fantasized I was.

if no one has a faculty of introspection capable of generating any states of awareness, that is entirely compatible with there existing mental states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness. — Bartricks

That is incoherent. It's a tangled mess. There's no such thing as a faculty of introspection incapable of generating states of awareness. Without introspection, there's no such thing as introspective discernibility/indiscernibility in the first place.

So that's what you think, given you have just said that D is wrong. — Bartricks

Nonsense. I don't think such a thing... it's incoherent.

Sure. If I genuinely see a cup, there's a cup there. If I hallucinate a cup, there typically isn't a cup there.
But both require having a percept. — InPitzotl

No. A belief is not a percept. Yet if I believe I am perceiving something, then my situation is introspectively indiscernible from what it would be if I was in fact perceiving something. — Bartricks

But a hallucination is not a belief; it is a fictive percept. A person with Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) for example experiences hallucinations, but does not confuse the hallucinated objects with real objects (which is a giant problem for you; they introspectively distinguish the reality of their percepts). They do, however, have fictive percepts.

So:

You are confused. Not me. You. — Bartricks

...you must be confused about hallucinations.

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. (A) What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness. — InPitzotl

Why don't you actually read what I take the trouble to write? (B) I addressed this stupid and irrelevant point earlier. Here: — Bartricks

(C)Note too that to say two states are introspectively indiscernible, is not to suppose that there is someone who is failing introspectively to discern them. (D)You seem to think it does suppose that — Bartricks

(D) is wrong; I think no such thing. (A) does not imply (C) is wrong. Therefore, (B) is wrong; (B) does not address (A), (B) addresses your confusion about (A).

Analogously, I can see; in particular I have color vision. There are spectra I can distinguish (loosely, colors) and spectra I cannot distinguish (metamers). I need not be looking at the things for this to make sense; somewhere in China there are three paint swatches, where two are metamers and the third is a different color. We can talk about this because I have vision. By contrast, Cleverbot does not have color vision, or vision at all (or self awareness or awareness); any speak about what Cleverbot can visually distinguish is a category error.

That you think the problem I pointed out has to do with the objects of introspection is your own fault. The problem is that introspection in and of itself presupposes awareness just as vision in and of itself presupposes sight.

You just keep saying that there is something incoherent in the idea of, well, what? Two mental states that are introspectively indiscernible, but one of which is a state of awareness and the other not? — Bartricks

This really confuses you? I'm aware that I have thoughts. Whether or not the thoughts are awareness, being aware of thoughts is in and of itself awareness (of thoughts).

Well, there's quite a big difference between a case of hallucination and a case of veridical perception. — Bartricks

Sure. If I genuinely see a cup, there's a cup there. If I hallucinate a cup, there typically isn't a cup there.

But both require having a percept. If you did not in fact have the experience of seeing a cup, you did not hallucinate it. Analogous to the big difference between a hallucination and veridical perception, there is a big difference between reporting having a hallucination and lying about having one.

So I don't think your objection can really be that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is incoherent, for it just so plainly isn't. — Bartricks

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness.

Utter nonsense. — Bartricks

It's the same essential objection as the one three days ago.

This is now too tedious for words. — Bartricks

Okay, but why is this too tedious for words now? You've spent 10 replies on this:

• In reply 1 you questioned where you said you were not introspectively aware of things; I showed you where you did exactly that.
• In reply 2 you said I was either stupid or couldn't read, fantasized that I called you stupid as well and was incompetent at driving whereas you were a qualified driving instructor, and found some spare time to conflate a parenthetical phrase with a consequent.
• In reply 3 you emphasized that you said 'if' to try to pass off your parenthetical phrase as a consequent.
• In reply 4 you claimed you did not say what I showed you saying in reply 1, because you said some other thing in the OP.
• In reply 5, you said I couldn't speak English, because what I showed you in reply 1 contradicts your position.
• In reply 6, you confused the fact that your reply 1 means you're not introspectively aware with the fact that you were accused of having that position.
• In reply 7, you continued that confusion, asking me why you would say the thing I showed you in reply 1 if you said some other thing in the OP.
• In reply 8 (part of a double reply), you offered your help showing how dumb I was, presented the Van Gogh genuine/fake example, fantasized about me calling you dumb this time (apparently I'm always calling you what you call me), fantasized about my saying that indistinguishibility implies something about Rolf Harris, and fantasized about me saying I'm better at chess than you are.
• In reply 9 you confused my claim that introspective indiscernibility implies lack of introspective awareness of distinctions with my claiming that you don't think we are aware of things, and called me consequently confused. In the same reply you strongly suggested introspection can exist without awareness ("my claim that there can be introspectively indiscernible states from those that give us awareness, yet that do not give us any awareness"), for which you were called out (given that, you know, your entire argument is supposed to be about having awareness at all).
• In reply 10 you confused the problem pointed out to you in reply 9 (that introspection requires awareness) with some claim that introspected mental states themselves can differ.

We can leave this hanging if you really want. But the original problem is still there.

There's nothing incoherent about it. — Bartricks

Sure there is. Incidentally, you just quoted my description of why it's incoherent, yet failed to address it.

Let's use the visual analogy. — Bartricks

The visual analogy is not analogous. Van Gogh's can be visually indiscernible from fakes. That has nothing to do with introspection requiring self awareness.

Similarly, the claim that two mental states - one a genuine state of awareness and the other not - can be introspectively indiscernible... — Bartricks

If I'm looking at two paint swatches I cannot distinguish, they could possibly be metamers. But to talk about my inability to visually distinguish C from E flat is simply a category error. It's only the former case that distinguishability is an issue; the latter case is more fundamental.

Looking at a paint swatch is analogous to introspecting on a mental state. But whereas looking employs vision, introspection employs self awareness. To introspect on a mental state is to be aware of a mental state, never mind whether that state per se is awareness.

That's the first issue. The second one is:

The problem would be if you claim both that they are visually indiscernible and to have visually confirmed which is the real one — InPitzotl

Similarly, the claim that two mental states - one a genuine state of awareness and the other not - can be introspectively indiscernible is not equivalent to the claim that those two states are indiscernible tout court, is it? — Bartricks

...what are you objecting to? The bolded part of your response certainly does not align with the bolded part of the thing you replied to.

And we can also know, by the kind of careful reasoning that I have engaged in above — Bartricks

You are mocking yourself. You're referring to the use of careful reasoning in your response to my post, and you have completely failed to notice what the objections were. If this is supposed to indicate how good your argument is, then you must be completely failing to address your premise analogously to your complete failure to understand the post you just replied to.

No, you said my view was that we are not aware of anything. — Bartricks

Nope. You made that up.

My claim that there can be introspectively indiscernible states from those that give us awareness, yet that do not give us any awareness due to lacking representative contents. — Bartricks

That's incoherent. Introspection employs self observation and implies self awareness.

You think it is, indeed you seem to think the claims are synonymous. — Bartricks

This is so muddled I can't interpret it. What is "it", what claims (plural) are you talking about, and why are you telling me what I think?

Which is everybody(?) as confused as thinking that if there can be a visually indiscernible image of sunflowers from that painted by van Gogh, then I am claiming that the actual Van Gogh is a fake. — Bartricks

The problem would be if you claim both that they are visually indiscernible and to have visually confirmed which is the real one.