For an analogy - it is possible for me not to exist, but I am never going to be justified in believing such a state of affair obtains). — Bartricks

Is that analogous to being unable to answer the question "Are you sleeping" in the affirmative?

And what I argue is that for a mental state to have representative contents, it has to be being used by an agent for the purpose of representing what it is representing. — Bartricks

It's less clear how this informs one about the nature of evolution.

Is that analogous to being unable to answer the question "Are you sleeping" in the affirmative? — Cheshire

No.

And what I argue is that for a mental state to have representative contents, it has to be being used by an agent for the purpose of representing what it is representing.
— Bartricks
It's less clear how this informs one about the nature of evolution. — Cheshire

Because if true, then in combination with premise 2 it tells us that the evolutionary processes that have furnished us with our faculties of awareness have not been unguided.

No. — Bartricks

No, as in imprecise or conceptually different?

Because if true, then in combination with premise 2 it tells us that the evolutionary processes that have furnished us with our faculties of awareness have not been unguided. — Bartricks

Why insist on calling something by a negated state? Not Unguided means guided, correct?

It comes across like I am therefore I think.

No, as in imprecise or conceptually different? — Cheshire

Different. The idea that I do not exist contains no contradiction. Yet I am confused if I think the idea a reality. Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality.

Then you say, for god knows what reason,

Is that analogous to being unable to answer the question "Are you sleeping" in the affirmative? — Cheshire

No, for it is both metaphysically possible that I am sleeping right now (and thus that this is a dream) and I can believe it coherently. I may even acquire evidence that it is true (if, for example, I suddenly find that I am a horse or something). So just not the same at all.

Why insist on calling something by a negated state? Not Unguided means guided, correct? — Cheshire

Stop being tedious.

Stop being tedious. — Bartricks

I'm not being tedious. I thought something was hiding behind your choice to select 'not unguided' versus 'guided'. Deciding this is the point at which this exchange became tedious reinforces my suspicion.

No, for it is both metaphysically possible that I am sleeping right now (and thus that this is a dream) and I can believe it coherently. I may even acquire evidence that it is true (if, for example, I suddenly find that I am a horse or something). So just not the same at all. — Bartricks

Really? I assumed it was in reference to an awake person asking some one obviously asleep if they were sleeping. Yes, I am sleeping would be an unanswerable form of awareness. Smells the same.

Really? I assumed it was in reference to an awake person asking some one obviously asleep if they were sleeping. Yes, I am sleeping would be an unanswerable form of awareness. Smells the same. — Cheshire

I don't know what you're on about now. Look, my example was just to illustrate something - to illustrate how we can acknowledge that something is metaphysically possible at the same time as acknowledging that it is epistemically impossible for it to be the case. What's the point in coming up with other examples when mine does what's necessary? I mean, can't you see that it is both metaphysically possible that you not exist, but epistemically not possible? If not, doesn't matter. The point is that it is metaphysically possible that all of our apparent states of awareness are fakes, but not epistemically possible.

But anyway, do you have any objection to what I argued in defence of premise 1? That is, do you agree that for something to be a representation, some agency needs to be using for that purpose?

But anyway, do you have any objection to what I argued in defence of premise 1? That is, do you agree that for something to be a representation, some agency needs to be using for that purpose? — Bartricks

Frankly, I'm a bit neutral. It sounds like it intends to be self-evident much like the other premise. Are you asking if I'm hearing something I must be deliberately using my ears?

What's the point in coming up with other examples when mine does what's necessary? — Bartricks

I thought it was beneficial to confirm I understood what you were saying well enough to demonstrate it through an adjacent example. I was having trouble nailing down number 1's defense, so why not confirm number 2.

I can't help but notice you didn't address my word choice question again. The selection of the seemingly double negative Not Un-Guided versus Guided. It looks like a cumbersome choice to be made for no reason.

Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality. — Bartricks

Quite the opposite apparently:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...assuming having a 'belief' that you're aware means you aren't aware, we wouldn't even be able to tell, at least through introspection. What other tests of awareness besides introspection can we perform?

Frankly, I'm a bit neutral. It sounds like it intends to be self-evident much like the other premise. Are you asking if I'm hearing something I must be deliberately using my ears? — Cheshire

I think it is self-evident, but I also illustrated its credibility with examples. I don't think you appreciate how my argument - and so arguments in general - work. You just veer from telling me I've contradicted myself to refusing to say clearly which premise you dispute. I ask you what objection you have to premise 1 and you give me concerns that only make sense as concerns about premise 2. You're all over the place.

Now, premise 1 first. Premise 1 says:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

What problem do you have with it? I defend it with examples. And you now reveal that you're neutral over its credibility.

Right - so are you neutral about the sky 'writing'? Are you being told there's a pie in the oven by the clouds? If you're sane, then you agree that you're not being told there's a pie in the oven by the clouds.

Why? Because clouds aren't agents. Nor are pies. They're not 'telling' you anything.

Now, round and round in circles we go. For god's sake recognise that the correct analysis of why hte clouds are not telling you anything is that they're not agents.

Now, apply that more generally. And now you'll find that premise 1 is true. No representation without a representer.

Don't waffle on about something orthogonal to this issue. Just focus. Focus on premise 1 and its incredible plausibility. It isn't open to reasonable doubt. To doubt it is to think that there can be representations that lack a representer. And that's to think that the clouds could be telling you about a pie in the oven.

Once you've appreciated how unbelievably plausible premise 1 is, move on to premise 2.

Premise 2 is not open to reasonable doubt either. You seem to think that I think it is. I don't. See the OP. I don't think it is open to reasonable doubt. It is metaphysically possible that all - all - our apparent states of awareness are fakes. But it is not open to reasonable doubt that some are, in fact, real states of awareness. Hence 2 is true. If you have trouble understanding this, I gave you an example to illustrate: it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist; but I am not able reasonably to doubt my own existence. Don't try and come up with another example of your own - you're not good at it. Just reflect on mine.

Once you've noticed that 1 and 2 are not open to any reasonable doubt, note how 3 follows from them.

If you didn't think 3 was true, revise that view. You've just been shown it is.

Similarly, the idea that all of our apparent states of awareness are in fact fake, contains no contradiction either. But once more, we would be confused if we ever thought it a reality.
— Bartricks
Quite the opposite apparently:
(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one).
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

What? You keep doing this - you keep quoting me saying entirely consistent things and then just insist they contradict. I am not going to do your work for you, so kindly explain how the hell those two claims contradict!

What? You keep doing this — Bartricks

Bartricks... this is trivial.

If 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from belief, and:

If that's correct, then surely this applies to all of the beliefs that one acquires? — Bartricks

...then 'belief' that you're aware is introspectively indiscernible from belief that you're aware.

in this case that your belief that there is a pie in the oven does not constitute knowledge that there is a pie in the oven. — Bartricks

...and 'belief' that you are aware does not constitute knowledge that you are aware.

So:

We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course. — Bartricks

...how do you know you know, given you could just be dreaming you know? Introspection is the wrong answer, because knowing cannot arise from 'belief', and belief and 'belief' are introspectively indistinguishable.

You keep whining about this over and over and over. Ironically, the only reason there's a conflict here is because I'm taking you at your word. I explicitly said a long time ago that you might not really mean what you said and might want to rephrase it. But, hey, if that's what you mean, that must be what you mean.

But it's just a raw hard fact. What you mean leads to this. So if you keep asking me WTH, what else is there to say, but that this is TH?

Incidentally, WTH do you mean by "your work"? Are you not offering an argument? You bit off a burden; it's your job to meet it.

You really are InPentrablyS!

If 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from belief, and:
If that's correct, then surely this applies to all of the beliefs that one acquires?
— Bartricks
...then 'belief' that you're aware is introspectively indiscernible from belief that you're aware.
in this case that your belief that there is a pie in the oven does not constitute knowledge that there is a pie in the oven.
— Bartricks
...and 'belief' that you are aware does not constitute knowledge that you are aware.

So:
We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course.
— Bartricks
...how do you know you know, given you could just be dreaming you know? Introspection is the wrong answer, because knowing cannot arise from 'belief', and belief and 'belief' are introspectively indistinguishable. — InPitzotl

Does 'X is introspectively indiscernible from Y' entail that we cannot know whether we have an X on our hands or a Y?

You think it does, right? (It doesn't - as I keep explaining to you, again and again and again and again - all to no avail).

That's the only way you could possibly think my claim that we can know we're aware contradicts my claim that it is metaphysically possible that all our states of awareness are fake.

You think it does, right? — Bartricks

No. But I think "of course we know" appeals to introspection. And you're way too busy trying to ask me stupid questions to bother answering the one I asked you.

So, here it is again... how do you know you're aware? In particular, how do you know in such a manner that it's obvious that you do? It's not by introspection. Is it by magic? Do you have an awarometer?

That's the only way you could possibly think my claim that we can know we're aware — Bartricks

The contradiction has to do with something being "introspectively X" to an entity that isn't aware. What I'm highlighting here is just a conflict (that you're dodging).

So, here it is again... how do you know you're aware? — InPitzotl

See the defence of premise 2. Although given how badly you reason there's not much point.

Do you now see that there is no contradiction? I can know that I have a real banknote in my pocket even though it is possible for there to exist a visually indiscernible note that is not real. See?

See the defence of premise 2. — Bartricks

Your defense of premise 2 doesn't erase the conflict.

Do you now see that there is no contradiction? — Bartricks

You're stuck again. Try a re-spoon feed:

The contradiction has to do with something being "introspectively X" to an entity that isn't aware. What I'm highlighting here is just a conflict (that you're dodging). — InPitzotl

Did you read it this time?

I can know that I have a real banknote in my pocket even though it is possible for there to exist a visually indiscernible note that is not real. — Bartricks

Sure. You reach in your pocket and boom... there it is. (Of course, that's refutable using lines from your OP, but let's set that aside).

Do you have your awareness in your pocket too?

Here's the thing you're avoiding saying by all means. It's intuitively obvious that we're aware. We can tell we're aware by simple introspection. We don't reach into our pockets to find awareness... we introspect.

No point continuing this, InPenentrablyS.

Premise 1 establishes that in order for us to be aware of anything our mental states would need to have feature P.

Premise 2 establishes that we are aware of some things.

We thereby establish that some of our mental states have feature P - a feature incompatible with our mental states being the product of unguided evolutionary forces.

Deal with it.

Premise 1 establishesasserts that in order for us to be aware of anything our mental states would need to have feature P. — Bartricks

FTFY.

But:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...means fake belief is introspectively indiscernible from real belief. Hey look there's a squirrel doesn't change what this means.

It's been five pages since you said that. Still no answer to the question of how you know, if not introspectively.

I gave an argument in support of premise 1. Read it after you've acquired the necessary intelligence to understand it. THen say something in criticism of it, or go away. Don't mention indiscernibility again.

I gave an argument in support of premise 1. — Bartricks

So? Still no answer. I'll let you give the last word for now, since this isn't supposed to be a chat room. But it'll probably still not be an answer.

I gave an argument in support of it. It's to do with what it takes for something to have representative contents. It has nothing to do with introspective indiscernibility. It has everything to do with what it takes for something to 'represent' something to be the case.

Like I say, read it when you can understand it, and then address it.

You just veer from telling me I've contradicted myself to refusing to say clearly which premise you dispute. I ask you what objection you have to premise 1 and you give me concerns that only make sense as concerns about premise 2. You're all over the place. — Bartricks

Yes, we covered the contradictions which you didn't find compelling. So, I was at least trying to understand the matter from your point of view. But, I don't think I can without knowing what implications you believe are being demonstrated by this information. All I honestly know is that it seems you want to make a statement about evolution and you are trying to derive it along the lines of an 'ergo sum'. However, you don't seem to believe it is without flaws yourself due to the excessive appeals to emotion and evasion of plain questions.

In summary;
Premise 1 is said to have defense, but you make no reference to evolution, the guiding or unguiding of evolution, what is implied by "wholly" as in I should imagine there as a degree of precision that is even implied.
Premise 2 is a bit of a novelty.
Premise 3 Inserts the novelty into premise one as if it some how relates to evolution.

It seems like a pseudo religious type argument where there's an irrational implication being reserved because no one would otherwise take this all seriously. What is it out of curiosity?

So now that chat mode is done:

Like I say, read it when you can understand it, and then address it. — Bartricks

And like I say, you've got this backwards. It's your job to make a valid and coherent argument, not my job to prove to you that your argument is invalid. Anything I do is gratis.

Your argument for premise 2 is lousy in the first place; you undermine it by that conflict you've yet to address. But to humor you:

2. Our faculties of awareness do provide us with some awareness of something — Bartricks

I take it that any attempt to deny this premise will undermine itself. For if, on the basis of what I have said above combined with a conviction that we are indeed a product of unguided evolutionary processes, you are persuaded that we are not aware of anything, then you will have to admit that you are not aware of that too. Which makes no real sense. — Bartricks

Picking out the logic, here's how this reads.

1. Your pie writing suggests that:
2. If an entity is the product of unguided evolution, and the entity is persuaded it isn't aware, then the entity is forced to admit it is not aware.
3. 2 doesn't make sense.
4. (implied) therefore the entity's faculties of awareness provide the entity with some awareness of something

The biggest problem here is that 3 doesn't imply 4; it's not even logically connected... you are expressing the form "'if A and B then C' doesn't make sense therefore D". In fact, it's so ludicrously disconnected that it's bizarre how you can even think it's an argument for the premise in the first place. It has more in common with the Chewbaca defense than a rational argument.

Even if I pretended it has some semblance of validity, what would this imply for an entity that is bot-built but persuaded it is aware? Would it reach the same conclusions about itself that you do about yourself (and us)? Add this in:

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...and we lose the ability to tell if we are aware. Your argument doesn't show that; 4 doesn't even apply to us, since we think we are aware and 2 is just talking about an entity that thinks it isn't aware. How do you know you're not, as you put it, bot built and just dreaming that you're aware?

Introspection is ruled out... not because I ruled it out, but because you did. Your argument for premise 2 not only doesn't follow but doesn't apply to entities that think they are aware. Apparently, by the argument at least, only bot built entities that think they aren't aware must be aware, because something doesn't make sense therefore they're aware or some such nonsense.

Don't waffle on about something orthogonal to this issue. Just focus. Focus on premise 1 and its incredible plausibility. It isn't open to reasonable doubt. To doubt it is to think that there can be representations that lack a representer. And that's to think that the clouds could be telling you about a pie in the oven. — Bartricks

Tell me this isn't satire. A literal 'pie in the sky' argument. Orthogonal? The word used in a premise isn't orthogonal.