Again, why do you think I am committed to the view that we are not aware of things? — Bartricks

No, which is why I didn't say you were committed to that view. I said you claimed something you didn't mean.

my claim that states of awareness are introspectively indiscernible from otherwise identical states that lack representative contents. — Bartricks

And yet, you are distinguishing them. That leads to my response to this:

Thus if we are bot built we will not know anything.
We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course. — Bartricks

...which was this:

Of course not. By your own admission you cannot even introspectively tell if you know things. So how could it possibly be obvious enough to say "of course"? — InPitzotl

...in the case of Van Gogh, maybe we can pull out a magnifying glass. Maybe we can carbon date. Maybe we can check certificates of authenticity. But here you claim that "of course" we know versus 'know', which suggests we just naturally, introspectively know it. That leads to the first challenge.

But it's here where you squared the circle:

Where did I say that I am not introspectively aware of things? — Bartricks

...and in the case of Van Gogh, if you cannot introspectively distinguish the genuine from the fake you ipso facto are not introspectively aware.

Honestly, this shouldn't require this much drama. You chose the drama route.

Why are you telling me what introspectively indiscernible means? — Bartricks

Because:

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...your claim ipso facto introspectively discerns two things (belief and 'belief') you claim are introspectively indiscernible. Because:

Where did I say that I am not introspectively aware of things? — Bartricks

...you pretend not to realize that claiming something is introspectively indiscernible means you cannot introspectively be aware of it.

And because, you know this. You're not as moronic as you're pretending to be. You just refuse to do a very simple reasonable thing.

What are you on about?? — Bartricks

LOL! And round and round and round we go!

You clearly don't understand English — Bartricks

Sure I do. Indiscernible means not able to discern. Introspectively is an adjective, meaning by means of introspection.

You clearly don't understand English. — Bartricks

Denial, contradiction and disinformation are key ingredients to gaslighting.

Again, no rephrasing necessary. You don't understand words.

That's not what the problem is. The problem is:

I don't know what grunts and howls would do the trick — Bartricks

...you absolutely refuse to clarify. It is not your intent to be clear. You'd rather be dramatic than do a simple reasonable thing. I won't speculate as to why, but you're making at least these things crystal clear.

↪InPitzotl
Greatest thinker since Plantinga?!? Now that's an insult! — Bartricks

Yeah yeah... Plantinga is a total amateur.

To recap: I have never, ever, ever said that we are not introspectively aware of things or not aware of things generally. — Bartricks

Ahem...

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...and that means, well, what it says it means.

Read the OP! I think we ARE aware of things. — Bartricks

So you just said something you didn't mean. Maybe you should rephrase it.

Or maybe try something else, but how is that something else working out for you?

It has everything to do with you not reading carefully or not understanding what you read — Bartricks

Nope. It has something to do with your allergy to conceding even that which would benefit you, for who knows why.

It said 'if', matey. If. — Bartricks

Yes, it did. Exactly as I said last post:

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

There's the if, right before the underlined antecedent, the italicized consequent, and the bolded parenthetical.

And you ignored that. Willfully ignored it, or didn't understand its significance. — Bartricks

Oh what narratives!

If the latter then i cannot rephrase my argument in a way you'd understand. I don't know what grunts and howls would do the trick — Bartricks

...oh what poetic drama!

But apparently the greatest thinker since Plantinga cannot tell a consequent from a parenthetical phrase. I don't believe you're that incompetent.

Christ, you are either very stupid or you can't read. — Bartricks

Have you got this far in life without knowing? — Bartricks

There's the gaslighting that has zero chance of working...

InPenetrablyS: "so I can go" — Bartricks

...and the fantasizing, right on cue.

Might I suggest an approach that would work a tad bit better... just rephrase your statement to mean what you mean.

But, let's do this.

Quote the whole sentence. — Bartricks

Sure. Here's you're whole sentence:

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

It says 'If'. — Bartricks

Indeed it does.

What does that mean? — Bartricks

"If" introduces an antecedent.

What's the difference between saying "If p, then q" and "q"? — Bartricks

That's irrelevant, because in the "full quote" above, the antecedent (p) is "all of our faculties are bot-built", and the consequent (q) is "they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs'". "(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one)" is a parenthetical phrase. That parenthetical phrase is not part of the consequent.

But, of course, you know that. Your reply has nothing to do with my being stupid, or incompetent in English. It is, rather, a doomed-to-fail strategy to try to avoid doing something very sane and simple... rephrasing your statement to mean what you mean.

Where did I say that I am not introspectively aware of things? — Bartricks

In the quote I underlined. This one: ======vvvv

(where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

^^^===== It's right there. It's underlined.

Introspectively indiscernible means not able to discern introspectively... in English at least.

Everytime i desvribe what 'would' be the case if our faculties were bot built, you read that as me saying that that's what is actually the case. — Bartricks

There's no other reasonable meaning of "introspectively indiscernible" except that one cannot discern using introspection.

No. I am arguing the exact opposite, as the OP makes clear. — Bartricks

Don't care. If you are so bad at communicating that you say opposite things, that's not on me. Introspectively indiscernible means one cannot discern using introspection.

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

A purer form of True Scotsman fallacy I have never seen.

Thus if we are bot built we will not know anything.
We do know we exist and a whole lot else, of course. — Bartricks

Of course not. By your own admission you cannot even introspectively tell if you know things. So how could it possibly be obvious enough to say "of course"?

This seems unworkably incoherent. Maybe you should rephrase something.

our brains evolved into different sexes — Iris0

But our species shares a gene pool.

I have always been able to tell I use my ears. I can also tell when someone has had "gender reassignment" — Andrew4Handel

I find it hard to believe that 99.9% of people are unable to differentiate between a male and female. — Andrew4Handel

I smell shifting the goalpost here. I also smell black and white fallacy here.

You're quite a dramatic little fellow aren't you. Observing one person who has transitioned who passes is all it takes to make the leap from always being able to tell to not always being able to tell. But apparently that's enough for you to invent disorders to explain the outliers.

Methinks you need a sense of proportion.

I meant Laverne Cox. Yikes. — Andrew4Handel

That would have been who I guessed you meant.

How did humans create 7 billion of themselves? — Andrew4Handel

Not sure why you're asking me this question.

It is not an average it is a huge majority of humans displaying sexual dimorphism. — Andrew4Handel

What is the antecedent to "it" there? We were just talking about sexual size dimorphism. I specifically cited sexual size dimorphism in spiders to contrast. Now suddenly you're talking about all sexual dimorphism.

Puberty blockers , hormones and genitals surgeries lead to the evolutionary dead end of infertility. — Andrew4Handel

There's nothing normative about evolution. There is no "scientific mandate" to reproduce.

Well you have just found a problem with the notion of science. In what sense is any observation not a personal account? — Andrew4Handel

To intentionally use the pun, science has made controlling for all sorts of errors in personal accounts a science. Scientific observations would employ said controls. Your personal observations are most certainly not controlled.

But there is science as well. For example men are taller on average than woman. — Andrew4Handel

Sure; humans are sexually dimorphic. But note that you're immediately jumping to averages, because the dimorphism in heights isn't all that extreme. There are plenty of short males and tall females. This is child's play compared to the sexual size dimorphism found in spiders.

Lauren Laverne identifies as female and is much taller than Chase Strangio who identifies as male. — Andrew4Handel

This is also anecdotal. Incidentally, are you sure you really mean Lauren Laverne?

Being able to identify a male form a female is not an anecdote and if you claim so you are just outright lying about reality. — Andrew4Handel

It is by definition an anecdote. I gave you the definition. What part of that definition does not apply?

Science has to assume that some human faculties are accurate., — Andrew4Handel

Science does not rely on anecdotes.

Are you seriously claiming you cannot identify who is male and female. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, I'm seriously claiming I cannot always tell.

The start of categorisation of entities is based on the reliability of the human senses. — Andrew4Handel

Okay, but that does not entail that science has to rely on anecdotes, nor does it suffice to show that anecdotal evidence is scientific. Neither of those things are true.

Science shows and every day experience that only a man and woman can produce a children. — Andrew4Handel

I crossed out the superfluous part. To the best of my knowledge, there's no ethical current technology to produce a human offspring without involving a male and a female, though there are potential unethical technologies. But this is simply factual; there's nothing normative here.

They have yet to create the insane dystopia of trying to give a woman a penis implant and implant a womb in a man. — Andrew4Handel

"insane dystopia" is a political term. As for the science, there's no scientific theory I'm aware of that states that it is impossible to give a woman such a penis. The absolute best you can say is that there's no extant technology to pull this off.

I engaged you over the scientific claims. You keep replying to me, but nowhere are you backing up that there's anything scientific here... you're just trying to pass off your politics as scientific. Here, I don't much care about anything else; there are plenty of folk here who will be happy to politicize with you.

In what sense is it anecdotal? — Andrew4Handel

In the definitive sense:

anecdotal
1. (of an account) not necessarily true or reliable, because based on personal accounts rather than facts or research
https://www.oxfordify.com/meaning/anecdotal

I have survived 45 years using my ears and eyes to tell me how reality works. I am not going to distrust my senses based on someone else's self i.d. in their mind. — Andrew4Handel

That doesn't sound very scientific to me. Using your eyes and ears to tell you how reality works is what nearly everyone does. Also, scientists don't tend to go around declaring whose eyes and ears they are going to trust and whose eyes and ears they are going to distrust.

I thought gender dysphoria was a mental illness now we are told it's not — Andrew4Handel

Given you have opened this thread talking about science, what does the science say?

Having surgery to mutilate your genitalia and spending a life time on wrong sex hormones and other body damaging chemicals is not changing sex it is forcing your body to be something it doesn't want to be and once hormones stop it will revert back to it's natural self. — Andrew4Handel

Having such surgeries is scientifically possible; but since when is bodies wanting to be things scientific?

You cannot tell the difference between a man or a woman.? — Andrew4Handel

Not always.

I have always been able to tell I use my ears. I can also tell when someone has had "gender reassignment" — Andrew4Handel

That sounds anecdotal, not scientific. Silly me, but by your OP I thought you were complaining about the acceptance of something that was scientifically impossible.

No. I have never needed to know about someone's chromosomes to know whether they are male or female. — Andrew4Handel

Okay, so how do you tell?

How is it possible.
It isn't from a scientific perspective. How has it become so accepted as a concept? — Andrew4Handel

Let's walk through this. Presumably, sex is a matter of chromosomes (it's not exactly; but that's close enough for government work). So let's call a person who is XY male-sexed, and a person who is XX female-sexed.

Now let's define a sex change in these terms. A sex change would be a change in the chromosomes from XY to XX, or XX to XY. This is what you're claiming is not possible. I'll presume by possible you're referring to something like technological feasibility.

How has it become so accepted as a concept? — Andrew4Handel

...and here we fail. It doesn't appear that it is technologically feasible to change a person from male-sexed to female-sexed.

So, maybe you're going to have to explain this to me. What impossible thing are you referring to that is accepted as a concept?

What on earth are you on about? — Bartricks

Your argument. I have mentioned that several times BTW.

Here's my claim: our faculties need to have been designed to provide us with information before they can be said to generate states with representative content. — Bartricks

Okay. So what backs up that claim?

You're trying to show this is false with an example of something that has been designed to give us information and is successfully doing so!! — Bartricks

Wrong!! See above. My problem is with your argument. Your claim does not follow from your argument. Incidentally, this makes everything below this line:

But anyway, that will do nothing whatever to help you. — Bartricks

...irrelevant.

"Oh, but, but, but, bots - bots are designed and you used bots to make your case. Bots. Garmin. Bots. Bots." — Bartricks

Well... yes. You were the one who offered the Bartricks-bot argument; the logic I teased out from your argument when applied to Garmin shows that the Bartricks-bot argument doesn't follow. Now, as far as I'm concerned, you're just whining because I'm forcing you to do the work you claimed to have done in the first place.

Bots are not designed to give information. They are designed to randomly generate 'messages'. — Bartricks

Okay... are you saying Garmin is not a bot then? If so, why not? What makes Bartricks-bot a bot and Garmin not one? Incidentally, I'm not asking you because I'm consulting the great wizard. I'm asking you because this is your argument you're supposed to be making.

The only difference you have pointed out so far that could apply in this thread here is:

no one was trying to convey to you that there was a pie in the oven — Bartricks

...and that doesn't cut it here. Nobody was trying to convey to me that I have reached my destination. Whatever "Garmin is designed to give me information" means, Garmin is nevertheless not trying to do anything, because despite being designed, Garmin is not an agent. I don't care that Garmin was designed; you're the one telling me Garmin is distinct. But your argument does not provide this distinction.

I'm fine with amendments, but what I'm not fine with is pretending you've made an argument you have not made.

Once more: how does your example challenge my case? — Bartricks

It's your exact logic! You have a problem with Garmin that you don't have with Bartricks.

If you cannot do something as simple as substitute tokens, all you're doing is faking having an argument.

This isn't about me proving you don't have an argument. It's your argument; you're the one who is supposed to make it.

You are trying to challenge that with an example of something that is designed to impart information. — Bartricks

Was Bartricks-bot designed to impart information? Funny the question never came up. With Bartricks you started with the premise it was a bot, and ended concluding there was no representative content, explaining why. All of those why's apply to Garmin, btw, despite it being designed.

ETA: Allow me to get you started.

ELIZA was designed to simulate a therapist. But the designer did not intend to... what? Bartricks-bot was (in any realistic imagination) designed to help people waste their times on nonsense. But the designer did not intend to... what? Garmin was designed to exploit the GPS system to help people navigate between locations. But that doesn't count because the designer intended to... what? Also note that the pie in the oven was baked by a person using a tool (under ordinary circumstances, bakers, which are humans, are the ones that put pie in ovens in such a context where it becomes non-obvious and thus necessary to communicate the same).

Incidentally, potential counter... unguided evolutionary forces produce two agents. One agent designed a Garmin. The other one used it to reach a destination. How does your argument refute this counter?

These things, btw, are the critical pieces of your argument. They're also the missing pieces. About all you're saying is that humans are involved when humans talk to humans, therefore invisible human like things made humans.

I am arguing that our faculties need to have been designed to do what they do in order for them to be capable of generating states with representative contents. — Bartricks

Not really. it's premise 1:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

...that you're trying to argue for. But you're giving a particular argument that alleges to do so. That this argument supports that premise is the question.

How, exactly, does that work? — Bartricks

Good question. Here's what you just got finished saying about a bot:

This isn't a message if I am a bot, right? Explain that without vindicating my argument — Bartricks

It doesn't have a mind. It isn't 'trying' to communicate, because it doesn't have a mind - so it doesn't have goals, purposes, desires.
So.....the message won't be a message at all. It won't have any 'representative contents' — Bartricks

So we have scenario 1. In this scenario there is some sign s that some entity x produced. In this case, s is a post, and x is Bartricks. You just said above that if x is a bot, then s is not a message. You just said above that if x is a bot, x doesn't have a mind; x isn't trying to communicate because it doesn't have a mind, x doesn't have goals, purposes, and desires. You just said above that therefore ("therefore" being a translation of "So.....") the alleged message won't be a message, and that it won't have any representative contents.

Enter scenario 2. Here, s is "you have reached your destination". x is Garmin. If the above follows above, it should always follow, and therefore it should follow here. So if x is a bot, then s is not a message. x is a bot. Therefore, s is not a message, for all the reasons you gave in Scenario 1 about Bartricks-bot.

You were happy to say Bartricks-bot isn't producing representative content. You patted Echarmion on the back about it, as if you were his proud papa. But suddenly you're calling foul when the bot is spelled with a capital G instead of a capital B. If there's a nuance with Garmin, there's a nuance with Bartricks. If your Bartricks argument is solid, then the Garmin argument is solid.

So you tell me. How does this work?

Has Garmin been designed to give you information? — Bartricks

Yes. But:

for it nevertheless remains the case that the pie was not trying to communicate with you (likewise for the clouds the pie created). — Bartricks

...the destination was not trying to communicate with me; likewise for the Garmin.

If you're going to use the argument, it has to be the argument you're using. Designed things cannot merely be special pleaded into an exception just because it happens to fit your premise; they have to be an exception specifically because your argument suggests it.

No you're not. See argument. — Bartricks

Still no answer to my question. Maybe I can get to this through another angle. You see, here you're obsessed about making a point that messages have to be made by agents, and as a result you're having us play pretend that you are a bot.

But I've got a real bot for you... it's called Garmin. Garmin sits in my car; it has no microphone in it, so I have to punch things onto its display. But it does mimic speech. I can go to a brand new location I've never been to and pull up restaurants in the area on the box, pick one, and drive to it. Then the thing starts barking apparent orders at me... things like: "In 1.8 miles turn right on Belmont street". On following some to most of those orders there will arrive a point at which it makes an apparent truth claim: "You have reached your destination". Now GPS devices similar to this are incredibly popular... so some variant of this situation happens some millions of times each day. And for now, let me just say that there's a reason they are popular.

But this is all supposed to be your argument for premise 1:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

...so you're being asked to follow through. If your pie in the oven sky writing is proving we aren't aware of something because an agent didn't intentionally try to tell us pie is in the oven, then there must be something we aren't aware of with Garmin when it tells me "you have reached your destination", because Garmin isn't intentionally trying to tell us we've reached our destination either. Garmin is a bot if there ever was one.

So what is this thing we're not aware of? It appears to me that there is no answer you can give to this question that doesn't expose a problem with your argument. So show me I'm wrong.

Now just apply that moral more generally and you get my position. — Bartricks

No no no... you stopped too early. You stopped at your message point and didn't relate it to awareness (remember premise 1?)

So let's not stop and handwave. Keep going:

It doesn't have a mind. It isn't 'trying' to communicate, because it doesn't have a mind - so it doesn't have goals, purposes, desires. — Bartricks

It doesn't have a mind; it's not trying to communicate; it doesn't have goals, purposes, desires, and therefore, we (who do have minds, have goals, purposes, and desires) cannot be aware of... what?

This isn't a message if I am a bot, right? Explain that without vindicating my argument — Bartricks

But aren't we aware of it?

You've spent your entire OP, and a big portion of this thread, trying to argue that an agent must intentionally create a message in order for it to be a message, and that's precisely what you're doing here. But furthermore, this is presumably your key argument for "premise 1" in your OP (that is what you said it was), which is this:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

...and you tie it in thusly:

What explains this failure to know is the fact that no one was trying to convey to you that there was a pie in the oven by means of your dream states. ...

So, in essence if our faculties of awareness - or rather, 'faculties of awareness' - are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then none of us are 'perceiving' reality at all. — Bartricks

...so we're aware of the message. Therefore, it is a fact that someone was trying to convey a message to us. So how could you be a bot?

Can there be desires without a desirer? No. Can there be thoughts without a thinker? No. Can there be precepts without a perceiver? No. Can there be representations without a representer? No. — Bartricks

You do realize you're trying to pass off the rehearsal of prejudices as reasoning.

Can there be moving without a mover? Can there be burning without a burner? Can there be growing without a grower? And yet, things move without agents intentionally pushing them, burn without agents intentionally lighting them, and grow without agents intentionally farming them.

Yes, a very lightweight opponent. — Bartricks

...given you've chosen to open this can of worms, what does that make 250 stone me with my 15 stone cat?

It seems to me that what's preventing you from acquiring knowledge in this sort of case is that you have acquired a true belief from an 'apparent' representation, not a real one. — Bartricks

If unguided - by which I mean, unguided by any agency - natural forces produced those shapes in the sky, then it was not imparting information to you. It was just pure fluke that, to you, the clouds appeared to be trying to tell you something. — Bartricks

Then I refute the idea that reliability has anything to do with whether something is representing or not. — Bartricks

Just a few interesting notes regarding this profound and beautiful argument.

Like I say, you don't have a case. You just know that Anscombe is supposed to have used the example of a speak your weight machine to refute an argument made by cs Lewis. — Bartricks

You do realize you're fantasizing again.

have now explained numerous times. — Bartricks

And I've explained numerous times why it works. So if the number of times one explains things is a factor in how true something is, then we're about even in that department, so you had better get another metric.

The weighing machine is designed. — Bartricks

And I might care, were it the fact that all you're arguing is that agency is involved somehow in semantics. But that's not what you were arguing. You were arguing that symbols must be intentionally given by an agent in order for them to represent something.

So my digital scale conveys signs to me, that I get to interpret as world states via the semantic content of the sign, and it is certainly not an agent (at least by my model of agency; pretty sure by your model either). At first, that didn't count because what if it didn't correlate to anything. Problem is, it does correlate. Then, it didn't count because that could possibly be a fluke. Problem is, with the digital scale, it's not a fluke. But now, it doesn't count because you already explained why too many times.

Okay. But that 15 on my digital scale still means my cat weighs that much. That's a string (syntax) conveying semantic content about a world state (weight of my cat) without an agent intending for that string to convey it (you keep mentioning the designer, but the designer didn't tell me my cat weighs 15).

Now, final time, the weighing machine example is shit. Why? Because it's DESIGNED. — Bartricks

I don't deny it's designed. The problem is:

I am arguing that in order for something - be it a mental state, a picture, some squiggles - to be said to be 'tepresenting'something to be the case (as opposed to appearing to represent something to be the case) there needs to be a representer. — Bartricks

...there's no representer (in the sense you mean it).

So it ain't a counterexample. — Bartricks

Sure it is, because the scale is not a representer.

You think the fact the machine enables you reliably to know the cat's weight is what's doing the trick, yes? — Bartricks

Yes. Incidentally, I am an agent that speaks English.

I keep refuting that with examples you don't understand. — Bartricks

You haven't refuted anything except in your imagination. We're still left with the symbols 15 that my scale displayed, and the fact that this indicates to me that my cat weighs 15. Somehow you got it into your mind that if you tell me a story about a leaf that by a fluke blows into my window with the number 15 on it, then it means that my scale isn't indicating my cat's weight. I have no idea how you came up with such a silly idea, but it's clearly wrong.

It has nothing to do with reliability. — Bartricks

Reliability is critical. If the symbols have nothing to do with what my cat weighs, they can't possibly represent my cat's weight.

Again, you are begging the question throughout by just helping yourself to the idea of a representation, — Bartricks

"Begging the question" does not apply here. Begging the question is a logical fallacy where you assume the conclusion of your argument.

when what it takes for something successfully to represent is precisely what's at issue. — Bartricks

So what's the problem? 15 on the digital scale successfully represents my cat's weight. The 15 on the leaf blowing through the window does not represent my cat's weight. You may as well have my cat knock over a deck of Tarot cards in such a way that when I draw the top card it happens to be a 15. Your particular idea of the causal relationship to the symbol via the leaf is simply the wrong idea (and it's just a rehash of your pie in the oven).

There's something critically different between 15 being displayed on my digital scale and that 15 on your leaf blowing through the window. Put it this way; we can use that digital scale to weigh cats; we cannot use your leaf to weigh cats. In the use of the digital scale to weigh things, the weight is reflected by symbols on the display. The symbols displayed represent the weight.

Not sure what that means, — Bartricks

Don't worry too much about that... other people know what it means.

"The symbols '15' represents the weight of my cat. My cat's weight was conveyed to me." — InPitzotl
Question begging. See OP and other representations of the argument above. — Bartricks

There's no question begging here; only your confusion. In fact, you agreed I formed a justified true belief that my cat weighs 15 pounds. I formed that belief by reading and interpreting the symbols "15". So something about those symbols justify my belief that the cat weighs 15.

It isn't superfluous because although I have other examples that illustrate the same point, they don't seem to have conveyed it to you, and thus I keep coming up with variations in the hope that by about example 7 or 8 you might get the point. — Bartricks

It might help if you understood why I say 15 on the digital scale represents my cat's weight.

The leaf is 'apparently' making a representation, but isn't actually. — Bartricks

The leaf is not even apparently making a representation. Incidentally, it's worth noting that the symbols "representing" a thing has suddenly mutated into the surface it's written on "making a representation" of the thing.

And no amount of tightening the causal relation between what it appears to be making a representation of and the truth-maker of your belief is going magically to make it start representing successfully. — Bartricks

Are you sure? Because you don't seem to know what you're trying to adjust for when you're tightening the relation.

I can perhaps make the point in another way. — Bartricks

I laud the approach... this is much better than repeating yet another silly thing with 15 on it. But it misses.

Imagine I want to convey to you what your cat's weight is. — Bartricks

So let's start here. You are a sentient entity that understands English. So you have mental representations. You are capable of using your agency to translate mental representations of agentive world models (including hypothetical ones) into strings. The digital scale I referred to is not an agent, and does not have mental models, but nevertheless its display can generate strings... strings like "15".

YOu read the note, which says 'your cat weighs 15 stone'. Is that a representation? Yes. — Bartricks

Agreed. It represents a mental model you've formed about a shared world model. But it doesn't represent my cat's weight. It just "apparently" represents my cat's weight.

Is information from me being conveyed to you? Yes. — Bartricks

Agreed. It conveys information about a mental model you have. But it doesn't properly inform me of what my cat's weight is.

Yet the mechanism I have employed is about as unreliable as it is possible to be. — Bartricks

In other words, it does not represent the weight of my cat.

Now go back to my leaf. — Bartricks

...okay.

and by purest fluke its markings cause you to believe that you are being told — Bartricks

...this doesn't seem to relate to what that 15 on the leaf represents.

Now imagine that the connection between the leaf coming through the window and your cat's weight is very tight, such that if your cat did not weigh 15 stone it would not have come through the window. — Bartricks

Not sure why, but okay.

That's not going to make a difference, is it? — Bartricks

Nope.

Maybe you should understand another property of my scale; one I've mentioned. My cat often stands on the scale spontaneously. Each time my cat does so, it displays 15.

That 15 is shown on the digital scale when the cat weighs 15 is indicative of its weight; contrast with your leaf, where it going into the window is coincidental.

No, you are just showing that you don't really know your stuff. — Bartricks

No, you're just crowing in a pathetic attempt to gaslight me.

Not wordplay, it's just about grasping the concept. — Bartricks

Words aren't concepts.

Once more, you have acquired a true belief. But no information was conveyed to you. For no representation was made. — Bartricks

The symbols "15" represents the weight of my cat. My cat's weight was conveyed to me.

Imagine a leaf floats in through the window and the markings on the leaf look like the number 15. — Bartricks

There's an infinite number of imagined scenarios where I can see the symbols 15 in such a way that they have no bearing on the weight of my cat. But they have no bearing on the fact that the scale's display showing 15 means my cat weighs 15.

Mental states with representative contents are essential to perception. — Bartricks

It sounds like you're confusing two things. "15" and "the cat is on the mat" are strings of symbols, written in a medium. We can call those signs. These signs exist on screens, displays, notes and the like. We form mental states from signs by reading them; but the signs don't require us to read them to be the signs they are. My scale would still show 15 if my cat stepped on it even if nobody read the display.

Now if I did look at the display, then we can talk about a mental state. And yes, we use perception to read displays.

For a mental state to have representative contents (and this is a vulgar way to speak, of course, for no mental state itself represents anything to be the case) it needs to be being used by an agent for the purposes of representing those contents to its bearer. — Bartricks

With said caveats, sure.

The leaf that floated in through the window with 15 on it — Bartricks

Your leaf example is superfluous. You already have a pie in the oven, and it doesn't refute my cat's weighing 15. I don't get why you think introducing a leaf with a 15 stamp is going to help you any.

First, perception goes by way of mental states with representative contents. You say you're willing to grant this, like there's an option to deny it. No, they're essential. — Bartricks

You're just playing games. How you define a word is arbitrary. If I want to say a brainless creature with nerves perceives something, I might want a weaker definition.

Second, 'conveying' information - as opposed just to acquiring a true belief - requires an information giver and an information receiver. — Bartricks

And yet, my cat weighs 15. There's no information giver here. So either this is a lingual quibble or it's wrong.

And in the case where the sky writing — Bartricks

If the digital scale my cat steps on shows you're wrong, it's pointless to keep running back to your cloud writing.

You then proceed to beg the question by supposing that it is somehow the squiggles that are doing the representing. No, they're not. Minds represent 'by' using squiggles to convey something to another. — Bartricks

And yet, my cat weighs 15. That 15 was not conveyed to me by any mind. And yet, my cat weighs 15.

You keep running into the same problem. I thought you said you agreed with this. You're going backwards.

ETA: I think what you're trying to say is that agents are what understand what the symbols mean. But you keep saying something quite different. "Agents" is also a bit broad; it's generally just us human types that understand complex statements. But a lot of other creatures perceive things.

The note does not understand the symbols written on it. But neither does the scale understand the symbols it generates. Nevertheless, the note conveys a meaning and so does the scale. The scale provides meaning to me; and it's even the semantic content of the symbols it produces.

But the semantic content of that digital scale's display is the weight of the cat. Surely you don't deny that "15" is symbols, the symbols are a number, and that this number is the weight of the cat, right?

In order to be able to perceive a world one needs to be subject to mental states with representative contents, yes? — Bartricks

If you bake that into your concept of perception, which is fair, then sure.

in order for a mental state to be said (vulgarly) to 'represent' something to be the case, there would need to be an agent who is doing the representing in question. — Bartricks

Sure.

The note is not telling you anything; I am telling you about the cat via the note. — Bartricks

This doesn't work. That you're trying to tell me about a cat isn't in question, so let's grant that immediately. But for you to succeed in your intent to inform me there is a cat via that note, you have to have written symbols on that paper that would convey that notion. Not all symbols do that; only particular symbols do that.

What you are doing, it seems to me, is focussing on the fact that we can nevertheless acquire accurate and justified beliefs — Bartricks

Well yeah, because you made a point regarding truth in the OP with respect to the sky writing (truth by fluke). But you were also talking about information being conveyed. So consider "the cat is on the mat". That's just a bunch of letters. But those letters have a meaning according to the rules of English; it's about some cat being "on" some mat. What it means for that statement to be true is for the semantic content behind those symbols to have valid referents. What it means for that statement to convey information regarding its truth to us (in the usual sense) is for those symbols to convey those semantic contents to us.

The representing is done via them, but not by them. — Bartricks

For you to convey "the cat is on the mat" to me as a true statement, it is insufficient for you to intend to tell me the same. You must also somehow be aware of the referenced cat's being on a mat.

They have to be being used - used by an agent - for that purpose or a sufficiently closely related one before they can be said to be 'representing' something to be the case (and again, even then, this is loose talk, for the state itself does not do any representing). — Bartricks

Yes, I can tell how loose it is.

So we can have two states that are introspectively indiscernible, and one can be representing something to be the case, and the other not. In order for us to be perceiving a world, our mental states - some of them - need to be representing there to be a world. — Bartricks

That's what perception does. There's an image on your retina. Something happens, and lo and behold... some mental state is formed about something that is a mental state such that you tend to have it if there were a cat there and not have it if there were no cat there. That is a mental state of "seeing a cat".

It is not sufficient that they be introspectively indiscernible from such states. They need actually to be representing something to be the case. — Bartricks

Sure; hallucinating cats isn't seeing cats.

And they will not be doing this unless an agent got them to arise in us for that very purpose. — Bartricks

There's the question begging again.

If that is not the case - if our faculties have been forged by unguided natural forces - then although we will still acquire true beliefs about the world we are living in from them, we will not be perceiving the world, even though our situation would be introspectively indiscernible from what would be the case if we were. — Bartricks

That's a difference without a meaning.

Running from hallucinated predators burns energy. Run too much, and you can't escape the real one. Hallucinated predators cannot kill you. But that real one...

Your requirement that agents make mental states represent the world is speculative. What's worse, it's one of those empty explanations... it purports to explain something it does not in fact explain. How does this agent make the mental states represent something? What is this agent doing? Supergluing the mental state of a cat to a cat? Formally pronouncing the mental state to be about a cat?

At first the analysis we might give here is that the reason you don't 'know' that there is a pie in your oven is that it was just coincidental that the clouds formed those shapes and that the belief these shapes caused you to acquire was in fact true. — Bartricks

I think this counteranalysis misses two major points.

The first major one... if you tell me there's a cat on the mat using a note, assuming I trust you (why not?), there's good reason for me to connect those symbols to an actual cat being on a mat, because you are an agent, and I already know agents of the human variety (that are also good English speakers, not necessarily native) have the capability of perceiving cats, judging if they are in fact on mats, and using that information to formulate notes using the English symbols "the cat is on a mat". Likewise, I know that my digital scale is capable of responding to weight by producing symbols that represent weight (which is the entire point of why it displaying 15 conveys information about what the cat weighs, as opposed to which channel my television is tuned into, even if it is on channel 15; or how many amps my fuse box can handle, even if that is 15 amps). I do not, however, have the ability to tie the semantics of "pie is in the oven" to the writing in the sky. Even if that pie caused that writing to be in the sky, that means nothing to me; there are no sensible mechanics sufficient for me to link that writing to the existence of said pie.

But it's still true that seeing 15 on the scale conveys information to me about how much my cat weighs.

The second major point is that the logic is irrelevant to justify premise one, as has already been pointed out. Demonstrating that some E can produce x that isn't y cannot reasonably be a demonstration that E cannot produce y. "E can produce x" is a capability. "E cannot produce y" is a limitation. x not being y is nowhere close to demonstrating said capability implies said limitation.

Premise one is about the impossibility of unguided evolutionary forces giving awareness. The alleged argument for this premise is about the capability of unguided evolutionary forces providing things that don't convey information to us. What has that argument to do with that premise?

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect. — Bartricks

JTB's are TB's, but TB's aren't necessarily JTB's, so:

You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. — Bartricks

...my no correctly refutes that wrong part.

And yes, the belief is justified. Relevance? — Bartricks

And when you step on it it emits a seed that is paper-like and has squiggles on it that look, by fluke, like'your weight is 250'. — Bartricks

The symbols "15" produced by the scale represent the weight of my cat because my cat's weighing 15 causally relates to the symbols "15" being produced on that display. The symbols "250" on your weird plant thing is unrelated to my weight being 250. So the fluke note does not represent my weight. The "15" on my digital scale by contrast does represent my cat's weight.

Do weight machines greet you now? — Bartricks

Nope. But digital scales can show representations of weights using symbols.

You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. — Bartricks

No, I acquire a justified true belief about my cat's weight.

When I write you a note, the note isn't telling you anything. It doesn't have a little mouth or desires that you know things. — Bartricks

And yet, the scale produces the symbols 15; and those symbols represent the weight of my cat. So apparently all those things the scale isn't doing, and doesn't have, don't have anything to do with the symbols representing the weight of my cat, since 15 does in fact represent the weight of my cat.

I am arguing that your faculties need to have been designed to tell you about the world if you are to be told about the world via them. — Bartricks

Yes, you're begging the question. We'll get to that later.

Meanwhile, you wrote this:

If I write you a note saying "The cat is on the mat" is the note telling you that the cat is on the mat? No. I am. By means of the note. The note is telling you nothing. I am telling you something by means of the note. — Bartricks

The note in this case is "15". It was produced when my cat stepped onto the scale. But apparently it cannot tell me anything. Nevertheless, 15 represents the weight of my cat.

And you are trying to challenge that with a weighing machine that is designed to give you information about your weight?!? — Bartricks

No. I am challenging your messed up notions of semantics here. I quoted the same exact quote where you messed it up in this thread.

So here's the question again. What is this thing that is telling me my cat weighs 15? According to you, that display isn't telling me what my cat weighs. So what is?