Sure, provability is an example of justification — Samuel Lacrampe

...and that's all that matters. Your PoSR analog does not apply to math. If you restrict PoSR to causality you can get out of this, but the causal analog of justifying a claim also does not appeal to the causal analog of PoSR for the same reason the proof analog doesn't appeal to the proof version of it.

My understanding is that the reason why the QI theory is not universally accepted — Samuel Lacrampe

...but that is uninteresting. You're proposing a rule (PoSR) that you propose scientists rely on that rules out randomness. So what's interesting isn't that scientists don't universally accept QI, but that scientists do not universally reject it.

A requirement for empirical science is that the hypothesis brought forth must be empirically verifiable. Your hypothesis falls under this science because we can empirically verify it by turning on the light, or by using a night-vision camera, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, we can't. If we turn on the light and/or bring in a night vision camera, all we'll find is a ball resting on the floor. We can empirically verify the theory, but applying the theory is not an empirical verification. At best we can apply the data we gathered to confirm that the theory is consistent with it. Empirical measurements apply to data; and science likes data. Laws are next... they're ways to quickly understand the data by formulating relationships... science really likes laws. But the real golden nuggets for science are theories... they try to formulate models of reality that explain deeper concepts of reality. But theories (in a scientific sense) are theoretical (in a philosophical sense)... they are not empirical measurements, they are extrapolations based on them onto features of reality.

Let's examine this line of reasoning some more. You are here making an inference to the best explanation, aka abduction, which brings forth the simplest hypothesis that sufficiently explains all the data. — Samuel Lacrampe

Here's a bad theory about slot machines. There are three types: lucky, expecting, and due. If a slot machine has hit faster than expected in the past, it's lucky; you should play lucky machines because they're likely to pay off. If a machine hasn't hit for a bit but is reaching the frequency at which it should, it is expecting; you should play that machine because it's likely to pay off. And if a machine has gone on longer than expected but hasn't payed off yet, it is due; you should play that machine because it's going to pay off very soon. Slot machines can change types, though, so it's best to be a bit careful.

This theory of slot machines is a sure fire recipe for going broke. It is, however, simple; and it can explain all of the data... every slot machine you've ever seen is explained here, and any machine you'll ever encounter is covered. The problem with this theory is that it doesn't stick its neck out.

What we want in a theory isn't just to explain the data, but to explain it in the most precise way. A theory should stick its neck out... the farther the better. There should be plenty of ways the theory can be wrong; if there's no way it can be wrong, then having that theory pass a gauntlet of tests tells us nothing... of course it would pass tests... it's useless. That's why we don't like the slot machine theory...its neck is all the way in the shell. It explains everything, but it explains everything in such a manner that it explains nothing.

This is correct scientific reasoning founded on the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

No it's not. It's founded on simply the principle that we have a good working justified theory, and this explanation applies it. PoSR has nothing to do with it.

If on the other hand, we dropped the PoSR and allowed the possibility that nothing causes the phenomenon observed, then this "no cause" hypothesis would be the simplest and thus most reasonable one to begin with; which would be absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, it would not be any more reasonable than the slot machine theory, but the problem is not that it doesn't appeal to your PoSR. The problem is that it is a useless theory... like the slot machine theory, its neck is entirely in its shell. It explains everything in such a manner that it explains nothing.

Bell's Theorem contrasts with this... it sticks its neck out. HVT's suggest probabilities that fall within certain ranges. The Born Rule suggests probabilities that fall outside of those ranges. There's a very simple way BT can fail... if the measured experimental probabilities are consistent with the HVT's, BT is wrong period; throw it out and go to the next thing. In fact, a great next thing to work on would be to see if you can find out what HVT is behind those results consistent with these probabilities. But if BT falls in the BR ranges, then those HVT's can be ruled out... throw them out and go to the next thing. That is reason; that is correct scientific reasoning; and that is precisely why you find Bell's Theorem in the scientific literature. If it had to do with PoSR, per your (as yet incomplete) definition, QI would be ruled out already.

Based on what I've read, the HVT is in reference to local hidden variables — Samuel Lacrampe

There are a lot more conditions required on the range of HVT's ruled out by Bell's Theorem, but you're missing the point. You are offering that you have a proof of souls. Your proof has a flaw in it... if QI is a thing, you aesthetically want to call it physical, and therefore random things are physical. Covering up this flaw with reasoning such as "well it might be okay because that only applies when" is antithetical to the purpose of claiming that you have a proof of souls. You're trying to prove something, not make excuses for it; so if there's a way your proof can have a hole, your proof should address it.

Traditionally, what is referred to as the "soul" is that non-physical entity that survives the body after death. — Samuel Lacrampe

I understand that... but the question is what is wrong with a physical soul... are you saying that the problem is that tradition says it's not physical?

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." — Lida Rose

Sure; I was involved in that interchange, but after your response to the necessity part, I didn't feel anything relevant changed. You questioned the relevance of the Nostradamus versus the deterministic model. Well, the relevance is that in the latter, the outcome may happen as a result of the subject, which in turn can be used to assign blame/praise to the subject. Only in the Nostradamus mechanic does the subject truly not matter.

But in your response to it, you were just dismissive about the difference. I can only conclude from that that to you the difference doesn't matter... that the only thing that does is:

The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

...so I read this as your sticking to the original definition with a qualification that even if the controlling influence is the subject, you would count that as a controlling influence and, as a consequence, would conclude there was no free will.

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Well the conflicting case here is that of compatibilist free will. So a good model of that would start with an agent. Agents are entities that interact with the world continuously. Agents act with intention; i.e., they direct their behaviors towards goals. The intention per se, being an intention, can be described loosely as a meaningful direction of behavior. So if we are discussing free will, we are discussing the selection of an intention to act upon. In your question you're labeling these as Y and Z. In this compatiblist model, the nature of the options is that of counterfactual goals... Y is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Y, and Z is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Z. In a (minimally considered; @Pfhorrest gives a more common practical criteria) compatibilist choice, the agent considers two such counterfactual goals and selects one of them to commit to act towards. Given compatibilism's definitive nature, the hypothesis is that this choice occurs in a way compatible with determinism... so in our model we can just commit to that and say that the choice happens deterministically.

Since you are asking the question of "how", I think that deterministic part is the part that bugs you, so let's get that out of the way. We may presume full determinism here. Compatibilists contend that only one outcome can happen in a deterministic universe. But as you apparently contended, only one thing will happen anyway. This would drive a libertarian nuts, since libertarians presume that unless there's some "ontic" way in which the considered-but-not-chosen path "could" happen, that it's impossible to assign responsibility to the agent. But compatibilists don't presume such a thing; all a compatibilist needs (minimally) to assign responsibility is to establish that it was the agent that made the choice. Compatibilist choices aren't "routings" of "reality itself" towards one of many "ontic futures"... they are merely selections of an action to commit to among a set of counterfactual considerations. So to a compatibilist it's simply not relevant how many of those futures there are... what's relevant is simply whether or not it was the subject that did the choosing (see first part of the post again).

The rest of what I added above is a rough sketch of bootstrapping... unless there's a modeled intention of an agent here, we're not talking about choice in the right sense (so, e.g., chess playing engines do not have free will).

It's like, Okay, so what? — Lida Rose

That's actually my question, in regards to this:

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

I.e., the outcome will be what it will be anyway. So what?

Again, so what? — Lida Rose

And again, that's my question, in regards to this:

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

...the same question I ask you. So what?

Again, let's backtrack. Here are your definitions:

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Will, as defined here, requires that a subject is a controlling influence. Free will, as defined here, seems to suggest that it is an ability to be a controlling influence without having a controlling influence, which is just a contradiction.

A property with a contradictory definition vacuously cannot be had. So, so what?

The problem is you've yet to demonstrate the mechanism by which the will freely works. — Lida Rose

No, that's not the problem. The problem is that your definition of free will can be ruled out vacuously, and that seems to conflict with how you want to use the term. For example you mentioned this (ETA: also in the title of this thread):

If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or deserve praise? — Lida Rose

...so this is common... people like to tie the concept of free will to blameworthiness. But that's a usage contraint on your term. But I have some serious questions about the connection between your ruling out this vacuous form of free will and the ability to hold people blameworthy/praiseworthy.

How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Nope; that's not my burden. It's your definition. If you want to talk about blameworthiness/praiseworthiness (for example), you have to show how lacking this vacuously impossible property makes such assignments impossible.

But I can see how to assign blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to a person choosing Y over Z without positing that they need to jump through a hoop that doesn't exist. If the person actually was the thing that caused Y, and caused Y intentionally, that suffices. But it suffices even in the absence of said person having this impossible property. So I think there's something off about your definition.

If you say it's because of M then you have the added task off showing how M works as it does. And if you say it's because of J &W then the same requirement applies to them as well. It's turtles all the way down---or back as the case may be. — Lida Rose

All of the stuff you said above presumes the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). Since I don't subscribe to PAP, I need not demonstrate any of those things.

The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

Let's backtrack.

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

I agree that if (A1) the universe is deterministic, then (B) the outcome will be what it will be. However, I can derive (B) from a much weaker premise than (A1); namely, I can derive it from (A2a) the past is fixed (i.e., there are facts about the past, and they do not change), and (A2b) A2a applies at all points in time. But that leads to a question of what you mean by free will again.

Here's how it works. Assume I have free will by this definition, and I will use that to perform an act a few moments from now. I will either do A, or I will do B; right now I haven't made up my mind (and again we're presuming it will be done by free will). But by A2a, tomorrow I will have done one of these things; perhaps I can resolve to even say tomorrow: "Yesterday I did X", where X is either A or B. I can possibly do that because by tomorrow, a few moments from now will be yesterday; and per A2a there's a fact about what I did, and it will not change. But everything I just said, by A2b, is true today (bear with me, lots of qualifiers). So today, it is true that tomorrow I will be able to say "Yesterday I did X" where X is either A or B, and be able to say it factually. Therefore, today it is true that the outcome of what I do a few moments from now will be what it will be (e.g., what it will be tomorrow).

So if I can derive (B) from merely presuming A2a and A2b, why does it matter that you can derive it from A1? I'm a bit skeptical that your definition of free will requires us to reject A2a and A2b though.

Similarly, I think your definition of will requires at least one controlling influence... the subject himself must be the controlling influence. As a consequence, your definition of free will inherits this dependency on a controlling influence. I suggest that determinism then is a distraction; if your definition of free will requires a controlling influence anyway (the subject), then you cannot by identifying a controlling influence rule out free will, unless your definition is contradictory from the get go.

Or to phrase it another way, "X made me do it" doesn't necessarily mean X forced me to do it; in particular, if X actually is me, then this just reduces to "I made me do it", which has to be true anyway for it to be will, right?

The fact of being required — Lida Rose

There's an aprocryphal story about Nostradamus visiting a lord who tests him by showing him two pigs, one white, one black, and asking him to predict which pig they would eat. Nostradamus tells him they will eat the black pig and a wolf will eat the white one. The lord secretly orders his chef to cook the white pig. His chef starts to prepare it, but after leaving it unattended, a wolf comes in and eats the white pig. To make up for this the chef prepares the black pig. When the lord tries to catch Nostradamus in an error, the chef fesses up and regales them about the story. Shrugs. Oh well, such is fate.

So let's play our own predict-a-pig game. I have a box with a light bulb, a button, and a two way switch (left/right) on it. You're charged to press the button on the box, but before you do, you have to pull a Nostradamus. Your charge is to predict whether the bulb will light up or not. To indicate your prediction, if you think the bulb will light up, you should ensure the switch is in the left position. If you think it will stay off, you indicate that by ensuring the switch is in the right position.

So here's my ingenious lordly design. I just put a battery in the box, wire it to the button, run that through the right side of the switch, and connect the resulting circuit to the bulb.

So here are my definitions (by example). If you believe in fate, then you can easily win my challenge. All you need is a Nostradamus. That bulb is either going to be lit or not; just figure out which one and you're nearly done. Indicate that knowledge with the switch position, and my evil complicated box design will be thwarted. A wolf will come and either eat or complete the circuitry. But if you think I'm playing a rigged game... if you think there is no way to win, then you believe that at least this box's behavior is deterministic. In that case, too, that bulb is either going to be lit or not; however, whether it is lit or not will be determined by the state of that switch. Fate = not even the switch can thwart what happens. Determinism = what happens depends on the switch.

So by being required, do you mean to convey a Nostradamus mechanic... that it doesn't matter what we do, where the switch is... a wolf will appear and force the forseen outcome? Or do you mean to convey a deterministic mechanic, where it does matter what we do, where the switch is... because that is how the bulb gets to be lit or not? (Either way, there's only one possible evolution towards the bulb state when the button is pressed; so we could in theory say that the bulb is required to be in that state).

I love any films that deal with the topic. — Benj96

Hmmm... let's put this to the test. Have you seen Primer (link: IMDb)?

Is it linear or cyclical?

Yes-ish maybe. It's curved; it can go in various directions, some of which reach ends. Oddly these ends might further extend in some cases indefinitely into other universes. It's quite interesting...

...see e.g. here and here (two blog posts in a series by Dr. Dilts);
...and/or, here (PBS Space Time, Youtube; there are also multiple prior episodes reviewing concept of Penrose diagrams and such).

As for closed time loops, I hear there's a Chronology Protection Agency that works to prevent this.

Discrete or continuous?

No idea.

Does it actually exist outside our conscious awareness of passing events?

The answers "yes" and "no" are both correct depending on what the question is really asking.

Are all "nows" the same?

The answers "no" and "mu" are both correct depending on what the question is really asking.

When is the end or beginning of an event?

Depends on the event; and depending on the event, there may not be a beginning or end to it.

Why does it seem to have a direction?

Because even with instruments postdiction is much easier than prediction. This is the same as the entropy answer others have given with a slight bent towards perspective.

What would we be able to know about the world if we had no concept of time?

To me this seems too speculative to have an answer.

Or if we had no standardised unit of time?

Either we would use obvious non-standard units or too speculative to have an answer.

What is the relationship between time, energy, rate and change?

There empirically appears to be a symmetry of change regarding fundamental processes; said symmetry allows the notion of "rate of change" to be meaningful as a metric of time. The symmetry is sufficiently strong that processes appear to evolve nearly identically with respect to shifts in time; time translation symmetry per Noether's Theorem allows us to derive a particular kind of value we call "energy" as a conserved quantity.

(BTW disclaimer: I am not a physicist... I just take interest)

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." — Lida Rose

What does necessity mean in this context? (I'm good on fate btw, but I think too many people confuse fate with determinism).

And I need a bit of help — Lida Rose

In the menus on the left, bottom section, you want "Useful Hints and Tips".

But no ability to edit? — Lida Rose

Who says you can't edit?

Boy, that's almost a membership breaker. — Lida Rose

Okay?

Is my brain constructing an image of blackness? — Benj96

Yes (see next).

Is this a conscious default setting when deprived of stimuli?

No [link: Tommy Edison Experience, Youtube].

There's variation as well; see here [link: Damon Ross, BBC News article] for a case of visual tinnitus.

It can get complex too: Charles Bonnet syndrome

Can we call black a thing? Does it exist? — Benj96

I would suggest yes.

How can something devoid of information exist? If no energy is going into my eye how can I say I am seeing? — Benj96

Well... it's a little more complex than this. When no light is hitting your eye, the photoreceptors in your eye go to a default state; but that default state is actually depolarized to about -40mV; this is the dark current (see also the section on advantages, which describes this a bit more). So no light hitting your eye = photoreceptor voltage potential, which has energy.

Pure mathematics is in the domain of identity, not causality. — Samuel Lacrampe

Mathematics includes many fields, not just equations with equals signs on them. But provability is not just an analog of justification, but an example of it. And it was justification that you claimed appeals to PoSR.

We judge scientific theories based on their agreement with principles of reason, and not the opposite way around. — Samuel Lacrampe

Who is this "we"? The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not. So if there's a PoSR that science relies on that does rule this out, somebody forgot to inform scientists about it.

Your example would only go against the PoSR if it wasn't explained by something like the time-translation-asymmetry. — Samuel Lacrampe

Quantum indeterminism is explained by something like wavefunction collapse, backed by the Born Rule. Let me label this so you can follow:

(a) Can you find an example of a claim that is widely accepted as true and also has no justification for it? — Samuel Lacrampe

(b) Randomness means that nothing causes the change between scenarios 1 and 2, where in scenario 1, Cause A results in Effect B, and in scenario 2, Cause A results in Effect C. Randomness fails the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

(b) first off is more nonsense. Randomness has nothing to do with changing a scenario to a different one. Quantum mechanics (per ordinary CI) involves a state A (namely, the state of a wavefunction) sometimes leading to Effect B (a particular classical state) and sometimes to Effect C (a distinct classical state). Quantum indeterminacy treats this collapse of quantum states to classical ones as real. Bell's Theorem rules out that there's a classical fact of the matter that leads to Effect B as opposed to Effect C in conditions where the former happens, by demonstrating that if there were, you would wind up with constraints in probability distinct from the Born Rule probabilities, and showing by experiment that you actually get the BR ones. So QI in this sense is justified by induction and reasoning (which is not the condition of a, but still conflicts with b). You're trying to rule out that reasoning, by saying that by reasoning we appeal to some foundational principle of reason that rules it out. But there is no such thing in the reasoning that leads to QI. The entire argument is nothing but sophistry. If there were any meat to it, and any actual scientific consensus (such as the one you pretend to appeal to), then the scientific community would rule out quantum indeterminacy based on such principles.

It means that science cannot rule out non-empirical causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, that's nonsensical. I drop a rubber ball in a dark room. I hear it bounce off of the floor, then bounce again, and again. The time distance between each bounce is faster. I can infer that the ball is falling, bouncing, and going back up; each time, it's losing energy to heat and sound, causing it not to return to the original height, causing it to fall back down faster. I don't have a thermometer, and I don't see the ball. The ball bouncing in this case is theoretical, as is the explanation of what I hear; it's not empirical because it's not observed. The causes I attribute are theoretical and not empirical. There is a non-empirical cause inferred by the evidence supported theory, and that is an application of science. We can rule out the non-empirical cause of the sounds we hear that energy is just being lost, based on appeal to the scientific theory. This is proper use of the term "empirical". Your usage is kind of an abuse.

But now are you claiming that you know for a fact that non-physical things don't exist? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're lost again (and just flirting with the fallacy fallacy). Bell's Theorem is a no-go theorem that rules out HVT's. You replied to this by some nonsense about how science cannot rule out "non-empirical causes" like it actually does in the simple example above. In your response you give "examples" of "non-empirical causes" like souls, free will, an objective values. So naturally, in context (were you not lost), you would be proposing that Bell's Theorem fails to rule out HVT's involving souls, free will, and objective values. But of course, you are indeed lost. Your fault, not mine; follow the threads back.

The whole objection about those quantum theories doesn't actually harm the original argument in the OP. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that's the entire basis of my objection. If you stop trying to wring blood out of this stone, I have the right to revise my entire stance, up to and including having no particular objections. However, this particular rephrasing of your premises is a bit weak. You seem to be saying now that everything deterministic is physical, unless it's at quantum scales, in which case it gets to be physical and not be deterministic. That... seems a bit fuzzy. It's a strange, contextual sense of physical, which doesn't quite seem like that's enough to save your argument. Pardon me, but out of curiosity, why exactly do you need the soul to be non-physical in the first place? What's wrong with a physical soul?

I don't have one. I was just saying that the fact that we can harness DC electricity isn't a reason for humans to live by itself. — schopenhauer1

Something that the statement "the world is made up of chemistry" doesn't really get at, — schopenhauer1

My basic objection to Becky was her (his?) objection to my response by saying "the world is chemistry and physics" and therefore X evaluation of the world. — schopenhauer1

Okay, I think we're talking past each other then, because I was just saying addressing the metaphysics is the wrong conversation. I see @Becky's quoted claim as off myself (as far as the description goes, because energy isn't a type of thing, but rather a metric for a property; that's always a property of something physical, and we "aren't" and can't "become" energy), unless possibly it's a metaphor I don't quite get.

.

You can see it sort of in my first response. — schopenhauer1

I see this in your first response; I'll label them:

(A) That matters though, only if you feel life itself matters, and that seems to be the question at hand. — schopenhauer1

(B) but what we should do as humans in the world. — schopenhauer1

(C) why should humans keep living, keep continuing, keep procreating? — schopenhauer1

(A) is a value-judgment; I offer that it has no meaning for a reason to continue living unless it has meaning to the subject under consideration. What is your objection?
(B) is just a generic prescriptive question; (C) is a bit more particular. So considering (C), I offer again that life is just an opportunity, open ended. You should keep on living if there's something about life that you value. Same thing about continuing, and procreating. Both, however, may be challenged and weighed against reasons against the same. So I ask again, what is your objection?

That matters though, only if you feel life itself matters, and that seems to be the question at hand. — schopenhauer1

So dear sir, why should humans keep living, keep continuing, keep procreating? This itself has nothing to do with whether we can harness DC energy or not. — schopenhauer1

You're still walking through my playground. What does it mean to say humans should keep living, keep continuing, and keep procreating for reason X? What does it mean for life to matter? How does metaphysics help you answer that?

I offered that life is an opportunity; open ended. If you have something you care about, you can devote your life to it, and that's a reason to live. What is your objection? And how does metaphysics help support your objection?

Im not talking about how how names refer to their referents in the world but rather the specific statement that math and science are the world. — schopenhauer1

I realize you're scratching a metaphysical itch, but I'm scratching a semantic itch, and I posit that you have to cross my playground before you reach yours. For example, what does it mean to say that math and science are the world?

That is not a metaphysical position. — schopenhauer1

I agree, but I think we have a bigger issue. You present that chemistry not being a metaphysical position is a problem with the claim that we're just chemistry. But I think chemistry not being a metaphysical position is a problem with your objection to the claim that we're just chemistry. Water is H2O; two parts of something we call hydrogen and one part something we call oxygen. Hydrogen has one proton in it, oxygen eight. Protons are made up of two up quarks and one down quark bound by gluons. And a quark is, maybe, a primitive classical unit. Or maybe, a portion of the universal wavefunction. Or maybe, a mode of vibration of strings. Or maybe, a particular equivalence class of features of the simulation we're in. Or maybe some combination of these things, or maybe none of them. All of these things have possibly distinct metaphysical implications.

But I submit it doesn't matter. Whatever quarks are, that the stuff coming out of my faucets is H2O is just a model saying such things as that I can run a DC current through it, and get two parts of something I call hydrogen and one part of something I call oxygen. So who really cares what the metaphysics is? That's irrelevant. What's relevant is simply whether that model is apt.

Further, my actual point is that even that metaphysical position doesnt tell us much about the himan experience itself other than claiming perhaps a statement about the constituents that make up people and the world — schopenhauer1

But with respect to the claim that we're chemistry, it's irrelevant what the metaphysics are. It's quite simply the wrong conversation to be had. What's relevant is simply whether the physics is apt to cover it.

ETA: Just to remain close to the topic I'll toss my view in. Life is quite simply an opportunity. Beyond that I don't think there's much to say; what it's an opportunity for is open ended, and whether that's a sufficient reason is open ended (and as some have said, it's not even necessary to have a "reason" to live to live). I would only hope that people find something to do with that opportunity and enjoy it if they can.

Physics and chemistry are sciences that explain observations. That is not the "thing-itself". — schopenhauer1

That does not follow; if "thing-itself" can refer to the thing-itself, so can "water" and so can "H2O". H2O may be theory laden, but it can still be used to refer to the thing-itself.

Probability. Reasonableness is equivalent to probability in mathematics without being quantitative. Note however, that the PoSR applies first and foremost to causality, and secondarily to knowledge, as an extension. — Samuel Lacrampe

You seem to be losing the ability to understand what you're quoting. Mathematical conjectures are not judged based on the probability that they are true; they are judged based on whether they can be proven or disproven.

But through induction, by observing that there exist no contradictory facts, and that we cannot even imagine contradictory images, then it is reasonable to believe the LNC to be true, both as an epistemic and a metaphysical principle. — Samuel Lacrampe

But if you're appealing to induction, then induction is in play; in that case, we can appeal to quantum indeterminacy as a reason to doubt PoSR.

There is a misunderstanding somewhere here. — Samuel Lacrampe

Indeed there is. You said this, here:

To confirm, in the statement about the PoSR "For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs", "sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

...and I got two concrete examples from you; one was support-ability of a beam by weight... the other was conservation of energy. The weight thing sounds fine, but hardly universal; I can think of several other principles where "lesser" amounts of some total are required for some thing, but PoSR must apply to all things not just certain classes of things, else there's no such rule. The conservation of energy thing plain fails, but:

This should still be okay with the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

...and that seems to be a curious exception. You gave this as an example of PoSR applying; turns out it flunks. But now you're backtracking. I'll allow this, but, there's a cost. So maybe PoSR is fine with energy increasing after all; you can pin that on time translation asymmetry. But if you can be wrong about this because energy can indeed increase due to time translation asymmetry, then how can we be sure you cannot be wrong about quantum indeterminacy because events can indeed be stochastic due to wavefunction collapse, in the same manner in which you allow indeterministic free will because events can be caused by original causes who are free agents?

If I were cynical, I would say that "greater" and therefore "sufficient" don't mean anything at all, because you just retrofit them to whatever is there post hoc. If energy is conserved, greater fits; if not, well, that's okay too. PoSR by this theory is meaningless, and lacks the ability to rule out randomness. But apparently the whole point of PoSR was to rule out randomness so you could use this proof of souls. So, come on, give me something meaningful enough to do the job you want to do; something that doesn't sound like special pleading.

That science may be able to show in some cases that it has accounted for all the causes that science can account for: observable, detectable causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

The word "empirical" refers to something you actually observe though; so phrases like ruling out empirical causes literally mean that you're ruling out causes that you observe, which is kind of nonsensical. In like fashion your previous rant about empirical science being science and what not is a bunch of meaningless babble that should just be ignored. As for the above statement, that's a bit more meaningful, but it shows lack of imagination and a complete ignorance of what a no-go theorem is. Bell's Theorem does not require the causes be observable or detectable; it merely requires that there be some sort of fact of the matter of the classical system that leads to the result.

E.g. there may exist things which are typically judged to be non-physical such as the soul, free will, and objective values. — Samuel Lacrampe

And now we're full circle? The photon goes left because it has a soul, free will, and objective values?

So this translates to "this thread is a proof that an engligh speaker is engaging me in a conversation". So far so good; no conflict with the PoSR that I see. But then what is your point? — Samuel Lacrampe

You have a talent for not following the discussion. You posited that by using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) that I'm appealing to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). I'm saying that just using a justification for a belief (O⊢P) does not require an appeal to PoSR (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P). Think of ⊢ mathematically as meaning proof; outside of math, as simply being a metaphor for justifies. But you're still trying to cargo cult some sort of ridiculous foundational dependency of (O⊢P) to (∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P).

Fair enough, but what if AI acts at a human level ? — path

Then I would say it probably understands things, but not necessarily that it's conscious. I don't have a great model for what it takes for something to be conscious yet, so wouldn't know when to apply what metric for that.

That's pretty mentalistic — path

Indeed it is, but that's a different question. You're asking a few of them!

I also have the intuition that I am a single consciousness. But I'm suggesting that this is trained into us. We just learn to talk this way. — path

"Trained into us" is making an assumption; as is "learn to talk this way". There is a social practice of naming people and treating them as distinct individuals for sure, but there are these features as well that I just described... to simply presume this comes out of a social construct requires an argument. We also know singularity of identity breaks down in certain cases, such as patients who underwent corpus callosotomy, and such individuals have distinct manifestations from the normative cases. It's interesting to me that a person whom we may have named "Charlie" may develop a case of Alien Hand Syndrome.

What does meaning add to reacting to 'get the chips' by getting the chips? — path

The ability to plan behaviors directed towards and manage to successfully attain a goal of getting chips and dip.

Also, yeah,I was using the Turing test metaphorically, extending its meaning. — path

I know, and such is apparently the trend here, but I feel like too often discussions about AI become hand wavy.

That's one of the assumptions that I am questioning. — path

What assumption? And who is making it?

Yet we vaguely imagine that this mind is radically private (maybe my green is your red and the reverse.)

We never peer into someone's pure mindspace and check that their red is our red. All we do is agree that fire engines are red. — path

Okay, sure, let's think about that. We both call fire engines red, even though we have no idea if "my red" is "your red". So if we can both agree that the fire engine is "red", it follows that red is the color of the fire engine and not the "color" of "my red" or the "color" of "your red", because we cannot agree on the latter. Note that my perspective on meaning allows p-zombies and robots to mean things; just not Chinese Rooms (at least when it comes to chips and dip).

Roughly speaking we all pass one another's Turing tests by acting correctly, making the right noises. How do you know that my posts aren't generated by AI?

Acting is not part of the Turing Test, since that involves communicating over terminals. In this medium we communicate using only symbols, but I imagine you're not AI based solely on balance of probability.

Do you assume that there is just one of you in there in your skull?

Well, there's an apparent singularity of purpose; this body doesn't seem to arm wrestle itself or reach in between the two options. And there's a continuity of perspective; when this mind recalls a past event it is from a recalled first person perspective. So there's at least a meaningful way to assign singularity to the person in this body.

I agree that the task is complex. But note that you are pasting on lots of mentalistic talk. — path

Not... really. You're projecting mentalism onto it.

If the android picks up the chips as requested, we'd say that it related to the symbols correctly. — path

I would, for those symbols, if "correctly" means semantically.

Our actions are synchronized. You can think of our noises and marks as pieces in a larger context of social conventions. Talk of 'I' and 'meaning' is part of that. I'm not saying that meaning-talk is wrong or false. I'm saying that it often functions as a pseudo-explanation. It adds nothing to the fact of synchronized behavior. — path

Well, yeah. Language is a social construct, and meaning is a "synchronization". But we social constructs use language to mean the things we use language to mean. And a CR isn't going to use chips and dip to mean what we social constructs use chips and dip to mean without being able to relate the symbols "chips and dip" to chips and dip.

I don't think this is focused on the real issue. If AI has a body, then it could learn to react to 'get some chips' by getting some chips. — path

You're trivializing this though. First, the symbols "chips and dip" have to actually be related to what the symbols "chips and dip" mean in order to say that they are understood. And what do those symbols refer to? Not the symbols themselves, but actual chips and dip. So somehow you need to get the symbols to relate to actual chips and dip. That's what I think we're talking about here:

Perhaps. But have we ever seen a human being with more than just nominal autonomy? — path

i.e., it's what is needed to be more than just "nominal", or syntactic.

So, yes, this isn't impossible for an AI, if only you gave it a body. But that's trivializing it as well. The AI needs more than "just" a body; it needs to relate to the world in a particular way. To actually manage to pick up chips and dip, you need it to be able to plan and attain goals (after all, that's what picking up chips and dip is... a goal; and to attain that goal you have to plan... "there are chips and dip on this aisle, so I need to wander over there and look"). Then you need the actual looking; need to be able to grab them, and so on and so on. This entire thing being triggered from a request to pick up chips and dip is a demonstration of the ability to relate the symbols to something meant by them.

Indeed, it's almost a religious idea. What does it mean to be an agent? — path

Something like I just described above, at a minimum. BTW, I think there's a lot more to add to make a conscious entity; but I don't see how a CR without a "body" (agency) can actually know what chips and dip is.

Note that I asked a question, that point of which was to say that ....hey, maybe we are taking our own autonomy for granted. — path

Well, yeah, but humans are agents; the Chinese Room, not so much. To me that sounds very important, not mystically, but practically. If I were to ask my s.o. to pick up chips and dip while at the store, my s.o. would be capable of not just giving me the right English word phrases in response, but also coming home with chips and dip as a response. It's as if my s.o. knows what it means to pick up chips and dip. How is a nominal-only program going to bring home chips and dip, regardless of how well it does passing Turing Tests?

I tend to agree, people take our autonomy for granted. But I think part of what we take for granted when we think of computer programs having thoughts is the simple fact that we're agents. (Yes, and we have hormones and brains and stuff... but the agent part in itself seems very important to me).

What I'm getting at is that autonomy is a vague notion, an ideal. — path

So you've said a fair bit about autonomy, but how about that "only nominal" part?

But have we ever seen a human being with more than just nominal autonomy? — path

Have you ever seen a human with only nominal autonomy?

Now the term "proof" is too strict — Samuel Lacrampe

Not in the realm of mathematics; proof is generally the level we're looking for. What weaker sufficient reason would you apply to mathematics?

Of course, first principles cannot be proven to be true, by definition, but sufficient reasons nevertheless are given to make them reasonable, such as induction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Could you explain that a bit more?

"Greater" may not always apply, as per your example. — Samuel Lacrampe

But this is your burden... to show randomness is impossible. Quantum Indeterminacy comes from application of Born Rule, which is the rule that you apply when you get classical states from the wavefunction collapsing. If greater doesn't apply here, then there's no argument against randomness in this.

doesn't it conflict with the first law of thermodynamics, that the total energy of an isolated system is constant — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes. This is an analog to Newton's Laws we were discussing earlier. Conservation of energy is a really great law, and it's "almost" true; it is, in fact, so close to being true that we may as well just say that it is. But we can derive conservation of energy from more fundamental laws; in accordance with Noether's Theorem, conservation of energy is a result of time translation symmetry. Dark energy introduces a time translation asymmetry, and dominates the universe at cosmic scales.

You were telling me a couple of posts ago something about greater... but when I tried to directly apply that to randomness, which you're ruling out, you're saying it doesn't apply there... and the one example you gave me of greater is actually false? Now regarding this "can support 10kg" stuff, sure, that seems to have a greater concept in it somewhere, but I don't really see one for three justifying any general rule. More importantly, if the one thing you're trying to rule out by the rule doesn't apply, then why are we discussing "greater"?

The domain of the empirical sciences (what we refer to as science for short) is limited to the empirical. But reality is not necessarily limited to the empirical. So while science may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes, it cannot make claims about possible non-empirical causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

This paragraph is meaningless to me. Based on my understanding of what the word "empirical" means, it's a bunch of babble, and straight out false... it's tantamount to saying that there's no such thing as a no-go theorem in science, which is quite silly given Bell's Theorem is such a thing. But based on what I understand the word "empirical" to mean, some of these phrases are outright nonsense; for example, what is this supposed to mean?: "may demonstrate there are no additional empirical causes"

But we don't commit to P, precisely because there is an insufficient explanation to claim that P is true. — Samuel Lacrampe

What are you talking about? P=an english speaker is engaging me in a conversation. O=this thread. O⊢P. Are you failing to abstract? You're talking about a principle that supposedly applies to all true things.

Does this mean that when something branches it doesn't create an 'entire world'? — ChatteringMonkey

Correct. The worlds aren't fundamental; they're emergent. Also the name MWI is a bit of a misnomer; MWI doesn't posit multiple worlds... it posits that wavefunction collapse isn't "real". That leaves only the evolving wavefunction. In fact, the title of Everett's seminal work is "The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction".

Worlds are, rather, simply portions of the universal wavefunction that don't meaningfully interact with other portions. The wavefunction never collapses; instead, when an "observer" measures a system in superposition, the observer simply entangles with it, creating a new wavefunction state where the observer too is in superposition, which in essence becomes multiple portions of the wavefunction that don't interact with each other meaningfully, aka "worlds".

But in SC, the "original" split is the decay versus non-decay of the radioactive material, which is in superposition. Then the detector observes this, thus entangling with it, making a detected decay versus undetected non-decay, resulting in a broken versus non-broken vial of poison (as the vial "observes" the detector), and so on. MWI is simply the idea that we keep going this way when Schrodinger opens the box, rather than apply a brand new rule ("real" wavefunction collapse) to him. So think of this as not an absolute split, but rather, a "propagating" split; observing a split splits you.

So the branches are allready there before they 'branch'? — ChatteringMonkey

Not quite. The cat branched when it "observed" (smelled) a system in superposition (between poison in the air and no poison in the air, resulting from broken vial and no broken vial, due to detection/no detection). That observation entangles the cat with this system, but that makes two "worlds". To the one Schrodinger, those two worlds are in superposition, until he opens the box; then his wavefunction entangles with this result, branching him into two Schrodingers.

Which one? Dead cats tell no tales, but the living cat smells no poison. (Make sure to see all edits above).

If a normal living cat is in superposition why doesn't it smell poison then? — ChatteringMonkey

"Normal sized living cat" is not in superposition; "normal sized cat" is (or more realistically, the contents of the box). The box is in a superposition between two states; A and B. State A has a living cat that smells no poison. State B has a dead cat in it. In MWI terms, once "Schrodinger" opens the box, he just gets entangled with this system. Then you have State A, Schrodinger sees a living cat, and State B, Schrodinger sees a dead cat. Then, the Schrodinger who saw a living cat "smells no poison" (sees no broken vials).

In other words, what it is like to be in superposition is the same thing as what it's like to not be in superposition. You're just a classical-ish thing that is a portion of the wavefunction, not interacting meaningfully with other portions of the wavefunction in superposition, even if that other thing is "a you" that evolved differently. (In MWI terms your "classical" portion would be a world).

Maybe hypothetical mini-electron sized cats do? — ChatteringMonkey

Normal sized Schrodinger's cat is in superposition; why would mini-electron sized cats be different?

what does it experience before the wavefunction collapses/splits, all possible positions at once... and then they all but one disappear when it hits the screen? — ChatteringMonkey

Living cats don't smell poison.

I'll do this first, because this is too important to leave at the bottom.

I'm not sure what your point is in this last paragraph. — Samuel Lacrampe

Within the domain of math, per your definition, I read "sufficient reason" as being equivalent to proof.

Here's some notation I'll be using:
Qualifiers: ∀=for all, ∃=there exists, ∄=there does not exist
Operators: A⊢P=A is a proof of P, ⋀=and, :=such that

Your statement: ∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P
But per Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem: ∃P : P ⋀ ∄ O : O⊢P
...namely, the Godel statement G that says that G cannot be proved within a system would be such a P. I would posit that if you extend your system, you just get another system.

In terms of math, when you say "X can be justified" appeals to your phrasing of the PoSR, given "proof"=sufficient reason, then you're literally saying that "O⊢P" appeals to "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P", which is ridiculous on the face of it.

Greater in terms of "causal power" or "ability". — Samuel Lacrampe

That doesn't sound generic to me, though it sounds a bit trivial. If we agree that A causes B, we could say that A has "resulting in B" as its causal power, which I see as simply a fancy way of saying that A can cause B. I don't get where "greater" comes in though. Wavefunction collapse causes the photon to go left. Okay, and?

Indeed if talking about energy events, then the energy from the effect cannot be greater than the energy from the causes — Samuel Lacrampe

That implies that the total amount of energy in the universe can remain the same, or decrease, but cannot increase. But that conflicts with the fact that the total amount of energy in the universe is increasing (due to dark energy). So, what gives?

I assume "randomness" here means that sometimes we observe event A and sometimes event B, with no apparent causes to explain that change. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I mean that state Φ sometimes evolves into state A and sometimes evolves into state B, and we can demonstrate that there exists no hidden variable that can explain the evolution of state A from state Φ as opposed to state B from state Φ. Being able to demonstrate that there are no HVT's is strikingly different than merely not seeing an apparent sufficient cause. Quantum indeterminacy is not based on pattern matching events; it's based on an evidence supported no-go theorem (Bell's Theorem).

The purpose of reason is to find truth, and we observe that when we reason about a topic, we always demand an explanation that is sufficient to defend the claim, and we reject the claim when the explanation is found to be insufficient (ie failing to fulfill the burden of proof). — Samuel Lacrampe

That does not imply∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P; all it implies is that we don't commit to P until we find an O such that O⊢P (with a much weaker sense of ⊢... an outright falsifiable sense... since we're dealing with induction most of the time).

The scientific method is based on reason, which uses both the LNC and the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

Reason doesn't rely on PoSR. You're making that up. There is no "∀P, P ⇒∃O:O⊢P" in "O⊢P".

Thought you'd like this — frank

This visual proof is a bit more elegant:


http://www.cut-the-knot.org/pythagoras#6

Simple version of proof: Given ABC with A as a right angle, construct its altitude AD. ABD, ADC, and ABC are all similar. Visually, the area of ABC=the area of ABD+ADC. Now picture ABD as a shape extending from AB, ADC as a similar shape extending from AC, and ABC as a similar shape extending from BC, and we have established that in this particular case, the area of two similar shapes extending from the sides equals the area of a similar shape extending from the hypotenuse. One can show that if this is true for one shape it's true for any shape ("exercise left to the reader"), thus it's true for squares, thus AB^2+AC^2=BC^2.

Not in the context of the PoSR — Samuel Lacrampe

That sounds like special pleading to me. But, okay.

"sufficient" means that the effect cannot be greater than its causes. — Samuel Lacrampe

And what does greater mean? Surely snowflakes can cause avalanches, and hurricanes can result from a butterfly flapping its wings. Is a rock greater than a stick? Is elasticity greater than magnetism? Are you just saying that if something requires x amount of energy then you need at least x amount of energy? Greater has to actually mean something you can use if you're going to define PoSR this way, and if it does, I'd like to know what that meaning is.

But whatever greater means, that has to be the thing you use to rule out Born Rule application of wave function collapse, because that's precisely what you're ruling out when you rule out the randomness Banno was talking about. (But even this would not be too convincing, because even if you ruled this out, the theory Banno described would do perfectly well as a physical theory... it just wouldn't apply to our world).

My aim is to show that the PoSR is self-evident, not that it is necessarily true. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, I'll attack this differently too... let's start here. Do you mean that PoSR is "obvious" (the common definition)? Because it's not so obvious to me. Or do you mean that PoSR "is known to be true without justification"? Because that would entail that I know it to be true, and I can find reasonable doubt of it being true (WFC realism). Because I can reasonably doubt it, you have to justify it to me. That's what this stuff really means. And what you're really trying to do is futile on top of futile... you're trying to prove to me that you don't have to justify PoSR to me.

Well, what about my reasonable doubt... the possibility that WFC is real?

By saying that "Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified", it is appealing to the PoSR in the form of "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true." — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not even related to the that claim; it's appealing only to the fact that a belief is justified if there's justification for it, which is kind of tautological. In fact, "For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true" is not even true! If your version of PoSR entails that it is, then I straight out disbelieve it; Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem's much better justified.

But if a claim does not need to but can be demonstrated, then it means it could be demonstrated without begging the question, which the statement in the wiki disallows. — Samuel Lacrampe

You keep treating demonstrate/justify and logical proof as the same thing. All three are different things. You demonstrate something by just doing a thing and showing that a principle is working, for that one event. You justify something by giving a good reason to believe it. You prove something logically by applying logical axioms and/or theorems.

Or leaving the wiki aside, we agreed we could also call a self-evident claim a "first principle". But we demonstrate a claim by appealing to a principle prior to that claim, which cannot exist for first principles, by definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

We're not agreeing on what is self evident. But you're trying to prove something is self evident, and at the same time, trying to say that you cannot prove it.

My point is the same as that of the wiki — Samuel Lacrampe

No it's not; you've confused yourself into thinking it's the same. The wiki says exactly this:

A logical argument for a self-evident conclusion would demonstrate only an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion based on one or more premises that differ from it (see ignoratio elenchi and begging the question).

...what you're not grasping is that this is a direct criticism of your attempts to logically argue for a self evident conclusion. This wiki is saying that you by doing so are demonstrating an ignorance of the purpose of persuasively arguing for the conclusion... that you're begging the question. That's supposed to be a bad thing, but you're doing it.

It was justified. It no longer is. — Samuel Lacrampe

It was justified but it was never sound. Relativity didn't become true when Einstein proposed it; to the degree that it's "truer" than Newton, it was "truer" dating back to the Big Bang singularity.

Why is that a fallacy? Also I suspect you do not understand the statement in the Wiki link, because it supports my claim. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, you suspect I don't understand the Wiki link because you do not understand it. See the quote above? Who is offering a logical argument that PoSR is self evident? That's not me, that's you. So who is being demonstrated ignorant of the purpose of persuasively arguing that position? If anyone that would be you, not me; I'm the attempted persuadee, you're the persuader. I'm the one doubting the PoSR is self evident. And who is begging the question by proposing that logical argument? Not me; that's you. I'm unconvinced PoSR is self evident, so I'm asking, not for a logical argument, but for a justification. Because... whose opinion is it that debates lead to truth? Not mine; that's yours.

And "absurd" means "away from common sense". — Samuel Lacrampe

...according to Einstein (apocryphally but believably), common sense is the set of prejudices learned by the age of 18.

You seem to appeal to the PoSR to support these theories, — Samuel Lacrampe

How?

and then conclude that the PoSR is false.

Wrong; I conclude PoSR isn't necessarily true. It's just a simple modal logic exercise. Maybe instead of bluffing you should read up on modal logic.

We can imagine the literal word "random" made of letters, — Samuel Lacrampe

It's trivially false that I cannot imagine something I don't perceive. I can imagine that there's a kidney underneath my skin somewhere; I can imagine the pipe running to my property delivering water. I can imagine uncomputable numbers, incompressible numbers, Godel numbers, and TM's that UTM's cannot decide are halting or not. I can imagine dependence and independence. You're fishing.

Similarly, it is useful to talk about "infinity" in math, but we cannot imagine it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Unless you're prepared to argue that there are a finite number of counting numbers because PoSR, I don't think you want to go there.

Interesting. I did not know that was what "sufficient cause" means. Alright. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sufficient has meant that since before you started your post. And I've been telling you what it means. I linked to an article even; you obviously didn't read it. Not until I spoon fed it did you agree. So what made you think you were qualified to lecture me on what sufficient means if you had no idea?

Look it up. — Sir2u

Sure. Here's a pdf copy; and here's an html one. (Context for others... these are links to Alan Turing's article "Computer machinery and Intelligence", 1950, which introduced what's now regarded as the Turing Test).

So an AI would need — Sir2u

That's reasonable; since it would involve more things, it likely would involve more code.

Computer learning has come a long way — Sir2u

Well, yeah, it has.

But one thing that most people seem to forget about — Sir2u

"Forget" is a strong word; that implies not remembering something said. Cite?

I'm not after a gotcha or a fight; just demonstrating that there's genuine room for confusion here. I'll take your response as a no, so hopefully that would clear things up about your intent.

In my humble opinion...
"Its like a finger pointing away to the moon. Dont concentrate on the finger or you will miss all that heavenly glory." — Bruce Lee — TheMadFool

Alright, let's turn this into a question then. In your original post, you said this:

the Turing Test in which a test computer qualifies as true AI if it manages to fool a human interlocutor into believing that s/he is having a conversation with another human. — TheMadFool

...after which you offered:

The following equality based on the Turing test holds:
Conscious being = True AI = P-Zombie — TheMadFool

...so, that reads like it possibly suggests this:

Conscious being = True AI = Passes Turing Test = Fools human interloculators into believing you are having conversations with another human = P-Zombie

So the question is... was that your intent in this thread?

You are taking the Turing test too literally. — TheMadFool

I can only reply that I've seen people choke on this point. Also, the term Turing Test is a term of art with a literal meaning, so I'm not sure how taking it literally can be a bad thing. p-zombie is also a term of art with a distinct meaning. Surely it's better to just be clear, especially if people get confused, right?

I think that Turing meant that you could have a conversation — Sir2u

I think you're missing the point. Yes, the TT involves having a conversation; but the conversation is limited only to a text terminal... that is, you're exchanging symbols that comprise the language. But the TT involves being indistinguishable from a human to a (qualified) judge. And if your computer program cannot answer questions like this, then it can't pass the TT. Over a terminal, though, all you can do is exchange symbols, by design.

It would be have to access vast amounts of data quickly and come up with the correct sentences, — Sir2u

Mmm.... it's a little more complex than this. Fall back to the TT's inspiration... the imitation game. Your goal is to fool a qualified judge. So sure, if it takes you 10 minutes to figure out that a banana is a good response to an oblong yellow fruit, that's suspicious. If it takes you 10 seconds? Not so much. But if it takes you 5 seconds to tell me what sqrt(pi^(e/phi)) is to 80 decimal places, that, too, is suspicious. You're not necessarily going for speed here... you're going for faking a human. Speed where it's important, delay where it's important.

I don't remember ever — Sir2u

I'm not writing a paper discussing Turing; I'm responding to the OP in a thread on a forum. In that post, there was one paragraph talking about an AI passing a TT. The next paragraph, we're talking about p-zombies. All I'm doing is pointing out that these are completely different problem spaces; that passing the TT is woefully inadequate for making you a good p-zombie.

The observation creates more strings of data for it to process, and make decisions about. — Sir2u

Technically, yes, but that's a vast oversimplification. It's analogous to describing the art of programming as pushing buttons (keys on a keyboard) in the correct sequence. Yeah, programming is pushing buttons in the right sequence, technically... but the entire problem is about how you push the buttons in what sequence to achieve what goal.

Think of this as skillsets. Being able to talk goes a long way to being a good p-zombie, but it's only one skillset; and mastering just that skill isn't going to fool anyone into thinking "you're" conscious. That "more strings of data" and "decisions about" you're talking about here is another skillset; say, it's a vision analog and you equipped your robot with a camera. That's all well and good, but that skillset is literally about discerning objects (and like "useful things") from the images. English is a one dimensional thing with properties like grammar; images are two dimensional things which convey information about three dimensional objects, which has no grammar... but rather, there are rules to both vision per se and to object behaviors. There's also acting; and reducing that to just moving a part is another oversimplification. Touching a banana isn't a function of "moving a part", but "moving a part appropriately such that it attains the goal of touching the banana"... that involves the vision again, and planning, and the motion, and adjustment, and has to tie in to object recognition and world modeling as well as relating that English text from that first skillset to appropriate actions to respond with. That's another skillset, and it's a distinct one. Furthermore, once your p-zombie starts interacting, it's not truly "just a computer" with "inputs" and "outputs" any more... it's really something more like "two computers" dancing... one with sensors and servos and silicon, but the other, the dance partner, is made of objects, object properties, and physical mechanics. The interaction required to just act towards attaining a goal, a must for fooling a human into thinking you're a conscious agent, is so mechanically interfused with what you're acting with that the entire system becomes important (consider that your actions have effects on your senses and that modeling that, which requires modeling your dance partner, is a required part of the skillset).

The test does not say that AI has to convince someone — Sir2u

Sure, but that's required to be a p-zombie.

That would involve more that just AI, things like appearance, smell, body — Sir2u

...well not quite. The p-zombie isn't trying to fool you into thinking that it's a human; it's just fooling you into thinking it's conscious.

One well-known test for Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the Turing Test in which a test computer qualifies as true AI if it manages to fool a human interlocutor into believing that s/he is having a conversation with another human. No mention of such an AI being conscious is made.

A p-zombie is a being that's physically indistinguishable from a human but lacks consciousness. — TheMadFool

I think it's important to point out that those are two completely different things.

"All" a computer needs to do to pass a Turing Test is say the right words in response to words a judge says. In the way it's typically imagined (there's debate on what a TT really is; let's just ignore that), the thing behind the terminal might be a human or might be a computer. Either way the only access the judge has to he/she/it per the rules is texting via a terminal. So a judge might ask something like, what's a good example of an oblong yellow shaped fruit? And if the response is "A banana", that's something a human could have said. Call that "level 1".

But here's the problem. If we take a "level 1" program and just shove it into a robot, what do you suppose we'd get? It'd be silly to presume you'd get anything other than this... a (hopefully) non-moving robot, incapable of doing anything useful, except possibly over a single channel of communication where it can receive and send sets of symbols equivalent to native language text (e.g. English). If, say, I brought a bowl of fruit, placed it in front of the robot, and typed into this channel, "show me which one is the banana"... then it doesn't matter how well the thing did in the Turing Test, I should expect no action. And that kind of feeble robot is certainly incapable of fooling anyone that it's a human. Before the "oh, that's just a minor detail... suppose we", let's actually suppose we. What do we have to add to this robot to get it to fool a human?

In this example, one thing we might expect the robot to be capable of is, when asked to pick out the banana from the bowl of fruit, that the robot would just reach out and either touch the banana or pick it up. So let's say it does that... then what more is it doing than level 1? Well, it's not just processing string data... now it's observing the environment, associating requests with an action, identifying the proper thing to do when asked to show me which is the banana, and being capable of moving its robot arm towards the banana based on its perception. Now it's not just spitting out words; it's a more semantic thing. It's not just the string "banana" that it has to respond with, but rather, it has to respond with "showing me" (aka, performing some action that counts as "showing me") one of a set of objects (i.e., be capable of identifying where that set is) that is the actual banana (associating the word banana with "the entity" that the word is about). That's a bit more involved than just passing a Turing Test... the two aren't equivalent. You need to do a lot more to build a good p-zombie than just trick people behind a terminal. P-zombies are at least "level 2."