From the same link: — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, that's the "common" one... "it's obvious". But also, in the common one, it simply says the epistemological definition is more strict. So my definition was: "Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.". And the "philosophical" one, from the link: "a self-evident proposition is a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof". And your definition-from-literal:

The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". You don't see it? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're quibbling over some interpreted "strictness" of my definition, but mine still aligns with the philosophical one, and yours is still nowhere close.

And also — Samuel Lacrampe

...okay, but that doesn't quite fit, because far from being ignorant of begging the question, you're literally embracing it. Your source seems to treat it as a bad thing. Also, you have this theory that debates lead to truth; so there must be something you can debate me with that would convince me.

We believe a claim was justified because we believe the argument was sound — Samuel Lacrampe

No, because we believe Newtonian mechanics was justified pre-Einstein, yet we don't believe it's sound. And belief that an argument is sound is not the same thing as an argument being sound.

One cannot say that a claim was justified even though the argument was not sound.

IEP did.

Inadequate in this context means "no rational error"; that is, the argument cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, let's go with that one then. In the current knowledge base of physics, best I understand, randomness cannot be refuted given the currently available set of evidence, nor can determinism be refuted given the currently available set of evidence. So neither conclusion is a rational error.

We are definitely not on the same page; because my point is that not being able to prove the LNC is part of what makes the LNC self-evident. — Samuel Lacrampe

And that's ridiculous. Not being able to prove massless cows are eating massless grass in the center of the sun doesn't make it self evident. You can't prove something is self evident by begging the question. And you can't prove it by begging the question and appealing to popularity.

Begging the question: Showing that one cannot avoid begging the question to demonstrate self-evidence is not a fallacy. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree. But using the fact that something begs the question to "prove" that something is self evident is a fallacy.

That's the problem. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, that's not the problem. The problem is that you're using logical fallacies to justify that claims are self evident, not that I'm not using enough of them.

You seem to fail to realize that a reductio ad absurdum is effective only when — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem isn't that I "fail to realize" this; the problem is that it's flat out wrong and you're just making it up. Since when did reductio have to do with popular opinion? Wiki gives this example of a reductio:

There is no smallest positive rational number because, if there were, then it could be divided by two to get a smaller one.

...how is this even related to people's beliefs in smallest positive rationals?

(1) it cannot be evidenced by anything else ... (2) Its contradictory (ie "not everything must have a reason or a cause") is absurd, because it invalidates the demand to justify any claims ever. E.g. the soul exists. Much shorter OP. — Samuel Lacrampe

As for (1), you're confusing justification with proof; I don't hold PoSR to be self evident; and you're trying to prove PoSR anyway. As for (2), nonsense; denial of PoSR does not require invalidating the demand to justify all claims. In fact, Quantum Indeterminism itself is even a thing because it can be justified. Real experiments show QM works. Born Inequalities provide a way to show the difference between application of BR according to QM and hidden variables. Real experiments bear BI out. Add some aesthetics, such as presumptions like that classical physics is real (by presuming that QM is just a calculation trick for example), and you get justified randomness.

What kind of model do you speak of? — Samuel Lacrampe

A conceptual model; a Copenhagen Interpretation of QM with WFC realism. It's conceivably possible WFC is real.

But none of your thoughts are random or uncaused. — Samuel Lacrampe

How do you know? They could be. But even if they aren't, that's irrelevant. None of my thoughts grow leaves either, but I can think of trees. And even if my thoughts are all caused and non-random, I can think of the word "random". There are thoughts like Bell Inequalities, and thoughts like "let's find out"; as agents we can interact with the world and, say, perform experiments confirming Bell's Theorem. Ask God what he's doing.

There is a difference between the perception of randomness (ie we lack information to predict an effect) and real randomness. — Samuel Lacrampe

And?

Are you saying that the wavefunction thing and the PoSR are incompatible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes; "real" WFC and PoSR are incompatible ("real" meaning a WFC theory that treats it as real rather than merely MWI or QD or something).

If so, I would just say that the wavefunction may be real, but that it has a cause, even if that cause may not be observable. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ironic... you're right on both fronts, but in being right you demonstrate you have no idea what you're talking about. Lucky you for being right. Wavefunction realism is what MWI posits. The wavefunction evolves according to the Schrodinger Equation, and that's completely deterministic. It's also, coincidentally, not observable. But that's not where quantum indeterminism comes in. Quantum indeterminism comes in when the Born Rule applies; the Born Rule is entirely stochastic in nature. The Born Rule results in a wave function collapse (WFC). Wave function collapses take the quantum wavefunction and bring them into a classical result, when it's observed. WFC realism would posit that the collapse is real... that pieces of the wavefunction actually disappear into classical measurements. That implies quantum indeterminacy, and that is incompatible with PoSR.

But I see 2 errors. — Samuel Lacrampe

Funny, because you didn't show any error in what you typed. You just had two comments:

"This article is about the formal terminology in logic. For causal meanings of the terms, see Causality." — Samuel Lacrampe

...so go to that link.

Incidentally, remember when you said this?:

Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time. — Samuel Lacrampe

...well, that link phrased it thusly:

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. — Causality

if we must stretch the example to speak about cause and effect, then what causes you to eat cereals is the intent to have breakfast. — Samuel Lacrampe

Doesn't matter. PoSR states that everything has a sufficient reason. That includes "eating breakfast", but it also includes "eating cereal for breakfast". Ignoring the latter is simply cherry picking; the rule, if it applies, applies to everything (because that's what the rule says it applies to). Besides, if we can just clump alternatives and ignore the specifics and that "counts", then PoSR doesn't rule out randomness, because Banno's photon went through "a slit".

We'll call it a draw on the topics we drop haha. — Samuel Lacrampe

But we're playing the debate game... isn't that what you wanted? After all, isn't that how truth is demonstrated... by spinning wheels trying to convince people your points don't need justified because by committing the right two fallacies you prove it's self evident?

If you want an alternative, we could just have a discussion about ways in which you could be wrong.

You are using — Samuel Lacrampe

Nice try, but the definition I use aligns well with the definition given by your source, and poorly with your linked to "common" definition. And your definition-by-literal definition doesn't seem to fit at all.

Let's use the term "First Principle" or "Axiom" if it makes things clearer. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not much of a difference; axioms (in philosophy) are statements presumed to be self-evident.

This does not invalidate my point that justification means "showing a claim to be right". — Samuel Lacrampe

It invalidates this point:

justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true — Samuel Lacrampe

Before Einstein, that belief was justified because Newton's demonstrations were believed to be right. — Samuel Lacrampe

But Newton's equations weren't "true"; they were just close. So Newtonian physics wasn't "sound", it was just justified. But the beliefs weren't justified because the demonstrations were believed (this isn't a chicken-and-egg game); they were believed because they were justified by being demonstrated.

Once Newton's demonstrations were no longer believed to be right after Einstein, then we would no longer have a justification for them. — Samuel Lacrampe

Einstein predicted the location of a star in the famous 1919 eclipse. Once the eclipse happened the star was observed to be in the predicted spot. That justified belief in relativity.

To loop back, you cannot have an "inadequate justification". — Samuel Lacrampe

But that's superfluous, since all "adequate" means is enough to convince you. That one star observation was enough to convince a lot of people. Some people wanted more. To this day there's doubt that relativity is "true", since QM and GR haven't been melded together yet (and since in addition there are singularities).

I give you an — Samuel Lacrampe

To me that looks like an argument from ridicule with a tu quoque fallacy thrown in for good measure. That's quite a great distraction from, you know, actually defending the point in question... which, here, is, how is committing three fallacies to argue that a thing is self-evident going to help in your goal to convince the LNC denier that he shouldn't deny the LNC?

What three logical fallacies? — Samuel Lacrampe

Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity ("I see no better way to..."), appeal to popularity.

Is this different from the PoSR? — Samuel Lacrampe

Can you point to, or write, a philosophical paper that adequately justifies the belief that wavefunction collapse is unreal?

You forget that "self-evidence" (or first principle if you will) has 2 criteria. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, just dealing with question begging separately. The appeal to popularity doesn't help; miasma theory, phlogiston, vitalism, spontaneous generation, all were popularly believed. We know people spread urban legends, because we have inventories of them. Cult personalities and propaganda run rampant; group think is a thing, Milgram is a thing, Dunning-Kruger is a thing, cultural differences is a thing. The only situations where popular opinion is trustworthy are those in which you have some other justification (at a minimal, the specific situations in which you have good reason to believe the populace itself is justified); in such cases, you have a valid justification other than "everybody else thinks its true". Two wrongs just make two wrongs.

or its opposite is absurd — Samuel Lacrampe

In this "productive" debate, that tiny little phrase is actually rational. Begging the question, appeal to personal incredulity, and appeal to popularity are just as garbage as they ever were, and will always be as garbage as they always were. But reductio ad absurdum? That can actually be a valid argumentation technique. This is a glimmer of actual rationality that I welcome. Do you think you can attempt a reductio on PoSR (without meaninglessly just "opining" the absurdity)?

Your argument is valid IF paraconsistent logic is true, that is, we observe that some objects — Samuel Lacrampe

All humans are capable of reasoning about conflicting information without concluding that 2=5.

It is indeed my position — Samuel Lacrampe

If it's your position that you can prove self evident things, and it's your position that PoSR is self evident, then why all the fuss? Just prove PoSR, like I asked you to several posts before.

Why do you claim random mechanics is possible? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because there's no inconsistency in a model including it. And since this is about reality, the most accurate authority of what reality is like is... reality itself. Instead of telling God what to do, you should just ask him what he's doing. So far, in the randomness camp, the ball could land either way... maybe it's MWI-like, maybe it's CI-with-BR-like.

Do you not see yourself appealing to the PoSR every time we enquire about what is true? — Samuel Lacrampe

If inquiring about what is true is equivalent to appealing to the PoSR, then you should be able to drop the PoSR postulate and replace it with a simple inquiry about what is true. So, if you're serious, do that... and derive that wavefunction collapse is unreal.

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "sufficient" with "necessary"? Otherwise, what is the difference between the two terms for you? — Samuel Lacrampe

No; and you would know that if you knew what necessary and sufficient means (i.e., you're bluffing again). But, okay, let's do this. A is sufficient for B means that if you have A, you definitely have B. A is necessary for B means that in order to have B, you have to have A. These are related but not the same; you can have mere reasons, necessary reasons, sufficient reasons, and necessary and sufficient reasons. The car swerving was a reason for the crash (but not necessary; I could have a crash by running into a telephone pole... and not sufficient; I could swerve to avoid such a car). For Pat to be a bride, it is necessary that Pat is female (but not sufficient; simply being a female doesn't make you a bride). If you ate a bowl of cereal this morning, that's sufficient to say that you had breakfast this morning (but not necessary; eating pancakes this morning would also be having breakfast this morning). For a computer to be Turing Complete, it is both necessary and sufficient that it be capable of simulating a Turing machine (a computer that cannot simulate a Turing machine is never Turing Complete; a computer that can is always Turing Complete).

He should have called it "I am not really writing this".... — Pantagruel

That would be misleading, as Dennett doesn't believe that.

But if you are serious with that claim — Samuel Lacrampe

No, that was a correction, not a claim. I responded to your definition of self-evident, which was based on armchair lexicography (some misguided "definition-by-literal" theory you invented), with the accepted definition. By the way, atom literally means indivisible; awful literally means full of awe; pompous literally means having magnificence.

A justification is defined as "showing a claim to be right" (source). So it cannot be inadequate. — Samuel Lacrampe

At least you're using a dictionary now, but you're over-interpreting "show". Also a dictionary isn't a great source for this (dictionaries document how words are commonly used; we're discussing terms in philosophy, which isn't a lay subject... though I could defend my definition this way anyway). What you need is a philosophy based reference that discusses this particular usage, like IEP:

Further still, true belief may not even be necessary for justification. If I understand Newtonian physics, and if Newton’s arguments seem right to me, and if all contemporary physicists testify that Newtonian physics is true, it is plausible to think that my belief that it is true is justified, even if Einstein will eventually show that Newton and I are wrong. We can imagine this was the situation of many physicists in the late 1700s. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

True, but I see no better way to pick one first principle (or axiom) vs its opposite. — Samuel Lacrampe

No method is better than a bad one.

E.g. some people may not believe in the LNC, and be very consistent in their beliefs (ie they contradict themselves), and I see no way to refute them other than to show it's a very unpopular belief. — Samuel Lacrampe

Might I suggest it more rational to give up your view that winning debates is a metric of truth than it is to embrace logical fallacies as a method of winning debates?

Recall that you denied that "the LNC is self-evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else", by attempting to justify it in another way. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't recall that because it never happened. First off, begging the question isn't wrong on the condition that I provide an alternative ("by attempting"...); it's wrong on the face of it. To say "LNC is self evident because it cannot be evidenced by anything else" is to say "X is self evident when X cannot be evidenced by anything else", and if that were true for X=LNC, it would have to be true for X=an invisible massless cow is eating invisible massless grass in the middle of the sun. Second, I didn't justify the LNC being "true"; in fact, I explicitly pointed out a case where it wasn't "true" (paraconsistent logic). Third, it's not my rule that I should be able to prove things are self-evident; it's your rule. My rule is simply that things aren't self evident just because you wish them up to be by committing logical fallacies out of desperation to win arguments against hypothetical deniers. But I do have an applicable rule; one I've mentioned before. Any referential claim (by which I mean something about the properties of or behaviors of an object to which you refer) requires justification (i.e., the don't-tell-God-what-to-do principle). PoSR falls into this camp.

Since this has not been accomplished, my position on the matter stands, namely that the LNC is self-evident, in a similar manner as it is for the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

By that criteria, both LNC and PoSR are not self-evident, because you commit three logical fallacies when debating a hypothetical denier of both. Your logical fallacies are invalid defenses of these things being self-evident, since they are, well, logical fallacies. So since you failed to refute the denier's position, the denier's position stands...namely, that neither LNC nor PoSR are self-evident. Not quite a checkmate, but definitely a stalemate. I mentioned this before, too; debates cannot be criteria for truth because I can easily construct conflicting irrefutable arguments. Only here, you actually provided the conflicting irrefutable argument (well, mostly; I just tweaked it slightly).

What is this random mechanics, and what's your justification to claim it exists? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's the wrong question, with the wrong burden. Random mechanics involves a process whereby an event happens as a stochastic selection among a set of possibilities, such as by application of the Born Rule. Your claim is that PoSR is logically self-evident. Logic implies necessity. If random mechanics were possible, that would suffice to refute necessity. Random mechanics is possible. Therefore PoSR isn't necessarily true. O/c, this is insufficient to disprove PoSR; PoSR still could be true. It's just that, if it is true, it's contingently true.

As per underlined, why is that the case? — Samuel Lacrampe

By definition of sufficiency.

I suspect you have a wrong grasp of the term "sufficiency". — Samuel Lacrampe

Then you're wasting your words... "proof by suspicion" is not valid.

Just because A is sufficient to cause B, it does not follow that A will necessarily cause B every time. — Samuel Lacrampe

If A can cause B, but B doesn't always happen, then in those cases where B does in fact happen, A is (maybe) a reason for B. For example, if a car swerves into my path while I'm driving, and as a result we have an accident, then the car swerving into my path is a reason for the accident. But cars swerving into my path don't necessarily cause accidents every time; I may see the car swerving and swerve to avoid it. But because it doesn't necessarily cause accidents every time, that reason is not sufficient to cause an accident. That's what you have here... A that causes B, but only sometimes. Such, given B, can be a reason for B, but cannot be a sufficient reason, because B doesn't always follow.

What is Energy made of? : https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/14444/what-is-energy-made-of — Gnomon

I'm quoting this reference to stack exchange because here, in this thread, it's simply a link, buried in a fair sized post. And over on philosophy-forum land it seems there are some people who are treating energy as a type of thing in itself and running with it. For such people I think it's a bit more important to dig deeper, to point out what experts say about energy. So I want to highlight the accepted response here, to unhide it:

Energy is not made of anything, energy is a term used to describe a trait of matter and non-matter fields. — AdamRedwine

...and from various comments:

• "Energy must be made of something. Or else mass itself is not made of anything" - Jus12
• "When people say "matter is converted to energy" it normally means the matter is being converted to some non-matter form. It also normally means the person in question is not a physicist ;-) Physicists rarely (never?) use such misleading terminology; instead we talk about e.g. pair annihilation" - DavidZ

The way I understand it, energy isn't the kind of thing things are made of. Rather, things are just what they are, and if they have time translation symmetry (TTS), then by Noether's Theorem (NT) (granting the principle of least action), there's a special kind of "quantity" (aka, number-with-units) that's conserved; that quantity (the thing you get as what is conserved when you apply NT to TTS) is what energy is. Incidentally, TTS applies to nearly everything in our universe, but at cosmic scales it breaks down; consequentially, conservation of energy applies to nearly all things in our universe, except on cosmic scales, where it breaks down.

bizso09 is equal to "mine" - possible
The only way it could be the answer is if I, bizso09, assert that the ONE universe is in fact me, bizso09. However, this would lead to a contradiction, when another person makes the same assertion from their point of view, i.e. perterpan is equal to "mine". Of course, I can always discredit any such person's assertion, leading to solipsism. This is the case of minimum entropy. — bizso09

Pardon, but where is the contradiction? Go back to the robots for a bit; there's robot X and robot Y. Consider fact Fx: "I", robot X, assert that the one "robot" is in fact "me", robot X. Consider fact Fy: "I", robot Y, assert that the one "robot' is in fact "me", robot Y. It sounds like you're telling me that fact Fx contradicts with fact Fy. But that seems to assume that Fx and Fy are the same fact; if they are two different facts, there's no contradiction.

In a similar fashion, we could consider two potential facts... Fb: the ONE universe is in fact me, bizs09; and Fp: the ONE universe is in fact me, perterpan. So how many universes are there? Under bizs09ian solipsism, Fb is a fact and Fp isn't. So there's one non-contradictory fact. Under perterpanian solipsism, Fp is a fact and Fb is not; so again, one non-contradictory fact. Discard solipsism and Fb and Fp are both facts, but there are two facts about two "universes". And so on. I can see constructing a contradiction, but only artificially; Fb and Fp are both facts and there's only one universe, but b and p are different entities, and so on... that contradiction seems vacuous, because it's only there if you put it there. Is there another you're referring to?

I don't understand your statement; can you rephrase it another way? — Samuel Lacrampe

Follow the quotes back.

The term "self-evident" literally means "evidenced by itself". — Samuel Lacrampe

Self evident means something that does not need to be demonstrated.

You don't see it? — Samuel Lacrampe

I see a perfectly rational way to deny PoSR.

When a claim cannot be evidenced any other way, then the appeal to popularity is sufficient to tip the scale in its favour. — Samuel Lacrampe

While I can appreciate the meta-ness of argumentum ad populum defenses of argumentum ad populum, it does nothing for me. The popular opinion was wrong in the past... there's no reason to believe it has any unique access to truth. "If a million people believe a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing." Ambrose Bierce.

Your lengthy paragraph seems to be an attempt at giving an adequate reason to justify the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

Who said anything about adequate, except for you just now?

Now if that reason is inadequate, then it fails to justify the claim

I'm perfectly okay with that. So it's inadequate. But it's a justification.

I apparently have to remind you again; I have no particular opinions on PoSR, except that you're flat wrong about it not needing justification.

Might I remind you... justification does not entail truth. Justifications aren't proof; they're just good reasons to think something is true.

To claim that the alternative to the LNC has no use that you see, does not prove the LNC to be true. — Samuel Lacrampe

But you're the one bringing up proving that LNC is true, not me. For me, it's enough that it's useful. Paraconsistent logics may also be useful. A system with PoE isn't "bad" because it lacks LNC; it's "bad" because everything is both true and false, which suggests that truth and falsity have no meaning. That's good enough for me; if it's not good enough for you, fine. Demonstrate a (non-vacuous) use for a system with PoE in play.

I am. You just haven't shown how I was wrong yet, — Samuel Lacrampe

But you're not. You just changed "possibly wrong" to "shown how I was wrong". Those are entirely different things.

Of course, I trust your comment applies to you too. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ways you have established that I can be wrong, so far:
(a) Denying PoSR is not logically consistent (with a system in which you presume PoSR)
(b) You personally believe PoSR is a law of logic
(c) If we assume PoSR and someone else doesn't, they made an error
(d) PoSR is self-evident because asking for a justification for it begs the question
Regarding (a), that's not compelling because it begs the question. (b) is testimonial. (c) presumes personal inerrancy. (d) one need not appeal to PoSR to justify it, and even if one did that does not suggest it needs no justification. Also, it's possible PoSR is wrong (in the case of random mechanics), therefore, it's not necessarily true that it's correct. Since it's not necessarily true, that it holds requires justification. IOW, all of your claims of PoSR being self evident are trivially refuted by the mere possibility of considering random mechanics.

Free will means that before the choice is made, there are numerous possibilities — Samuel Lacrampe

Free will being a sufficient reason for any of those possibilities means that's the only possibility. Go back to randomness... if a collapsing wave function (CWF) causes the photon to go left, as a result of Born Rule application which specifies a 50% probability of doing so, it still factually goes left. I might incorrectly say, if it goes left, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go left; but if it goes right, then the CWF was a sufficient reason for it to go right. That would be incorrect because it would be a redefinition of sufficiency to the degree that it becomes meaningless. But under such redefinitions, randomness would follow PoSR. See how that works?

Again, it's really, really simple. It boils down to a single question... how many things can your free will decision possibly result in? If you say one, it's a sufficient reason for that thing, but you can't prove we have a soul. If you say more than one, it's not a sufficient reason for whatever happens, and you can't say it follows PoSR. That should be enough, but I understand why it's not. It's inconvenient for you.

Not if there is no other way to justify it. — Samuel Lacrampe

So, let me clarify. You're going with: "'X is self evident because it begs the question' does not beg the question if I cannot justify X"?

A claim is self-evident if (1) it cannot be evidenced (i.e. justified) by anything else, and (2) if everyone believes it to be true by default — Samuel Lacrampe

(1) is a red herring; not being evidenced in no way suggests self-evident. (2) is an appeal to popularity.

Now can you think of a way to justify the PoSR without begging the question? — Samuel Lacrampe

Me? Absolutely! It would go something like this. QM is well evidenced. A popular theory that grants indeterminism, on analysis, really only becomes indeterministic per application of the BR. But said application is strange. When Schrodinger has his cat in a box, per this story, we're supposed to use a particular rule to describe the box contents... the cat is in superposition. But when Schrodinger opens the box, we use a different rule... the box's wavefunction collapsed. That seems wrong... introduce Everett. Let's say we put Schrodinger and his cat-box in a bigger box now, shut the lid, and have Everett describe this system. How is he supposed to describe it? According to the rules he should describe it the same way Schrodinger describes the cat in the box contents... Schrodinger is in superposition. But Schrodinger, inside this box, describes the same thing differently... well, sort of. There's a portion of the wavefunction where Schrodinger describes seeing the live cat, and another where he describes seeing the dead cat, and these two are in superposition. But each of these reports a collapse of the wavefunction. So is something really collapsing? BR seems redundant and unreal; it introduced bigger issues. So let's just toss it out; instead of thinking that us "Everett's" are part of "the world", imagine we're just parts of a bigger universal wavefunction. Now SE is all that really happens; the rest is just what that wave function looks like to Schrodinger, and to Everett. Given that only the SE is real, since there's no indeterminism in the SE, the universe must be deterministic. Maybe there's a deeper principle like this, where everything happens for a reason.

This is an example justification of PoSR. I don't think it helps you.

So what? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're responding to the so what.

Why should we not believe in the PoE or that 2=5, if not because it violates the law of non-contradiction? — Samuel Lacrampe

What use would that have? By contrast, embracing LNC and denying PoSR would have the use:

(1) There are only 3 possible explanations for all events: determinism, free will, and randomness, as so: — Samuel Lacrampe

...of modeling the randomness possibility. I've asked this as a question, now I'll rephrase this. You should be interested in all of the possible ways you can be wrong. It is suspicious for you to propose to be interested in truth but not be interested in such things.

This is not how I interpret sufficiency. E.g. Observing that a floor can support a 10 kg weight is sufficient to conclude that it can support 10 kg or less; but it could also support more. But maybe you can give me an example of what you mean by [sufficiency?]? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's not a problem but it doesn't help you. A floor that can support 20kg ipso facto can support 10kg; these two things are not alternates, they are counterfactuals. Note that both can be true for the same floor at the same time, regardless of whether there's a 20kg weight on it, a 10kg weight on it, or neither. But a man who poaches an egg cannot scramble that egg and vice versa. So if this man does poach an egg, but "could have" scrambled it, it's not true that the egg was scrambled. Those are alternates. If that man's free will does lead to poaching the egg, but could have led to scrambling it, then we can't say the man's free will is sufficient to poach the egg. (Unless you want free will possibilities that are counterfactual; but such being consistent with determinism, that implies compatibilist free will, which stops dead steps before your soul conclusoin).

From implication, if P=>Q, then P is sufficient for Q. That means that if P holds, Q absolutely must hold. So P is sufficient for Q. By contrast, Q is not sufficient for P (though we can say it's necessary; if Q doesn't hold, P cannot hold). To use your example with counterfactuals, if the floor can hold 10kg then it can hold 5kg. If it cannot hold 10kg, it cannot hold 20kg. So for it to be able to hold 20kg, it has to be able to hold 10kg; but it still can be true that it can hold 10kg and not hold 20kg. So the fact that it can hold 10kg is necessary for the fact that it can hold 20kg to be true (same reason as in implication; were it not to support 10kg, it cannot support 20kg), but is not sufficient (same reason as in implication; that it can hold 10kg does not imply that it can hold 20kg). Again, back to alternates, if a man's free will is a sufficient cause for the egg to be poached, that egg will get poached; it's impossible for it to be scrambled, because "free will is sufficient" is like saying "free will => egg is poached". And if that's the case, the egg cannot be scrambled, which conflicts with the possibility of the alternate.

The difference isn't about my being one of several possible qualitative identities, but about being one of several quantitatively/numerically distinct entities that I might have been any one of, but were not. — bert1

Let me ask you a direct question. If I refer to the bert1 that typed this stuff onto the forum and submitted it, and I refer to the bert1 that is currently reading what I'm typing, are these two states of being the same bert1?

If you say, "yes", and I imagine you would (and I would agree), then I want to directly ask you... how do you know? What is it about bert1-poster-of-quote and bert1-reader-of-this-post that makes these two states of being the same identity?

So it looks like you are changing the position you took here where you said you saw no problem with the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

There's no change in my position; I think you may have misinterpreted something. Doubly so, because if you assume I would never question my own opinions, then you must have forgotten what I was doing when I first questioned your epistemic approach. It sounds like you're doubling down on being grandiose; so I'll quadruple down on anyone being susceptible to error; that applies just as well to you as it does to me. I kind of beat you to the punch, though, by being slow to opinion in the first place.

I've no opinions on PoSR. My opinions are about people who make opinions without justification. Speaking of which:

Anyways, the PoSR is a self-evident principle, because asking for a justification is asking for a sufficient reason for it, which begs the question. — Samuel Lacrampe

You make it sound like the only way to justify PoSR is to use PoSR. If that's the only reason you think it's justified, then it is begging the question. But calling that self-evident because it begs the question is literally rationalizing away begging the question.

This is similar to asking for a justification for the Law of Non-Contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not even close. If you start with traditional logic and deny the law of non-contradiction, you wind up with the principle of explosion; given PoE, you can prove 2=5 (though PoE could be avoided by using paraconsistent logics). If you deny PoSR, you simply wind up with not everything having a reason; you don't wind up with the PoE. These two things are not the same.

Why can't free will have sufficient power to cause A if it chooses A, and cause B if it chooses B? — Samuel Lacrampe

It's very simple. If your free will could lead to either then it's not a sufficient reason for either. Again, that's just what that word "sufficient" means. You're trying some weird convoluted way to promote "reason" to "sufficient reason" with some if it's this it's sufficient if it's that it's sufficient, but that's just meaningless word play. Sufficient is sufficient is sufficient. If alternate things can happen, it's not sufficient.

So semi-predictability is like probability. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not really. Probability is but one form of semi-predictability. Probability that changes over time is another. Of the latter, you can have probabilities that change unpredictably with stability of some sort (such as locally; like the weather), or probabilities that change based on particular circumstances (such as the sudden jump from completely unpredictable to absolutely known that occurs when you measure properties of one of a set of entangled particles in QM).

Facts are 1 to 1 corresponding models (of creations) , that is how facts are forced. — Syamsu

Facts are, as I understand it, bits of information we can consider to be true. I don't know what you mean by 1 to 1 corresponding models of creations. The Born Rule via Bell's Theorem, however, establishes a type of model... that predicts purely random results... which do not have counterfactual definiteness.

You cannot make a model of agency, like for instance fear. It's just not factual. — Syamsu

We can make models of pain, a subjective experience, using the Wong-Baker Pain scale and use it to perhaps measure the efficacy of pain medications. I don't know if this is a contradiction or not, because I still can't quite decode your words.

Still, it is simply not factual, because agency cannot be modelled. — Syamsu

Either I've rebutted this, or I have no idea what you mean by factual and modeled.

I seem to be "affixed" to my body, somehow. When I look around, I don't see my face, but I see things from a first person perspective with a view within my body. I might look at this clock and see that it says it's 8:43. Moments pass and, once again, I look around; I don't see my face, but I see things from a first person perspective with a view; it's still within this same body. If I think back a few moments, I remember looking at this same clock, which now says it's 8:44, but I remember seeing it say 8:43. So not only am I in this body now, but I was in this body one minute ago. The latter isn't a first person perspective (or at least by what it references), it is a memory of a first person perspective. But this memory of a first person perspective goes way deeper than proving I'm affixed to my body... it is how I know I am the same person one minute ago; i.e., if I say that it proves I'm in the same body, I have the facts backwards. There are two distinct "states of being" here... (a) the first person perspective behind these eyes at 8:44, and (b) the first person perspective behind these eyes at 8:43. The "sameness" of identity of (a) and (b) is established by the fact that (a) remembers (b). It's because of this continuity that I can say (a) is the same person as (b). The perspectives now are unique, but so are these chains back in time... you will never remember seeing this clock from behind these eyes at 8:43... only I will. That's not the secondary fact that proves I'm stuck in this body... it is the primary fact... the secondary fact is that the conscious entity at 8:43 is the same as me. So I think you're asking what connects the "being" through time to this particular body having this perspective. And the response is, you have it backwards. The particular body having this perspective is what makes the "being" through time have a specific identity.

Yes, but what determines which one you are? — bert1

By "you", which one of us are you referring to?

Short answer, or rather very long answer in very short form: DNA. — tim wood

DNA is just the holder of your genotypes. An organism is a phenotypical expression. Phenotypes are influenced greatly by DNA, but they are also influenced by environmental factors.

Regardless, I think this typology isn't directly relevant to identity. Banno's suggestion I think is the way to think about this. I always like to add in that it's not just your first person perspective, but the memories you build up; including, specifically, the memories of having had a first person perspective. So even twins with the same DNA will have different identities; the one would not only never have the perspective of the other, but would never remember those perspectives (one could say, never remember being the other).

Which one? (ETA: answered in edit) Quick request... fix the numbering (you have two 6's)... good for reference (like jgill's)

The argumentation is about whether agency can be established as fact forced by evidence, or if agency can only be identified with a chosen opinion. — Syamsu

What do you mean by "force"? If you mean evidence proves something (forces conclusions), you're simply mistaken. Evidence always suggests; it never proves. Nothing inferential in nature is ever certain. If we see evidence of choices, we have evidence of agency. I think you're confusing determinism with induction. We induced the Born Rule in Quantum Mechanics; now there are still deterministic interpretations of QM, but, this betrays your imagined rule that specific outcomes are the only thing evidence can suggest. So the rule is definitely not globally applicable; if you think it should still apply to agency, you're going to have to give a good argument for why. A sketch of what you're arguing isn't what I asked for... rather, I'm asking for the actual argument.

And then it is demonstrated that establishing agency as fact, leads to an error of contradiction. — Syamsu

There's nothing contradictory about this form of agency, though. You have possible alternatives (PAP), and original causation by an agent. Again, I think you're conflusing determinism with induction.

And then it is shown that identifying agency as a matter of chosen opinion works, it does not lead to error. — Syamsu

But if agents employ this non-contradictory mechanic (original causation selecting an outcome from alternate possibilities), then choice creates real effects in the world; namely, the actions taken as a result of choice. That's enough to possibly establish that choices are a thing using inference; for example, one may study all known effects and look at the residues, in a manner similar to how we discovered the Higgs Boson not too long ago. And if we establish that choices are being made, we can easily infer agency, since you're saying that agents are by definition what causes choices. The fact that this can possibly happen in a realistic manner conflicts with your assertion that logically it cannot. Because of this conflict, I'm afraid you're going to have to justify why you think logic dictates we cannot establish factually that agents exist.

But how else can you determine if a thing is true, other than by using justification or reasoning? — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm not proposing that there's another method. I'm just highlighting that being justified does not imply being correct.

You look at it, and based on the color you perceive, you conclude it is reasonable to believe the cup is the color you perceived, until given a reason to believe otherwise.

Yes, that would work, if you could do that.

But if you and I both accepted the PoSR premise as true, then both you and I must conclude Banno made an error by contradicting the PoSR. We must accept the consequences of our assumptions. — Samuel Lacrampe

Nope; it's always possible our acceptance of PoSR is in error. What is its justification?

But B was possible before the choice was made. As so:
At time T1, both A and B are possible choices. At time T2, we make a choice which causes A to manifest, and not B. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that doesn't help; you're explaining the wrong thing. This is just an account of LFW; as such, there's no problem there. Your choice causes A to happen, but it didn't have to cause A; it could have caused B. But the problem isn't to make sense of LFW; the problem is to explain its compatibility with PoSR. This type of cause is not a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason for A must cause A; it cannot cause B (where B is an alternate). Choice of the nature you specify is incompatible with PoSR.

I don't understand why we need to — Samuel Lacrampe

...the need is simple; you're making an argument where you enumerate possibilities, rule some out, and have the rest "by default". You can't do this properly if your enumeration is incomplete.

If a thing is not always predictable, then it must be unpredictable. — Samuel Lacrampe

Semi-predictable is perfectly coherent, even useful; it's why your smart phone has a weather app on it.

I would guess we have reached an impasse, as your responses seems scarce on substance to me as well. — DingoJones

I disagree that it's an impasse, so I cannot "agree to disagree". In my mind, you're simply refusing to voice specific complaints about actual moral high grounds real vegetarians have, and are giving the excuse that I haven't said anything of substance. (Maybe you misunderstand the complaint? Saying that my response is "scarce on substance" is a bit odd to me... presumably, you're griping about vegetarians holding moral high ground. I'm assuming you're saying they don't hold moral high ground by their own rules. The question then is, are you correctly applying those rules? Are you actually refuting them? Nothing I see in your complaints is genuine... it all seems straw-mannish).

But if you prefer forfeiture, fine; that's your prerogative. I cannot force you to defend your claims.

The vegetarians im referencing have been the ones that dont eat meat because it causes suffering to the animal providing the meat and ones that think hey have the moral high ground for not eating meat. — DingoJones

But I don't see any inconsistency, even here:

Anyway, once you decide insects arent to be included as suffering creatures you are making the same calculus as a meat eater, arbitrarily drawing the line at insects the way a meat eater might draw the line at dogs, or monkeys. Thats problematic for what I hope are obvious reasons. — DingoJones

Such vegetarians draw a line arbitrarily, but it's a false equivalence to say that this makes it the same exact calculus, because said vegetarians factually would eat less kinds of things than the people they claim to hold the moral high ground over. To say this is the exact same calculus is to commit a fallacy of the heap. Your "obvious reasons", to me, sound more like rationalizations; irrational ones at that.

As for your social contract theory, I think that's a miss as well. We cannot hold social contracts with non-humans, so... it makes sense to say not hold court trials for the atrocities of cats against the suffering they cause mice. But certainly that doesn't prohibit us from making social contracts with humans against abusive behaviors for pets. If you think we can do that, then shouldn't we be able to likewise make social contracts with humans to avoid eating meat? And if you don't, why not? If it's the latter, I haven't seen an argument for it from you in this thread.

The real problem here is that I have to invent what I think are fictitious vegetarians to be targets of your criticisms. For example, regarding those who are concerned with just minimizing overall suffering who apparently don't realize suffering exists in nature, what specific thing do such vegetarians do that make them morally culpable? For a non-vegetarian example, if I were a doctor am I compelled to stay awake, working myself to exhaustion, to save lives, given I can? Back to the vegetarians, are they likewise compelled to, say, save caterpillars from Ichneumon wasps? What sort of actual moral criticisms (using actual vegetarian moral systems) are you advancing?

I don't think you have answered that in this thread, at least none I can comprehend. What you have presented, at least to me, seems like a bunch of fuzziness and false equivalences.

I dont think that all meat would be entirely excluded in that calculus, we would find some meats (maybe alot) that would be ok to eat. — DingoJones

This sounds very vague. What meats specifically? What vegetarians specifically? I've been finding it incredibly difficult to actually apply your criticisms.

For example, there are a lot of vegetarians that don't mind eating eggs... some, don't eat eggs, not because the egg suffers, but because the hen that lays it does. It sounds to me these are actual examples of applications of the principles you prescribe. Or are you talking about the morality of eating termites? Without some actual specific critiques, it's hard to find, well, an actual critique here.

As another example, you did discuss the "bug suffering" thing in raising crops, but that sounds suspicious, because those farmed animals eat crops too; so I'm not quite sure how you can argue that it's "more" or "equivalent" suffering to eat said crops versus to feed them to farmed animals and eat them (especially since I don't quite see eating, using a rough metric, a pound of crop as being equivalent, in terms of mere crop related "harm", to eating a pound of farmed animal that was fed crops... surely it takes raising much more crops to make that pound of farmed animal than it does just eating that amount).

The first law does not hold on a cosmological scale. — Pfhorrest

This.

Conservation of energy is, per Noether's Theorem, a consequence of time translation symmetry. At cosmological scales time translation symmetry breaks down and, as a consequence, so does energy conservation. I won't speculate much more than this... but here's a good explanation from Nick Lucid of science asylum:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnGYMe6GBeQ

where "justified" means you have sound argument for why it is true. — Samuel Lacrampe

Justified means you have good reason to think a thing is true; having a justified belief doesn't guarantee truth. That's why we talk about knowledge as JTB's instead of just JB's.

Relax. I said the purpose of debates is to find truth. I did not say it was the only way to find truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

You can debate all you like. That's not going to tell you what color that cup was.

Here's what I mean: — Samuel Lacrampe

...and here is what I mean. Going to simple quotes mode (with italics added for clarity):

"You claim the cup is red" ...I never did that, so the whole thing is moot. But let's continue, as a hypothetical: "But I claim it is in fact white" ...why? Did you just guess? "the reason you see it red is because you are wearing glasses with red lenses ..." ...how did you know, did you even know? "You then remove the glasses" ...how come I was so dense I didn't realize I was wearing them? "indeed you now see the cup as white" ...lots of problems so far, but when I look at the cup and see its color is white, that would give me justifiable reason for believing it's white. "I have refuted your original argument" ...unless you knew, you didn't refute it... you were just insanely lucky... so lucky that we cannot possibly take this into consideration in our how-to-obtain-truth toolkit. And if you knew, you didn't come to this conclusion because you formed an opinion, or debated it; you came to this conclusion because you were justified... because you formed a belief in such a way that the actual truth of the claim affected what you believed. Now backing out of hypothetical-land, there was a real, not hypothetical, cup to the right of my mouse pad. Think of a way to find out what color it was.

I would have said that a proof needs to be sound, not just valid. But fine; minor disagreement. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is what you did say:

More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty. — Samuel Lacrampe

...I cannot see ever having such a proof. But I can easily see two people arguing with neither being capable of establishing soundness. And that's the real problem here:

Okay, but it is a premise we have accepted as true. — Samuel Lacrampe

But that doesn't mean it is true; only that we're treating it as if it were true for some purpose.

So if Banno's demonstration contradicts a true premise, then there is an error. — Samuel Lacrampe

Banno was questioning the premise. The only "error" here is that he did not as you requested accept the premise.

Why do you say "A manifesting excludes B"? B can still manifest later. — Samuel Lacrampe

B here is the alternate possibility you require; it is literally the AP in PAP. B "manifesting later" would require a choice later, which would be a different choice.

Are you perhaps conflating the terms "impossible" with "not actual"? E.g. Both options A and B are possible. Before I choose, A and B are non-actual (or in potential). Once I choose A, A becomes actual (what you call manifest), and B remains non-actual, but still possible. — Samuel Lacrampe

No. Since you apply PoSR to rule out randomness, let's presume that manifestation in this case is due to causality, and talk in those terms. If A happens at T2 (i.e., happens at all), then PoSR demands that A happens for a sufficient reason X. If X is a cause, that means (a) X caused A (the reason part), and (b) A must arise from X (the sufficient part). Since A must arise from X (due to sufficiency), and B is an alternative (supposed to be an alternate possibility), then B is not possible. I did not use PAP to come to the conclusion that B was not possible, nor did I presume that A happening means B isn't possible. I derived that B wasn't possible by applying PoSR. It's the sufficiency of the reason demanded to exist by PoSR that makes B impossible. PoSR itself suggests it's impossible. As I originally stated, the definition of PoSR is almost the definition of determinism from the get go; if you interpret PoSR in a causality sense, it is the definition of determinism.

I don't get your states 2b and 2c. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your possibility 1 was that A always leads to B; that is predictable, but it is always the same for state A. 2b is just predictable, but not the same. 2c is sometimes predictable, sometimes not. 2c isn't really that different than how you think of free will, except that you imagine that itself as a mechanic that comes whole cloth with a conscious entity.

But as you originally said this was only a minor objection, maybe we can just drop it? — Samuel Lacrampe

If you like, but shouldn't you be interested in all of the ways in which your assumptions can be wrong?

Yes but you wouldn't be closer to knowing the truth; where knowledge means "justified true belief". — Samuel Lacrampe

Closer when? By what metric? What is it you imagine is happening? You advance an invalid argument for some true thing S. Your opponent refutes your argument. Then... what?

Let me propose something to you, because you sound horribly confused. At the time that I type this, there is a plastic cup sitting on my desk to the right of my mouse pad. That cup is either a red cup or it is a blue cup, and it is not both. Now consider what you would need to do to get to the truth of the question: "What color is that cup?"

What I'm hearing you propose is that one person forms an opinion of the cup, then finds an opponent. The two debate. The guy whose opinion that the cup is red puts a burden on his opposition to disprove his opinion for him. They keep going until one proves the other wrong. The one not proven wrong has not been refuted, and therefore, must be correct. To me, this sounds horribly misguided and ridiculous... the entire exercise. Even forming the original opinion is ridiculous. Having formed one, finding an opponent with an opposing opinion before you change yours, is ridiculous. Having found them, placing the burden on them to prove you wrong, is ridiculous. Having "exposed" the flaw in their argument, using that as confirmation of your opinion, is ridiculous. The entire thing, end to end, is a bunch of nonsense... but this is what you're proposing as how we get to truth. There is no part here that has anything to do with the color the cup.

The only way to figure out the color of the cup is to do something relevant... something that involves forming a belief about the cup's color based on what that cup's color actually is. You know, like looking at it? And yes, you might debate after that with nimwits who form random opinions, but your confidence only comes from that relevance.

More seriously though, an "irrefutable argument" is also called a "proof", which gives truth with certainty. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, an irrefutable argument is simply one that cannot be refuted. A proof establishes an argument is valid. Valid arguments do not entail truth; sound arguments do.

How would you know this if the arguments cannot be refuted? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because I can construct contradictory arguments that are irrefutable.

But what do you mean by "justified", if not that the position is defended by a valid reason? Because this is also the definition of a valid argument. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, this is an amphiboly. "Valid reason" is just a reason recognized as relevant. "Valid argument" is a term of art referring to an argument that follows from its premises. Besides, you're not proposing the use of justification to get to truth... you're proposing debating. I could just mix these two chemicals and see what happens, but no, I have to form an opinion of it, find an opponent, and tell my opponent that he has to prove my opinion is wrong.

And so if contradicting, then one (or both) of us must have made an error — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? Both arguments can be valid. At most one can be sound.

It is not logically consistent if it contradicts a law of logic that is the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe

You're begging the question. PoSR is unnecessary to presume for logic. It is a premise.

Both options A and B are possible, AND there is a sufficient reason for choosing A over B: free will. Where do you see a contradiction? — Samuel Lacrampe

The term sufficient has a meaning. To say that X is a sufficient reason for A is to say that if X is present, A manifests. To say that A has a sufficient reason is to say that A manifests for some reason X such that if X is present it will manifest. If A manifesting excludes B, as in this case, and A manifests for reason X, and X is sufficient for A, then B is impossible. That's simply what that word sufficient means... that is the S in PoSR.

It is. Due to the Law of Excluded Middle: Either p or not-p is true.
Either "Cause A always gives Effect B" (Determinism) or "Cause A does not always give Effect B".
And if the latter, it is either because there exists in Cause A the power to choose the effect (ie Free Will), or there does not (ie Randomness). — Samuel Lacrampe

"Cause A does not always give Effect B" is bordering on gibberish; importing causality where it doesn't belong. Technically we can have a cause leading to random effects, but I don't think that is what you mean here. If you talk about states and evolution it becomes more coherent... (1) State A always evolves to State B, or (2) State A does not always evolve to State B (still clumsy; what's meant is that it doesn't always evolve to the same state, but it'll do). So let's focus on scenario 2. Random roughly means unpredictable. So if we have randomness, it's something like (2a) State A leads to an unpredictable state in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. Without appealing to free will just yet, how about... (2b) State A leads to predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. (2c) State A leads to semi-predictable states in the set States B where B has cardinality of at least 2. In fact, free will actually involves something like (2c), with an agent. But somehow you want 2c to only count as a possibility if it has an agent. Recall the discussion we had with the photon being an original cause? Well, it sounds to me like you're not just failing to exhaust the possibilities, but that you're intentionally constraining them.

I think it should have been clear to you that "agency", is by definition what it was that made the choice turn out A. — Syamsu

No, that was by no means clear. In fact, that makes this less clear, because:

Then there is the question about agency "what was it that made the choice turn out A?" — Syamsu

...there can be no question about whether the thing that made a choice is an agent or not if by definition anything that makes a choice is an agent. At best, there's a question of if the choice is made by something.

I am guessing you want it to be a matter of fact that Jack chose to go left, instead of right. — Syamsu

Want it to be a matter of fact? What a curious phrasing!

But at this point we don't even care. Something chose to go left, instead of right. That thing is by definition an agent. Who cares if it's Jack or not?

But then I must refer you back to the explanation — Syamsu

...what explanation? I certainly may have missed something, but I searched for "agen" on this page, and just saw your original post, a response to hachit, Valentinus's post, and your reply. Your reply doesn't make sense. At best there's an opinion as to whether a choice has the properties you specify (essentially Principle of Alternate Possibilities). But if it does, by definition, whatever made the choice is an agent. I have a suspicion whatever argument you're referring to you simply forgot to give it. The closest I have seen is your original statement, which simply says that by logic, there can be no evidence of an agent, but does not say anything about what logic that is.

Supposing there are alternative futures A and B. A is made the present, meaning A is chosen. Then there is the question about agency "what was it that made the choice turn out A?" — Syamsu

Back up a hair. Here's what you're presuming to explain:

By logic, there can be no evidence whatsoever of the agency of a choice — Syamsu

I see this as a no-go theorem on having evidence of agency (of a choice). So I would ask you to define agency. I would also ask about choice, but then, I think you're implicitly defining choice sufficiently.

Then we gather evidence in order to establish a fact of what made the decision turn out A, and come to the conclusion that it was in fact X which made the decision turn out A. — Syamsu

What if X is equivalent to the agency?

But then X being a definite factual thing, we are saying X forced A — Syamsu

Is an agent not a definite, factual thing?

So then there is an error of contradiction between the premise that alternative future B was available, and the conclusion that B could not have been chosen. — Syamsu

Let's introduce tags for times; T1<T2<T3. Let's say our agent is Y. Being a real moral dilemma, suppose A is saves a puppy; B is murders a puppy. Say further that the choice happens at T2...

and the decision could not have turned out B. — Syamsu

...but I would hope not in an ontic sense; i.e., a sense in which we can say that at time T1, Y is a puppy murderer. So the sense in which B is possible has to be a sense that doesn't make Y culpable for B. And unless we're all puppy murderers, then it should be possible for Y to "force" A. If Y can force A, how come X can't be Y? Can we not at least evidentially confirm that Y is not in a general sense a puppy murderer?

By logic, there can be no evidence whatsoever of the agency of a choice, — Syamsu

Why not?

it sounds like the volition of the robot "supervenes" on its physical parts and interaction with the world, as opposed to being a power of the mind or consciousness. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly.

He who's arguments have not been refuted is the closest to knowing the truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

Wrong. There are invalid arguments for true things and irrefutable arguments for false things. To know a truth requires aligning your beliefs according to those things that would make it true. So if you want to get close to knowing truth, what's critical is not whether or not you have won arguments or how many you have won... those things are weak indicators at best. Rather, what's critical is what things justify your belief and whether or not they are affected by the veracity of the thing.

I don't see one. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, good. But you do realize that both you and Banno cannot be correct, right? But both of your views are not "nothing but abritrary opinions".

I feel we are finally having a productive debate. — Samuel Lacrampe

Oh I hope not; that would be the most unproductive thing I can think of. You might feel it makes progress towards truth but that's illusory.

So then, what do you say is wrong with premise (5)? That the PoSR disallows for randomness, or that the PoSR is simply not true? — Samuel Lacrampe

Neither of those are particularly problematic. What's problematic is this:

"nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
it goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts. — Samuel Lacrampe

Put it this way. Banno's view is logically consistent, and supported by evidence, legitimately. It may or may not in the final analysis be correct, but it's certainly not fallacious.

A lesser problem with your use of PoSR isn't that it suggests determinism, but that it allows for free will, which specifically in this context means libertarian free will. LFW of the sort you discuss necessitates the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). Given I choose A among options A and B out of LFW, PAP demands B is possible. PoSR demands there be a sufficient reason for A, suggesting B is not possible, because A both happened for that sufficient reason and that reason was sufficient for A to happen.

An even lesser more sophisticated possible objection, should you find some way to justify PoSR free will, would be that your list of determinism, randomness, and free will may not be exhaustive.

And a robot, who is a more complex program with mechanical parts, has volition.
And so would you say the critical part to volition is complex programming? — Samuel Lacrampe

No, the critical part is not how complex the programming is... the critical part is having the right kind of system. That system involves a continuous monitoring of world states by developing world models based on sensory inputs, a representation of a goal state in terms of the world model, and the use of said world model (and action models) to guide the robot towards the manipulation of the world states in accordance with said goal. This in place, there's a causal correlation between world states and the state of the world model, and another causal correlation between modeled goal states and the counterfactual world states that would represent attainment of the goal. Likewise, there's a world model for the robot's actions and a corresponding world in which the robot is actually acting. So the system here isn't just the computer in the robot... it is the robot interacting with the world in this type of way. By the way, we, too, interact with the world... continuously. That is what makes us agents. We also initiate voluntary actions of precisely this sort. We do a lot more things as well... the robot simply reflects the simplest level that can be meaningfully called intention.

Debates are formal discussions in which arguments are put forward; and the function of (sincere) arguments is to find truth; therefore debates lead to truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

Well let's sanity check this idea. You're talking about free will, mechanics, and the existence of the soul. Your position is that by debating this you're going to find truth. People have been debating this for over two millennia... did they find the truth? What are you doing different than them?

Which part in the summary is nothing but an arbitrary opinion? — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, let's start by how you qualify that very question. We went from "opinion" to "nothing but an arbitrary opinion". So let me offer you another opinion (I'll fake it, because I don't really have one on this)... Banno is correct (<- do you see why I even started this line now?); experiment supports that the universe is indeed random. If we add the evidence-supported premise that the universe is random to your summary, we get a contradiction. Having a contradiction implies that one of the premises is wrong. My opinion is that premise (5) is wrong. Having gone through this, let me turn this question back to you. Which part of that rebuttal is nothing but and arbitrary opinion?

Ok, so if I understand correctly, your intent of bringing up the video was neither to attack or defend the points made in the summary, but only to show that it was related; is that right? — Samuel Lacrampe

It was to get your opinion on Bell's Theorem, which is obviously related. FTL is incredibly whacky, by the way. MW, though it is deterministic and local, is a lot more counterintuitive to most people than randomness. And that is what I think your (5) premise really is... it's not logic, it's just your intuition.

But if all you mean by "volition" is "respond to external information to achieve a goal", — Samuel Lacrampe

You're confused. You're both choking on this and ignoring it: "The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world." That statement is a specification for the robot not a definition of volition. Volition is still goal oriented behavior, not an achievement. The type of goal is described by that specification... it's describing something like cleaning troughs. Attaining that goal doesn't even require goal oriented behaviors; rather, goal oriented behaviors involve orienting behaviors towards those types of goals. So take cleaning troughs as an example... that involves manipulating the state not of a robot, or an output device, but a trough:

then mere programs without mechanical parts can do this too.

...mere programs without mechanical parts are not going to clean troughs.

There exists programs which goal is to win at a game of chess for example.

...not the right type of goal, and not the right type of behavior. If May and Joe play chess in the park, May, too, may lead with E4. But May plays this move by carrying out a series of voluntary actions that manipulate a physical chess piece... that white king's pawn... such that it moves to a specified location... the E4 square. That manipulation of the world states is the voluntary behavior that May is exhibiting; that is the thing that requires May to invoke a series of voluntary actions... you know, moving the arm with intention as opposed to having tics or seizures. E4 is just abstract shorthand for this concrete behavior. Note that May neither is a white king's pawn, nor has a white king's pawn; the state of the board after May's play is not a state of May; it is a state of something in the world that isn't May.

As for the other topic, let's take this side track. First this tiny bit:

does not conflict with the PoSR — Samuel Lacrampe

...you're confusing "conflict with" with "contradict". Now let's take a bigger side track, much more important:

It may disprove classical mechanics ... there can be a non-physical cause ... is not necessarily empirically detectable ... giving links to other sources is not an argument. ... Part of the onus of proof is to do the ground work for it. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your epistemic approach is all messed up here. The burden you place on having your beliefs is virtually non-existent; and the burden you place on discarding them is not only too high, but you're placing that burden on me. It's not my job to fix your false beliefs; you're the one who has them. Mine is just to fix my own false beliefs.

You're applying debate semantics here... that's quite popular but it's a fool's errand. Debates are worse than useless... they are counter-productive to truth. In a debate, two sides go in with an opinion, two sides go out with the same opinion they went in with, both sides think they won, and both sides delude themselves into becoming more confident because they "won". Opinions are the real problem; everyone has opinions, and people disagree with each other, so trivially a lot of those opinions are wrong. You are a person, therefore, it's reasonable to suspect you have a lot of false opinions yourself. But your epistemic approach is one that favors clinging to whatever false opinions you have for as long as you possibly can, which is the exact opposite strategy you should have if you want to believe in as few false things as possible. You want to get rid of your own false opinions... the lower the amount of time between your forming a false opinion and your rejecting it, the better. To do this, you should be looking honestly for all of the ways in which your opinions might be wrong, not could still be true. To summarize, debating is a bad epistemic approach... what you want to do on these forums, instead, is discuss. When you do debate, however, know fully well that it's just a game.

I'm not even interested in "proving you wrong". My beef with you is that you're confusing your opinions with logic.

The guy in the video — Samuel Lacrampe

Derek.

says that one of the two explanations given by physicists

Don't take Derek too seriously here; there are more than two intepretations, and the FTL one doesn't even have that much representation among physicists. The random view is one of the mainstream ones; the others are are quantum logic (QL) and many worlds (MW), neither of which mesh well with your confuse-your-intuitions-with-logic approaches.

MW, however, does grant determinism; not only that, it has locality. And it might be true. But to think it's true because you developed an opinion that it "has to be" is still wrong... it might be false, after all. And you don't want to believe false things.

IMO, your perspective seems a bit off.

What difference does it make if I die now or 100 years from now? — Qu King

I'll call your 100 years and go all in... what difference does it make if you die now, or never die? If you are immortal what is the point?

You think 100 years is long... forever sounds like torture:

The first ten million years were the worst. And the second ten million years, they were the worst too. The third ten million years I didn't enjoy at all. After that, I went into a decline. — Marvin (from Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy)

I cannot believe I am the only one that thinks like this. — Qu King

You aren't, actually; lots of people feel this way. But this is just your survival instinct talking for you. Picture it not as an ideal, but a reality. Congratulations! You're now immortal. Now what? Take it seriously and see where it goes. I'm sure you'd really have a blast the first... few days. Weeks. 20 years. 500 years. Whatever number that is probably depends on you, but at some point everything is going to get incredibly monotonous. After a few hundred times the time it takes for things to get monotonous, then what?

Your survival instinct is deluding you... living for a long time no more gives you purpose than dying young robs it from you. Purpose has to do with what you do while you are alive. You remind me of my mom... every time I call her she complains about how I never talk to her. That's you... you're here, existing and living your life, but every moment you're alive (okay, that's a hyperbole; realistically, every moment you spend on this thread), you're complaining about how you won't be alive when you're not alive. That is what robs you of purpose.

And not bullshit of redefining free will with the logic of being forced, — Syamsu

I don't think so... know your history.

The notions you describe were promoted by Chrysippus, a resident of the planet from 280BCE to 206BCE:
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/chrysippus/

That is literally older than the language you're typing in.

But a robot is essentially a program + mechanical parts; — Samuel Lacrampe

More or less, sure.

and if a robot is going to have volition, it's going to be through its program and not through its mechanical parts. No?

Actually, no. It is going to involve those mechanical parts, critically so. The robot must actually act in the world and achieve a "real" goal state in the world. To do that by means that don't involve magic, it must model the world via sensors, model the effects of potential actions, use the action-models to select actual actions that attempt to attain the goal states, monitor the actual results of actions through the sensors in order to compare the predictions to the actual results, and make adjustments as necessary as the actual results differ from the goal state it is directing itself to attain. The modeled goal state, the fact that the behaviors are directed towards that modeled goal state, and the fact that this modeled goal state is a result of modeling the sensed world as opposed to just simulating something, collectively are what make it meaningful to say that this robot is trying to attain a goal. Without those pieces you lose this meaning. To have those pieces, you need all three of the program, those mechanical parts, and that world.

I failed to see the relation with my summary. — Samuel Lacrampe

Point (8): PoSR demands a sufficient cause. Bell's Theorem: Under reasonable presumptions of classical mechanics, a "conspiracy" to yield particular results (i.e., whether there are sufficient causes for the results) in families of experiments would suggest probabilities that conflict with standard quantum mechanics; in particular, with the probabilities predicted by the Born Rule for such experiments. The conflict between these two things provides an experimental way to test which is true, and the experiments conflict with any classical results. Bell's Theorem is in essence the death nail of hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics.

I have to be blunt... I'm having an incredibly difficult time taking you seriously when you say that you fail to see the relationship between this and your summary. And when I see this:

But it's your objection; not mine. What then do you have to say about it with regards to the summary? — Samuel Lacrampe

...I can't help but think that you're just bluffing.

If A is nothing but B which is doing nothing but C, then A is doing nothing but C. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's pretty difficult to find A's that are nothing but B's. Generally, either A and B have to be identical or B has to not only be a superclass of A but one that necessarily entails all things about it. My house key, for example, is an object that is shaped in such a way that it allows me to open the door. It is also a flat metallic object that maintains an electric current as a result of changes in the surrounding electromagnetic field, a lump of mass that exerts a gravitational influence on Jupiter, and a lot of other things.

If a robot is nothing but a program which is doing nothing but executing lines — Samuel Lacrampe

A robot is not even a program, much less nothing more than one. Robots and programs are different things.

let's clean it up by summarizing where I think we are — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, let's take this in a different direction. I'll just pick on (6) through (8).

What, then, do you have to say about Bell's Theorem ("cliff note" version by Derek/Veritassium)?

But the question is not "what works". — Heiko

For me, it absolutely is. The alternative to this is that the question is, "what is my favorite pet theory"? I prefer the Feynman path: "I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting 'not knowing' than to have answers that might be wrong."

To Do and Being done. No difference? — Heiko

A lot of people tend to want to view things as if there are two kinds of things... a subject, and an object; a me, and a world. Why? How come you can't just be part of the world?

A "what" is never free. Things are involved in external relations defining them and putting them in place. This would contradict free decisions. — Heiko

I think you need to try again. You're trying to convince me that there's some sort of a problem with us being a what, but all I'm getting from this is that you have a term free that you define a certain way and another compound term free decision that you define a certain way, and what's don't really fit the definition too well. Okay, sure, but what should I make out of that outside of it being a linguistic exercise applied to your vocabulary?

Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties) — Heiko

Why are those mutually exclusive? Who you are is what you are works fine for me.

But in this case I'd not be a subject anymore but an object. Not even a "who" but a mere "what" (those properties). How degrading. I guess you meant to say something else. — Heiko

Again, only if those things are mutually exclusive. Otherwise, you would be a what that is a who. Who you are is what you are, but not all what's are who's.

The difference is that one holds dignity, the other does not.

I don't buy that.

You're starting with a picture of us as being elevated to a certain level, and x (where x is being a "what" or "properties"... I'm abstracting because this is generic) as being lower. With that in mind, when you hear the suggestion that we are x, you picture that as (a) lowering us from our level to the level of x. But that is an artificial perspective, and it is completely unnecessary. There are at least two other ways of looking at the same thing: (b) it elevates x, (c) it elevates x when x is us.

For x being properties, I take the (c) perspective, not the (a) perspective.

In fact, if it would depend on anything it would not be "will" but an effect of that property. — Heiko

I don't know about that:

Being uninfluenced by totally everything is what makes it free and why "will" is always free. — Heiko

This has a flaw... if an action is uninfluenced by totally everything, then you cannot have willed it. So will necessitates at least influence of the actor; otherwise, in what sense is it will at all? So there must be influence for there to be will. With that crack in the door, though, the rest becomes questionable; if an effect is a result of properties, but those properties make you who you are, then there's no difference between your acting of your own will and the actions being a result of those properties... they are the same thing. The conflict here would be illusory, something analogous to the fallacy of the single cause.

Why would one need the concept concept of free will then to blame someone? — Heiko

I've been trying to figure that out for a long time; the PAP folk swear by this.

Your version of free will is much more coherent to me.

So my question is, how are they different, such that a robot can have intentions? — Samuel Lacrampe

Words are our slaves, not our masters. The robot I described is the minimal system for which it makes sense to say that it is trying to do something. If you want to add other criteria for "intentions", that's fine; but I find one thing very, very interesting... using this robotic minimal version of intention, I can distinguish between voluntary actions and involuntary actions in humans. Voluntary actions are those for which there's a goal driving behavior like that robot has; involuntary actions are the rest. Using this criteria I can tell the difference between my hand shaking due to a tic and my hand shaking because I'm trying to shake it.

I'm fairly sure a robot is nothing more than a computer executing a program line by lines, with sensors attached. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not a problem. The robot has a computer in it, and that computer is executing a program line by line. But there is no sense in which that computer is trying to execute a program line by line; there's no "attempt" to "attain a goal" of executing programs line by line, because there's no representation of what it's doing at this level, no observation of how things are occurring, and no calculated adjustment towards "execute the instruction". It's just a wind up doll. There is by contrast a sense in which the robot, with the same computer in it, is trying to clean the troughs; there is a representation of what it's doing at this level, an observation of how things are occurring, and a calculated adjustment towards "cleaning the troughs". Or if you don't follow that, fine; look at the shaky person driving the car. There is nothing in that shaky person trying to shake his hands. But in the same person, even with the same hand still moving, insofar as it is reaching towards a gear shift and shifting it, there is something in that shaky person that is trying to shift the gears. There is no more a contradiction between the computer program following a program line by line not intentionally doing so and yet the same computer trying to clean troughs, as there is in the shaky person having their hands shake not intentionally shaking them and yet the same shaky person shifting a gear trying to shift.

How does this fit with the original objection about the laws of thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

You're arguing that physical things must be fully determined, because logic; that humans aren't, because free will (which gets them a logic-pass to not be fully determined); and therefore, humans are not physical. This argument applies different yardsticks to humans than it does to physical things. You opened a thread here to discuss this, so here I am... to my eyes, it looks like you're rigging the game to reach your goal.

These were merely a response to your 6-step objection, which admittedly I apparently have misunderstood. — Samuel Lacrampe

The 5 statement thing and the 6 statement thing are meant to emphasize that if you have a problem with the logic of how physical things work, then it would be inconsistent to say that it is with the 1 through 5 things... that it must be with thing 6. And all thing 6 does is invoke the word "physical". You yourself gave two syllogisms; one to argue that physical things are fully determined, the other to argue that if something isn't fully determined, then it's not physical.

This is really straining away from common sense. — Samuel Lacrampe

You can't meet the burden of logic by appealing to common sense.

Of course photons are physical; why wouldn't they be? — Samuel Lacrampe

By your argument. If we look at photons and find out that they cannot be fully determined, we just apply syllogism 2, and we get that they aren't physical. I mean, it's pretty straightforward... your syllogism is a recipe for proving something non-physical and, like it or not, that recipe applies to anything we show is not fully determined.

As per above, the only alternative to determinism is free will — Samuel Lacrampe

So, photons have free will? (Incidentally, since you mentioned logical fallacies, how does appeal to personal incredulity and false dilemma sound here?)

ETA: Let me cut to the chase for you. There are two main ways you can talk about things: (a) prescriptively, and (b) descriptively. When you're using method (a), you're basically specifying all of the properties that a thing has to have to be the thing you're talking about. When you're using method (b), you're basically referring to a thing, and you use the referent to try to figure out what kinds of properties the thing has. The problem with your approach of the physical is that you're trying to do both of these things at the same time. You want to refer to photons, but prescribe their mechanics.

So, what makes you think a rational decision could be different all circumstances being the same? Is rationality arbitrary? — Heiko

TBH I'm kind of wondering about a similar issue... how this works in terms of moral choice. I made a terrible decision last Saturday at 11:47pm; it was a bad thing to do. But now I realize it, and am a better person. Free will means I can go back to that state, down at the atomic level and make a different choice... perhaps a better one. But, now, it's not really identical, because the second time around, I am the "better" person... the first time, I was a "worse" person... so the "revert time" version really isn't as identical as it's being made out to be. Apparently, though, I have to be exactly as terrible as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, and make a different decision, to have free will. If I make the same decision, being the exact level of blameworthiness as I was last Saturday at 11:47pm, then I don't have free will and therefore cannot be blamed?

Randomness and free will are different things. Freely willed actions are consciously chosen, — Cidat

I don't think you're aware of how this actually works in practice. We don't make decisions "consciously", at least as a matter of course. We make decisions and become conscious of them. On some rare occasions, we deliberate, but most of the time we just act. The more habituated the action is, the more consciousness is "optional" for it. Also, the "us" in the we is the "subject" of consciousness, not the "object" of it; by which I mean, what you are self-aware of isn't your entire self... it's just a fraction of your self. Any notion of free will that we're actually likely to have must fit into this. And any sensible theory of free will requiring responsibility needs to account for the fact that the guy generating these actions most of the time isn't aware of them while generating them, but is still nevertheless the guy who did them. Otherwise, you're just going to invent a fiction of folk theory. As a curious free will agnostic, I'm more interested in the kinds of free will we might actually have.