Great analysis.

Furthermore, your assertion that if we come into existence then we are not responsible for our initial character implies you believe that all other events not related to human action are also determined; our initial character, if it is predetermined, must be the result of causes outside of our control that can be identified with a state of the universe. If said state of the universe is necessarily the result of previous states, and it would have to be for your character to be predetermined, then it seems to follow that determinism is true.

3. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
4. I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything. — Bartricks

To say that one is not morally responsible for those things seems to me to be rendering them external to the will, and if those are the only things that affect our decisions, as you have indeed implied, then all factors affecting our decisions are external to the will, so determinism, based on how I have defined it, is also implied.

Determinism: the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will.

I did not say 'necessary' once. So you're introducing the notion of necessity, not me. It is not present in my argument. I do not believe in necessary truths. — Bartricks

You appear to believe that determinism is a necessary truth, however. Or at least you presume so in your argument. I don't see how you can say that determinism is basically true in your aseity argument to support that we exist with aseity, and then say something like that aseity shows determinism isn't a necessary truth. As far as I can tell, determinism is either true or not true, and if true, it is necessary.

I do know that whatever they mean, they do not capture my argument for my argument certainly committed no modal fallacy. — Bartricks

Then you understood what I was trying to say enough to realize that I was accusing you of a modal fallacy, and that that was what I was trying to express. You probably could've figured it out. You are assuming that my argument was fallacious while attempting to conceal an important argument that might mean you committed a fallacy.

What's needed for moral responsibility - as my argument shows - is not control over everything, but the power truly to originate one's decisions. — Bartricks

Define aseity, then.

But you've reasoned like this:

2. We exist with aseity.

3. Therefore we are morally responsible — Bartricks

No, I argued that aseity implies free will, which then implies moral responsibility. You use this premise:

8. Therefore I have not come into existence. — Bartricks

To support the assertion that we have free will. There must be an argument saying that aseity implies free will if the premise 1 of your moral responsibility argument is true. Furthermore, if that argument exists, and if free will implies moral responsibility, then I don't see how my argument is fallacious.

1. If we are morally responsible, we exist with aseity
2. We are morally responsible
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity — Bartricks

So you are saying that if we have free will we are morally responsible, right? I assume that that is what you mean. Furthermore, how does that argument mean that if we exist with aseity then we are morally responsible? You said yourself that it is only necessary, not sufficient. So I don't see how it goes both ways, unless there is another argument you are leaving out.

If you say that it is not logically necessary that we are morally responsible, then there must be alternatives to being morally responsible by us existing with aseity (the only way we can have moral responsibility). But you have demonstrated that the only alternative is a deterministic view that negates both agency and any sort of moral culpability. I don't see how you can square the two without us existing with aseity.

I mean I could say:

1. It is logically necessary that(if one makes a crappy analogy, then they should be ashamed of themselves).
2. One makes a crappy analogy.
3. It is logically necessary that(one should be ashamed of themselves).

How on earth is 3 a logical necessity? Maybe you should just grow a thick skin and not give a shit what people think of your crappy analogies. You are presuming something is logically necessary based on the logical necessity of its constituents; there could indeed be a world in which moral responsibility is nonexistent, even if some things are logically necessary for it to exist.

Unless I'm mistaken you do indeed use the argument:

1. If we exist with aseity, we have free will.
2. We exist with aseity.
3. Therefore, we have free will.
4. If we have free will, we are MR.
5. Therefore, we are MR.

You also use this one:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity
2. We have free will
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity

The first premise of the first one correctly asserts that aseity => free will, while the first premise of the second correctly asserts that free will => aseity.
Thus, since both premises are true, aseity <=> free will.

The expression ((A => FW) => U) is implicit in the first argument outlined in this post that you use. (FW is free will, U is MR, A is aseity)

The following argument is analogous to the first one outlined in this post that you use:

1. A => FW
2. A
3. Therefore, FW
4. FW => U
5. Therefore U

If that is true, and considering the implicit expression, then this is essentially the metalogic (I think I'm using that word correctly) you are using to support your MR argument:

1. It is logically necessary that(FW => U)
2. FW
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary that(U)

which is fallacious.

I don't dispute that argument. The argument I dispute is formed from this:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity
2. We have free will
3. Therefore, we exist with aseity

According to the aseity argument you outlined in you latest post, it is logically necessary that if we have free will, we exist with aseity, and, thus, are morally responsible. (it is logically necessary that((FW => A) =>MR))

I mean, we have no control over whether or not we have free will, and thus exist with aseity, and thus have moral responsibility. How could we control those things? If we could, then maybe we could just wish away our moral responsibility or something.

Don't tear me apart, I'm correcting my earlier post

In order for the Santa argument not to be fallacious you must have a rule that accounts for the fact that the past might have been different; you couldn't have not put out the cookies and milk, but even so, that doesn't mean you cannot deliberate and take actions that lead to Santa not eating the cookies. So, again, you must come up with a rule that allows one to infer that the future follows directly from past events we have no control over.

But this is just an example put in terms of an argument you have used. The main point is that your argument for aseity is fallacious, I think.

I suppose I would say that seriousness is an attention to principles and a fact-based dialectic.

Any measure of what it means to be a philosopher has to be measured against what one intends; if you engage in philosophical discussions to stimulate yourself, I think you are doing philosophy, even if perhaps you would not be considered a philosopher per say.

And I don't think success is the best criterion for whether or not one is a "real" philosopher, nor popularity, but rather seriousness about their craft. You can tell if someone is serious pretty quickly. For instance, I agree with Sam Harris on religion, but his take on how the US is a "well-intentioned giant" is just not serious. As for what determines seriousness, that's a little open to interpretation.

You could always just eat the cookies yourself, or hit Santa with a baseball bat for invading your home; the argument suffers from the fatalist fallacy. Just because we can't alter the facts of the past doesn't mean our actions cannot bring about different outcomes. The past, while fixed, runs forward into the future, and we are able to deliberate in the present, critically evaluating our reasons for acting. So there is some agency even if the past is fixed, I think.

I derived this from your argument, so if anything is wrong just say so (this is my first try at an argument like this):

1. It is logically necessary that((FW => A) => U)

2. N((FW => A) => U)

3. A <=> U (A is materially equivalent to U)

4. N((FW => U) => U) (from 2 and 3)

5. Therefore, it is logically necessary that((FW => U) => U)

N is the operator “no one has any power over” (which signifies “is logically necessary”)
U is moral responsibility
A is aseity
FW is free will

This argument (derived from 5 and your own argument for aseity) is fallacious:

1. It is logically necessary that((p => q) => q)
2. p & q
3. Therefore, it is logically necessary that q

Here is an example of said argument that is obviously fallacious:

1. You have no power over the fact that if you put out cookies and milk for Santa, he will eat them.
2. You put out cookies and milk for Santa.
3.Therefore, you have no power over whether or not Santa eats the cookies and milk.

I can't really dispute the aseity argument, but I can dispute whether or not we have aseity, and I think that if you agree that our initial, current, and future character is solely the product of external causes, then the argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.
4. If we do not have power over the facts of the future we cannot choose to do otherwise.
5. No one has power over the facts of the future.
6. Therefore, we cannot choose to do otherwise.
7. We have free will only if we can choose to do otherwise.
8. Therefore, we do not have free will.

applies. There are definitely objections to this argument, but they don't include assuming that we have aseity, because I'm attacking one of the premises necessary for showing that we have aseity.

As if the cake analogy wasn't enough.

You took your name from that one lecture, right? I watched a little bit of it.

I no longer stick to the arguments I made in the opening post. I think that moral responsibility is plausible.

btw, I'm not a philosopher, nor even experienced in writing philosophy. I've written a couple of essays, but that's it. And I usually am wrong, it seems.

could it be built into our initial character? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Maybe if you ground it in god?

could our environment have determined that we have free will? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I don't know. I'll have to think about it.

also have you read John Calvin. Much of what you are saying sounds like his philosophy. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I will look into some of his philosophy. I would never have expected to sound like a theologian.

So the future really does depend on our choices.

Yes but that is a different philosophy to determinism. Which is what ToothyMaw is arguing. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I didn't argue for determinism. I argued that unless determinism is proven false, we would have no basis for moral responsibility. It turns out I was begging the question, because I was only attacking an indeterministic view of free will, when really there are compatibilist accounts I was not addressing.

If agency still exists then how are we not morally responsible? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

We are able to affect the future through our actions regardless of whether these actions are predetermined; If one had acted differently, and one undoubtedly could've in almost any situation if something about them, their environment, or initial character were different, then they could've brought about a different future - unless one externalizes one's will, but that leads to implausible accounts of agency.

How does one reduce suffering in a world that is predetermined. Wouldn't the amount of suffering on earth merely be the amount that was always going to exist no matter what? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Agency still exists even if determinism is true. It is (usually) fallacious to say something like that we cannot affect the future, and thus the amount of suffering in the world, even if all of the suffering that will occur is predetermined.

I mean if someone makes such a damaging argument that people want to murder them, then that's a reflection of how emotionally vulnerable people are, not a reflection of the character of the person who made said argument.

I do not want to attack your beliefs. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

It wouldn't bother me in the least if you did.

1. Do you believe that moral responsibility exists? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Perhaps. I'm formulating some new views on the matter.

I cannot see a way in which morality could exist if moral responsibility doesn't, but I would be interested to hear any arguments against my belief if they are out there. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think that even if we don't have moral culpability, we are morally responsible for reducing suffering. So in a way, I think that there are moral responsibilities.

If our moral actions are determined externally of us, could the same argument not be made for what knowledge we have? If I refuse to learn to spend money wisely, wouldn't I be responsible for running out of money? Essentially what I'm asking is are we held responsible for our own knowledge? If not then so be it but if so, how is it different than morality? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think we are obligated to be intellectually honest, and not shy away from the truth, even if it is unpleasant. I think it is somewhat tied into reducing suffering, but that it also exists independently in some ways. For instance, even if an argument has horrible implications ethically, we should probably just look for counter-arguments instead of stifling said argument. That would be stupid. Free speech is paramount.

BTW you can link people into your posts so that they get a notification.

I'll check it out. To be honest, I don't read nearly as much as I should. And I'm often intimidated by rigorous arguments. But I'll try to get through it if I can get it free somewhere.

Looks like moral responsibility might exist! — ToothyMaw

I mean maybe I will have to admit it exists

Sorry, not maybe might

Looks like moral responsibility might exist!

I mean if character is defined in that way I think it accounts for (1) and (2), but the ramifications it has for agency are pretty implausible, yes.

Yes, thank you. Now it is valid. It's a good starting point. It now remains to be elucidated what "having the power over..." means exactly in such a way that the two premises are true and this operator represents a plausible conception of the power of human agency. One question that can be asked is how very much your "power over" something is restricted when those past facts about yourself that you presently lack "power over" are both (1) partially constitutive of who you are and (2) contribute to the determination of the future. — Pierre-Normand

I suppose it is implausible to assert that one's current character is a blend of all of the factors external to their wills and their interactions with these external factors (environment, laws of nature, initial character)? It does seem odd, as one's previous character affects one's previous actions and thus current character, and is not really external to their will according to the compatibilist. If the will is externalized then one's current character results directly from one's previous character and one's current character is pretty much predetermined and there is no agency at all. No one would have any power over anything they do. .

I have absolutely no background in logic at all. I'm just learning as I'm going. But that makes sense. I'll think on your last post.

I'm thinking if it's to be a general rule it's the first one.

Should it be

N(p)

N(p entails q)

N(q) — ToothyMaw

or:

N(p)

N(p entails all q)

N(q)

When it is made explicit that you are reliant on such a rule, and you've explained the nature of the N operator that you are making use of, it may become apparent that you are tacitly assuming an implausibly thin conception of the power of human agency in the way khaled had suggested. — Pierre-Normand

I have a reply to this, but first I'll fix my argument.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

This is valid because of the following rule:

N(p)

N(p entails q)

N(q)

Where the operator N means "no one has any power over over"

@Pierre-Normand Is this valid?