You clearly do not understand how arguing works or what the terms you're employing mean. First, a premise can't be logically valid or invalid. Validity is a property of arguments, not premises.

Premises can be true or false. Which premise is false? You need to say, otherwise you're just not addressing anything I have argued.

You changed this premise:

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything — Bartricks

What I meant was that it was semantically invalid. It now appears to be totally valid.

I'll have to take a look at your argument now that you have modified it. I'll see if I can deny a premise, but if not, I will conclude that we exist with aseity and thus have free will (until I can come up with a good counterargument or come across a better argument). This might take some time and a new thread if this one is abandoned because I'm not quick enough.

Not to say I'll make a duplicate thread!

This premise assumes that we are only the products of initial character, environment, and the laws of nature that prevail in it:

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything — Bartricks

Otherwise there could be a moral element to our actions. However, if we are the product of only those things, there is no moral element to any of our actions, so your premise:

7. I am morally responsible for some things — Bartricks

Is false.

It is not modified. It is the same argument. I have just 'simplified' it.

so you're denying 5.

5 says "If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything"

Because you are not denying 1 or 2, you accept that if I have come into being, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character.

Because you have not denied 4, you accept as well that I am not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it.

So what you deny is that it follows from my lack of moral responsibility for those things that I am lacking in moral responsibility for what they produce, yes? I mean, what else is left? I am not responsible for my initial character, and not responsible for the environment and laws of nature in which my initial character finds itself, then what else is left for me to be morally responsible for save what those things produce?

In other words you think this principle - if I am not in any way morally responsible for A, and not in any way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, I am not morally responsible for C - is false, yes?

You think you can be morally responsible for an event - X - even when X was caused by matters for which you are in no way morally responsible. How?

You accept that I am not morally responsible for my initial character. But why do you accept that, given that you think one can be morally responsible for things that are the product of things for which I am in no way morally responsible?

I mean, I am in no way morally responsible for my own production - I didn't create myself, but am the product of alien forces. But that shouldn't trouble you, given that as far as you're concerned the fact I was in no way morally responsible for my own production and was instead the product of alien forces doesn't, in and of itself, suffice to establish my non-responsiblity for my initial self.

So your own position seems inconsistent. If you reject 5, it is odd to me why you accept 2 or 4. For the only reason, surely, for accepting 2 and 4 is the principle expressed in 5?

You write:

if I am not in any way morally responsible for A, and not in any way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, I am not morally responsible for C — Bartricks

I actually agree with this. However, implicit in 5 is the assumption that the only things that affect us are our environment, initial character, and the laws of nature. I also agree that these are almost the only things we could be morally responsible for.

But what about other people's potentially free choices? Wouldn't you have to address those? You are presupposing that all that affects us are external factors that can, presumably, be traced back indefinitely. But you must also specify, so as to guarantee that we are not morally responsible for anything, that we are not morally responsible for other people's (potentially free) choices, as you admitted that one can come into existence yet still have the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action (even if it doesn't magically make people morally responsible).

If you specify that we are not responsible for other people's choices, then a large swathe of what is considered abhorrent behavior is excused.

Do you deny that you have to take into account other people's choices?

And if you say we are sometimes responsible for other people's choices, then there is something we are morally responsible for and thus 5 is false.

What's the question?

I'll make it formal:

1) I am not morally responsible for anything iff I am not morally responsible for my initial character, the environment, the laws of nature that prevail in it, and other people's choices.
2) I am morally responsible for some of other people's choices.
3) Therefore, I am morally responsible for some things.
4) I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5) Thus, even though I am not morally responsible for my initial character or for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I am morally responsible for some things.

Unless I'm mistaken 5 is the negation of 5. If there is a flaw in my logic please point it out.

I fixed it a little I think.

1) I am not morally responsible for anything iff I am not morally responsible for my initial character, the environment, the laws of nature that prevail in it, and other people's choices.
2) I am morally responsible for some of other people's choices.
3) Therefore, I am morally responsible for some things.
4) I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5) Even if I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I still am morally responsible for some things.
6) Thus, even though I am not morally responsible for my initial character or for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I am morally responsible for some things.

I have a few questions which you may have already answered but I missed them if you have.

1. Do you believe that moral responsibility exists?

If so where do you lay this moral responsibility.

If not then do you believe in morality. I cannot see a way in which morality could exist if moral responsibility doesn't, but I would be interested to hear any arguments against my belief if they are out there.

If you do not believe morality exists then why do you care if people are held morally responsible? You seem to be implying that it would be better for us to not hold people morally responsible for their actions. If this is the case then could you please define what you mean by better. If not morally then what?

2. Do you hold the same beliefs about intellectual responsibility?

If our moral actions are determined externally of us, could the same argument not be made for what knowledge we have? If I refuse to learn to spend money wisely, wouldn't I be responsible for running out of money? Essentially what I'm asking is are we held responsible for our own knowledge? If not then so be it but if so, how is it different than morality?

P.S. I tried hard to keep this from sounding combative, I hope I have. I do not want to attack your beliefs.

I do not want to attack your beliefs. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

It wouldn't bother me in the least if you did.

1. Do you believe that moral responsibility exists? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Perhaps. I'm formulating some new views on the matter.

I cannot see a way in which morality could exist if moral responsibility doesn't, but I would be interested to hear any arguments against my belief if they are out there. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think that even if we don't have moral culpability, we are morally responsible for reducing suffering. So in a way, I think that there are moral responsibilities.

If our moral actions are determined externally of us, could the same argument not be made for what knowledge we have? If I refuse to learn to spend money wisely, wouldn't I be responsible for running out of money? Essentially what I'm asking is are we held responsible for our own knowledge? If not then so be it but if so, how is it different than morality? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think we are obligated to be intellectually honest, and not shy away from the truth, even if it is unpleasant. I think it is somewhat tied into reducing suffering, but that it also exists independently in some ways. For instance, even if an argument has horrible implications ethically, we should probably just look for counter-arguments instead of stifling said argument. That would be stupid. Free speech is paramount.

BTW you can link people into your posts so that they get a notification.

I mean if someone makes such a damaging argument that people want to murder them, then that's a reflection of how emotionally vulnerable people are, not a reflection of the character of the person who made said argument.

BTW you can link people into your posts so that they get a notification.

Sorry I'm new to forums

I think that even if we don't have moral culpability, we are morally responsible for reducing suffering. So in a way, I think that there are moral responsibilities.

How does one reduce suffering in a world that is predetermined. Wouldn't the amount of suffering on earth merely be the amount that was always going to exist no matter what?

How does one reduce suffering in a world that is predetermined. Wouldn't the amount of suffering on earth merely be the amount that was always going to exist no matter what? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Try squaring that with religions that believe in karma, because karma is only generated by the intentional action of agents, and it’s impossible to determine in advance how that will play out.

How does one reduce suffering in a world that is predetermined. Wouldn't the amount of suffering on earth merely be the amount that was always going to exist no matter what? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Agency still exists even if determinism is true. It is (usually) fallacious to say something like that we cannot affect the future, and thus the amount of suffering in the world, even if all of the suffering that will occur is predetermined.

Try squaring that with religions that believe in karma, because karma is only generated by the intentional action of agents, and it’s impossible to determine in advance how that will play out. — Wayfarer

Yes but that is a different philosophy to determinism. Which is what ToothyMaw is arguing. The determinist would just say that Karmic religions are wrong.

If agency still exists then how are we not morally responsible?

@ToothyMaw also have you read John Calvin. Much of what you are saying sounds like his philosophy.

Yes but that is a different philosophy to determinism. Which is what ToothyMaw is arguing. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I didn't argue for determinism. I argued that unless determinism is proven false, we would have no basis for moral responsibility. It turns out I was begging the question, because I was only attacking an indeterministic view of free will, when really there are compatibilist accounts I was not addressing.

If agency still exists then how are we not morally responsible? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

We are able to affect the future through our actions regardless of whether these actions are predetermined; If one had acted differently, and one undoubtedly could've in almost any situation if something about them, their environment, or initial character were different, then they could've brought about a different future - unless one externalizes one's will, but that leads to implausible accounts of agency.

So the future really does depend on our choices.

also have you read John Calvin. Much of what you are saying sounds like his philosophy. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I will look into some of his philosophy. I would never have expected to sound like a theologian.

could our environment have determined that we have free will? Or could it be built into our initial character?

could it be built into our initial character? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Maybe if you ground it in god?

could our environment have determined that we have free will? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I don't know. I'll have to think about it.

btw, I'm not a philosopher, nor even experienced in writing philosophy. I've written a couple of essays, but that's it. And I usually am wrong, it seems.

I will look into some of his philosophy. I would never have expected to sound like a theologian. — ToothyMaw

Actually after I looked closer it seems you have almost the opposite belief as him. He believes that we cannot affect the future yet we still have moral responsibility. According to him our actions are predetermined by God in order to show his glory. However we are still morally responsible for our sins, not God. I must admit it doesn't make sense to me and even Calvinists that I've talked to say it only makes sense from God's perspective.

Agency still exists even if determinism is true. — ToothyMaw

I think Calvin would agree with this statement, but he would come to an opposite-ish conclusion. It might still be worth checking out.

I no longer stick to the arguments I made in the opening post. I think that moral responsibility is plausible.

Maybe if you ground it in god? — ToothyMaw

That is my belief.

btw, I'm not a philosopher, nor even experienced in writing philosophy. I've written a couple of essays, but that's it. And I usually am wrong, it seems. — ToothyMaw

same here.