Yes but that is a different philosophy to determinism. Which is what ToothyMaw is arguing. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I didn't argue for determinism. I argued that unless determinism is proven false, we would have no basis for moral responsibility. It turns out I was begging the question, because I was only attacking an indeterministic view of free will, when really there are compatibilist accounts I was not addressing.

If agency still exists then how are we not morally responsible? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

We are able to affect the future through our actions regardless of whether these actions are predetermined; If one had acted differently, and one undoubtedly could've in almost any situation if something about them, their environment, or initial character were different, then they could've brought about a different future - unless one externalizes one's will, but that leads to implausible accounts of agency.

How does one reduce suffering in a world that is predetermined. Wouldn't the amount of suffering on earth merely be the amount that was always going to exist no matter what? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Agency still exists even if determinism is true. It is (usually) fallacious to say something like that we cannot affect the future, and thus the amount of suffering in the world, even if all of the suffering that will occur is predetermined.

I mean if someone makes such a damaging argument that people want to murder them, then that's a reflection of how emotionally vulnerable people are, not a reflection of the character of the person who made said argument.

I do not want to attack your beliefs. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

It wouldn't bother me in the least if you did.

1. Do you believe that moral responsibility exists? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

Perhaps. I'm formulating some new views on the matter.

I cannot see a way in which morality could exist if moral responsibility doesn't, but I would be interested to hear any arguments against my belief if they are out there. — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think that even if we don't have moral culpability, we are morally responsible for reducing suffering. So in a way, I think that there are moral responsibilities.

If our moral actions are determined externally of us, could the same argument not be made for what knowledge we have? If I refuse to learn to spend money wisely, wouldn't I be responsible for running out of money? Essentially what I'm asking is are we held responsible for our own knowledge? If not then so be it but if so, how is it different than morality? — Fides Quaerens Intellectum

I think we are obligated to be intellectually honest, and not shy away from the truth, even if it is unpleasant. I think it is somewhat tied into reducing suffering, but that it also exists independently in some ways. For instance, even if an argument has horrible implications ethically, we should probably just look for counter-arguments instead of stifling said argument. That would be stupid. Free speech is paramount.

BTW you can link people into your posts so that they get a notification.

I'll check it out. To be honest, I don't read nearly as much as I should. And I'm often intimidated by rigorous arguments. But I'll try to get through it if I can get it free somewhere.

Looks like moral responsibility might exist! — ToothyMaw

I mean maybe I will have to admit it exists

Sorry, not maybe might

Looks like moral responsibility might exist!

I mean if character is defined in that way I think it accounts for (1) and (2), but the ramifications it has for agency are pretty implausible, yes.

Yes, thank you. Now it is valid. It's a good starting point. It now remains to be elucidated what "having the power over..." means exactly in such a way that the two premises are true and this operator represents a plausible conception of the power of human agency. One question that can be asked is how very much your "power over" something is restricted when those past facts about yourself that you presently lack "power over" are both (1) partially constitutive of who you are and (2) contribute to the determination of the future. — Pierre-Normand

I suppose it is implausible to assert that one's current character is a blend of all of the factors external to their wills and their interactions with these external factors (environment, laws of nature, initial character)? It does seem odd, as one's previous character affects one's previous actions and thus current character, and is not really external to their will according to the compatibilist. If the will is externalized then one's current character results directly from one's previous character and one's current character is pretty much predetermined and there is no agency at all. No one would have any power over anything they do. .

I have absolutely no background in logic at all. I'm just learning as I'm going. But that makes sense. I'll think on your last post.

I'm thinking if it's to be a general rule it's the first one.

Should it be

N(p)

N(p entails q)

N(q) — ToothyMaw

or:

N(p)

N(p entails all q)

N(q)

When it is made explicit that you are reliant on such a rule, and you've explained the nature of the N operator that you are making use of, it may become apparent that you are tacitly assuming an implausibly thin conception of the power of human agency in the way khaled had suggested. — Pierre-Normand

I have a reply to this, but first I'll fix my argument.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

This is valid because of the following rule:

N(p)

N(p entails q)

N(q)

Where the operator N means "no one has any power over over"

@Pierre-Normand Is this valid?

I wonder why you are favoring this form of the argument for incompatibilism, starting with a premise denying control over facts of the future, over the more commonly encountered versions of van Inwagen's consequence argument, which rather start with the much more uncontroversial premise that no one has power over facts of the past. — Pierre-Normand

I actually make use of that argument. Check out one of my earlier posts. The argument I gave depends on the one in the SEP article.

But I don't see how my argument:

1. If we do not have power over the facts of the future we cannot choose to do otherwise.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we cannot choose to do otherwise.
4. We have free will only if we can choose to do otherwise.
5. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

is an instance of the modal fallacy, even if my serial killer example might not be absolute proof that we cannot choose to do otherwise if we have no power over the facts of the future. The facts of the future are directly the result of our actions, which, given how I defined character, are indeed features of our character, or will, which must exist independent of external causes to be free. Our previous character, and thus actions, are the result of factors external to ourselves, so our choices and the resultant actions cannot be free (determinism is true). It seems undeniable to me then that our own actions are facts of the future that we must not have control over unless we could could have acted differently then we did due to a factor that is not external. To presume that one could have acted differently due to a difference in character that is not external to the will, however, is to assume that determinism is false. It follows that since determinism is true, premise 2 is supported, along with 1. 4 must also be true, as it is derived from my definition of free will. Thus, my argument applies.

You are obviously no longer being serious, if you ever were.

And I disputed that we have free will, so unless you can find a flaw in my argument you cannot say it is false because we exist with aseity. Unless you just assume that we have it. And it sounds like that is what you are doing.

Not to say I'm some psychopath out to fuck everything up; I just want to actually get to the bottom of this.

The reason of virtually everyone represents them to be morally responsible for what they do. That means that we have unbelievably powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible. — Bartricks

I don't really care.

This, for example, is not a good argument:

1. We are not morally responsible
2. therefore, we are not morally responsible. — Bartricks

Then I'll change my argument.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.


1. If we do not have power over the facts of the future we cannot choose to do otherwise.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we cannot choose to do otherwise.
4. We have free will only if we can choose to do otherwise.
5. Therefore, we do not have free will.

Is this logically invalid? I think not. Dispute a premise.

I mean maybe you are forgetting, but my position originally was that we have no basis for the concept of moral responsibility. It is enough for me to show that we don't have aseity according to you.

magical abilities — ToothyMaw

Correction: aseity

What you're saying is that free will requires having some control over the facts of the past. — Bartricks

No, free will requires power over the facts of the future; you would need to have magical abilities to be able to alter the facts of the past in the present, which is what

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. — ToothyMaw

means. It doesn't say "no one had power over the facts of the past."

The argument up to 6 establishes what's needed: aseity. If you challenge 7 you are not challenging that we need aseity, you are challenging that we have it. — Bartricks

Yes.

The idea of "having power over the facts of the future" seems a little obscure to me. I would rather rely on the more straightforward definition that you gave in the opening post of your previous thread:

"Free will: the ability to both choose between different alternative courses of actions and to act free of external causes." — Pierre-Normand

I will change my definition in the OP. I had the previous definition in mind. Sorry.

With the previous definition in mind, one's control over one's actions entails control over the facts of the future; they can bring about future outcomes with their free choices. Not to mention the first argument implies that one couldn't have done otherwise, and if one couldn't have done otherwise one does not have free will according to my definition of free will. I'll try to now respond to you without any straw manning, as you were responding to something a little different.

For an embodied human agent to act in the world doesn't consist in the agent stepping outside of her own embodiment, as it were, and for her to control the role her own body (and brain) plays in the causal chain of physical events. Acts of agency rather consist for an embodied person to play such an ineliminable causal role in the chain of intelligible events (i.e. intentional actions and their intended or foreseeable consequences). — Pierre-Normand

what determines what she intentionally does is her own act of practical deliberation. The specific nature of this action, described in high-level intentional terms, may supervene on some set of physical facts about her bodily movements and brain activity. But the higher level intentional action (which may or may not be praiseworthy or blameworthy) that those lower level physical facts happen to materially realize isn't set by the laws of physics. That's because the laws of physics are silent regarding what bodily motions constitute intelligible actions, and what good or bad reasons for acting are. — Pierre-Normand

It seems there is a confusion of "physical facts" and just "facts". A fact could entail that an action was performed, whereas a physical fact could be gravity's existence or a brain state.

What if a serial killer reflects upon his despicable acts and thus chooses to work towards redeeming himself? He is playing an ineliminable role in a causal chain in the act of reflecting on intelligible previous actions, but these actions are still fixed - as facts that he now has no power over - directly affecting a new, intelligible action (that is the result of an intent derived from previous facts). In this example his deliberation supervenes on previous facts; he is acting with the intent to redeem himself, but it doesn't change the facts of the past, which do not themselves change because of his deliberation. Thus his current intent, which results in an action, is resulting from a fact of the past that he cannot control. That seems to me to be external causation without any disembodiment.

Even if we must be the judges of what an intelligible action is, that doesn't mean that what we are judging to be an action isn't a small portion of a universe subject to the laws of cause and effect.



Please read my whole post; I outline an argument against the premise that we have free will later on.

As I said in the moral responsibility thread, it is not clear to me on what grounds 5 can reasonably be denied. For if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. — Bartricks

I totally acknowledge this here:

Our character is in constant flux, developing due to our own actions and interactions with an environment constrained by physical laws. Our actions and a mix of those factors, for which we are not morally responsible, dictate our character, and through this blend our subsequent character is formed, from which our subsequent actions flow. — ToothyMaw

My reply is that you don't account for the effect of other's free choices, something that follows from assuming free will to support your premise:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity. — ToothyMaw

Can we establish if this is the case? It seems as if you accept it here:

if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added? — Bartricks

But I want some confirmation before moving forward.

I doubt babies have an “initial character”. You develop a personality/character as you grow up. — khaled

There is undoubtedly a certain measure of initial character that is, if not predetermined, then factored into one's development from one's birth. Thus, that doesn't seem to be a good point to me; I only defined aseity as being self-originated, not totally self-sufficient, which is how it is used in its positive sense. But I am not using it that way here.

@Bartricks @Pierre-Normand @khaled

Relaxing some of the causal assumptions that yield an implausible externalization of agency might be another way to achieve the same result. — Pierre-Normand

I don't see how this would be different from some sort of indeterminism, which would have you going against the PAP. And even if you claim that that is question begging and that compatibilist ideas of free will sidestep the PAP, you have to come up with a positive account of agency compatible with determinism that gives us moral responsibility, not just a new definition for "free will". This seems impossible to me unless you can address the following two arguments:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will.

Furthermore, in terms of the aseity argument, the application of these two arguments is not question begging imo because the point of the aseity argument, as you point out, is to show how free will can be compatible with determinism and indeterminism; determinism is essentially assumed in premises 5 and 6, in addition to an indeterministic view of free will in 2. I am essentially making an effort to show that:

2. We have free will. — ToothyMaw

is false. You cannot presuppose that we have aseity to deny these two arguments, because they attack a premise necessary for the conclusion that we exist with aseity.

I fixed it a little I think.

1) I am not morally responsible for anything iff I am not morally responsible for my initial character, the environment, the laws of nature that prevail in it, and other people's choices.
2) I am morally responsible for some of other people's choices.
3) Therefore, I am morally responsible for some things.
4) I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5) Even if I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I still am morally responsible for some things.
6) Thus, even though I am not morally responsible for my initial character or for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I am morally responsible for some things.

I'll make it formal:

1) I am not morally responsible for anything iff I am not morally responsible for my initial character, the environment, the laws of nature that prevail in it, and other people's choices.
2) I am morally responsible for some of other people's choices.
3) Therefore, I am morally responsible for some things.
4) I am not morally responsible for my initial character, environment, or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5) Thus, even though I am not morally responsible for my initial character or for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, I am morally responsible for some things.

Unless I'm mistaken 5 is the negation of 5. If there is a flaw in my logic please point it out.

And if you say we are sometimes responsible for other people's choices, then there is something we are morally responsible for and thus 5 is false.

You write:

if I am not in any way morally responsible for A, and not in any way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, I am not morally responsible for C — Bartricks

I actually agree with this. However, implicit in 5 is the assumption that the only things that affect us are our environment, initial character, and the laws of nature. I also agree that these are almost the only things we could be morally responsible for.

But what about other people's potentially free choices? Wouldn't you have to address those? You are presupposing that all that affects us are external factors that can, presumably, be traced back indefinitely. But you must also specify, so as to guarantee that we are not morally responsible for anything, that we are not morally responsible for other people's (potentially free) choices, as you admitted that one can come into existence yet still have the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action (even if it doesn't magically make people morally responsible).

If you specify that we are not responsible for other people's choices, then a large swathe of what is considered abhorrent behavior is excused.

Do you deny that you have to take into account other people's choices?

This premise assumes that we are only the products of initial character, environment, and the laws of nature that prevail in it:

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything — Bartricks

Otherwise there could be a moral element to our actions. However, if we are the product of only those things, there is no moral element to any of our actions, so your premise:

7. I am morally responsible for some things — Bartricks

Is false.

Not to say I'll make a duplicate thread!

I'll have to take a look at your argument now that you have modified it. I'll see if I can deny a premise, but if not, I will conclude that we exist with aseity and thus have free will (until I can come up with a good counterargument or come across a better argument). This might take some time and a new thread if this one is abandoned because I'm not quick enough.

You changed this premise:

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything — Bartricks

What I meant was that it was semantically invalid. It now appears to be totally valid.

Address the category error. Or does that not matter for some reason? I'm being serious; I'm claiming that one of your premises is not logically valid. That seems to me to mean that there is something wrong with your argument.

You ask me to confirm the validity of your argument so that I have to deny a premise, when, really, your argument is indeed logically valid but the following premise of yours suffers from a category error:

F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for.

I have explained why this is the case. Please address this issue.

Even if you argue that our initial character and our actions causally result in our future character, and, thus, the actions that flow from our character, we are still interacting with an environment that affects us and are bound by the laws of nature. Furthermore, you must specify that our actions are the product of our environment and the laws of nature in addition to initial character before saying that our actions are only the product of initial character, our environment, and the laws of nature. Thus, to support this assertion you must make an additional claim that we are the product of our environment and the laws of nature.

If you do that the argument I gave contradicting the existence of free will earlier applies.

Of course it's valid, but you are being a slippery eel, drawing attention away from the flaw in your argument by demanding I accept its logical validity. The premise:

F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for — Bartricks

Allows your argument to be logically valid, but it is not logically valid itself.

You write:

C) If we have come into existence, we are not morally responsible for our initial character.

And also:

D) We are not morally responsible for our environment or for the laws of nature.

These two claims are obviously true, but you need to specify in a premise that we are the product of environment and the laws of nature, otherwise the premise:

F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for — Bartricks

Just assumes that we are products of environment and the laws of nature contingent merely upon having come into existence. That presupposes that there are no moral elements to our decisions if we have come into existence without specifying the conditions under which we exist; you can say that if we are the products of initial character, environment, and the laws of nature that we must not have moral responsibility, but you do not make the conditional claim that we are the products of our environment and the laws of nature before saying that that is all we are a product of, when you need to for your premise to make sense, otherwise, once again, you are assuming that just because you have come into existence you are the product of your environment and the laws of nature.

There seems to be a confusion of "product of the laws of nature" and what I mean by "bound by the laws of nature". We should agree on which of those terms to use, as you say product, but then imply that nature only constrains actions.