Aseity And Free Will

ToothyMaw

I will be arguing against what I will call the “aseity argument”, which dictates that we exist with aseity and, thus, have free will. If we have free will, then, presumably, we are morally responsible. I am agnostic as to who the burden is on to either assert that we do or don’t have free will; to some it is apparent to reason that we have it, to others perhaps not. But to begin the argument the burden will be placed on the free will denier.

I will now define some terms:

Aseity: the quality of being self-derived or originated specifically.

Free will: the ability to choose between different courses of action unaffected by causes external to the will.

Moral responsibility: the idea that certain choices and actions have the quality of being morally relevant; culpability.

Character: one’s predispositions, inclinations, and motivations; the will from which our actions flow.

The following is the “aseity argument”.

1. If I have come into existence, then I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with.
2. If I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
3. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for my initial character.
4. I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature that prevail in it.
5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything.
6. Therefore, if I have come into existence, I am not morally responsible for anything.
7. I am morally responsible for some things.
8. Therefore I have not come into existence.

This argument supports the following premise:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity.

As noted earlier, it may be apparent to reason to some that we have free will. So the assumption that we have free will is prima facie justified:

2. We have free will.

This argument is logically valid and the conclusion is that we exist with aseity, which effectively partitions the will from the laws of cause and effect. Thus, I will deny a premise.

I will dispute premise 5: If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything.

One might argue that the factors outlined in premise 5 are all that affect one’s choices; premise 2 says that we are not morally responsible for our initial character, and what, if not our character, dictates what we will do? Our character is in constant flux, developing due to our own actions and interactions with an environment constrained by physical laws. Our actions and a mix of those factors, for which we are not morally responsible, dictate our character, and through this blend our subsequent character is formed, from which our subsequent actions flow.

I contest this. Even if one is interacting with an environment constrained by physical laws, with a fixed initial character, one could be able to choose freely between alternative courses of action. I argue that this is the case because the aseity argument assumes free will prima facie; it must be assumed that we have those elements of free will not contradicted by 5. While this is not equivalent to having free will, it does mean that people’s choices need to be accounted for as they are not solely the product of the factors outlined in 5, but also the product of something innate or external that allows such choices to be somewhat free. And they undoubtedly affect our decisions, so we must not be morally responsible for others' decisions too if 5 is to be true.

If one says it is innate, then the proponent of the aseity argument will find themselves attempting to prove that we do not have said innate quality that allows us to choose freely between alternative courses of action. Alternatively, they could claim that our ability to choose wholly or somewhat freely exists as derived externally.

If it is derived externally, then the proponent of the aseity argument needs to give a positive account of how, exactly, a level of free choice has been bestowed upon us or linked to us by external causes. If they say through aseity, it is difficult to imagine what external, alien forces could possibly be at work causing people to self-originate. If it is even possible to cause someone to self-originate. Because then they aren’t self-originated.

Furthermore, if the burden of proof is on the proponent of the aseity argument, then:

2. We have free will.

Is not prima facie justified. Therefore, we cannot conclude that we exist with aseity.

A side note: one might think that assuming free will prima facie justifies also assuming that we have absolute moral responsibility, thus negating the whole argument. It doesn’t. It just means that the free will denier has to disprove the argument in which that we have free will is a premise in some manner.

@Bartricks Just let me know if I missed anything or if my definitions aren't precise/adequate. I tried to represent the argument well.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

As the aseity argument is my argument, I certainly think it is sound.

As I said in the moral responsibility thread, it is not clear to me on what grounds 5 can reasonably be denied. For if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added? I mean, if I am not morally responsible for C when it is wholly the product of A - something for which I am in no way morally responsible - then surely I remain non-responsible for C if it is the product of A and B, if A and B are factors for which I am in no way morally responsible?

Perhaps all this does is show that 2 should not be granted either - that we can be morally responsible for our initial characters despite the fact they were created by causes for which we had no moral responsibility. But I can't se any reason why 2 should not be granted, given it seems self-evident to reason.

Perhaps one might object that when it comes to 5, although we are not morally responsible for our natures or the environment and laws of nature prevailing in it, we can nevertheless be morally responsible for what these things produce, namely our actions, provided they are produced in the right kind of way.

But I find that a kind of magic and on its face implausible.

As to the claim that we are morally responsible (and thus do exist with aseity) - well, as philosophers we should follow arguments where they lead. The conclusion - that we exist with aseity - is inconsistent with naturalism about us, but so much the worse for naturalism.

Too many - including too many contemporary philosophers - see in philosophy nothing more than a tool that should be pressed into the service of rationalizing conventional beliefs, whatever they may be. And so as naturalism is the prevailing worldview of the present day, at least among the thinking classes, philosophical arguments are considered good if they support the naturalization of some feature of reality, and absurd or questionable if they do not. But that's not good reasoning: that's not to follow an argument where it leads, but is instead to set limits in advance on where it can go.

So, I really do not see any good grounds for denying either that moral responsibility requires aseity, or for denying that we actually possess that feature.

khaled

↪ToothyMaw

2. If I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character. — ToothyMaw

I doubt babies have an “initial character”. You develop a personality/character as you grow up.

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything. — ToothyMaw

Would be the premise to attack really yes. What exactly counts as “environment” or “external”? Because some folks around here like to count their own bodies and brains and “environmental” and “external” to them, so anything those bodies and brains do, they are somehow not responsible for. I don’t know why people do that.

And then they’re surprised at how it turns out they’re not responsible for anything. That’s because “They” themselves cause nothing in their own setup. Their bodies are “external” to “them” so what the heck does “them” do? When you externalize the source of your agency you’ll end up with the conclusion that you’re just a helpless watcher who has no control over anything that happens. But why would you externalize the source of your agency. “Your honor, I didn’t punch the man, it was my fist the punched him see? I had no choice in the matter!”

which effectively partitions the will from the laws of cause and effect. Thus, I will deny a premise. — ToothyMaw

Yup. That would be the normal reaction. Not what Bartricks is doing, saying “Yup, this goes against countless laws of conservation that we have derived, but so much worse for science! My armchair is a better source of knowledge”

Pierre-Normand

And then they’re surprised at how it turns out they’re not responsible for anything. That’s because “They” themselves cause nothing in their own setup. Their bodies are “external” to “them” so what the heck does “them” do? When you externalize the source of your agency you’ll end up with the conclusion that you’re just a helpless watcher who has no control over anything that happens. But why would you externalize the source of your agency. “Your honor, I didn’t punch the man, it was my fist the punched him see? I had no choice in the matter!” — khaled

I quite agree with your diagnosis of the main problem but it seems to me that the underlying assumptions that yield this sort of externalization of the human power of agency are shared by @Bartricks and @ToothyMaw. See the latter's original post in the previous thread. This leads @ToothyMaw to conclude that moral responsibility couldn't be ascribed to agents if determinism turned out to be true. In the ensuing discussion, @Bartricks correctly points out that indeterminism wouldn't be of any help either. So, he proposes the ascription of aseity to human beings in order to make free will and responsibility compatible both with determinism and with indeterminism. Relaxing some of the causal assumptions that yield an implausible externalization of agency might be another way to achieve the same result.

ToothyMaw

As I said in the moral responsibility thread, it is not clear to me on what grounds 5 can reasonably be denied. For if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. — Bartricks

I totally acknowledge this here:

Our character is in constant flux, developing due to our own actions and interactions with an environment constrained by physical laws. Our actions and a mix of those factors, for which we are not morally responsible, dictate our character, and through this blend our subsequent character is formed, from which our subsequent actions flow. — ToothyMaw

My reply is that you don't account for the effect of other's free choices, something that follows from assuming free will to support your premise:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity. — ToothyMaw

Can we establish if this is the case? It seems as if you accept it here:

if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added? — Bartricks

But I want some confirmation before moving forward.

I doubt babies have an “initial character”. You develop a personality/character as you grow up. — khaled

There is undoubtedly a certain measure of initial character that is, if not predetermined, then factored into one's development from one's birth. Thus, that doesn't seem to be a good point to me; I only defined aseity as being self-originated, not totally self-sufficient, which is how it is used in its positive sense. But I am not using it that way here.

@Bartricks @Pierre-Normand @khaled

Relaxing some of the causal assumptions that yield an implausible externalization of agency might be another way to achieve the same result. — Pierre-Normand

I don't see how this would be different from some sort of indeterminism, which would have you going against the PAP. And even if you claim that that is question begging and that compatibilist ideas of free will sidestep the PAP, you have to come up with a positive account of agency compatible with determinism that gives us moral responsibility, not just a new definition for "free will". This seems impossible to me unless you can address the following two arguments:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will.

Furthermore, in terms of the aseity argument, the application of these two arguments is not question begging imo because the point of the aseity argument, as you point out, is to show how free will can be compatible with determinism and indeterminism; determinism is essentially assumed in premises 5 and 6, in addition to an indeterministic view of free will in 2. I am essentially making an effort to show that:

2. We have free will. — ToothyMaw

is false. You cannot presuppose that we have aseity to deny these two arguments, because they attack a premise necessary for the conclusion that we exist with aseity.

Pierre-Normand

I don't see how this would be different from some sort of indeterminism, which would have you going against the PAP. And even if you claim that that is question begging and that compatibilist ideas of free will sidestep the PAP, you have to come up with a positive account of agency compatible with determinism that gives us moral responsibility, not just a new definition for "free will". This seems impossible to me unless you can address the following two arguments:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

The idea of "having power over the facts of the future" seems a little obscure to me. I would rather rely on the more straightforward definition that you gave in the opening post of your previous thread:

"Free will: the ability to both choose between different alternative courses of actions and to act free of external causes."

I think a thick embodied view of human agency doesn't comport well with the idea that past facts about you, your own body, character, cognitive abilities and dispositions, etc., all constitute 'external causes' of your actions just because they lay in your past. On closer analysis, the idea seems nonsensical. This was the thrust of @khaled's post and I quite agree with him. For an embodied human agent to act in the world doesn't consist in the agent stepping outside of her own embodiment, as it were, and for her to control the role her own body (and brain) plays in the causal chain of physical events. Acts of agency rather consist for an embodied person to play such an ineliminable causal role in the chain of intelligible events (i.e. intentional actions and their intended or foreseeable consequences).

So, it may be the case that past physical facts, and the laws of physics, determine all the future physical facts (let us suppose). That would not imply that the conjunction of those facts and those deterministic laws determine what intelligible human actions those future physical facts materially realize. If the human agent acts in the light of reasons that she has (or takes herself to have) for doing what she does, then the past facts that were obtaining before she deliberated what to do may have been constraining what the range of her opportunities were, and also constraining the limits of her deliberative abilities (as well as enabling them). But what determines what she intentionally does is her own act of practical deliberation. The specific nature of this action, described in high-level intentional terms, may supervene on some set of physical facts about her bodily movements and brain activity. But the higher level intentional action (which may or may not be praiseworthy or blameworthy) that those lower level physical facts happen to materialy realize isn't set by the laws of physics. That's because the laws of physics are silent regarding what bodily motions constitute intelligible actions, and what good or bad reasons for acting are.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

My reply is that you don't account for the effect of other's free choices, something that follows from assuming free will to support your premise:

1. If we have free will, we exist with aseity.
— ToothyMaw

Can we establish if this is the case? It seems as if you accept it here:

if 2 is granted, then one accepts that if one is not morally responsible for that which caused one's initial character, then one's non-responsibility for the cause transfers to the effect. If one grants that - and that certainly seems self-evidently true to my reason - then surely one must accept it when more causes for which one is not responsible are added?
— Bartricks

But I want some confirmation before moving forward. — ToothyMaw

I am not sure I follow. By 6 it has been established that aseity is necessary for moral responsibility/free will. But 6 doesn't tell us anything about what is in fact the case. It just tells us that a necessary ingredient for free will is aseity. 7 then asserts that we are morally responsible.

As I understand you, you are now asking for evidence that 7 is true. I think there's good evidence that 7 is true, but even if there was not, that wouldn't do anything to challenge anything upstream of 7.

My evidence that 7 is true is that our reason represents it to be. That is, the reason of literally billions of people. Perhaps our reason is malfunctioning on this matter and we are subject to a systematic rational illusion of free will. But that is not the default - far from it. The burden of proof is squarely on the one who wishes to deny that things are as they appear to be, and as we appear - and here we are talking about rational appearances, which is what all evidence claims are ultimately an appeal to - to be morally responsible, it is the denier of 7 who owes the arguments.

ToothyMaw

The idea of "having power over the facts of the future" seems a little obscure to me. I would rather rely on the more straightforward definition that you gave in the opening post of your previous thread:

"Free will: the ability to both choose between different alternative courses of actions and to act free of external causes." — Pierre-Normand

I will change my definition in the OP. I had the previous definition in mind. Sorry.

With the previous definition in mind, one's control over one's actions entails control over the facts of the future; they can bring about future outcomes with their free choices. Not to mention the first argument implies that one couldn't have done otherwise, and if one couldn't have done otherwise one does not have free will according to my definition of free will. I'll try to now respond to you without any straw manning, as you were responding to something a little different.

For an embodied human agent to act in the world doesn't consist in the agent stepping outside of her own embodiment, as it were, and for her to control the role her own body (and brain) plays in the causal chain of physical events. Acts of agency rather consist for an embodied person to play such an ineliminable causal role in the chain of intelligible events (i.e. intentional actions and their intended or foreseeable consequences). — Pierre-Normand

what determines what she intentionally does is her own act of practical deliberation. The specific nature of this action, described in high-level intentional terms, may supervene on some set of physical facts about her bodily movements and brain activity. But the higher level intentional action (which may or may not be praiseworthy or blameworthy) that those lower level physical facts happen to materially realize isn't set by the laws of physics. That's because the laws of physics are silent regarding what bodily motions constitute intelligible actions, and what good or bad reasons for acting are. — Pierre-Normand

It seems there is a confusion of "physical facts" and just "facts". A fact could entail that an action was performed, whereas a physical fact could be gravity's existence or a brain state.

What if a serial killer reflects upon his despicable acts and thus chooses to work towards redeeming himself? He is playing an ineliminable role in a causal chain in the act of reflecting on intelligible previous actions, but these actions are still fixed - as facts that he now has no power over - directly affecting a new, intelligible action (that is the result of an intent derived from previous facts). In this example his deliberation supervenes on previous facts; he is acting with the intent to redeem himself, but it doesn't change the facts of the past, which do not themselves change because of his deliberation. Thus his current intent, which results in an action, is resulting from a fact of the past that he cannot control. That seems to me to be external causation without any disembodiment.

Even if we must be the judges of what an intelligible action is, that doesn't mean that what we are judging to be an action isn't a small portion of a universe subject to the laws of cause and effect.

↪Bartricks

Please read my whole post; I outline an argument against the premise that we have free will later on.

Bartricks

↪Pierre-Normand

I think a thick embodied view of human agency doesn't comport well with the idea that past facts about you, your own body, character, cognitive abilities and dispositions, etc., all constitute 'external causes' of your actions just because they lay in your past. On closer analysis, the idea seems nonsensical. — Pierre-Normand

I do not follow you on this at all. If someone comes into existence, it really doesn't matter at all whether they came into existence gradually or all of a sudden, the fact will remain that they are the product of external causes. And that's sufficient to establish that they are not morally responsible for how they are.

If we have come into being, then there's a real question about exaclty when 'we' come on the scene. But this doesn't in any way allow you to escape confronting the issue: which is that we will nevertheless have come into being as a product of causes for which we are in no way morally responsible.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

But you said this

But I want some confirmation before moving forward. — ToothyMaw

So I assumed that you took your scepticism about 7 to bear on the credibility of the preceding argument. Which it doesn't.

There are two issues: what's needed for free will and do we have it?

The argument up to 6 establishes what's needed: aseity. If you challenge 7 you are not challenging that we need aseity, you are challenging that we have it.

Bartricks

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false if the aseity argument goes through. So you're begging the question. Until or unless you provide independent grounds for thinking a premise in the aseity argument is false, you're not entitled to assume premise 1 in the above argument is true.

ToothyMaw

The argument up to 6 establishes what's needed: aseity. If you challenge 7 you are not challenging that we need aseity, you are challenging that we have it. — Bartricks

Yes.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

Right, here's what I'm saying: free will requires this vital ingredient - aseity.

What you're saying is that free will requires having some control over the facts of the past.

I agree!! That's precisely what aseity delivers.

So we agree about that. But you're then just asserting that we do not have that control - and thus asserting that we do not exist with aseity - and concluding that we lack free will.

I'm saying that we do have free will and thus we do have control over some of the facts of the past and thus we must exist with aseity.

You, then, are just denying that we have free will, whereas I am saying that we have it.

But my claim - that we have free will - is supported by reason, whereas yours - that we lack free will - is not. Thus you need an argument.

ToothyMaw

What you're saying is that free will requires having some control over the facts of the past. — Bartricks

No, free will requires power over the facts of the future; you would need to have magical abilities to be able to alter the facts of the past in the present, which is what

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. — ToothyMaw

means. It doesn't say "no one had power over the facts of the past."

ToothyMaw

magical abilities — ToothyMaw

Correction: aseity

ToothyMaw

↪Bartricks

I mean maybe you are forgetting, but my position originally was that we have no basis for the concept of moral responsibility. It is enough for me to show that we don't have aseity according to you.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

No, free will requires power over the facts of the future; you would need to have magical abilities to be able to alter the facts of the past in the present, which is what — ToothyMaw

You don't seem to understand the point: if we exist with aseity, then there was never a time when all the facts of the past were ones for which we were not morally responsible.

So again, 'if' we exist with aseity, then premise 1 of your argument is false.

Again: this was your argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. We have free will only if we have power over the facts of the future.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false. That means the argument is unsound. You can't now just assert that no one has power over the facts of the future: they do. Premise 1 is false. So your conclusion - 3 - has not been established.

What's my evidence that we exist with aseity - and thus that premise 1 of your argument is false? It is that we are morally responsible.

You are denying that we are morally responsible. I want an argument for that which doesn't simply assume it.

This, for example, is not a good argument:

1. We are not morally responsible
2. therefore, we are not morally responsible.

Yet that's what your argument amounts to.

So this premise - my premise 7 - is default justified and you're not entitled to reject it without an argument: I am morally responsible for some things.[/quote]

Your only basis for rejecting 7 is that you think no-one is responsible for facts of the past. But will be false if we exist with aseity, yes?

And do we exist with aseity?

Well, if we're morally responsible we do.

And we appear to be morally responsible.

Thus, we are justified in concluding that we exist with aseity.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

I mean maybe you are forgetting, but my position originally was that we have no basis for the concept of moral responsibility. It is enough for me to show that we don't have aseity according to you. — ToothyMaw

I'm not forgetting anything. You can't escape having a burden of proof just by being the first to say something.

The reason of virtually everyone represents them to be morally responsible for what they do. That means that we have unbelievably powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible.

I keep stressing this, but you don't seem to register it.

You have the burden of proof.

I have provided independent evidence that moral responsiblity requires existing with aseity.

That doesn't by itself show that we do or that we do not. It just shows that aseity is a vital ingredient of moral responsibility.

Until or unless you can refute that argument, the point holds.

But, importantly, the combination of the aseity argument and the fact we have evidence that we do have moral responsibility now constitutes evidence that we 'do' exist with aseity.

For example, ginger cake contains ginger in some form. Let's imagine that's true. Well, then if I have excellent evidence that there's a ginger cake in my cupboard, then I have excellent evidence that there is ginger in some form in my cupboard. That's how I'm arguing.

What you're doing is arguing like this: there's no ginger in any form in the cupboard. As there is no ginger in any form in the cuboard, there can't be any ginger cakes in the cupboard and anyone who says "but what about that apparent ginger cake in the cupboard - the one virtually everyone perceives to be there when they look?" is begging the question.

No, they're not begging the question. There appears to be a ginger cake in the cupboard. To reject such appearances on the basis of no more than your theory, is to have stopped following evidence: it is to have assumed how things are and then to have interpreted the data through the prism of your theory. That's perverse. That's to have allowed the tail to wag the dog.

The evidence - prima facie, defeasible evidence, no doubt - is that we are morally responsible and that being morally responsible requires existing with aseity. Thus, we have prima facie evidence that we exist with aseity.

ToothyMaw

↪Bartricks

This, for example, is not a good argument:

1. We are not morally responsible
2. therefore, we are not morally responsible. — Bartricks

Then I'll change my argument.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

1. If we do not have power over the facts of the future we cannot choose to do otherwise.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we cannot choose to do otherwise.
4. We have free will only if we can choose to do otherwise.
5. Therefore, we do not have free will.

Is this logically invalid? I think not. Dispute a premise.

ToothyMaw

The reason of virtually everyone represents them to be morally responsible for what they do. That means that we have unbelievably powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible. — Bartricks

I don't really care.

ToothyMaw

↪Bartricks

Not to say I'm some psychopath out to fuck everything up; I just want to actually get to the bottom of this.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

I don't really care. — ToothyMaw

The representations of our reason is what evidence consists of.

So, what evidence do I have that this argument is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

Well, that my reason and the reason of virtually everyone else represents it to be.

So, if you don't care what our reason represents to be the case, then you're not interested in following evidence. That is, you're not really interested in what's true.

What do you want from reasoning? To have an echo chamber in which you just hear your own view bounced back at you, or genuinely to find out how things are with reality? If the latter than you must follow reason, not yourself.

Now it isn't seriously in dispute that the reason of most people represents them to be morally responsible.
So it isn't seriously in dispute taht we have powerful prima facie evidence that we are morally responsible (and thus, by extension, that we possess whatever moral responsibility requires).

You need countervailing evidence that we lack moral responsibility. That is, you need to find even more powerfully self-evident premises that, together, contradict the premise that we are morally responsible. Simply not caring is not evidence.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future. — ToothyMaw

Premise 1 is false. I keep saying this.

Premise 1 is false if we exist with aseity!

ToothyMaw

↪Bartricks

And I disputed that we have free will, so unless you can find a flaw in my argument you cannot say it is false because we exist with aseity. Unless you just assume that we have it. And it sounds like that is what you are doing.

ToothyMaw

↪Bartricks

You are obviously no longer being serious, if you ever were.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

No, you need to dispute a premise in my argument and to do so without simply assuming that another premise is false.

Bartricks

↪ToothyMaw

No, I'm very serious which is why I am insisting that you dispute a premise and that you do so without begging any questions.

I don't think you understand what aseity involves. It means I was not created. It means I've always been in existence. It means there was never a time when I did not exist. So it means that there was never a time when facts outside my control caused my existence. It means, in other words, that premise 1 of your argument is false.

So if you think premise 1 if your argument is true, you need to provide evidence that I - we - do not exist with aseity.

And to do that you need either to provide independent evidence that we are not morally responsible (evidence that does not simply assume we do not exist with aseity - for that would be question begging), or independent evidence that we do not exist with aseity.

You have done none of these things and so I think you simply do not understand either aseity or the dialectic.

Pierre-Normand

It seems there is a confusion of "physical facts" and just "facts". A fact could entail that an action was performed, whereas a physical fact could be gravity's existence or a brain state.

What if a serial killer reflects upon his despicable acts and thus chooses to work towards redeeming himself? He is playing an ineliminable role in a causal chain in the act of reflecting on intelligible previous actions, but these actions are still fixed - as facts that he now has no power over - directly affecting a new, intelligible action (that is the result of an intent derived from previous facts). In this example his deliberation supervenes on previous facts; he is acting with the intent to redeem himself, but it doesn't change the facts of the past, which do not themselves change because of his deliberation. Thus his current intent, which results in an action, is resulting from a fact of the past that he cannot control. That seems to me to be external causation without any disembodiment.

Even if we must be the judges of what an intelligible action is, that doesn't mean that what we are judging to be an action isn't a small portion of a universe subject to the laws of cause and effect. — ToothyMaw

I was distinguishing facts from laws because of the way deterministic systems usually are defined. I took 'facts about the past' to include all the physical states of matter that, in conjunction with the laws of physics, would uniquely determine a future course of events. It's because higher level facts, or states, (such as biological, psychological or social facts) are taken to supervene on physical states that physical determinism is taken to entail universal determinism. (Facts about some level B are said to supervene on facts about some level A if there can't be any B-level difference without there also being some A-level difference. Furthermore, physicalists usually hold that all high level empirical domains supervene on the physical domain.)

Back to the serial killer: I am happy to grant you that, on the assumption that determinism is true, the serial killer couldn't possibly have done something different than what she actually did without there being something in her past (either in her environment or about herself) that would have been different. It doesn't logically follow from this statement that, therefore, she could not have done something different. Concluding this would be an instance of the modal fallacy. The modal fallacy takes the form:

1) necessarily(P implies Q)
2) P
3) therefore, necessarily(Q)

The conclusion (3) would logically follow if the second premise were replaced by (2b) "necessarily P".

So, is there something about the killer's rational or moral character, at the time when she readies herself to act, that in conjunction with the laws of nature, determine that she will kill someone and that is necessarily a feature of her character? Only on that condition is it possible to logically infer that she could not possibly have done otherwise than what she actually did.

Pierre-Normand

I do not follow you on this at all. If someone comes into existence, it really doesn't matter at all whether they came into existence gradually or all of a sudden, the fact will remain that they are the product of external causes. And that's sufficient to establish that they are not morally responsible for how they are. — Bartricks

Yes, I was not making anything hinge on the possibility of rational agency being gradually rather than suddenly acquired. My concern rather is about the way embodied rational agents relate themselves to time, in practical deliberation, after they have acquired rational autonomy. I am perfectly happy to grant you that they aren't responsible at all for the happy circumstance of their having been brought (either gradually or suddenly) into a state where they were first endowed with powers of rational deliberation. Only after they have become autonomous (to some degree) can they be held responsible for their actions. I may bring a caveat, though, since it also can be warranted to hold responsible children, who are not yet autonomous, as a matter of proleptic attitude, in order to help shape their behavioral dispositions in a way that favors their acquisition of rational autonomy.

If we have come into being, then there's a real question about exactly when 'we' come on the scene. But this doesn't in any way allow you to escape confronting the issue: which is that we will nevertheless have come into being as a product of causes for which we are in no way morally responsible.

Yes, this is granted. But when we blame people, we are blaming them for their choices, and for the characters that they have displayed through making those choices, when they already were in possession of some powers of rational agency. We are not blaming them for their having had flawed characters when they first became rational agents. I would also grant that we can sometimes be warranted in evoking unhappy initial character shaping circumstances as excuses, or partial excuses (and hence attenuation of personal responsibility), for subsequent unhappy life turns; but only in some cases, and to limited degrees.

Bartricks

↪Pierre-Normand

Only after they have become autonomous (to some degree) can they be held responsible for their actions. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but what it takes to be autonomous is what's at issue. My argument appears to demonstrate that it requires aseity and thus that one cannot 'become' autonomous. For to be autonomous in the way presupposed by moral responsibility requires that one's actions 'not' be the product of external causes (not wholly, anyway). Which they will be, of course, if one has come into being. So by suggesting that though one is not responsible for hte way that one is, one can nevertheless 'become' autonomous is already to have begged the question. If there is no false premise in my argument, then the very idea of 'becoming' autonomous is confused.

To be autonomous - to be truly the director of one's self - requires aseity. Then there is 'what' one is morally responsible for. And that can change over time and change with the acquisition of powers of reason. Plausibly one will not be morally responsible for defying Reason until one starts to hear her. But it would be a mistake to think that it was hearing Reason that made one autonomous. One was autonomous already, it is just that by coming to hear Reason one's autonomy now makes one responsible for how one responds.

But when we blame people, we are blaming them for their choices, and for the characters that they have displayed through making those choices, when they already were in possession of some powers of rational agency. We are not blaming them for their having had flawed characters when they first became rational agents. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but that's not inconsistent with my argument. I have not argued that aseity is sufficient for moral responsibility, only that it is necessary.

ToothyMaw

↪Pierre-Normand

But I don't see how my argument:

1. If we do not have power over the facts of the future we cannot choose to do otherwise.
2. No one has power over the facts of the future.
3. Therefore, we cannot choose to do otherwise.
4. We have free will only if we can choose to do otherwise.
5. Therefore, we do not have free will. — ToothyMaw

is an instance of the modal fallacy, even if my serial killer example might not be absolute proof that we cannot choose to do otherwise if we have no power over the facts of the future. The facts of the future are directly the result of our actions, which, given how I defined character, are indeed features of our character, or will, which must exist independent of external causes to be free. Our previous character, and thus actions, are the result of factors external to ourselves, so our choices and the resultant actions cannot be free (determinism is true). It seems undeniable to me then that our own actions are facts of the future that we must not have control over unless we could could have acted differently then we did due to a factor that is not external. To presume that one could have acted differently due to a difference in character that is not external to the will, however, is to assume that determinism is false. It follows that since determinism is true, premise 2 is supported, along with 1. 4 must also be true, as it is derived from my definition of free will. Thus, my argument applies.

Aseity And Free Will

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