Thanks dude.

Not seeing it.

The practical question here is what kind of argument might be used to convince others that your take on human nature is the "objective" one. — Echarmion

I would think that many people could be convinced of the objectivity of a more nomological view; it is empirical - but I suppose that anyone could make any claim about human nature, such as that we are born sinners in need of redemption in the face of eternal torment, or maybe that we have to be "monsters" in order to be self realized and competent. The real issues here are dogma and pseudoscience imo, along with the difficulties that would come with extracting axioms from human nature.

That seems like a low bar to cross though. Humans can reason themselves into all kinds of things, including behaviours usually considered extremely immoral. In fact, it's kind of a feature of the most egregious human conduct that it's the product of reasoning of some kind. Purely emotional reactions can be very violent, but are also usually limited. — Echarmion

I suppose someone like Hitler reasoned in such a way as to come to the conclusion that he was justified in mass murdering people; but if what is considered moral were voted on as a plurality then we wouldn't see despots or even tax increases on the middle class; the people usually know what is in their best interest imo.

First, thanks for responding.

Can axioms that can be reasoned with be extracted from an evolutionary view of human nature?
— ToothyMaw

What does "can be reasoned with" mean here? That they're intelligible, free of contradictions, or some other quality? — Echarmion

That they are Intelligible and sufficiently representative of humanity; the axioms need to be coherent with respect to human nature for any reasoning done with them to produce behaviors rational for humans.

If humans are, for instance, compassionate towards those less fortunate than themselves in a way distinct from other animals, and sufficiently for being human, does that mean that this trait can be synthesized and used to develop behaviors for specific situations that are rational, with respect to human nature, for humanity?
— ToothyMaw

Whether or not human compassion is "sufficiently distinct" to be a genuinely "human" trait seems to rest on a number of value judgements. We'd first need to show that these can be made in some non-arbitrary way. — Echarmion

I see no issue with what is sufficient for being human being arbitrary; human nature can still be objective. Furthermore, I think some aspects of human nature are observable. For instance: humans value the lives of loved ones over those of strangers much of the time. There are exceptions, but not many. It actually seems to me the nomological account is superior in this respect; evolutionary biology can provide some truths about what humans tend to be. Neuroscience too.

Could these loose concepts be extracted and reasoned with to create rational behaviors, with respect to human nature, for specific situations for humanity?
— ToothyMaw

How would you go from a behaviour to a rational behaviour? Where does rationality enter the picture? — Echarmion

I'm saying that since the behaviors are reached via reasoning they are rational - if they are anchored to human nature. According to another metric they might not be rational.

I wrote "inept" not "ept".

Once again I'm having difficulties understanding you. I guess you mean what if people voted for laws based upon optimism/pessimism lines? I don't think that most issues are related to the ethical ramifications of bringing a person into this world. For instance, combating climate change has nothing to do with the human population (not saying humans don't contribute to climate change) as far as I know, other than that the earth will not be able to sustain the current population after a certain point. But the more pressing issue is how to avoid a scenario in which the population cannot be sustained.

But it remains that the right to assisted suicide is predicated upon the conception that a life isn't worth living; perhaps it isn't worth living merely because you want to arbitrarily end it, or maybe it is because you wish to end your own suffering or the suffering of your family and friends. But the right doesn't exist without people believing that some lives aren't worth living and thus voting accordingly. Thus this feeds into the optimism/pessimism divide.

I am not sure we can say it is due to optimism/pessimism really. Rather, this has to do with rights of people to do what they want with their life. They may think life is great and that the people are making a terrible mistake but believe it is okay to end one's life when one wants easily. Also, often religionists are very pessimistic even though they are anti-abortion/assisted suicide. Rather, they want everyone to live so they can see the End of Times. Some also believe suffering is a virtue and all that. — schopenhauer1

Good point; many people probably would recognize the assisted suicide thing as an issue of rights. But the second part of your statement about the religious only supports the point I made about the right and left disagreeing on different issues and feeding back into the pessimism/optimism politics. I don't think that the pessimism/optimism political divide is required to make the right/left politics coherent.

The left/right politics is how we deal with this mess now it's happened. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I disagree; as discussed in my earlier post I believe that the politics of the right/left concern the optimism and pessimism that the OP describes and that they do differ significantly in terms of what they say about bringing people into this world.

Yeah I think the OP is a good one. Do you think that if the optimism/pessimism dichotomy presupposes the left/right that the politics of the left/right can affect the optimism/pessimism? Or do you think it isn't transitive?

Oh forreal? My mate had a few drinks and the last thing he remembered was not being a father. Needless to say, when he came to he was cheerfully informed. — Outlander

Cheerfully informed that he was a father? Or that he wasn't a father? .

I'm claiming that these two positions, are the ultimate political-existential divide. Left and right politics, are intra-wordly and after-the-fact. They are generally already on the same side because they think existence has positive value or that it is good and that the trials and tribulations are worth it for all humans born. — schopenhauer1

Many of the optimists you describe might advocate for abortion or infanticide in the case of a fetus in utero or a baby that is born and will die in agony before becoming a person. These people are on the left mostly. Would you consider them pessimists even if they believe that people with valuable futures should be brought into the world?

I don't believe that the left and right are on the same side generally; it differs significantly based on context. For instance, on a related note, mostly only people on the left and libertarians believe physician-assisted suicide should be legal. Does this make them pessimists? What if a life is truly miserable and it would be better for everyone involved if someone committed suicide legally? This, while not optimistic, doesn't seem to fit neatly into the category of pessimism; it doesn't express a negative valuation, but rather an acceptance of reality; some lives, in many people's opinions, are not worth living. This loops around to the earlier issue of abortion/infanticide. These same people, mostly leftists, believe that it is at least passable to bring someone who will not suffer unduly into existence. Thus, on specific issues, there are fundamental differences between the left and right when it comes to the valuation of life and all its potential suffering and joy.

People who are religious will normally, at least to some extent under-gird their moral structure with their religion. — Restitutor

Many religious people use Divine Command Theory to "under-gird" their normative moral beliefs reflected in revelation. Divine Command Theory dictates that moral actions are obligatory merely because god commands them. This makes morality totally arbitrary (if objective). In a way, god is the easiest solution to the issue of objectivity; many people just want morality to be objective so bad that they will bend over backwards trying to justify unjustifiable beliefs. Apologetics is an industry.

Atheists often times have a more provisional morality, and humanists in particular are often rigorous in their justifications for moral actions; they don't start with a conclusion based upon faith and work backwards. They mostly want to improve the human condition, and, if one make this their goal, there are real, objective steps that can be taken, such as limiting emissions to fight climate change, or reducing factory farming. And so, while there may not be an objective morality, there are more or less reasonable beliefs, and, thus, actions, given certain assumptions.

For me the idea of absolute morality that extends beyond what is self-serving is as unlikely as there being a white bearded god out there. I think that atheists carry on believing in absolute morality because the idea of morality is so emotionally and practically important to us. For these reasons we overlook the fact it doesn’t make intellectual sense. — Restitutor

If someone defines morality in a suitably robust sense one can justify any number of principles or actions. If one defines morality in terms of non-arbitrariness one can select only for moral actions that one's opinions, identity, or inclination have no bearing upon. Whether or not one should value non-arbitrariness is uncertain perhaps, but once one decides upon it, certain moral actions make more or less sense and some become absolute.

To believe that human morality, even the highest and most substantial, is in no way dependent on religion, or necessarily linked to it, is a fallacy. — Rafaella Leon

What about something like preference utilitarianism? It is based on a secular principle: the maximization of fulfilment of preferences. I don't see how it is related to religion at all, even if there is an overlap between the actions prescribed by said principle and a form of religious morality. I think you are being fallacious; a similar conclusion can be reached independently from more than one starting point.

There has never been a “secular civilization”. — Rafaella Leon

The United State's constitution is entirely secular (despite the best efforts of evangelists and such).

The atheists morality is only good because their conduct schematically — and externally — coincides with what the principles of religion demand, that is, that the very possibility of good lay conduct was created and sedimented by a long religious tradition whose moral rules, once absorbed in the body of society, began to function more or less automatically. — Rafaella Leon

So only religious morality, or derivations of it, are good? Religious morality is entirely arbitrary if one subscribes to the view that moral actions are obligatory merely because god commands them; this cannot be avoided unless one admits that moral facts independent of god exist. If this were true an atheist could be good for following a code of conduct entirely separate from god or religion. This would be a truly secular and objective morality. Are religious people willing to concede that their morality is as arbitrary as something more subjective that an atheist might subscribe to? I doubt it. Anything can be good with traditional religious morality; at least humanists draw lines and use reason to reach their conclusions.

And sorry for being a little flippant.

Just curious, what is the point or message of your OP exactly? Pain can bring trauma? That federalism, shared powers, and an open enough society that allows these things (CIA waterboarding) to actually see the light of day as opposed to crimes and persons never being heard of/from again is good? If so, you did a bang up job. — Outlander

More so that the rationalizations one might go through while or after being tortured can contribute to pernicious and long lasting effects.

Pain is all in the mind. — Outlander

I suppose, but, as it appears you admit, psychological torture is a little harder to overcome; it breaks down your very ability to resist, and, much like fdrake said, causes you to develop pathological coping mechanisms, perhaps even perceiving your torturer's motives as good.

Not going to lie, I don't understand most of what you wrote; it's total gibberish to me. Maybe try writing something a little more coherent? And nowhere did I say that only authoritarian regimes are capable of evil.

You don't blame the animal when it acts as it is and shows to all who may observe it truly knows no better. The worst victims are those made or raised to be so malleable by the fears and the worst of life they view themselves as part of it or that it's "right" or "necessary", and need tell themselves nothing. — Outlander

Can you explain what you mean by this?

I appreciate the quality of your post; you obviously know quite a bit about this. Quite frankly what you describe sounds like a form of indoctrination. Have you read at all about the after-effects of these pathological coping mechanisms and whether it is possible to shake them after they have been developed? And can you recommend any reading?

People will often consider society or culture as a cause for human behavior, but isn’t society itself actually caused by human behavior? — Pinprick

Reading some of the common definitions of society, I have come up with the working definition that society is an independent entity that both affects and is a function of the shared beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of the collection of individuals it represents. This presents some feedback; it both represents the people by being a function of their actions and beliefs, and thus is not merely synonymous with "individuals", and also affects actions and beliefs. To demonstrate this: many religious people believe that atheists are immoral and cannot be trusted. This belief causes many atheists to stay closeted. This closeting can be blamed on the segment of society that espouses these backwards views; their views are part of the aggregate that comprises the shared beliefs of our society. So I think the closeting behavior of atheists can be blamed on society to a certain degree; everyone wants to be respected. This is not a matter of cowardice I think. Similarly I think violent behavior can be blamed on one's upraising to a certain degree, especially given the definition of society I provided.

Seriously? I'm misogynistic? I literally said that I believe abortion should be permissible.

Thanks. You too mate. People should use contraception as much as they can; I don't think at this point that it is even ethical to bring a child into the world.

Sarcasm?

And yes, veganism or vegetarianism seem to be the most ethical positions to me too.

You misunderstand - I think abortion is not only permissible, but an ethical obligation sometimes. I just didn't feel like going over every tired argument. And yes, it seems wrong to kill anything that has the potential to have a happy life. But if one buys into the idea that it is always wrong to deprive potential beings of potential good lives, one is obligated to populate the earth with happy cows or some such easily pleased creature. And contraception and celibacy would be immoral.

trying to understand when a human person can be said to be a fully formed human. — Gregory

There are probably too many abortion threads but I'll give it a go.

I think a better question is when human life becomes a person. Unless I'm mistaken human life begins at the moment of conception. However, there are objective criteria for when something qualifies for personhood, such as sentience and consciousness. For much of a pregnancy a fetus possesses none of the criteria for personhood, despite being human life, and, thus, many believe it is okay to kill a fetus. This raises some questions, however: if it is okay to kill a fetus because it is not a person, then shouldn't it be okay to kill a person in a coma? And what about the potential for a valuable future for the fetus? Do they not own that? And what about the fact that if the status of the humanity of the embryo/fetus/child reaches all the way back to conception, and there is at no point a defining moment at which the status of the humanity of the embryo/fetus/child changes, then isn't the embryo/fetus/child as human as it is as a child as when it is an embryo/fetus?

But if we have free will, it seems difficult for it to make sense of holding people account for their actions. People do things for reasons. But if they do them for reasons, then unless they are irrational, they will act on them. — RolandTyme

It seems to me that if people have free will they can choose to act on reasons; reasons as far as I can tell don't directly compel one to act a certain way. Reasons can be both good or bad, but ultimately people can still choose and thus be held accountable for acting a certain way if one assumes free will. There is nothing compelling us to be rational; if rationality was ingrained in human nature such as that we always act rationally then free will would be kind of trivial I think. But humans are often irrational. That being said even irrational people usually act for reasons, even if not for good reasons, so I don't think that the potential to act irrationally automatically makes decisions arbitrary. Once again, there are both good and bad reasons.

You first paragraph is right on I think, but I don't understand the third really.

You're equating moral beliefs with moral truths, which is the very distinction being considered. Moral realists will argue that there are moral truths separate to our moral beliefs, and that our moral beliefs are only correct if they correspond to moral truths.

So it's not enough to argue that we each have our own moral beliefs; you also need to argue that our moral beliefs are also moral truths to argue that morality is subjective. — Michael

One could also argue from the point of the relativist that the realist has to demonstrate the existence of moral facts. Do they exist out in the universe, or are moral claims tied to some observable entity? Where is the reasoning?

"Moral truth" and "moral fact" are interchangeable for me. If they mean something else to you then reconsider my previous post using "moral fact" rather than "moral truth". — Michael

I don't mean to be pedantic, but I think it's a useful delineation. Truth can be subjective, but facts are, obviously, objective.

Not necessarily. One culture might believe that there are men living on the moon. They'd be wrong. That culture might believe that killing the sick is morally acceptable. They might be wrong. — Michael

That there are things permitted for that culture is not necessarily that there is nothing more to morality than what each particular culture permits. It may be that some things are (objectively) wrong even if a particular culture permits them. — Michael

It seems useless to me to speculate about how any action could possibly conflict with an unknown moral fact. Maybe there is the fact: one should allow any culture to act according to their subjective morality.

You're equating moral beliefs with moral truths, which is the very distinction being considered. Moral realists will argue that there are moral truths separate to our moral beliefs, and that our moral beliefs are only correct if they correspond to moral truths. — Michael

Does a statement of subjective preferences not correspond with the reality of one's beliefs? Is a moral belief held by a culture not a moral truth for them, even if it is subjective? Perhaps it doesn't correspond to a moral fact, but it seems to me to be a truth nonetheless. When one says "x is acceptable behavior for us", with reference to one's culture, this is a moral truth - for the culture in question this is a statement of what is permitted for that culture. This is more than just a belief. I think the term you are looking for is "moral fact", not moral truth.

:up: This in turn makes me consider if bodily pleasures should win out over some sort of "higher order" happiness. The addict might not be acting freely, and thus not be making a moral decision. However, the addict using a substance might still result in the greatest amount of bodily pleasure, if not "higher order" happiness. Thus, if bodily pleasure wins out, then one need only initiate addictions and allow them to unfold to do a good thing. No negative externalities, no rules or exceptions to rules. However, most people, I think, would argue that some sort of lasting happiness would be preferable to an addiction.

However, what if they are in conflict? What then? Would the more pressing preference "best" serve to satisfy our preferences with respect to how we want to act?

You seem to be saying that many of our preferences are based in a nomological view of human nature, and that they exist side by side with other preferences that are rooted in the evolution of our minds. Well, drinking the soda is no longer about survival in real terms because you can get by just fine without drinking soda now. Same goes for eating meat; just because it might have been necessary at one point doesn't mean it is necessary now. But I see what you are saying - at one time both preferences would not have been in conflict.

Good point. I'm mostly referring to instances in which the act is weighed via evaluation of reasons. That being said, I'll try to better explain what I mean: someone might want to drink soda because it is sweet and they like sweet things, but they also want to avoid gaining weight. If they weigh these two preferences and decide that they think their desire to drink soda outweighs their desire to manage their weight, then their desire to drink soda has won out (or so it would seem). I'm asking if in such a situation it can be said that the person can be said to be satisfying their preferences with respect to how they want to act in those specific circumstances if they drink the soda. Or is it only a partial satisfying of preferences because they are not also managing their weight, another still existing preference?

Is that better?

Morality is a set of rules of the form " x is right to us" or "y is wrong to us." These rules can be used to judge concrete behavior. They also represent what behaviors are considered by the majority of humans to be good or bad in specific circumstances. Lastly, these rules can be used to deduce more specific rules.

This seems to presuppose an outcome of precisely the kind of majority view that should have primacy. — Kenosha Kid

Well, it would have primacy most likely. I think most people would recognize how barbaric and stifling it would be to exile everyone who goes against the consensus

I agree; it would be barbaric and stifling to exile every person who is determined to act against the consensus. But there would have to be an enforcement of the laws. I think the best solution is to isolate the problem individuals so they couldn't act immorally yet continue to allow them to participate in the referendums. In other words: put them in jail until they agree not to act on their immoral beliefs while allowing them to vote.

Thanks for the reply.

Personally my faith in the majority is low. — Kenosha Kid

I mean, Trump got elected, that's pretty much all that needs to be observed. Granted, Hillary sucked.

one thing that democracy constantly highlights is that majority opinion is pretty ugly, stupid, and backward. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, well, majority opinion can be swayed. George Floyd's death was tragic, but it catalyzed protest on an incredible scale. That being said the left is leaderless and disorganized, and when the leftist opinion surges up it is usually organic. Chomsky made the good point that the left has always voted against, not in favor of their favorite, morally pure politician; that kind of dogma is for the right.

You can't get a meaningful majority opinion on questions like 'Should you be deported to your grandmother's country of birth if you commit a minor fellony' when most people live in the country their grandmother was born in. — Kenosha Kid

Good point. One could just resize the sample, however.

Sorry for fucking around with my comment so much.

I understand. My point is that this isn't useful. The axioms are just statistics. One can do away with them and just tell people the statistics and have a single moral imperative: conform! — Kenosha Kid

If the statistics are represented as axioms they can be used to theoretically develop abstract rules via rational discourse. This would allow for growth and progress. Furthermore, these abstract rules would be able to be applied in different situations; it would be impossible to have a referendum, and thus statistic, on every possible situation. So, in some ways one would have to conform; but in a situation that doesn't correlate to a specific statistic one would have to apply multiple consensus-defined axioms to come to the right act. If there was a single moral imperative based on the statistics this would be impossible.

through rational discourse one could persuade people to act in new ways via application of axioms that are established by consensus
— Aleph Numbers

But wouldn't those persuaders and persuadees be acting against morality by arguing against moral truths? If majority opinion is moral fact, then contrary opinion is also contrary to morality. — Kenosha Kid

This is only partially true. Acting counter to what is believed to be good behavior would be wrong, but to argue that the consensus is wrong could be considered not immoral. For example: if the majority of humanity believes that stealing is usually a wrong behavior for most people some of the time, a descriptive claim, is run through the process I outline in the OP, it becomes the moral axiom that stealing is sometimes justified relative to humanity. This is because the morality I propose is defined as "what is considered by the majority of humans to be good or bad behavior for most people some of the time" One can make another descriptive claim, such as that stealing is a good behavior if you are trying to feed your starving children, that isn't by definition immoral as it is merely descriptive until it is run through the consensus finding process. Nor is it by definition incorrect; but if the initial statistic were that stealing is always a wrong behavior for most people some of the time it would result in the axiom that stealing is always wrong relative to humanity, and, thus, to propose a descriptive claim that would result in a contradictory axiom would indeed be immoral. But one could still argue that a certain moral belief is more or less rational given what axioms are currently defined by the consensus.