What needs elaboration? You asked what it is to have two experiences without having some "larger experience," as though this were impossible. I gave the example of two experiences separated in time; that were not had simultaneously.

What would it even be like for you to have two experiences, and not have a larger experience that contains them both? That just seems like a basic feature of having multiple experiences in a unified consciousness. — Mr Bee

For example, having different experiences at different times, like smelling burnt toast today and skydiving five years ago. I don't have some "larger experience" of these two events, unless that "experience" is my entire life.

I don’t fully comprehend the distinction between stage theory and worm theory, but they are both consistent with a 4-D block universe, and a 4-D block universe is consistent with a static, motionless universe. Endurantism, on the other hand, is consistent with a 3-D dynamic (presentist) universe. I believe that the perdurantist “stage theory” is an attempt to incorporate some dynamic aspect into the static 4-D block universe, but I consider these to be irreconcilable.

Likewise, the reason given in the OP: “P3. Our experience is limited to only one time” also appears to be an attempt to reconcile the dynamic nature of our experience of time with the assumed scientific reality of a static 4-D block universe. However, an easier way to reconcile them is to drop (or else fully embrace) the assumption of the 4-D block universe, which is simply a model of (static) existence over time. However, if our dynamic experience cannot be considered illusory (because it would undermine the meaning of the terms “experience” or “illusion” - as illusions and other experiences can only be had “in” time), then dynamism must be real, and the problem must lie with the static block universe model.

Do you mean that you didn't intend to insult me? Or are you unaware that you insult people when you tell them that you suspect they are ignorant?

I suspect you don't know what you're talking about. — Thorongil

I suspect that you're an obnoxious individual with no sense of humour. But tell us again how insults aren't really necessary.

That's not very nice. Corporations are people, too, y'know?

Allegedly Bruno Latour has claimed that the ancient pharaoh Ramses II couldn't have died of tuberculosis since it was yet to be socially constructed as a single identifiable disease in the 19th century. — Jkop

Isn't that a bit like saying that no evolution could have occurred before Darwin?

Do we need something other as a comparison to notice whether we're poor at an activity? — Marchesk

Yes. To say that humans are poor at philosophy assumes some ideal way of doing philosophy that humans are not attaining. It's like saying that all humans are poor at basketball, despite players such as Michael Jordan. It presupposes some ideal philosopher (or basketball player) that no human can match.

Here's the suggested evidence that humans perform poorly at philosophy:

1. Errors in reasoning affecting even professional philosophers. — Marchesk

To err is human. Again, who else does philosophy?

2. Failure to resolve issues explored by the ancient Greeks. — Marchesk

All of them or some of them? Perhaps some are unresolvable.

3. Failure to reach consensus on almost anything. — Marchesk

Really? The subject of philosophy has evolved over the millenia and many of its questions have been subsumed by science, which has provided much consensus on many of its branches. Philosophy will continue to evolve, of course, and there is no reason to expect that all of the various issues that it has raised or will continue to raise should have been resolved by now.

That professional philosophers generally agree with the assessment that their colleagues are poor at doing philosophy. — Marchesk

Perhaps most philosophers are just inherently pessimistic and/or hypercritical (compared to other humans, that is).

Are humans bad at music?

Is there someone/something other than humans doing philosophy?

I doubt that you are doubting your doubting.

God is said to have given us free will, unlike parents who do not give us free will. So there is a difference in the meaning of "permission" in the OP when you compare parents who permit their children to perform evil acts and God who ("permits") allows for the ability to choose to perform evil acts.

I think you may be wilfully blurring the distinction between ability and permission.

What philosophical question gets under your skin? Why does it get under your skin? What led you to the point where this question got under your skin? Or did it happen all at once? Do you think there's an answer to this question?

The mind-body problem is definitely one, but I can't say for sure whether it gets under my skin.

How can philosophy leave everything in its place if philosophy is supposed to have therapeutic value? — sime

Possibly by producing a gestalt shift in one's perspective on philosophical problems, to break free from the "picture" that "held us captive". For example, via a reminder of the normal use of a (philosophically problematic) concept within a particular context.

Is it really the case that a therapeutic philosophy can be qualitatively different from classical approaches to philosophy that unashamedly advance metaphysical doctrines? — sime

In terms of Wittgenstein's approach, "our considerations could not be scientific ones", "we may not advance any kind of theory", and "There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings [...] The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."

This is obviously at odds with the antiquated view of philosophy as the "queen of the sciences" or with the traditional attempts to advance metaphysical theories, including the younger Wittgenstein's attempt to express the foundation of all propositions, or some such thing.

is it possible to make a straightforward categorical distinction between philosophy, no matter how pyrrhonian it purports to be, and cognitive-behavioural therapy? What is their relation? — sime

There might be a family resemblance in "therapy" here, perhaps. I think that one can probably find more than a few similarities between philosophy and CBT, but as for the differences, I would say that it is one of content or aims. For example, I don't believe that we would class the attempts to alter the behaviours of someone with an eating disorder as philosophy. Wittgenstein's focus, especially, saw philosophy as the dissolution of conceptual difficulties or confusions, rather than behavioural ones.

It certainly is a question, but if you're unable to answer it then perhaps you should reconsider your argument.

What if there is no end? Why should that imply that the compositionality of concepts fails?

I don't follow how the compositionality of concepts fails.

How does it fail?

Okay, justify this new claim. Why are all of the opposing theories wrong? Why can't non-atomic concepts be composed?

You said earlier that "some theories of concepts might say that 'dog' is divided into 'animal', 'quadrupedal', 'mammal', and so on." So, why isn't this an example of "dividing" the concept of 'dog' into other concepts? That is, why don't those other concepts compose the concept of 'dog'? Why can't this be done?

You're contradicting yourself. You said earlier: "Many [opposing] theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed."

Now you are saying: "If concepts are not atomic, then concepts cannot be composed."

I see the difference, but you said: "If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case."

You have stated that there are opposing (non-atomistic) "theories of concepts" which also assert that concepts can be composed. This makes your premise 2 false.

Do you have no comment to make on your inconsistent statements:

1. "Many theories of concepts say that [...] concepts can be composed."

2. "If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case."

You have said both:

"Many theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed. Conceptual atomism says that concepts can be composed only when they are atomic."

"(2) If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case."

Again, I understand this, but you are just asserting conceptual atomism rather than arguing for it.

You state that "Most theories of concepts say that lexical concepts have lower levels of contents". And, like you, these other theories also claim that concepts can be composed. Yet they reach the opposite conclusion to you. Why?

I haven't misunderstood.

The second premise seems problematic. If lexical concepts can be composed of "lower level" concepts, then why must there be any termination to this composition? I don't see why mere composition should imply atomism. You appear to be assuming this, rather than demonstrating it.

But in answer to the question: are you the same person you were when you were a child, you can't really either answer 'yes' or 'no'. You're not the same person, but you're also not a different person.

As I said in my last post, I think that you really can answer 'yes' or 'no' [i.e. to whether it is the same ship, or to whether you are the same person] but it completely depends on the context of the question. There is no correct answer outside of the context. It is the search for an "answer-outside-of-the-context" which leads to the paradox.

I think it depends on whether the people talking about the ship consider it to be the same or different, or on the purposes of some linguistic community, in other words. I don't think that there is some truth of the matter beyond this as to whether it is the same or different at t1 compared to t2.