I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. — creativesoul

I don't know about that, but it's very kind of you to say. :)

What is the physical/physiological difference between us seeing a mental representation and a mental representation existing in our heads?

This is where I think you're getting so confused by grammar.

If mental representations exist and if distal objects are not constituents of these mental representations and if our knowledge of distal objects is mediated by knowledge of these mental representations then indirect realism is true, because that's all that indirect realism means. — Michael

Apologies for the following "argument by AI", but it is far more eloquent than I am, and I believe is in agreement with my view:

I asked ChatGPT for some assistance in distinguishing my view from indirect realism:

User
With respect to the direct/indirect realism debate, what difference does it make to the indirect realist position to say that perceptions are mental representations, instead of that we perceive mental representations?

ChatGPT
In the direct/indirect realism debate, direct realists argue that we perceive the external world directly, while indirect realists contend that what we perceive are mental representations or sense data, rather than the external world itself. The distinction between saying "perceptions are mental representations" versus "we perceive mental representations" may seem subtle, but it carries significant implications for the indirect realist position.

Perceptions as Mental Representations: This perspective suggests that perceptions are constructed within the mind based on sensory input. In other words, our experiences of the external world are mediated by mental processes that interpret and represent sensory data. From this viewpoint, perceptions are seen as internal mental states that correspond to external objects or events. Indirect realists who adopt this view typically argue that our awareness of the external world is always filtered through mental representations, which may or may not accurately reflect the true nature of external objects.

We Perceive Mental Representations: This formulation emphasizes the act of perception itself, suggesting that what we directly encounter are mental representations rather than external objects. According to this interpretation, perception is inherently subjective and mediated by mental processes. Indirect realists who adopt this stance argue that our experiences are fundamentally shaped by the way our minds represent sensory information, and that there is no direct access to the external world independent of these mental representations.

The difference between these two formulations lies in the emphasis on either the nature of perceptions themselves or the act of perceiving. However, both perspectives align in asserting that our awareness of the world is mediated by mental representations. The distinction may have implications for how indirect realists conceptualize the relationship between the mind and the external world, as well as how they address philosophical challenges such as skepticism and the problem of perception.

User
Could those who say "perceptions are mental representations" be direct realists instead of indirect realists?

ChatGPT
Yes, it's possible for individuals who assert that "perceptions are mental representations" to still be direct realists, although this stance might require some clarification and nuance.

In the direct realism framework, the key idea is that our perceptual experiences directly reflect the external world as it is, without the need for intermediary mental representations. However, some direct realists might acknowledge that perceptions involve mental processing and representation without necessarily subscribing to the idea that these representations mediate our access to the external world.

For instance, a direct realist who asserts that "perceptions are mental representations" might argue that the mind actively organizes sensory input and constructs a coherent perceptual experience, but they would maintain that this process occurs in real-time and directly corresponds to external objects or events. In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality.

So, while the statement "perceptions are mental representations" is often associated with indirect realism, it's conceivable for a direct realist to adopt this view with the caveat that mental representations serve as immediate reflections of external reality rather than as intermediaries mediating perception.

This also appears to be consistent with the enactivist view that @Pierre-Normand and @fdrake have been arguing for, if I understand it correctly.

Thanks for the explanation. A question arises regarding the misguided notion of naive realism, that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself.

The qualifiers “in itself” or “as it is” confuse me to no end, and to be honest I have never seen a naive realist affix these phrases to statements about an object of perception, at least in common language. It makes me think that in order to see an object “as it is” I must see it from an infinite amount of perspectives at the same time, that in order to really see an object I must also see what I cannot possibly see, for instance the back of an object while looking at the front of it, or what it looks like if no one was looking at it, and so on. — NOS4A2

Naive realism "is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are." (Wikipedia)

"Naïve realism claims that [...] objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass." (IEP)

"Naive realism is the philosophical concept that suggests our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world as it truly is, without any interpretation or mediation. According to naive realism, when we perceive something, we directly perceive the object itself as it exists independently of our perception." (ChatGPT)

Illusions and hallucinations are often cited as being problematic for naive realism, suggesting that our senses do not provide us with direct awareness of the external world as it is. Science also tells us that the world isn't really coloured, so we do not perceive the world as it really is wrt colour. Hopefully, this gives you an idea of the naive realist view of perceiving the world in itself, or as it really is.

So the question is: If we’re not perceiving the world in itself or as it is, what are we perceiving? — NOS4A2

According to my view, which is neither naive realism or indirect realism, we are perceiving the world as (normal) humans (normally) perceive it, given our human sensory organs (that is, assuming you and I both perceive it in the normal way, like most humans do). This includes us perceiving illusions, such as sticks bending in water, the Muller-Lyer illusion, or the checker shadow illusion. Science tells us that other animals (and some other humans) may perceive the world differently to us.

To paraphrase the ChatGPT definition of naive realism above, on my view, when we perceive something, we can directly perceive the object itself, but the perception depends on our sensory organs or perceptual apparatus.

So to make this simpler; I am watching a stopwatch whilst the counter is counting according to the prescribed rules. When the stopwatch reaches 60 I look at the counter. What digit does it show? — Michael

I imagine the counter would be spinning at a near-infinite speed by that stage, making it very difficult to read.

Yes, to me, internally representing the world begets a representation of the world, something that represents, models, or stands for, the environment. We have a space in which representing occurs (internally), and presumably this representation or act of representation (sight) is the intentional object.

I could be completely wrong; that’s just how I always understood representationalism. — NOS4A2

Right, but the direct/indirect realism discussion is also commonly framed in terms of whether we directly perceive real objects or whether we instead directly perceive a representation or other perceptual intermediary (and only indirectly perceive real objects). I reject that we perceive a mental representation and say that we directly perceive real objects.

As stated earlier, I think the naive realist position is based on the misguided notion that when we perceive a real object we perceive the world in itself (or somehow identify the perception with the object). A perception that is identical with its object is not really a perception at all; it is the object.

The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object.

I reject the direct realist notion that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself (or that our perceptions are identical with the perceived object) and the indirect realist notion that we directly perceive only mental representations of real objects. Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations.

The condition of the body, I presume? — NOS4A2

Yes.

I’m curious because as far as I know representations prohibit us from seeing the world, and I’m interested in how you can see (or represent) around them. — NOS4A2

How do representations prohibit us from seeing the world? I think you may be referring to seeing a representation of the world (instead of the world)?

What I am talking about is sight as a representation (an internal representation) of the world. In order to see anything, the things we see are internally represented. So we need an internal representation in order to see the world (or to see anything). That’s a very basic description of my understanding of how sight works.

What you are referring to—seeing a representation of the world instead of the world—would require us to have sight, or an internal representation, in the first place. Otherwise, we would not see anything, including seeing a representation instead of the world.

ETA: You don’t see an internal representation; sight is an internal representation.

Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2

The representation is the condition for seeing something, not some thing that you see.

Given that both "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, what do you think direct and indirect realists are arguing about? — Michael

I think direct and indirect realists are arguing over whether we perceive the world directly or whether we perceive mental representations (or some other intermediary) of the world.

While I believe that mental representations are necessarily involved in perception, or that perceptions are mental representations, I reject the indirect realist view that we perceive mental representations.

My view is that the brain represents the world to us in cases of sensory perception, and that the representation is the act of seeing; Therefore, we do not perceive the representation. If perceptions are mental representations, as per my view, then it would require a prior mental representation in order to perceive the first mental representation; a prior perception in order to perceive the first perception.

You claim that "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, but on the proviso that you see colours directly and see cows only indirectly. I make no such distinction. When I see cows and their colours, I make no distinction between seeing the colours directly and the cows indirectly. My brain represents the cows to me in the act of seeing, and the colours are a part of that singular representation. I do not see a mental representation; I see the cows. And I see them in colour.

How, then, do I see colours if they are not in the world? Because that's just what human seeing is (normally); that's how our brains visually represent the world. That's what it means to "see" objects.

The problem I have with indirect realism, although it correctly identifies the necessity of representation, is that it begins from a position prior to representation or perception, and from there it claims to perceive representations. Indirect realists posit an intermediary mental representation between our perceptions and the world, but if our perceptions are mental representations, as I posit, then in order to perceive this intermediary representation of the world, a (second) representation of this intermediary representation is required. And so on.

If perceptions are mental representations, then we do not perceive mental representations (of objects). The only possible intermediary between a perception and a real object must be located in the (external) world.

If that's the same as what you mean by "I see cows" or "I see colours", then I guess we are both direct realists.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. Naive realists claim they are, indirect realists claim they're not. — Michael

I don’t see how this relates to whether we perceive objects directly or indirectly or, in particular, how it relates to the supposed perception of representations or perceptual intermediaries. This is the philosophical substance of the dispute as I understand it. Direct realists claim we do not perceive any perceptual intermediary or representation, whereas indirect realists claim that we do.

Furthermore, I don’t see why a direct realist must hold the view that “distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience” in the physical sense that you suppose. A direct realist can have an unmediated perception without the perception needing to be the perceived object. Otherwise, it’s just a strawman of perception.

How is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists any different? One group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to include distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience and the other group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to exclude distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience.

The problem is that for each of your examples, the second sentence is wrong, not the "I see" part. — Lionino

I take it you mean the second part of the sentence? Why should it be wrong if, as Michael claims, "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are both true? I take it this covers all instances of seeing.

Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects." — Luke


No. — Michael

Then how is it merely grammatical? You said:

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. I see cows and cows are distal objects. I see colours and colours are mental phenomena.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism. — Michael

Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects."

Yes, we see distal objects.
— Michael

So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?
— Luke

No — Michael

Then I don't understand the point of this post:

What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael

Yes, we see distal objects. — Michael

So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?

Because I'm including hearing and smelling and tasting and feeling. It's not all about sight. — Michael

I never said it was all about sight. I asked whether we see distal objects.

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. And we experience mental phenomena like colours and smells and tastes and pain. — Michael

I asked whether we see distal objects. Why are you now talking about experience instead of seeing?

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael

Do I see distal objects? Do I feel distal objects when I touch them? Are distal objects a mental phenomena?

They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it. — Michael

I could equally say that direct and indirect realists mean the same thing by "I see X" but disagree on what constitutes X.

Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism and agree with the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations". — Michael

I do not agree with the substance of indirect realism. To reject naive realism is not necessarily to accept indirect realism. This is not a grammatical dispute over "we see representations". The claim "we see representations" is the substance of the dispute between direct and indirect realists. Indirect realists claim that we see representations, whereas direct realists claim that we do not see representations.

To say 'perceptual experience is a representation' (as I said), is not equivalent to saying 'we perceive representations' (as indirect realists claim). To say that the perceptual experience is a representation is not to say that the perceptual experience is the perceived object, or the thing seen. The representation is the seeing, not the thing seen.

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. Whatever each group means by "visual experience" it must be such that if, as naive realists claim, distal objects are constituents of visual experience then we have direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. — Michael

Whatever each group means by it, it must be such that if what one group means by it is true, then…?

Naive realists claim that “visual experience” includes distal objects among its constituents. Indirect realists claim that “visual experience” does not include distal objects among its constituents. Therefore, both groups mean something different by “visual experience”.

Otherwise, please explain how one group claiming that we perceive real objects and another group claiming that we perceive mental objects is a merely grammatical dispute.

It seems to me as if my visual experience literally extends beyond my body and that distal objects are literally present within my visual experience. This is the naive view that naive realists accepted as true, but which the science of perception has now shown to be false. Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body.

Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists accept this indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists, probably because that get confused by the grammar of "I see X".

They've just redefined the meaning of "direct perception". — Michael

I do not hold the naive realist view that visual experience extends beyond the body. However, this does not make me an indirect realist because there is another point of dispute between direct realists and indirect realists. Direct realists claim that we directly perceive real objects, whereas indirect realists claim that we directly perceive mental objects.

While this latter dispute could boil down to a disagreement over the meaning of the word "perceive", the dispute between naive and indirect realists could equally be viewed as a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase "visual experience". So, if the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists is merely grammatical, then so too is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists. They are therefore equally substantive disputes.

I see colours and colours are a mental phenomenon.
I see trees and trees are not a mental phenomenon.
I feel pain and pain is a mental phenomenon.
I feel my hand burning and my hand burning is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael

According to indirect realists, these are all mental phenomena, no matter what you see or feel. What you see or feel can only be a representation, so it must all be mental phenomena. Unless indirect realists are allowed to have both perceptions of a mental phenomena and perceptions not of a mental phenomena?

The phrases "I see" and "I feel" have more than one meaning. — Michael

But not as the indirect realist uses them.

I feel pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, therefore I feel a mental phenomenon.
I see colours, colours are a mental phenomenon, therefore I see a mental phenomenon. — Michael

I see trees, trees are a mental phenomenon... Wait, I thought you were a realist?

Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body. — Michael

That doesn't seem to be your position, though, nor that of indirect realists. Indirect realists do not claim that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. Instead, they claim that we perceive this mental phenomenon or representation of the world outside the body. They do not consider the mental phenomenon or representation to be the visual experience; they consider the perception of the mental phenomenon or representation to be the visual experience.

Then so-called "non-naive" realists accept that indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists — Michael

Until you abandon the idea that the mental phenomenon or representation of the world is a perceptible intermediary, and is instead part of the perceiver, then our dispute is not merely grammatical.

To be presented is to be present. If some distal object is presented in experience then that distal object is present in experience. If that distal object is present in experience then it exists within experience.

But experience exists within the brain and distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects do not exist within experience and so are not presented in experience. — Michael

They are presented in experience as a perception of the object, not as the object itself. It is absurd to argue that in order to have a direct perception of an object then the object must be present inside your body.

Are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience such that their mind-independent nature is presented to us or is experience nothing more than a mental phenomenon, with is features being at best only representations of those mind-independent properties? — Michael

I'm not sure what you take a direct perception to be. Must a distal object become part of one's body in order to have a direct perception? Who thinks this is a perception?

In what sense is the mind-independent nature of distal objects and their properties not presented to us via perception? You seem to indicate that unless perceptions provide us with complete and incorrigible knowledge about objects, then they don't provide us with any knowledge about objects.

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly receive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael

I think much of the dispute between direct and indirect realists may revolve around the fact that direct realists limit the meaning of the word "perception" to sensory perceptions that are stimulated by distal objects, whereas indirect realists give the word "perception" a wider meaning that includes non-sensory "perceptions" that lack any external stimulus, such as hallucinations, dreams and imaginings. Neither side has the monopoly on correct usage, but given the question of whether or not I directly perceive some distal object, the former meaning would typically be assumed.

I see things when I dream and the schizophrenic hears voices when hallucinating. Sensory organs are not involved. — Michael

You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.

An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived.

Another picture that may prove helpful, with the lines representing some relevant causal connection.

amr0096dgaltgb9e.jpg — Michael

Thanks for this diagram, which illustrates the distinction between direct realism and indirect realism.

I think that the distinction could be brought out further by noting where each opponent locates the perception. Direct realists locate (direct) perception between the mental image and the distal object. Indirect realists locate (direct) perception between the cognition and the mental image. As the diagram depicts, indirect realists see the mental image directly and see the distal object only indirectly.

But how does the cognition "see" anything? It is the mental image, the representation of the distal object, which is the "seeing"; the sensory perception. The cognition does not have its own set of sensory organs with which to perceive the mental image.

Interestingly, when one sees an illusion, one sees it directly, i.e., without seeing any intermediary.

However, I suspect that indirect realists will argue that seeing is the intermediary. The intermediary between the object and what, though? Surely not the perception. Seeing is the perception.

Do I see things when I dream? Does the schizophrenic hear voices when suffering a psychotic episode? — Michael

Dreams are not perceptions, and "hearing voices" is an abnormal case of perception.

This is where you're getting confused by grammar into thinking that indirect realists are saying something they're not. — Michael

Your picture suggests otherwise.

Take the picture here. If indirect realism is true then if we remove the mental image then we have no knowledge of the distal object. And I believe that's correct. The mental image is the necessary intermediary. — Michael

The picture maintains what I consider to be the false assumption of indirect realism: that we require a second-order cognition/awareness/perception in order to perceive the first-order perceptions. In other words, cognition/awareness/perception of perceptions, which seems to imply an infinite regress. Perceptions (i.e. first-order perceptions) are here treated as not something already present to consciousness, or as if they were themselves external objects.

Again:

I might agree that perception does not always provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects, such as in cases of illusion, hallucination or error. But I do not agree that perception never provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. In fact, I would say that perception more often than not does provide us with [some] direct knowledge of distal objects. — Luke

I take it that the position of indirect realism is that perception never provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. And the position of naive realism is that perception always provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects?

I have direct knowledge of the colour red and indirect knowledge of a distal object reflecting light with a wavelength of 700nm. — Michael

I don't follow. In what sense is your knowledge indirect here? Is the wavelength of the light a property of the distal object?

The meaning of "direct perception" is such that if perception is direct then perception provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Therefore, if perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects then perception is not direct.

Given our scientific understanding of the world and perception it is clear that perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Therefore, perception is not direct. — Michael

Which scientific understanding of the world and perception are you referring to? I might agree that perception does not always provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects, such as in cases of illusion, hallucination or error. But I do not agree that perception never provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. In fact, I would say that perception more often than not does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects.

Otherwise, I take it you are referring to the world as it is in itself. Yet, you stated in a recent post that:

that they have a "real look" is a confusion, much like any claim that distal objects have a "real feel" would be a confusion. There just is how things look to me and how things feel to you given our individual physiology. — Michael

That is, you appear to reject the possibility of perceiving the world as it is in itself.

...a non hallucinatory experience of a distal object by definition requires the existence of a distal object. — flannel jesus

Glad you agree. In case you missed it, this "tautology" was in response to @Michael who holds the view that:

...distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael

…it is nonetheless the case that it is only mental phenomena of which we have direct knowledge in perception… — Michael

The relevant issue is whether we have direct perceptions of real objects, not direct knowledge of perceptions.

What are hallucinations if not an experience of a distal object without a distal object? — flannel jesus

Yes, but not all experiences of distal objects are hallucinations. Perhaps I should have said "you could not have a non-hallucinatory experience of a distal object without them".

Naive realists believe that distal objects are constituents of experience and so that experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. — Michael

I also believe that distal objects are constituents of experience in the sense that you could not have an experience of a distal object without them. I think that naive and non-naive direct realists would agree on this point. I don't see why it must be restricted only to physical constituents, especially since an experience does not have physical constituents.

The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.

Why wouldn't you use the same argument against naive realists?

Which is an irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael

Is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists also "an irrelevant argument about grammar"? Non-naive realists and indirect realists have the same dispute.

Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.

I don't see how this example is related to distal objects.