I'm very sorry, but the rate at which you are posting broke the page in my browser. I edited the statement in my last post to answer you properly.

the thinking is, if you state that a is logically equivalent to b, then the statement is considered true. However, the 'truth' which one considers is a semantic evaluation, not a property of the syntactic system itself, and so 'truth' is not redundant, but somehow associated with the statement. Different epistemologists consider the relation in different ways, and the exact statement of each of their beliefs here could only be superficial. But in summary, there are 'naturalists; who hold that truth is an instrinsic property of the abstractions that create it. There are association theories, which hold that truth is one of the properties of a proposition. Kuhn believes that we attach truth by an act of wilful 'dubbing.' And there is Davidson, whose description is far too complex for me to even begin trying to state it in one phrase.

Now you may believe such distinctions rather arbitrary, so I will make one statement about why different views exist. It depends whether you think truth of a proposition exists before a person evaluates its truth value. That immediately starts to get into issues of monism versus dualism, or even in Wittgenstein's theory of logical positivism, whether language is the only thing that is actually real. So that is a deeper explanation of why the specific nature of truth is dependent on metaphysics, and it remains a hotly debated issue in modern philosophy.

Well it seems then, what I refer to as 'tautological truth,' as different from other forms of truth, is something with which we are in a agreement, but you simply think that it is 'wrong' to call 'tautological truth' a form of truth at all?

Well, there are other perspectives on truth by other people. But they would not agree that their definition, is 'redundant,' because, for example, it is the basis of the philosophy of science, and the merit of a metaphysical system, in the modern view, is that it is no longer a case of how 'true' it might be, but rather how useful it is in improving understanding of the world. As science has greatly improved understanding of the material world, and somewhat helped in other aspects of reality, they believe their system of truth evaluation is of great merit. That's basically what they would say of it.

I said there are three BASIC forms of truth evaluation across the thinkers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

Nothing is wrong with an ostensive definition. If you are not interested in modern philosophical theory, talk about whatever you like. But I did revise the definition in response to constructive comments, and as people frequently use wor4s like 'right and wrong' interchangeably with 'true and false,' and the issue of truth and 'wrongness' in is in the last paragraph.
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In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three basic kinds of truth evaluation, which I here attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the modern philosophers Russell, Whitehead, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson. According to all these various thinkers, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations.

• Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves defined in formally as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.
• Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply an assertion. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts or data, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
• Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, and additionally, they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed, yet errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are more frequently better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty'  is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

Truth in theology, morality, ethics, law, and metaphysics

Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Theological systems make assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven; morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual; ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society; law strives to define that which is right or wrong; and metaphysics strives to define that which is real. In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.

It is the formal definition of philosophical truth in modern metaphysics. There is no 'justification' involved.

That is to say, if you ask a professor with a PhD in modern philosophy, who has read several thousand books with different opinions on the subject, that is as good an approximation to a short answer they the professor would state that I can currently write.

well across these thinkers, a better distinction is tautological, EMPRICAL, and causal. And yes, they all do not believe propositional logic by itself can cross a semantic turnstile, so causal truth requires epistemological additions beyond those in syntactic languages.

What I have done is extend my above definition very slightly, in response to comments received here and elsewhere, and shared it on the thread "true and truth"

HI tTm, I did recently compose an answer to this on another thread, here I copy it for you.

In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three main basic kinds of it, which I hear attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the formal logicians Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson. According to all these various thinkers, truth is the result of evaluating a proposition, but the relation between truth and the proposition itself can be different depending on epistemological considerations.

• Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with syntactic rules which are themselves defined in formally as logical propositions. These propositional systems can also define rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.
• Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material objects, states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply an assertion. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts or data, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic. 'Internal' states, resulting from consciousness, are also evaluated empirically. The nature of consciousness itself is part of the epistemology.
• Causal truths, which again first must be generally consistent within the rules of propositional calculus, and additionally, they must not contain any syntactic fallacies of deduction or inference. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed, yet errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are more frequently better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty'  is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

Truth in theology, morality, ethics, law, and metaphysics

Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Theological systems make assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven; morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual; ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society; law strives to define that which is right or wrong; and metaphysics strives to define that which is real. In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.

Oh. Well what I am thinking is that there are now very exact formal definitions of logical truth, and that in modern philosophy, that is the preferred definition. I wrote a short summary of them in another thread 'what is truth?' However, if you believe that nonsense, then I can't really discuss anything with you further, because it has made sense to me for 40 years now, and I'm not really able to explain it to people who only want to find it wrong.

Earlier I posted a book by Sartre, who also accepted such definitions, and who believed that imagination is the basis of phenomenological knowledge. Note that it is knowledge, not truth, that Sartre was talking about. Truth is the result of evaluating the validity of a proposition, and the sum of known propositions by any one person constitutes their knowledge.

I am sorry It's going to take me a couple of days to get to the next part.

So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me? — dclements

No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition.

That is a good observation to an extent. However it is not entirely circular, as to provide answers to material propositions, it also requires an epistemological basis on semantics, which actually is far more complicated than the simplicities of propositional calculus by itself.

Well, without any education in formal logic, you clearly have ability in the subject, I hope you find time in your life to further your studies, and I look forward to seeing your posts.

Absolutely I am sure. In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. As I stated, I attempted to define it in a way compatible with the theories of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

1. Yes, that's pretty standard stuff.

2. That's actually what I said. Kant was the first to make the triangle, and Marx was the first to point out that the synthesis itself creates another thesis.

3. I do have some studying of Fichte to do, yes.

4. As Marx was not concerned with rights, it's rather obvious his position did not include mention of them. What others have suggested is that the 'evolution' is actually cyclic, using the antithesis to Marx of adding property as a right to complete the cycle.

It would be helpful to me if you could state what school teaches the views you state. Mine are from Oxford University, and thus follow the standard formal progression of thought in modern logic, from Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson, I take it you are already familiar with those, as you speak with such authority. And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately.

So. First baby step;. The correct way to approach the question is not "what rights do I have which the government may not take away?". The correct question is: "what authority must the government have to maximize everyone's rights?"

Because that results in the greatest liberty, and hence the greatest prosperity and well being of all. The most frequently cited example these days is water rights, starting from a golden era of plenty. People divide labor in the Socratic way. One person decides to farm fish and buys all the lakes. But then there is a draught. The wrong way to approach this problem is for the person who now owns all the water to ask: "why should I sell my water for less than the maximum profit I can get?" The correct question is: How much authority does the government have to limit the price which it pays the lake owner so that everyone can have water?

In this case, the answer according to natural law is, quite a bit of authority, because water is essential to life. Life takes precedence over liberty and pursuit of happiness, and only the lake owner has water, so the lake owner, in the interest of the greater good, has to provide the water. However, the state cannot deprive the lake owner himself of the ability to run a fish farm, as according to his own desires and chosen life pursuit. Therefore, the equation is very straightforward. The government pays sufficient money for the lake owner to rebuild his fish farm to the same condition as it would have been without a drought, and takes all the water needed to ensure that no one suffers from thirst.

By contrast, let's suppose there is a manufacturer of soccerballs, and there is a shortage of materials to make them. the pursuit of happiness is a much lower priority, but it still exists. If many children are playing soccer at schools, the government can legitimately have the authority, under natural rights, to raise some taxes in order to pay for the increased cost of materials to make soccerballs. But as the absence of soccer balls only limits children's' freedom to a limited extent, the amount of taxes which the government can collect is proportionally much less.

So that is the first straightforward example of how natural law works in real-world situations; it is a system of hierarchically arranged needs of the society to prosper, and a beautiful thing it is too, isn't it?

I'm sorry I don't have more time today to answer you more fully, but I can quickly the idea is of 'positive law' creating 'rights,' rather than 'positive rights.' But from Locke's perspective, positive law works differently than you might think. The point of positive law is to enable a better society, increase peace, and reduce conflict. That is, if people are guaranteed life, and free to act as they wish, then they might choose to act for the greater good, which results in a better society, THEREFORE liberty and pursuit of happiness are natural rights, and THEREFORE people can choose their government. It is predicated on the premise that humans are on the whole good. Locke believed the state of nature to be benign--people mostly happily living in peace without quarrel, who need to be protected from natural disasters and rather infrequent evil individuals. It is a collaborative and constructive vision, with a main emotion of enjoyment

That was a big reversal from Hobbes, who assumed humans are on the whole bad, and thus need an authoritarian system to punish people into behaving cooperatively. It is predicated on the assumption that given freedom, people will naturally choose to steal, kill, rape, and exploit. To Hobbes, the main emotion in state of nature is fear. Therefore, in Hobbes' view, democracy is bound to fail, there can be no positive law, and he suggests that a feudal system is the only workable form of government.

One way of looking at it is to think that if the positive law in Locke's vision collapses, then society has no choice to regress into a Hobbesian state. Locke himself called this 'a state of war' arising from collapse of a social contract based on the state of nature.

On your second point, I agree with you personally, once one understands how the idea of inalienability works, it is actually a lot of effort to justify exceptions at all. I could explain some reasoning, but I am going to need a little time to answer it peaceably.

As I said, I gave you my final answer. Third time. I have no desire whatsoever to read someone who just wants to justify killing. You're not paying me anything, and your spirit is too ugly to behold for free.

Thank you. I really should read them again myself, it's been 35 years. Perhaps a week to answer the question is over optimistic.

No. Natural law does not allow for the death penalty. Life has to be a primary right, or it doesn't work. The result of denying the primary right to life is again, societal rebellion against authority, which is then justified, post hoc, after the government executes an innocent person, as has happened far too often in the past.

The taking of life in self defense is also against natural rights. There exist plenty of means of self defense which are not lethal.

A liberal and conservative can have different opinions about their own desires. The point of positive law is that it does not exist to curtail the rights of any individual, and the point of the natural law in the united states is that the choices people make which are constructive for society are those which are for the greater good. THEREFORE pursuit of happiness is a natural right. The problem with your questioning is that it imposes a negative and selfish perspective of rights which people have by some kind of entitlement BECAUSE they have natural rights,. That is not answerable.

I answered the question on abortion three times now. It is a POSITIVE perspective, not a NEGATIVE perspective. When a woman is pregnant she will have a baby, unless there is some untoward circumstance. She has the right to have that baby, and the baby has a right to life. For cases where only the mother or child could survive, there can be no resolution from natural rights, and therefore it falls on the states. In cases where the baby has serious deformity or illness that impede natural life, then there is no answer from natural law and it falls on states to decide, so that people can choose their preferred result. Having said that, I am personally rather offended with your attitude for untoward events as a justification. When there are untoward events and either the mother or baby cannot survive, then it is a very tragic situation, and everyone, in a benign social contract, should want all babies to live. But if you are forcing me to answer your question yet again, then I have to say, you sir, are a cad. and that is my final answer.

I certainly don't want to point out to you that the taking of life is irreversible, a choice made to terminate life can never be taken back, and many people are extremely envious of others having babies, and would be glad to adopt them. And finally the parents themselves might change their minds and regret a decision to kill their own offspring but cannot be saved from that tragic consequence.. That should be too obvious to even require stating So you are a cad searching for any method whatsoever to kill beautiful babies, and are just as morally destitute as the Syrian Assad terrorists with their poison gas.

Have I answered the questions properly now?

The battle between the left and right in the US is ideological, with both sides arguing their principles are right. — Hanover

NO, that's impossible in a theory of natural law in this nation. If there may be a difference of opinion in interpretation, then there is no basis for a social contract that avoids a Lockean state of war. That is why the natural law must be inalienable--equally applicable to everybody--and undeniable, as Jefferson originally stated.

It is possible for such a conflict to exist in a social contract based on Rousseau's theory. But as Rousseau defines the social contract as driven by the will of people, rather than by a state of nature, it is not based on natural law. That would mean the social contract in the USA is not based on the laws of nature and God, which would void the source of authority for an independent nation, and we would only be a rogue British state which, as USA's enemies claim, deserves to be eradicated.

What the political process attempts to do is to corrupt the natural law in favor of one group. So in fact, Rosseau's social contract is ALSO in operation in this country. However, it is a corruption of the original social contract, which was Lockean, and which allowed for no such variation of opinion as to how it should be interpreted, because all its tenets derive directly from the human condition

Oh I'm sorry, I left out the last issue. That is, modern legal positivists, such as Hart, attempt to do away with promulgation from natural law to constitutional law entirely. And that is frequently taught in law schools now, almost to the exclusion of any other legal theory, because lower courts are expected to act entirely within the US legal code. But this doesn't work in debating issues not directly defined by existing constitutional law, because the USA used Brtain's abrogation of natural law to justify militant takeover. While lawyers inside this nation are rather blithe to the implications of that now, the USA has no authority to interact with other sovereign nations, internationally, if the foundation of natural law is removed, and the USA becomes no more than a rebel insurgency that the world should eliminate. And those in positions of international diplomacy are very aware of that.

This one is quite good. You should find a large portion is free to read online.

https://books.google.com/books?id=b-g_yf7kVeIC

We forget, or we weren't born yet, that there was more terrorist activity in Europe in the 1970s than in Europe in the present decade — Bitter Crank

You are so right. Lord Mountbatten handed me my high school diplomas, and in the following month was almost killed by terrorists. The following year they tried again and succeeded. That's the only person I had met who was killed in terrorist attacks, but I am much more sympathetic with the WTC families since, as I similarly went insane with rage at the time, and he wasn't even a relative. It still doesn't justify invading two countries and killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people, but it is more understandable to me as an insane reaction.

Well, if you are interested in that, I did a quick search to find the most recent article on this topic here:

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-5151-1_4?no-access=true

But it is $30 for the chapter. I have a pretty good idea what it says, but it would take me a week to write it properly, and I have to work on my application for a Masters in philosophy, in fact I am behind working on it, so please excuse me by saying, yes I understand your viewpoint, and I wish I had more time to discuss it with you. It is certainly one of the more mystical aspects of Wittgensteinian thought, and does take some time to grasp. Reading the tractatus, red book, and blue book is helpful. Some of the refutations of other logicians in the tractatus are a little complicated, but most of the rest of all three is quite readable.

can philosophy be considered "seeking after the truth", or no? — Noble Dust

Also the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, e.g. whether it is the search after the truth, therapeutic contemplation, or love of wisdom. I believe that the latter is the generally accepted definition. — jkop

In ancient philosophy 'seeking after the truth' was one of the first definitions, so it has attained rather more prominence than it should now. Philosophical truth in the current era is rather formally defined as the property of a statement--or derived from a statement--or a natural quality that is necessarily inherent in a statement-- or some other association to a statement, depending on one's epistemology. I just wrote something on this yesterday, defining three basic forms of truth, and the consequences, as follows. I apologize for its laxity, I only just formulated it.

{1}Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.

{2}Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic.

{3}Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty'  is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

The explanatory gap arises from a failure to distinguish 'the experience of red' in its constituitive sense (i.e. the physiological events that constitute having the experience) from its intentionalistic sense (i.e. your physiology's interaction with electromagnetic radiation). — jkop

But there is another sense, arising from association with experiences one has with red objects. These are often social. for example, red in the USA tends to mean 'danger' or 'stop,' whereas in China it has more the connotation of 'parade' or 'party'. While one certainly can explain such connections in terms of neurons, it's a rather useless pursuit. It makes more sense to think of them as abstractions, like mathematical relationships, As such these higher levels of association are between concepts, not brain cells, it makes more sense, scientifically, to use logical abstractions to define a model for those abstract relationships.

Science is only a philosophical method that creates predictive models of reality, built from interdisciplinary simplifications. Expecting the simplification to a physiological model to explain abstractions of thought is thus even wrong in scientific terms.

If the experience of Red can not be found in the only things we know, Matter, Energy. and Space then speculating that there must be some other Thing out there is a completely logical step in the analysis. If you are a Materialist then of course you wont like that. If you think my Capitalizations are Random then you are not really reading what I say. It is my style and I will authoritatively say I'm not going to stop doing that. — SteveKlinko

Your style is fine.

You do need to extend

The problem with number 2 is that we say we have a Red Experience but we don't take it to the next step and ask Where Is That Experience Happening? — SteveKlinko

Different people reach that realization in different ways, and maybe it would be easier for your first example to choose an experience which is not based on sense experience, and work upwards from that, rather than downwards into material reality.

Easy Problem and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.by David Chalmers — SteveKlinko

I also find this thinking too reductionist. While I understand the inclination to seek such a hypothesis scientifically, it does nothing at all to resolve the actual problems of conceptuality, and so it actually does science a disservice. Personally I find the issue of individual consciousness itself turns into a solipsistic red herring. Most of the ideas I know are not my own, but other peoples', so by the same extrapolation you refer to, I don't feel that beliefs based upon them are my own beliefs either, but rather just inserted into me, like fake limbs, by other people. I have been led to understand that is a very rare experience, but that is how I feel about them, and I feel if all the things I had learned from other people did not exist, but I had some kind of 'self consciousness' regardless, it would probably be on the level of awareness of a pet cat.

I must apologize for the laxity of my above explanation, it is the first time I ever tried to write it down.

Again, I didn't say that light does exist. You said that light exists and color doesn't. I said that light doesn't exist just as much or as little as color. As that is difficult for you to understand, I will put it the other war around. Color exists just as much or as little as light does. That means the same thing.

Please do not quote me out of context.

But the idea of a religion being at odds with practices other than the religion is nothing new; the secular law not based in the religion is just an extension of that line of thought — Chany

Yes, it's certainly true that religions were at odds with each other, but not with theories of secular law, because it didn't exist until Cicero formulated it. Of course there was atheism at the time, so it was only conflicts between divine law. There were written rules beforehand, such as Rome's twelve tables, but they were not a system of law that applied to all situations (much to Greece's disappointment, which had high hopes before it received a copy of the 12 tables, but on receiving them, they were rather dismissed as ineffective). Cicero was the first to define a system of law, and strangely enough, just after he did, the Roman Republic collapsed immediately. Maybe that was not so much a coincidence of timing, but again its not possible to make absolute statements of causality in the messy real world.

Regarding the empire's collapse, it was not so much whether Constantine was truly Christian or not, but rather that later, it could not maintain authority over predominantly Christian provinces, some time after Augustine was declared one of the church fathers. So as the military empire slowly converted to a Holy Roman Empire, and the nations became sovereign states, with royal authority delegated divinely from the Pope, they had to honor Augustine's doctrine of divine law over secular law, and that is why the doctrine persisted so long.

Well that I can answer, and I did answer that over a number of posts and repeated several times, but I will say it again briefly.

First, natural law is based on the human condition. In accordance with the laws of nature, when a woman is pregnant, then she has a baby if there are no untoward events. When a person interferes with that process, the person is taking individual power over that of life of the person that will be born. But natural rights must be accorded to all people without exception. Therefore that is a violation of the child's natural rights.

Additionally, in the American formulation of natural rights, which is based on a theistic premise, the child is also a child of God. By not permitting the child to live, one is depriving God of the ability to grant eternal life to that individual in the manner that God intends. While I understand that is not a concern to most people these days, it remains the argument that Jefferson would have believed true had the legal issue of rights to abortion existed in his own life. .But it wasn't a legal issue in his life, not because it wasn't possible, but rather because that belief was rather considered obviously true in his time. No one at all wanted legal rights to abortion., Thus, for those holding that the 'intent of the founding fathers' should govern constitutional law, however ridiculous that Hamilton's formulation to assert constitutional law over natural law may be, it still remains true.

As for liberty or pursuit of happiness taking precedence over life, that results from a misunderstanding of *why* liberty is a natural right in the first place. Similarly for pursuit of happiness So I explained if fully.

finally, for the question of a bad pregnancy where either only the child or only the mother cdould survive, there is no clear answer to that from natural rights, and so it should not be a part of federal law, but a decision for the States to answer. And a similar case would now be made for severely deformed children, such as from the Zika virus; and for conceptions that are not of the mother's free will.

Thank you for phrasing the question so I could answer it.

The first person to argue divine law's supremacy over human law was Augustine, specifically in response to the first attempt to define secular law based on natural law by Cicero. It wasn't possible elsewhere because there was no other existent theory of secular law, even in China. And as I said, that specific Christian doctrine was the core dogma leading to the collapse of Roman secular law and its replacement by divine law, during the Dark Ages, which lasted approximately 900 years, and as I said, it was a Christian doctrine first. Augustine invented it. As I said, there is no way to prove that Mohammed got the idea from Augustine or not. But that does not change the fact that it was a Christian doctrine first, and widespread. So you could try to claim there is no 'direct influence' on the current thinking of Radical Islamic terrorism, or not. Either case is unprovable. But you are rather stuck with the fact that Augustine's doctrine had already started to erode Roman authority, and that continued throughout all Europe for almost a millennium. So you definitely can't claim it is not a Christian doctrine.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_question#Complex_question_fallacy
don't expect rhetoric 101 to work on someone who has read Plato in Greek. Translation is not effortless, so one has plenty of time to consider the tricks.

And if you really want to learn about post-enlightenment thought on the subjectivity of light, this is quite entertaining.

http://study.com/academy/lesson/comparing-renaissance-baroque-use-of-light-plane.html

Or if you prefer a written account:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiaroscuro
and
http://www.getty.edu/art/exhibitions/renaissance_drawings/

Similarly there are psychological experiments to verify that. The most popular example is now this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Checker_shadow_illusion