Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad? — mew

I'll only comment on your last two questions. If what you seek to achieve is an explanation, or philosophical elucidation, of the concept of truth, then circularity isn't necessarily bad. You can start with the concept of truth as you understand it, and then proceed to analyse it by means of the examination of a variety of practical contexts where the concept is normally used. Circularity only is bad in deductive proofs, or demonstrations. In that case it is a fallacy. You can't assume what you intend to prove as a premise of your demonstration. In informal contexts of discussion, this is also called begging the question.

But where explanations are concerned, Wittgenstein has suggested that circularity only is bad when the circle is too small, and hence uninformative. So, the trouble with some circular explanations isn't the circularity itself but the excessive simplicity: such simplistic, quasi-tautological, explanations aren't sensitive enough to all the relevant aspects of the use of the concept one wishes to elucidate. The solution to this problem is to widen the circle of inter-related concepts one appeals to. Peter Strawson called this (wide) circular method of philosophical analysis "connective analysis" (which could be contrasted with reductive analysis). In epistemology, Clark Glymour has devised a convincing explanation of the somewhat circular nature of empirical evidence for scientific theories. It's called the bootstrapping theory of confirmation. It's a good way to account for the essential theory-ladenness of empirical concepts: your evidence always is couched in terms that presuppose some aspects of the theory you are attempting to confirm by means of scientific experiment or data gathering.

Thank you!

Hello.
Aristotle tried this definition (I am paraphrasing): If one says it is that which objectively is, and isn't that which objectively isn't, then he speaks the truth; but if one says it is that which objectively isn't and isn't that which objectively is, then he does not speak the truth. In other words, if judgement reflects reality then truth, if not, then untruth. But this explanation seems circular to me, because to say "that which objectively is" is the same as saying "that which truly is".

Pascal says that some concepts are so fundamental that attempting to define them results more in confusion than clarity. I think truth is such a concept, as shown above. Maybe the best is to acknowledge that we all have the implicit knowledge of what truth is, even if we don't have the explicit definition. As such, we can still apply the concept correctly.

"Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad?"
— mew

The closest thing we have to truth as human beings is something we call facts and/or data (ie. information about a physical thing) but such information is obviously transient and dependent on time, place, etc. in order for it to be useful. Also 'facts' in our mind seem to be not as transient as those applied to real world things (1+1 always equals 2, but the sky isn't always blue), but these things are either only true because we say they are true and or merely labels for real world things (ie. Main Street could be called Broad Street if we desire it and instead of 1+1= 2 we could have I + I = II).

This is not that hard to visualize until you have to deal with axioms; social/culture/ideological 'truth' most people have been ingrained with since they became aware of their surroundings. Such beliefs include human life is 'good', killing is 'evil' (unless it is done to defend oneself or country), famine/ war/ disease/etc is bad; I think you get the point.

In order to overcome your own indoctrinated axioms you have to realize there is an aspect of morality that is highly subjective, most ethical/moral beliefs are merely opinions/beliefs and not 'truths', and every action done by any human being requires a judgement call that is subject to own biases and prone to errors of one sort or another. While most people understand this to some degree, they don't like to admit how fallible our beliefs, knowledge, judgement, etc are and when we do screw up, we merely pass it off as IT IS THE BEST WE COULD DO WITH WHAT WE KNEW AT THE TIME, instead of realizing part of the problem is that we were too arrogant when taking certain actions.

I know this sounds like one has to be to politically correct or fret over one's actions too much, but that isn't a given. If fretting too much and being to PC IS counter productive then my arguments should be interpreted as to why someone SHOULDN'T care about fretting or trying to be PC if for them it creates more problems than it solves.

I guess my overall message is that the world, our choices of actions (as well as the lack of resources/time to always choose wisely), and other issues makes things more complicated than we often like to acknowledge them to be; and too often holding on to the idea we know some non-transient 'truth' just makes thing more FUBAR than they need to be.

So the answer to you OP is yes, presupposing something is 'truth' without doing the due diligence to prove something is actually truth (ie. which it is pretty much a given that it is impossible to due at this time) is "bad" because it can hinder one's judgement.

What would you say truth is? — mew

A good question for Holy Week.

Pilate then went back inside the palace, summoned Jesus and asked him, "Are you the king of the Jews?"
"Is that your own idea," Jesus asked, "or did others talk to you about me?"
"Am I a Jew?" Pilate replied. "Your own people and chief priests handed you over to me. What is it you have done?"
Jesus said, "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place."
"You are a king, then!" said Pilate.
Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king. In fact, the reason I was born and came into the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth listens to me."
"What is truth?" retorted Pilate. With this he went out again to the Jews gathered there and said, "I find no basis for a charge against him. — John 18:33-38

Pilot doesn't get an answer to his question. It seems like Jesus is dodging the question, "just who the hell are you and what did you do?"

The 'truth' to which Jesus is testifying about has been presumably been revealed to the reader of the Gospel, in the life and teachings of Jesus, and this Jesus can't, won't, or isn't able to summarize in a "25-words-or-less-definition".

"Truth in labeling" is straightforward. If the package says "1 dozen large brown eggs" then there should be 12, large, brown, eggs in the package. A lot of labels are very difficult to define clearly. "Climate warming is True" or "Climate warming is False" are not simple claims. I believe the claim that "climate warming is True" because it seems to align consistently enough with statements I find factual. For instance, "January in Minnesota is 60% warmer now than it was 50 years ago" is a fact, according to the historical record. In the historical past, Minnesota was damned cold in January, so 60% warmer doesn't mean that that one can pick roses in January.

Those who disbelieve the claim of climate warming can site similar facts, like "July in Minnesota is not hotter than the historical average." If January is 60% hotter, then July should be 60% hotter too, right? Apparently not -- more facts about climate warming or climate stability have to be brought in.

So, some facts seem to support the truth, and some facts don't. One has to decide which facts have the most weight, or are most numerous and consistent, and which facts aren't. As Pierre-Normand says,

circularity only is bad when the circle is too small, and hence uninformative. — Pierre-Normand

All the facts connected with the truth of climate warming are voluminous, and the circularity is large.

In modern philosophy, truth is defined by formal logic on propositions (statements). There are three main basic kinds of it, which I hear attempt to express in way compatible with the thinking of the formal logicians Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, Kripke, Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

• Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.
• Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic.
• Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty'  is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

I must apologize for the laxity of my above explanation, it is the first time I ever tried to write it down.

"That is a very common error in the post information age, so you cant be criticized for believing it. Data are neither true nor false; they are simply data. And mathematics is not 'facts determined from real world things."
— ernestm

I disagree with your analysis and I will explain why...

"Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality."
— ernestm

Tautological truth are merely what I explained as mental constructs/models of the world around us and they are true only because we and/or our models say they are true. It has been well know since Ancient times that in our mind we can construct 'perfect models' (ie abstract models) of something in our own mind, yet these abstract models never translate into a real world thing. What your describing may be more accurate according to some philosophical text book, but my description is meant so that it can be understood by anyone while yet not being inaccurate. What we are talking about here is close enough to the same thing that I don't really feel the need to waste time splitting hairs about, even if our wording of things could be construed as that we each are talking about something else.

"{2} Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic."
— ernestm

These "Empirical truths" you talk about are merely best guess and opinions as opposed to actual truths. I'm not sure how much you read about the Enlightenment period of philosophy, as this passage seems to be one of the propositions made at the beginning of it which got torn apart as soon as some of the skeptics like Hume stepped in. I also hope you realize there is a difference between 'sort of the truth', 'sometimes the truth', what we guess is the truth', and actual 100% objective TRUTH which is the truth under any condition. The 'truths' devised from Empirical study/observation are merely thing derived from statistical analysis and/or human observation and are better describe as best guesses in order to not confuse them with actual objective truths.

Put it to you this way even nature laws, such as the Laws of Thermodynamics (which are about as close to something we know being true 100.000% of the time) are considered to be contingent on certain rules in our universe staying the same; however it is not a given that these rules have always been the same nor that they will ever change in the future. In other words every nature law, or any variation of "Empirical truths" is contingent on the things making them possible to never change, however it isn't a given that the thing that allow them to be will be as they are today.

While your argument may be more valid in a certain academic context, outside of that context it falls apart if one factors in the actual complexity of world

"{3} Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex."
— ernestm

These "contingent truths" are even weaker than "Empirical truths" since the only thing different between is that causal truths almost wholly rely on human observation where as empirical truths have things like statistical analysis/studies, etc. in order to prove there validity. Needless to say because they are the same thing but weaker it is a given that they have the same problems (if not even more) as empirical truths.

"While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory."
— ernestm

In other words it our BEST GUESS that the sun will rise each morning that we are alive as long a wondering black hole, sun going supernova, or other similar event prematurely interrupts the stability of the star our planet orbits; but it isn't a given that nothing will interfere with a star during it's normal life cycle nor is it a given nothing will happen to our star in our lifetime. While we often like to talk about truths in an academic setting or working with something that is nothing more than a mental model; with dealing with real world issue

"Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above."
— ernestm

Isn't it a given if these other 'truths' are always contingent on in order for them to be 'true' that something doesn't undermine them, that they are only 'sort of the truth' or 'truth unless some contingency/Act of God/etc changes it' truth, that they are a bit less than the 100% of the time objective kind of truth when we think of something being the TRUTH?

Of course, I might be just splitting hairs here if you already assume that these academic, contingent,
and/or empirical truths are obviously fallible under nearly an endless variety conditions and you are only using the word 'truth' as a means to describe a problem in a more.. palatable means; or perhaps the people that wrote the works you are referring from used such nomenclature and your just repeating it.

It would be helpful to me if you could state what school teaches the views you state. Mine are from Oxford University, and thus follow the standard formal progression of thought in modern logic, from Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson, I take it you are already familiar with those, as you speak with such authority. And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately.

Are you sure you are elucidating truth, and not justification?

Your three items look like different reasons to believe some statement, rather than different types of truth.

What would you say truth is? — mew

It's not the sort of thing that can be said - although it can be shown.

is on the right track; although placing the word objectively in the Aristotle quote is erroneous and misleading; but then including the word objectively in almost any philosophical discussion is erroneous and misleading...

It is tempting to treat the T-sentence as a definition of truth, like so:

T is true if and only if T

But this only shows that "...is true" is redundant. An example by way of explanation:

"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" (that sentence) is true if and only if it is snowing at Charlotte Pass

That is, the sentence '"It is snowing at Charlotte Pass" is true' is truth functionally identical to the sentence 'it is snowing at Charlotte Pass'; "...is true" is redundant.

SO suppose we are presented with a definition of truth. There would indeed be a circularity in asking if that theory is true. But it is not a vicious circularity. All that is required is that the theory be true in its own terms.

Pilot doesn't get an answer to his question. — Bitter Crank

I was always struck by the existential weight of that question within it's historical context, especially because he then says he sees no basis for a charge against Jesus.

Hi! What would you say truth is? Doesn't it presuppose truth to say what truth is? If this is so, is it bad? — mew

No, it's not bad. I've always liked the simplicity of the argument you bring up: asking whether truth exists or not doesn't beg the question, but rather answers itself in an utterly pure manner. Indeed, it's circular in the best possible way. This is because truth is one of the very building blocks of consciousness. We live in an age where this is beginning to get fleshed out. Keep asking those deceptively simple questions.

"It would be helpful to me if you could state what school teaches the views you state. Mine are from Oxford University, and thus follow the standard formal progression of thought in modern logic, from Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson, I take it you are already familiar with those, as you speak with such authority.

And obviously, the framework I propose has to be rather basic, in order to support all their varying opinions without inconsistency, but I believe it does so adequately, albeit without the exactitude I would really prefer, but more details would extend its length beyond that which people actually read these days, so really I cannot avoid the laxity. If you can please provide the authorities behind your own thought, I would be able to respond appropriately."
— ernestm

Thank you for noticing the authority (perhaps even arrogance?) I try to speak with. It doesn't come studying but from the time I have devoted to the subject and effort I make in trying to get others to want to knock me off my soapbox; as well as the hope that I can find someone that can do this.

To be honest, I was just guessing that your arguments/parts of your posts came from a formal education and not just something you where pulling out of your..hat (or just cutting and pasting) like some people arguing philosophy do. The only formal education I have in philosophy is about three courses at a community college (Intro to Philosophy,Intro to Religions,and intro to ethics) but I have over a decade of studying and debating philosophy which in some ways can trump an actual education in the subject. However there have been countless debates and several books I have read that have influenced my opinions; and yes I am aware that my arguments are only my opinions. Also I have read the following books which have helped influence some of my thinking:

Philosophy For Beginners
Eastern Philosophy For Beginners
Postmodernism For Beginners
Kierkegaard For Beginners

(I even have a pdf copy of Kierkegaard For Beginners which I can give you a copy of, and point out the parts where he talks about morality being subjective; or at least the author of the book commenting on the subject.)

I will have to admit that since I have ADHD, I have trouble reading some of the more wordy text books and have to rely on sources, such as the 'for beginners' books, that cut to the chase. While you may look down on me now for admitting I don't have a real education on philosophy, the irony is that I have something better than an education which is ten years of having to deal with the subject without being hindered by a formal education in the subject where I have been forced to think for myself and come up with my own stuff without support from the philosophers that came before me. I don't know if you are aware of the quote from the teacher who commented on the full verses empty glass, but I think it sort of applies here.

If time is short and/or you are unable to access the books I noted you can even look up the following links which more or less same similar things as passages to the books I noted:

Is–ought problem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem

"The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between positive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law, or Hume's guillotine."
— Wiki

Turtles all the way down
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
Münchhausen trilemma
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma

"In epistemology, the Münchhausen trilemma is a thought experiment used to demonstrate the impossibility of proving any truth, even in the fields of logic and mathematics. If it is asked how any knowledge is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that there are only three options when providing proof in this situation:

The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts
The trilemma, then, is the decision among the three equally unsatisfying options."
— Wiki

There are a couple more sources but I think this should do for now. I will have to admit the whole fact/data vs opinion/judgement call is just something I created to simplify the problem (as it can be worded in may other ways) so trying to find an EXACT source for it would be kind of futile except other than perhaps finding my previous posts.

Absolutely I am sure. In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. As I stated, I attempted to define it in a way compatible with the theories of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson.

Well, without any education in formal logic, you clearly have ability in the subject, I hope you find time in your life to further your studies, and I look forward to seeing your posts.

That is a good observation to an extent. However it is not entirely circular, as to provide answers to material propositions, it also requires an epistemological basis on semantics, which actually is far more complicated than the simplicities of propositional calculus by itself.

"Well, without any education in formal logic, you clearly have ability in the subject, I hope you find time in your life to further your studies, and I look forward to seeing your posts."
— ernestm

So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me?

I have taken courses and studied enough in digital logic/philosophical logic to not have to bother taking them over again. However the 'truth' when used by the nomenclature of such things is not the same thing as 'truth' when used in ethics/religions/morality. If you don't know that and/or the basics of identifying fallacies or differences between facts and opinions then you really don't know anything about philosophy itself and instead you are merely to regurgitating some of what you heard in your classes while not even bothering to think for yourself.

"Absolutely I am sure. In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. As I stated, I attempted to define it in a way compatible with the theories of Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, through Carnap, Strawson, Putnam, Searle, and Kripke to Popper, Kuhn, and Davidson."
—ernestm

One's ideas/beliefs may be considered the 'truth' or more accurately 'true' in the context of their own work, but when critiqued by others it usually loses such meaning and especially so when critiqued by those who have different opinions. In Post Modern philosophy the search or hope for 'Truth' has all but been completely abandoned in the face of diametrically opposing viewpoints and the understanding/ acknowledgement of how complex the world really is.

"We do what we do because that is the way that we do it", and that is both the way it is and the way it is going to be for the foreseeable future. But seriously your type of arguments/viewpoints where abandoned back in the age of enlightenment when most philosophers had to grow up and realize 'perfection" and "truth" were merely an illusion and they had to adjust their perspective to account for such things.

So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me? — dclements

I think Ernestm was merely paying you a compliment.

So because your degree is bigger (or something else for that matter) than mine, you think you automatically know more than me? — dclements

No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition.

Truth is that thought which accords to reality whether we recognise it or not. Subjective opinion is only truth insofar as it is truly our opinion...sometimes it also accords with reality, that we call knowledge. Sometimes people claim knowledge , when in fact, it is merely their false opinion.

"I think Ernestm was merely paying you a compliment."
— Pierre-Normand
Actually you are right, I misread the post and didn't see the part that he actually complimented me. :D

Sorry about that, my ADHD sometimes hinders me from seeing part of a post when another part kind of set me off but at least I'm not to arrogant to admit that it happens.

"No. However, I do believe people who have devoted their lives to furthering this subject, and who have studied the prior thought for centuries, and who discuss their resulting thoughts with each other in formal ways, have together built a far better explanation than any one person can ever obtain via intuition."
—ernestm

You are committing an argumentum ad populum fallacy, argument from authority fallacy, and likely a few others as well. Just because someone wrote down something in a book somewhere and other people sometimes agreed with them doesn't necessarily make such ideas better than those you can come up with from the top of your head. And besides there are just as many existentialist/ deconstructionist/ nihilistic philosophers that have dedicated their lives to writing books and making similar arguments to mine. Because of that it really isn't accurate to say I'm just pulling it all out of my hat even if I more often than not came to my conclusions before reading their work.

Also subjectivity isn't really about undermining math, scientific ideas, concepts (ie. pure science supposedly assumes hypothetically ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE even if from a technical standpoint we don't always have to be aware of that issue) it is about dealing with hard core ideological dogma that tries to paint the world in 'Good'/'Evil', Black/white, True/False as well as other binary/false dilemmas that are too common is Western ideology. If you don't understand WHY people need and use subjectivity as a tool, perhaps it is just something you are not ready for.

"Truth" can remain 'ok' when used to reference mental constructs, but human beings are too fallible for us to know whether these mental constructs really are one for one in regard to the real life counter parts. However once one gets over oneself and the fallibility of the human race as a whole is isn't that big of a deal, unless one encounters someone who is unaware of human fallibility.

"Truth is that thought which accords to reality whether we recognise it or not. Subjective opinion is only truth insofar as it is truly our opinion...sometimes it also accords with reality, that we call knowledge. Sometimes people claim knowledge , when in fact, it is merely their false opinion."
—Chester

Or in other words human beings are to fallible for us to safely assume that any axioms or 'truths' through either mental construct and/or opinion really applies in the real world. And to quote Socrates again "I'm the wisest man in Greece, since I know that I know nothing". Actually I don't think it is noted that Socrates said that but since we only know him from what Plato wrote of him, it is plausible that he actually said something like that either at during his trail or perhaps some other time.

What I have done is extend my above definition very slightly, in response to comments received here and elsewhere, and shared it on the thread "true and truth"

In modern philosophy, truth is very clearly defined in formal terms. — ernestm

What is it you have in mind here? T-sentences? Kripke's recursive definition?

Ernestm, are you proposing that tautological truth is a different truth to epistemological truth and to causal truth?

That does not seem right to me.

However once one gets over oneself and the fallibility of the human race as a whole is isn't that big of a deal, unless one encounters someone who is unaware of human fallibility. — dclements

Whoever would be unaware of human fallibility? That would never happen, would it? The streets must be teeming with people who reflect on their fallibility and the unreliability of their grasp of truth. Just read the news.