He believed he had hands without the certain knowledge he had hands
— Ciceronianus — hypericin

Where did you find this? I don't recall saying such a thing, and the comment I'm directed to doesn't seem to contain it.

This underpins our modern understanding of science, that every theory is provisional in principle. This extends to our pragmatic, mundane lives: we cannot explain any phenomena definitively, another explanation may always come along which explains the same thing equally well, or better. — hypericin

So, our "modern understanding of science" is that it supports the existence of an Evil Demon as much as any other explanation of our observations? I don't think so.

You seem to be on the "quest for certainty." No certainty, no basis for judgment. I think that's something very different from an acknowledgement that new evidence may require an adjustment in judgments made. That acknowledgement doesn't mean we must believe that any theory, no matter how well-tested, no matter how well it fits the evidence, is no more preferable than any other. If so, the belief we're hatched from eggs by the will of God is just as reasonable as any other explanation of our existence.

If your view is the prevailing view, it's no wonder people won't take vaccines for fear of microchips or turning gay, and believe Trump won the 2020 election.

o be sure, following ↪Ciceronianus's point, we might excuse those who fein admiration in order to avoid becoming victims themselves, although presumably god will be aware of their attempted subterfuge and treat them accordingly. — Banno

Well, is this just about admiration? Worship may be based on fear, which isn't admiration. I think worship has been based on fear in many cases. That would be the duress I refer to. If an all-powerful being commands worship and eternal punishment if it's not given, worship would be rendered out of fear, not admiration. One doesn't have to admire such a being, but will do what's necessary to appease it. Such a being wouldn't necessarily require admiration--that's the "Let them hate me so long as they fear me" stance of such as Gaius Caesar Germanicus, better known now as Caligula.

Those Christians who chose to worship a god they believe will damn fol for eternity remain morally reprehensible. — Banno

Perhaps an argument can be made that they acted under duress. Convinced that they must be Christians and believe Christian doctrine to avoid eternal punishment and be saved, they're compelled to accept both--hell and the Christian God who created and tolerates hell. If they worship because they fear eternal punishment, can they be said to be morally reprehensible?

I can't remember if this was addressed in the article, but I don't think it was. Believe in hell or go to it, saith the Lord, or at least his Church.

We know that Christianity is flawed-that doesn't mean the people are. — john27

Christians would consider themselves flawed, it being part of Christian doctrine. You're not the one who can save them, either. So, don't feel too bad about it.

That was probably the orientation of Saint Paul. — Primperan

Christianity as a religion, as we know it, would not exist but for Paul of Tarsus. It's largely his creation, I think. There's no escaping him and his influence. Without him, it's likely it would have been a Jewish sect.

This is a recurring counter to those who say hell is our own choice, since god still forces upon us a "choice I was forced to make in ignorance". — Banno

Yes, there's a kind of "informed consent" argument available, although it can be said in response that we've been warned about eternal damnation. But I have no problem with what's said in Lewis' Divine Evil. I think intolerant, exclusive monotheism such as Christianity (with its one but oddly "triune" deity) necessarily condemns those who don't accept it to some form of punishment, extreme in its case.

Let's take as an illustration two notable christian philosophers, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine:
— Amalac

Thanks for this. Those who have claimed that belief in hell is not central to Christianity would do well to consider your post.

If they would make the claim that Christian doctrine has changed over time, or that these two Church Fathers did not mean what they said, then there is significant further explanation needed. Changes in morality over time are prima facie incompatible with what is right being what god wills. It looks as if what is right changes along with human sentiment, such that what was once considered acceptable no longer is.
an hour ago — Banno

To know the official view of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church on hell, you need only consult the Catechism (as to the heretical Protestant communities, who can say what those people think). You'll find hell addressed in Part One, Chapter Three, Article XII, IV (I've deleted footnote references, and have used italics to emphasize those portions of the text which may used to support the position that God is really a swell guy, hell notwithstanding):

"1033 We cannot be united with God unless we freely choose to love him. But we cannot love God if we sin gravely against him, against our neighbor or against ourselves: "He who does not love remains in death. Anyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in him." Our Lord warns us that we shall be separated from him if we fail to meet the serious needs of the poor and the little ones who are his brethren. To die in mortal sin without repenting and accepting God's merciful love means remaining separated from him for ever by our own free choice. This state of definitive self-exclusion from communion with God and the blessed is called "hell."

1034 Jesus often speaks of "Gehenna" of "the unquenchable fire" reserved for those who to the end of their lives refuse to believe and be converted, where both soul and body can be lost. Jesus solemnly proclaims that he "will send his angels, and they will gather . . . all evil doers, and throw them into the furnace of fire," and that he will pronounce the condemnation: "Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire!"

1035 The teaching of the Church affirms the existence of hell and its eternity. Immediately after death the souls of those who die in a state of mortal sin descend into hell, where they suffer the punishments of hell, "eternal fire." BUT WAIT! The chief punishment of hell is eternal separation from God, in whom alone man can possess the life and happiness for which he was created and for which he longs.

1036 The affirmations of Sacred Scripture and the teachings of the Church on the subject of hell are a call to the responsibility incumbent upon man to make use of his freedom in view of his eternal destiny. They are at the same time an urgent call to conversion: "Enter by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it are few."

Since we know neither the day nor the hour, we should follow the advice of the Lord and watch constantly so that, when the single course of our earthly life is completed, we may merit to enter with him into the marriage feast and be numbered among the blessed, and not, like the wicked and slothful servants, be ordered to depart into the eternal fire, into the outer darkness where "men will weep and gnash their teeth.

1037 God predestines no one to go to hell; for this, a willful turning away from God (a mortal sin) is necessary, and persistence in it until the end. In the Eucharistic liturgy and in the daily prayers of her faithful, the Church implores the mercy of God, who does not want "any to perish, but all to come to repentance."

See? Hell isn't God's problem, it's ours. If that's where we end up, it's our fault. And okay, maybe there's some fire there, but the real punishment is "eternal separation from God" so the fire can't be that bad.

It's true that God sounds quite needy. He just wants to be loved. It's an odd thing for an all-powerful, all-knowing, eternal being to be needy, I'll admit, but just the same. Hell apparently is the fury of a God scorned.

I think that's more a dispute over the definition of "sex." As far as I know, there's no dispute regarding the definition of "hands." But in all honesty, I don't know much about the "war" you mention.

the dead horse of organized religion — Tzeentch

Ah, if only it was dead! Or a horse.

I wonder about that. For Descartes to respond imaginatively to his experience as he did — is that “distancing” himself from life, rather than another possibility of life? Is there no imagination in the life and in the world you suggest are our proper study? — Srap Tasmaner

Philosophy (in the past at least, and it seems for some now) cherished certainty and perfection. Philosophers sought immutable truth, beauty and goodness. They treated the "real world" and ordinary day-to-day life as imperfect and consequently inferior, unhelpful in seeking the absolute. For example, they thought that cases of mistakes in perception established our senses could not be trusted as sources of knowledge in any case regardless of whether they could be explained by circumstances and conditions that applied. They thought dreams indicate we can't tell for sure whether we're asleep or awake at all times. They ignored context, perhaps because they thought context was the world and the world just wasn't good enough.

I think that's what Descartes and other philosophers thought. That allowed them to ignore the fact that moment to moment their existence and conduct established they didn't harbor any reasonable doubt they had hands, or that there was an "external world." Instead, they thought they had to justify the fact they didn't doubt what they didn't doubt, instead of inquiring whether there was any reasonable basis for doubt in the first place. They were befuddled, in other words.

You’re wrong. Descartes had reason to doubt he had hands. I imagine if you were to ask him point blank what odds he would give that he had no hands he would say something like 1/10th of 1% or less, probably much less. That is not certainty of having hands, that is exceedingly strong confidence of having hands. The point isnt the percentage of doubt. It is that there is no way to exclude at least a smidgeon of doubt, due to the possibility that one’s faculties of cognitive judgement have been deranged. That is a vital and important point to make about where cognitive certainty and doubt come from, especially when it is contrasted with what he claimed one can be indubitably, 100% certain about in cognition. — Joshs

Well, if you think we have "reason to doubt" in any case absent absolute certainty, then I think you've accepted a very peculiar definition of "doubt" which admits of no reasonable discussion of it given its definition.

Do you think this was an important idea for him to convey , an idea deserving of analysis within thousands of doctoral dissertations written over the past few hundred years? — Joshs

I can't say I do, sorry. I fear there's nothing I can do about those doctoral dissertations, but I don't think I'm alone in thinking philosophers have been addressing pseudo-questions for centuries, so it isn't surprising that such dissertations were written.

Tell me how much stronger Descartes’ argument would have been had he eliminated reference to the ED — Joshs

That's difficult to do, as I don't think he needed to argue that he had hands. I don't think there was an reason to think he didn't. However, if the question was raised, e.g. if someone claimed he had no hands, or that he should doubt their existence, in his place I would have asked--"Why?" And have addressed the feebleness of the responses made.

I'm struggling to see what your point has been. Are you accusing him of disingenuously pretending to honestly believe he had no hands, or what? — Janus

I'm saying he pretended to have no hands (and so on). I'm unsure how to make this any clearer. He entertained a faux doubt--he feigned doubt--for the purpose of justifying the fact he never had any doubt in the first place. But, to put it simply, we don't doubt what we don't doubt. We don't resolve doubt when we have no doubt. We may be able to resolve our doubt when we actually doubt, by addressing the reasons for our real doubt and determining whether they have any basis. Resolution is obtained when we no longer feel any doubt.

Descartes never felt any doubt he had hands. There was nothing to resolve or explain. He would never have come to the conclusion that he had no hands, or that his doubt he had hands was justified. The conclusion was never in question. There was no question to be addressed, and the answer was "fixed." I think that entertaining pseudo-questions isn't beneficial.

Descartes was able to imagine a scenario in which the existence of his hands (to stick to the example) could be subject to doubt. — Janus

"Imagining a scenario" sounds quite a bit like pretending, to me. I suppose you may say that Descartes "imagined" he had no hands if you'd like to or even "imagined" doubting he had no hands. What I contend, though, and what it seems several people disagree with, for reasons unclear to me, is that he never actually doubted he had hands; he always believed he had hands; he always thought he had hands. Like "pretending," "imagining" something to be the case isn't believing it to be the case.

Are you offended that Descartes had thoughts that he didn’t have to? — Srap Tasmaner

No. I don't find anything he did (that I know of) offensive. I think he never, really, thought that an Evil Demon was fooling him, or that he thought he had no hands, no eyes, or that he thought any of things he said he would assume didn't exist didn't, in fact, exist. I don't find that offensive. I merely think it was a pretense.

The point is Descartes did not believe he had no hands etc. He found himself capable of doubting he had hands etc, on the strength of the possibility that he might be dreaming, it might be a trick played on him by the ED and so on. He went through the process of identifying everything he could possibly doubt in order to see what he could not possibly doubt.
— Janus

I re-post this, which you (perhaps conveniently?) failed to respond to previously. — Janus

Let's consider the definition of "doubt."

Macmillan Dictionary (online)
"to think that something is probably not true or that it probably does not exist
to think that something is unlikely"

From Dictionary.com:

"to be uncertain about; consider questionable or unlikely; hesitate to believe
verb
to be uncertain about something; be undecided in opinion or belief:
noun
a feeling of uncertainty about the truth, reality, or nature of something:
a general feeling of uncertainty, worry, or concern:
As soon as I'd dropped out of school to become a full-time musician, I was full of doubt—what if I’d made a terrible mistake?
Set your doubts aside, and listen to my business idea with an open mind."

From Collins English Dictionary (online):

"1. VARIABLE NOUN
If you have doubt or doubts about something, you feel uncertain about it and do not know whether it is true or possible.
2. TRANSITIVE VERB
If you doubt whether something is true or possible, you believe that it is probably not true or possible.
3. TRANSITIVE VERB
If you doubt something, you believe that it might not be true or genuine.
4. TRANSITIVE VERB
If you doubt someone or doubt their word, you think that they may not be telling the truth."

As you say Descartes did not believe he had no hands, I assume you think he believed he had hands. By saying he was nonetheless able to doubt he did have hands, are you saying:

He believed he had hands, but was uncertain he had hands?
He believed he had hands but thought it probably not true he had hands?
He believed he had hands but thought it questionable he had hands?
He believed he had hands but thought it unlikely he had hands?
He believed he had hands but believed it might not be true he had hands?
He believed he had hands but hesitated to believe it true he had hands?

If not, you should reconsider your use of the word "doubt." If so, you must think Descartes to have been a very frightened, undecided and confused man.

If you and others believe he really thought he had no hands, or eyes, or nose, or ears, and that an Evil Demon was having a joke at his expense, then by all means say so. If you don't believe he thought that, but nonetheless said he would assume that was true, have the kindness to say that as well.

Those who do not believe in god, when they die, will be cast into eternal torment. — Banno

It's their own fault, though. They were granted free will. They knowingly reject God, or commit mortal sin without repenting.

This is a punishment out of all proportion with the offence. — Banno

Nah. It's not a big deal anymore. In my distant youth, in Catholic grade school, we were shown films and slides which depicted sinners burning alive in the flames of hell (or maybe purgatory, depending). We saw screaming faces sticking out of the fires (well, not real ones). But now, hell is merely deprivation of the presence of God and the vaguely named "blessed" for all eternity. It's nothing worth weeping or gnashing your teeth over anymore. There's no longer a "lake of fire" to be tossed into. It would be like never being invited to a really good and very lengthy office party, or being forever persona non grata at the country club.

I dont think so. — Joshs

Ok.

To me this shows what happens when we go on first impressions rather than bothering to read the background material. — Joshs

Does it also show that you shouldn't quote someone without quoting the "background material" as well, and then complain that the person you provided the quote to hasn't bothered to read the "background material"? By all means, quote all of Husserl and the work of all phenomenologists. I'll let you know when I'm done reading, but you can check on my progress now and then if you like.

Is what you’re
really trying to argue here that the belief in a god who tells us how to think must be considered ‘pretend’? — Joshs

Alright, I confess. All this time I've been seeking to undermine belief in God.

Philosophy includes questions of moral responsibility, human rights, the scope of state powers. The answers to the questions can affect lives and deaths. — Cuthbert

It doesn't do anything so useful and worthy when it entails questioning the existence of the "external world" or asking why there's something whether than nothing and such inconclusive, unresolvable chestnuts (meaning, "something repeated to the point of staleness").

“The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the- man among other men. “(Husserl, Crisis, p.184) — Joshs

For me, this merely shows how clumsy, how awkward, how incoherent we become when we try to make explain the ineffable in words, as philosophy.

You're quoting the father of pragmatism yet aren't sure why I'd be interpreting your position as pragmatism? — Hanover

Yes.

Is the point of using this strained meaning of "pretending" to disparage the position to imply an intentional dishonesty? I get up every day expecting the sun to rise so that I can go about my day. I act just like it rises and greet the rising sun as if it had risen, totally pretending as if it rose. — Hanover

I quoted a definition of "pretend" in the OP. I think it applies. I think it's possible to pretend without being intentionally "dishonest." When I say Descartes was pretending when he assumed there was an Evil Demon, and all that entailed as he described it, I'm saying he didn't believe there was an Evil Demon, nor did he believe had no hands, eyes, etc. Do you think he believed in the Demon, and that he had no hands, or eyes and all else he said was entailed by the Demon's illusion? If you don't, I agree with you. If you do, I think there's a problem.

It strikes me as odd that a lawyer would even attempt to say that philosophy as a field is all make pretend. I mean, at least the philosopher is sincere about his intentions about the issue of foundationalism or Descartes' skepticism or theories of truth, no? — Shawn

Sorry to take so long to respond. I was (ever so sincerely) doubting my hands exist, and questioning whether, if they did, they could use this (apparent) keyboard on which I may or may not be typing, for some time now. I've decided, after serious thought, that it doesn't matter in the least.

Don't you think that lawyers pretend as well? This very moment, I'm pretending I care what you think about lawyers. What wonders will I learn from this pursuit?

I'm sure that Descartes was very sincere in his insincerity. I'm also confident that he, like Hume as Cuthbert noted, understood his faux doubt to be ridiculous when he stopped philosophizing. When philosophizing, he seriously pretended he had no hands, eyes, etc. He did that for a purpose. That's what I mean when I say pretended.

I think he was misguided in doing so. You may, if you wish, think he really believed he had no hands, etc., and only very slowly and laboriously convinced himself that he did indeed have them, but I don't.

With what limited understanding I have of pragmatism from Rorty, — Shawn

I think you have very limited understanding of Classical Pragmatism if what you understand is derived from Rorty.

My understanding of the issue is that you're perverting what Dewey might have stated in that we only think when confronted with a problem. Is that accurate in your view? — Shawn

I positively seethe with perversity. But I don't pervert what someone "might have" said. That would be silly and pointless--to pervert what might or might not have been said. If it had not been said, there would be nothing to pervert.

It happens Dewey indeed said that (although I paraphrase). You may find that out for yourself if you manage to convince yourself there is an Internet and you can access it. I happen to agree with him. And with Peirce that what he calls "self-deception" on the part of Descartes shouldn't be indulged in.

If we are good philosophers, we should doubt those things, because there are many brain conditions that show us what we at one time thought to be indubitable are merely relative , contingent constructions of mind n — Joshs

It may be useful in some sense to pretend to doubt for a particular purpose, just as it may be useful in some sense to pretend to be or do something we aren't or don't do for a particular purpose. But we should know we're pretending in that case, and I think the purposes for which we pretend would be fairly limited.

think you'd like Descartes. He's saying we don't need the Church as a foundation for knowledge. It was a step on the right direction. — frank

It's certainly true I'd agree with him about that.

No more than philosophers of mind are pretending when they invoke derangements of cognitions such as schizophrenia and then ask if there is anything left of the sense of self that the deranged mind can rely on. — Joshs

Well, we shouldn't entirely disregard the fact that in that case, they're considering the effects of a disease or condition they don't doubt exists on an actual person they don't doubt exists.

It is conceded that no one delays their day to day interactions in order to reconfirm their corporeal existence, but that again is a reference to pragmatism. — Hanover

It's a reference to what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives. I don't know what you mean by "pragmatism", but for me, if we in doing philosophy claim to doubt what we do, and are, and think, and believe, and confirm every day of our lives, we're pretending to do so, as as our own conduct, our own lives, establish that we don't doubt that at all.

We cannot begin with complete doubt. — Ciceronianus

Peirce said that by the way, not me.

We cannot begin with complete doubt.
— Ciceronianus

That's what Descartes said. :rofl: — frank

He also said this in his First Meditation, as I noted above.--"I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things"

I guess he was pretending, then.

Something like this is what Descartes was after, a core notion self in the form of the ‘I think’ that could be considered immune to doubt. — Joshs

I'm with Peirce when it comes to Descartes, and I think the same criticism applies to others. He calls it self-deception, I call it pretending. It is of course done with a purpose in mind. That purpose may be very worthy. But see the last sentence of the following quote. That's what I feel philosophers have been doing, doubting while philosophizing what they don't doubt in their actual lives.

"We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." C.S. Peirce, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities

For me, philosophy at its best is concerned with how best to live. That's a view of philosophy which held in ancient times. I favor the Stoic position in that respect. I know philosophy over time became less and less concerned with our lives as we live them from day to day, to the point that now it seems, deliberately and even literally, otherworldly (there's that external world). To his credit (I think) Dewey felt philosophy should be a method cultivated to address the "problems of men" rather than the "problems of philosophy."

I appreciate you disagree with them, but to the extent your disagreement rests upon your claim that they were simply disingenuous, there's no proof of that, and the argument is entirely an as hom. — Hanover

How's this then: They claim to have no hands (or eyes, etc.) or to doubt they do, despite the fact that the see them, feel them, use them, and in every way act as if they know they have them and do not doubt that they do. But perhaps you don't think they acted as if they had hands or believed they had them.

Regarding a pertinent hypothetical, I think this is more apt: "Doctor, assume an Evil Demon has caused you to think the plaintiff exists, and is your patient, and that you have treated him, but all this is but an illusion. In that case, would it be your opinion the plaintiff has sustained a permanent injury?"

Category error, counselor. You just claimed it's a "philosophical question" and now you're implicitly comparing it (negatively) to a "scientific answer". No bueno, señor. — 180 Proof

What I was trying to say is that if no scientific answer is sought, it would appear no real answer is sought, i.e. that it's a pseudo-question, as you note.

Do you have grounds to question "what you know"? Or grounds to reject "what you know"? If in both cases you don't, then the question is moot. — 180 Proof

Or, I think, that you "pretend" there are grounds, though there are none.

Perhaps, that "what we know" is subconscious or that we are mistaken that we know "what we know". — 180 Proof

But in that case we wouldn't know. But when we do know, how do we know we know? I don't think this is a real question unless it relates to the process by which we ascertained something is the case, or perhaps something like a neurological answer regarding what takes place.

Philosophy, when at its best, can show us how to live, but I don't think it's a route by which we can satisfy ourselves regarding our purpose and place in the universe, or our salvation, by addressing "ultimate questions." I think there may be other ways to do that, but think they're evocative, and address emotion and the spiritual. Art, music, poetry, religion may be evocative in this sense, but not philosophy, or so I think.

Ad hominem fallacies go to the person rather than the argument. Everyone knows this. And then the straw person argument that because Heidegger embodies the history of Western philosophy, he as untenable as Christian metaphysics. Curious. Why not simply look at the discussion and figure it out? — Constance

You take me far too literally. I'm saying that calling Heidegger philosophy incarnate is like claiming Jesus was the Word made flesh. It's a substantial, I would say greatly exaggerated, claim. To that claim (which I think preposterous) I made a response which I thought responded, sarcastically, to such a claim, noting that philosophy incarnate was also in that case an unrepentant Nazi.

Me? I want to know what it is to be a existing person in the middle of reality, "thrown into" a world of suffering and joy. — Constance

Well, we all know that, do we not? If not, in what sense don't we know it? I think you're looking for some kind of a religious or mystical revelation.

How is this any more abstract than inquiring about how brakes work, knowing full well how to use them? Asking how knowledge works is an inquiry that in no way steps beyond the boundaries natural inquiry.
So I am saying an inquiry into the nature of knowledge is not an abstract matter at all. — Constance

If we knew how brakes work (I don't, not really) why would we ask how they work? If we ask how we know how they work, wouldn't the answer be based on our experience with brakes and making or fixing them? What else could the answer be, except perhaps a neurological or biological one addressing the functioning of the brain?

In any event, Descartes did have reason to doubt. — Hanover

He had reason to doubt he had hands, eyes, blood, senses (though using them all to write that he doubted them)? Doubt the "external", the chair he sat on, the paper he wrote on, the pen or quill or whatever he used to write with? He had reason to doubt, in other words, that he was writing that he had reason to doubt? All this is what he claimed. You may consider the reasons he gave as adequate for him to doubt he had hands; I don't. Had he reached for something in the past and found he had no hand to grasp it? Try to clip his fingernails only to find he had no fingers?

I think the absurdity of such claims highlights the fact he never could have believed them in the first place.

I take the thrust of your objection to be that you don't believe Descartes when he says he had doubt, and you suggest he's dishonest at some level in having asserted the doubt he did. Your objection is therefore an ad hom because it hardly matters whether he specifically did doubt what he says to have doubted. — Hanover

I'm claiming only that he pretended something was the case in a misguided effort to "prove" something he had no need to prove. Children aren't dishonest when they play "Let's Pretend."

Isn't the nature of a hypothetical that we assume something for the sake of argument, regardless of truth? Hypotheticals themselves appear in the subjunctive, indicating they are not statements of fact, but are, as you say, "pretend" (e.g. "If I were you" versus "If I was you."). — Hanover

I don't think it can be said a hypothetical situation is one in which we're asked to assume that everything is an illusion. What would be the hypothetical situation in that case? There could be no situation at all. He's doing more than asking a hypothetical question.

Imagine yourself asking this question in court. "Doctor, assume that your patient didn't exist. Would it be your opinion in that case that he had sustained a permanent injury?"

Holy Mother Church has so much to answer for, I'm afraid.

So, if I say "Suppose it rains tomorrow, will they still have the game," I'm pretending it will rain tomorrow. Is that correct? — T Clark

Come now. Are you seriously claiming this is comparable, or analogous, to saying this?

“I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be.”
― René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy