I think that's more a dispute over the definition of "sex." As far as I know, there's no dispute regarding the definition of "hands." But in all honesty, I don't know much about the "war" you mention. — Ciceronianus

Lucky you. It's dismal. The relevance, I'm arguing, is that as well as all the heat and dust there is a metaphysical question or doubt, although not the same as Descartes's doubt. One proposition is that, given all that can be known about a person's body and its history, their sex may be inferred, if it can be inferred at all. Another view is that such a proposition is false. On the contrary, it is believed, any amount of information about a person's body is insufficient to establish their sex with certainty; and such information is indeed not even necessary. The 'war' is real enough: passions are raised, careers threatened and relationships broken. Perhaps this is a case where we have not enough in the way of general metaphysics outlining at least the possible grounds for agreement and difference. Far from being a waste of time the speculations could contribute to making peace. Anyway, nothing else seems to be working.

One of my daughters has scolded me for being confused by the term "non-binary" and finding it difficult to remember to refer to someone as "they" or "them." I like to think this is more the result of being old than being a bigot.

I can see this as being an issue in law, and know it has been to an extent in the case of restrooms, but haven't had to deal with it yet. I look forward to it being addressed by our Supreme Court, after it has dealt with abortion, again. [Irony warning] Since it's determined speech includes money paid, I'd think it would be able to handle this area with ease.

Ah well, nothing wrong with deliberately misquoting someone, is there? — Ciceronianus

:roll: Don't be so dense.
My point is that your list was incomplete. My version is the sense in which Descartes would doubt he had hands, were he to do so.

Is there any basis for this preference? One which makes it more likely to be correct than ED, for example? — Ciceronianus

Yes. Its sheer arbitrariness, for one.
And, the quantity of additional theory which is required to flesh out this universe. It must posit godlike beings (or being, in the solipsistic version) capable of sustaining this unfathomably complex delusion of only apparently stable objects. What is their biology? What is our own, since all we know of ours is just illusion? Are they supernatural, which would require an entirely new physics to account for?

These reasons are not definitive. They can't be, since we in principle cannot be certain it is not true.

Why should we care whether a theory fits all observations? What if it fit most observations, as opposed to theories which fit none at all? — Ciceronianus

If it fits most observations, then something must be wrong with the theory, or with the observations. If it fits none, then the theory is just nonsense.

These reasons are not definitive. They can't be, since we in principle cannot be certain it is not true. — hypericin

Ah, "in principle." Happily, absolute certainty doesn't matter in practice, which is to say that it's disregarded, just as we disregard in practice any pretended "question" regarding the existence of our hands.

Yeah, except this is a philosophy forum, discussing philosophical topics. You know, "what is really out there?" "What do we really know?" Not the pragmatics of using your hands.

Maybe you've just got the wrong forum? People have lived perfectly successful, pragmatic lives without raising a single philosophical question.

Yeah, except this is a philosophy forum, discussing philosophical topics. You know, "what is really out there?" — hypericin

And, don't forget, "Do we have hands?" Or eyes, noses, feet, etc. "Are our hands really out there? Do we really know we have hands?"

Wittgenstein may have been right when he claimed that a good and serious philosophical work could consist entirely of jokes. Cicero may have been right when we wrote that there's nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it. Being fond of the Classical Pragmatists, I may have a different idea of what constitutes philosophical topics than you do.

Do you have hands, by the way? I assume you're not certain you do. But how could you tell, in any case, "non-pragmatically"?

Yes, the law will decide. The link I am making to Descartes is on the question of 'what can be doubted?' Knowing someone's complete physiology, present and past, does it make sense to doubt their sex? Some say very insistently, no, it makes no sense, because the sex can be read off the physiology with certainty. Others say most stridently, yes, because a person's sex is determined not by observation of others but by that person's self-perception. The law, in deciding, will need to grapple with the metaphysics. If it doesn't do so explicitly and with argument, then it will do so implicitly and with unquestioned assumptions. It's a case for philosophy of law, not just for law. If the law-makers ever get round to consulting a philosopher I would bet that the name of Descartes will surface at some point in the discussion.

I'm not sure how much I'm devil's advocating here because I share your impatience with apparently meaningless questions, brains in vats and other distractions. But increasingly I see how these tangles can be a cause of real life problems and I have more sympathy for the ivory tower puzzles than I used to feel.

Knowing someone's complete physiology, present and past, does it make sense to doubt their sex? Some say very insistently, no, it makes no sense, because the sex can be read off the physiology with certainty. Others say most stridently, yes, because a person's sex is determined not by observation of others but by that person's self-perception. The law, in deciding, will need to grapple with the metaphysics. If it doesn't do so explicitly and with argument, then it will do so implicitly and with unquestioned assumptions. — Cuthbert

I think it will be more a matter of definition--the presence or absence of one--at least in the case of the law where I practice. When a word is defined by the law (as in a statute containing definitions of words used) that definition is accepted. The meaning of the word is clear, and it isn't subject to interpretation. Law is subject to interpretation only when it's ambiguous (where reasonable persons may disagree on meaning).

If it isn't defined by the law, recourse may be had to dictionary definitions, and, again, if the meaning is clear, there's no opportunity for interpretation. If the meaning of the word in itself or in context is ambiguous, then courts may interpret the law. That may be done based on legislative history if it exists, comparing the law with other, similar, laws in which the word is used, looking to case law interpreting other laws--there are rules of statutory construction which are followed by courts. Meanings of words, which can change over time and in circumstances, are significant, not metaphysical questions regarding the existence of an external world. You may say metaphysical assumptions are built into the meaning of words, and in a trivial way (as far as the law is concerned) that may be true. The law generally is committed to the existence of an "external world." You won't find me, or I think any lawyer, citing Descartes as an authority in a court proceeding.

Chances are that in a court, those people who assume there may be an Evil Demon or that there's no certainty we have hands won't be considered "reasonable." Depending on the matter before the court, they may be not only considered but adjudged incompetent.

You won't find me, or I think any lawyer, citing Descartes as an authority in a court proceeding. — Ciceronianus

True. I am talking about the philosophical bases of law and law-making rather than legal practice. But you will find philosophers dealing with legal concepts and lawyers who do philosophy. I'm thinking of Mary Warnock, for example, her work on education of children with disabilities (1970 Education Act). Abortion, passim. Human rights law. etc.

Being fond of the Classical Pragmatists, I may have a different idea of what constitutes philosophical topics than you do. — Ciceronianus

I’m curious. Would you consider the following to be an example of “let’s pretend”?

“…entirely honest, sincere and unaffected, because unprepense, meditation upon the Idea of God, into which the Play of Musement will inevitably sooner or later lead, and which by developing a deep sense of the adorability of that Idea, will produce a Truly religious Belief in His Reality and His nearness. It is a reasonable argument, because it naturally results in the most intense and living determination (Bestimmung) of the soul toward shaping the Muser's whole conduct into conformity with the Hypothesis that God is Real and very near; and such a determination of the soul in regard to any proposition is the very essence of a living Belief in such proposition. “

Musement, you mean? I've always been interested in Peirce's Neglected Argument for the Existence of God. But no, I don't think he was pretending, as he wasn't purporting to doubt what he didn't doubt.

I would say that venerable joker, Rene Descartes, was (in effect) playing "Let's Pretend" when he pretended an Evil Demon--evidently an even more practiced and accomplished joker than Descartes himself--was causing him to believe the entire world actually existed — Ciceronianus

I don't think "Lets Pretend" is the same as "it could be."

:point:

I don't think he was pretending, as he wasn't purporting to doubt what he didn't doubt. — Ciceronianus

:up:

Google Definitions:

Pretend: behave so as to make it appear that something is the case when in fact it is not.

"I closed my eyes and pretended I was asleep"

Assume: suppose to be the case, without proof.

"topics which assume detailed knowledge of local events"

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There's a subtle difference between pretend and assume.

Philosophy is assumption-based and so, philosophy can't be a game of let's pretend!

Of course, if we put ourselves in explore mode, pretending is not just permissible but in fact necessary. Truth isn't the only game in town now is it? We may fantasize, lead fictional lives, immerse ourselves in RPGs, escapism is healthy.