I don't know what more to say. If the statement "It's raining but John thinks it isn't" is true, then it's raining but John thinks it isn't. If John's statement "It's raining but I don't think it is" is true, the John must think it's raining and think that it's not raining; or perhaps know it's raining and think it isn't raining. In what circumstances would that be true?

"Stoicism can not contain itself. Stoics misinterpret feelings and human nature and set unnatural limits to other people. They prioritize their -ism over being interested in the well-being of themselves and others." (Nietzsche?) — mortenwittgenstein

I never could understand why Frantic Freddie Nietzsche was so upset with the Stoics, but he was the sort to get upset whenever and wherever he could. Perhaps he understood that his amor fati and concept of eternal recurrence were for the most part accepted by the Stoics, and was angry for that reason. He loved to think of himself as an original.

recommends accepting things that "outside of your control" and being "indifferent" to the external world asserting the falsehood that there's no difference between being rich or poor but it's all to do with a mindset. Second stoicism leads to passivity instead of forward thinking revolution such as women's rights and freedom from colonialism or slavery. A stoic would just have "accepted fate" and tried not to fight against it but focused on what they "can control" like being a good slave or being a good secretary, this comes after reading many chapters of bullshit in a book titled "the little book of stoicism" I wish I could link the screenshot pages to make my argument more clear but I don't know how to do so. — Gitonga

Stoicism doesn't say there is no difference between being rich and being poor. It teaches that you shouldn't let the fact that other people are rich disturb you to the point where your reason is incapacitated.

Also, Stoicism maintains that we each are obligated to live according to nature, which to the ancient Stoics was to use our reason to live a virtuous life. It's a part of reason, or virtue, to act for the good of others--which would be to do things within our control--because we each share in the immanent divinity of the universe. Also, the ancient Stoics promoted the ideas of the "brotherhood of man" and the natural equality of human beings, because we all carry within us a part of the divine.

With our current level of technology it would be extremely difficult to assemble very large stones of different shapes with extreme precision. Also cutting perfect square holes into hard stone is virtually impossible without modern tools and indeed would be even difficult today. — Marco Colombini

Ah, you don't fool me. That only proves aliens were involved, not God.

he point is that if it did happen, he would have said something true. — Snakes Alive

Sorry, but I don't think the statement "X is the case, but I don't think X is the case" is a true statement.

As I said:

The hypothetical John's statement would be "true" only to the same extent it would be "true" that he thought it was raining while aware it wasn't. But that wouldn't happen. So it would be as "true" as something that wouldn't happen would be "true."

For me, there are problems with describing what wouldn't happen as "true."

Definition of futile
1: serving no useful purpose : completely ineffective
// efforts to convince him were futile

--Merriam-Webster Online

The hypothetical John's statement would be "true" only to the same extent it would be "true" that he thought it was raining while aware it wasn't. But that wouldn't happen. So it would be as "true" as something that wouldn't happen would be "true."

Because when we're not mistaken, we're not mistaken. When someone else is not mistaken, they're not mistaken. According to Moore, in the first case there's a mistake. In the second case, there is no mistake.

Such a profound insight. And all that was needed to arrive at it was to pretend that a statement which would not be made was made, and was "true."

Oh no. I've made an assertion I don't believe without saying I don't believe it. That's absurd, isn't it? Why is that?

Your first and last paragraph are in direct conflict with one another. — creativesoul

Well, if you think statements (1) obviously not intended to be taken as literally true, and (2) which refer to what was believed in the past, are the same as statements (3) to be treated, according to Moore, as literally true and (4) which refer to what is believed now, I suppose that would be correct.

Each and every time one is mistaken - and those situations are innumerable - there are most certainly at least a few true statements about the scenario, that that particular individual cannot say about themselves without sounding absurd, despite the fact that others can say without issue. That is the scenario put forth by Moore. — creativesoul

There's no mistake, not really. Someone might say "It's raining but I don't believe it" in frustration or amazement (for example, if it hasn't rained for a long time but rains heavily the day of an outdoor wedding). In that case there's no mistake, of course. The speaker isn't actually standing in the rain without believing it's not raining. Someone may express the fact that they were mistaken by saying "It's raining, but I didn't believe it was."

In Moore's example, when it's said of MacIntosh that he doesn't believe or doesn't think it's raining, is that statement being made of MacIntosh while MacIntosh is standing in the rain, or watching it rain? In that case, he's not mistaken; he's not making an error, and we wouldn't say that of him. Something's seriously wrong with him.

If it's raining and MacIntosh tell us he doesn't think it is while MacIntosh is sitting with us in a windowless room, then he'd be mistaken.

There's no circumstance, however, where we would say "It's raining but I don't believe it is" unless there was something seriously wrong with us, or unless we're playing games. There is no truth to the statement. It sounds absurd because it would never be said by a normal person in a normal situation, but nor would it ever be thought true. It might be thought to be a statement made by someone seriously ill, but that obviously isn't what Moore intends. I think there is no paradox because there is nothing "true" about Moore's contrivance.

Not sure if a sorta-Stoic like you gets as much of a kick outta Žižek as sorta-Epicureans like me usually do. "The first duty", perhaps; certainly not the only one or the last ... — 180 Proof

It's not clear to me that philosophy is needed for us to understand that we're in deep shit. And, if we don't already know that, I doubt it will be philosophy that persuades us that we are. It may help us understand why we are, though. But in order to do that, I think we have to consider what's wrong with how we live, which ultimately involves determining how we should live.

Others can say it about us, when we're mistaken about the weather, but we cannot say it about ourselves in the same scenario, when we're mistaken about the weather, without sounding absurd.

"I do not believe that it's raining outside, but I'm wrong" describes the very same scenario as "It's raining but I do not believe it". — creativesoul

Yes. But you said there are virtually an innumerable number of true statements we cannot make about ourselves without sounding absurd. In what sense are the statements "I do not believe that it's raining outside, but I'm wrong?" or "It's raining but I do not believe it" true? I assume they'd have to be made by someone who doesn't believe something is taking place though aware it's taking place, or someone who knows something is taking place but does not believe it's taking place. Otherwise, it strikes me they wouldn't be true statements.

Who would make such "true statements" in virtually innumerable instances?

We cannot say the same of ourselves, while it's happening to us, because it's happening to us; which means that we are the one lacking true belief about the weather. — creativesoul

What is the "true statement about ourselves" here?

I don't think the law justifies property. — Andrew4Handel

The law doesn't justify anything, for that matter. What's legal isn't necessarily what's right or just.

Property in the sense of physical objects or land merely exists. Property requires no justification.

If we're discussing property in the sense of something someone has a right to, I think legal rights are the only rights which exist for any practicable purpose. Those "rights" people like to refer to as "natural rights" are merely what people think should be legal rights.

It’s the other way about. Without property there would be no laws protecting it. — NOS4A2

If "property" as being used in this thread means "a physical object" or "land" than I suppose that's the case. But I thought something different was being addressed.

For example can you own something once you are dead? In this sense owning something does not attach you to the thing in an compelling way. — Andrew4Handel

Well, you can't do much of anything when you're dead. However, you can, now, impose restrictions on the use of property which will govern its use after you're dead, through a will or a trust.

Anyone may steal a car or otherwise violate the law applicable to property of persons. This merely impacts possession of property. The property may be obtained through the courts, and the violators may be arrested and prosecuted if the violation is criminal, and be punished.

You may disagree with the law all you like. But there is nothing else which will define property and establish rules governing it, which may be enforced by any authority.

If the concern is solely whether the choice increases the chances of the Democrats winning the presidency--and I assume that was ultimately the sole concern--the choice is probably a good one, compared to others.

For the concept of "property" to exist, the only thing required is law, if by "property" you mean something which a person can claim to own.

They are virtually innumerable such true statements(if that's what you mean by "truths") about one that they cannot assert about themselves without sounding 'absurd'. — creativesoul

Speak for yourself. Though I can, of course, make statements about myself (whether false or true) in an tone or voice which will make those statements sound absurd, or in a manner which will appear absurd, or in circumstances in which the statements are absurd. But I'd guess that's not what you mean.

Like all paradoxes the solution was found in a re-wording of the issue. Resolving this paradox resulted fairly directly in the logic of speech acts, which was not a bad thing. — Banno

You see, I'd have hoped that would result without the need for this contrivance. Ah well. But what on earth is Marie McGinn speaking about? Surely (I know I shouldn't call you that) she means "there are truths about me which I cannot assert without appearing absurd"?

I don't know much about her, I confess. But I understand she's a lawyer, and of course we need more lawyers in high government positions.

Irony, you know. I think we make lousy politicians, being trained to represent usually one client at a time, rather than groups with diverse interests.

Absolutely everyone agrees to all of this. — Srap Tasmaner

If that's the case, then it seems to me that debating, or perhaps more properly discussing, this "paradox" at length is nothing more than an effort to explain what nobody would ask to be explained in the first place.

https://fortune.com/2016/03/12/googles-go-computer-vs-human/

Hanover is right (see link). And, as a chess player who has resented claims that computers can beat people at chess, but not at Go, I say to Go fans nyah, nyah, nyah, nyah, nyah.

Then you agree the Moore sentence is not a contradiction. So what's wrong with it? Why is it something no one would ever say? — Srap Tasmaner

A statement is made regarding the weather by X. Then, X says he doesn't believe the statement he just made regarding the weather. When people say they don't believe what they just said is the case, that strikes me as indicative of a problem with the sentence, and possibly a much greater problem with the speaker.

The sentence isn't "I say it's raining, but I don't believe it's raining", it's just "It's raining, but I don't believe it's raining." — Pfhorrest

It doesn't say "I say it's raining" because "I" clearly is speaking, saying, that it's raining. It isn't necessary to say you're speaking when you're speaking. That in itself would be peculiar.

When someone says it's raining, they merely say that. They say nothing about themselves. The say something about the weather.

Gee whiz, that Wade Davis sure is a gloomy fellow.

I don't think civilization "has been brought low" by Covid 19 quite yet. After all, Wade Davis is still being published.

And I don't think the argument regarding the significance of this pandemic in the fate of our Glorious Republic is well supported by detailing all the problems experienced by it since the Second World War. By his account, the U.S. was coughing up blood, at least, by the time Covid 19 showed up.

I'm inclined to think, no doubt cynically, that the professor was already convinced of the decline of God's Favorite Country and the pandemic served as an excuse for noting that conviction. Even so, it would come as no surprise to me that we've been looking rather seedy and down-and-out, petty, ignorant and downright stupid to the rest of the world. I don't think that Covid 19's the cause, though, and hope that the End Times aren't here yet. But I confess I've been thinking about Pope's The Dunciad and these words which appear at its end:

“Nor public flame, nor private, dares to shine;
Nor human spark is left, nor glimpse divine!
Lo! thy dread empire, Chaos! is restored;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall;
And universal darkness buries all.”

At the risk of being subjected to the wrath of unenlightened, however, I note pedantically that the Roman Empire lasted far longer than the subsequent, namby-pamby empires the highly civilized Wade Davis mentions. Rome fairly well dominated the Mediterranean world by 200 B.C.E., expanded from then into Europe and Great Britain and the Middle East. It almost slipped into fragments in the 3rd century C.E., but was revitalized under Aurelian and Diocletian. The accepted fall of the Western Empire took place in 476 C.E., and the Eastern Empire to centuries after that, even incorporating much of the old Western Empire during the reign of Justinian in the 6th century C.E. and then in diminished form until the 15th century C.E.

So hell, the American Empire may still last for centuries, if the U.S.A is supposed to be the new Rome. So, you see the relevance of the digression.

y girlfriend similarly asked why anyone would say anything like the statement in question, and I said in response that they wouldn’t, because it would be such an odd thing to say, but the interesting question, what makes for the paradox, is WHY is it such a weird thing to say about oneself that nobody would ever say it, but it’s not at all weird to say about others? — Pfhorrest

But it would be a weird thing to say about another. Because in order to say that another is saying the same thing, it would be necessary to say that they said or say it's raining, but don't believe it is, or said or say it's raining, but said or also says they don't believe it's raining. Only then would MacIntosh be saying, as does McGillicudy, that it's raining but he doesn't believe it's raining.

Really, you know, they're just games. Wonderful games (chess I know is, Go I heard is), but games nonetheless.

Yours is a text and its meaning and significance - and what you want to make of it. The man is incidental and peripheral to that. — tim wood

"'Once the rockets go up, who cares where they come down? That's not my department' says Wernher von Braun." --Tom Lehrer.

the risk of inducing apoplexy in banno et al, — Isaac

Banno "et al," forsooth.

Speaking on behalf of "et al", I wish to note something once wisely said about philosophy. No, not the comment made by my daemon Cicero that "there is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it," which is something of a truism. Rather, the statement of C. S. "Charlie Logic" Peirce: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." Why? Because there be dragons which make Puff himself look like something we meet on the street each day.

I think Peirce would say, similarly, that we shouldn't pretend in philosophy that a paradox is presented by describing as true a statement which nobody would make about himself/herself, let alone make at all, in any circumstances which resemble what takes place in the life of humans. What we learn from such a fabrication, beyond the fact that it is clearly a fabrication (which can be determined with very little effort) can only be a fabrication itself.

where does the conscious awareness of a newly conceived baby come from? — Benj96

Damned if I know. I think it has to do with a stork.

Hence, if Mac asserts both that it is raining and also that he does not believe that it is raining, we can conclude that he is being insincere. — Banno

Ah, but if we pretend that he wasn't, then we can keep having fun.

If it's raining then the assertion "it's raining" is true even if the person saying it is lying. — Michael

If it's raining and he/she says it's raining, there is no lie. No false statement is made.

Of course nobody would say it. The question is, why not? — Srap Tasmaner

I think the questions to be addressed are--Why does Moore say/think it would be said? Why does he maintain a true statement has been made? He doesn't bother to explain. If there's no reason to accept his assumption, then there's a problem with the "thought experiment", I think.

It's not so much a question of how I approach the question. I won't approach it; I won't even circle it warily. But if someone is really interested in obtaining an answer, if an answer can be found, it seems to me obvious that a scientific approach presents the best chance of success. Nobody's going to figure out why the universe exists by thinking about it really hard.

And that's the only question, isn't it? Why does something exist? There is no "nothing" which is an alternative to something and would exist if there wasn't something.

You are making the assumption that the "sentences" (assertions?) "I know it's raining" and "It's raining" are equivalent. — Pierre-Normand

Actually, if I'm assuming anything, I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another. In any case, there is no true statement being made. It's necessary that we pretend the statement is true for the paradox to exist. I suppose we pretend when we engage in thought experiments generally, but I doubt this is one of those experiments where we pretend something is the case.

I think this is an example of treating something which isn't a problem as if it is a problem.

The sentence "I know it's raining (i.e., it's raining) but I don't think it's raining (i.e., but I think it's not raining)" isn't "true" as the thought experiment proposes. There can be no situation in which it's true. When we know something to be the case--that it's raining--we don't think that it isn't raining. As a result, there's no paradox.

Their purpose is to tease out hitherto unnoticed consequences of our assumptions. This peculiar tough experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions. — Pierre-Normand

If you say so. But it seems to me not a particularly "tough" experiment; instead a silly one. For me, addressing the question "Why is it absurd for me to say something I would never say?" doesn't strike me as useful.