The person who says "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" isn't being sincere. — Michael

Even in that case, the speaker cannot believe both at the same time.

All with have are two propositions... — Isaac

No. It is a long standing historical mistake to treat belief statements as though they are equivalent to statements and/or propositions.

Hence...

Talk of P, when discussing belief begins on the wrong footing.

...If the truth of "It is raining" is determined by whether it's raining, not by whether I believe it's raining, then I can say it is truthfully raining, but I don't believe it is. — Isaac

Equivocating the term "truth" doesn't help.

What you cannot do is believe it is raining, and not believe that it is raining at the same time.

The problem here is caused by the contradiction between a philosophical commitment to correspondence theory, and the actual psychological reality that the truth of a statement is always a judgment and always based on the belief of the person doing the judging.

Nah.

The problem, as I've expressed clearly enough, is that some people are treating the two belief statements as though they are not belief statements at all, but rather just - at face value - some statement/proposition or another... in general. The problem is of historical origins, and it amounts to a conflation of belief and statements, and/or belief and propositions. There's a remarkable actual difference between the two...

Hence...

Both statements can be true at the same time, without contradiction, but both cannot be believed at the same time without self-contradiction.

Suppose you are sitting in a windowless room. It begins to rain outside. You have not heard a weather report, so you don’t know that it’s raining. So you don’t believe that it’s raining. Thus your friend McGillicuddy, who knows your situation, can say truly of you, “It’s raining, but MacIntosh doesn’t believe it is.” But if you, MacIntosh, were to say exactly the same thing to McGillicuddy—“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”—your friend would rightly think you’d lost your mind. Why, then, is the second sentence absurd? As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

As common language users, we automatically presume sincerity and/or honesty in another's speech. This happens autonomously, early on, and it is necessary for language acquisition. It's a default not of our own choosing. But later on, when we come to realize that some folk are insincere, we temper our certainty/trust in another's sincerity accordingly. The tendency, the need, to assume sincerity most of the time remains.

The second sentence in question above is 'absurd'(I much prefer self-contradictory/incoherent) as a result of violating what's possible for us to believe, and as a result of our recognizing that the speaker themselves cannot believe both statements at the same time despite being quite able to assert both simulataneously.

Furthermore, the speaker is not saying something true about themselves, as Moore suggests, they are clearly contradicting themselves from one belief statement to the next.

I guess I am not reading the statement correctly because it is truthful and reasonable to me. He states that it is raining, which is factual and true so he has confirmed the truth. The fact that he states that he doesn't believe it is true is because there is no necessity to hold a belief in anything after you have established the truth.

The Moorean statement, "It's raining but I don't believe it is" is paradoxical only if it both makes sense and it doesn't. The reason why it makes sense seems to be based on the fact that when another person says, "it's raining but TheMadFool doesn't believe it" there's nothing fishy going on.

The instant I say of myself, "it's raining but I don't believe it is" it becomes self-contradictory i.e. it doesn't make sense.

A resolution of the paradox requires that either in both cases, the sentence is nonsense or in both cases it makes complete sense.

Clearly, in my humble opinion, "it's raining but TheMadFool doesn't believe it is" can't be nonsense for the simple reason that there are many things happening out there in the world that I, TheMadFool, am not aware of so can't form a belief on them. Take the recent explosion at a port in Beirut. When it happened (on Tuesday), I wasn't aware of it and so I didn't believe it - the sentence "It's exploding (in Beirut) but TheMadFool doesn't believe it is" is perfectly sensible.

So, the only option available for us is to try and demonstrate that when I utter the words "its raining but I don't believe it is" makes sense. One possible way seems to be to make believing/belief an option i.e. there maybe truths/facts but we can choose whether to believe them or not - a fact/truth is different to any beliefs about it.

This strategy meshes well with the Justified True Belief (JTB) theory of knowledge as it, like I'm doing here, considers truths/facts as distinct from beliefs about them - the basic idea being that there could be truths/facts but we may or may not believe them.

Too, the phenomenon of denialism - someone refusing to believe a fact/truth as happens when having a traumatic experience - supports the idea that belief/believing could be an option independent of facts.

:chin:

I'm discussing the belief statements, because that's how the self-contradiction and/or incoherency is found and understood. — creativesoul

There are two belief statements in question here. "It is raining outside" and "I do not believe it is raining outside". They cannot both be believed at the same time. — creativesoul

Even in that case, the speaker cannot believe both at the same time. — creativesoul

I'm not saying that he believes both, only that he says both. People can assert things that they don't believe. That's why there's nothing wrong with the sentence "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining". The only problem is when you infer from this that the speaker believes the sentence to be true, but then the problem is with your inference, not with the sentence itself.

Not to put a fine point on it. But the two statements are not equal. A truth is a statement with sufficient evidence to accept the statement as truth. A statement of only belief is a statement of minimum evidence or at least that the belief does not have sufficient evidence to accept the truth of the statement.
If he's making the statement of truth when he has no direct knowledge of it then you have to consider that the statement was made by his friend and likely a trusted source. A trusted source magnifies the evidence to a sufficient level that acceptance established the Truth. The value of a statement of belief is greater when the establishment of truth has been achieved. Since the greater value was stated then the extra statement of affirmation would have been redundant and unnecessary. It would have been irrational because the extra statement of belief would have added no value in terms of a contribution to the conversation. However, the effect of the statement lacking belief caused a good deal of contribution to our conversation.

A Justified True Belief is just a restatement of the condition where sufficient evidence to accept the statement as Truth has been achieved. To continue to refer to it as a belief expresses an unjustified resistance to accept the existent difference.

3
A Justified True Belief is just a restatement of the condition where sufficient evidence to accept the statement as Truth has been achieved. To continue to refer to it as a belief expresses an unjustified resistance to accept the existent difference. — Edgy Roy

I can go along with your distinction between 'truths' and 'beliefs' as being the degree of justification, but it's a little too far to say that someone not accepting this proposed definition is somehow in denial, don't you think?

I proposed no definition of anything, I just stated that the difference between the two was clear and so to treat them as identical has no justification that I can derive for the failure to recognize or accept that the two are not the same. My distinction between the two is based only on the single fact that one has satisfied the required condition for acceptance and the other has not.

My distinction between the two is based only on the single fact that one has satisfied the required condition for acceptance and the other has not. — Edgy Roy

Indeed. Distinction is one thing. Labeling one half 'belief' and the other 'truth' is an act of definition. We do not get to just define terms to our liking, they already have public meanings (often many). For example, both types of thought might be called 'beliefs'. One simply stronger than the other and additionally earning the label 'truth'.

Any two things are identical in some sense and different in another, so without context it's wrong to say anyone is ignoring the difference, they may merely think it irrelevant to the context.

I tend to draw a less sharp distinction than you do between those beliefs about which I'm prepared to say they're true and the others. For me, my judgement about whether the criteria have been met to call something 'true' is not simple, nor always readily available to my concious awareness.

So I agree with you that "It's raining" and "I believe it's raining" express the same type of thing (a belief about the weather) to different degrees of certainty, but I don't think we can universalise the distinction. That too is something within the mind of the person making the statements.

Labeling is not an act of definition. You are confusing the container with the thing contained. Labeling is by definition an act of giving a thing a label. Naming something is not the same as defining the thing itself. I doubt now your ability to discern the difference between any two objects because you clearly have weak comprehension skils as demonstrated by the inability to form a proper argument. The inaccuracies in your statements make it easy to understand why you prefer belief over truth because you don't possess the faculties necessary to validate the truth of even a simple expression. You are just plain irrelevant in relation to this site and any reasoned discourse so I will conclude and bother you no further.

Moore was envisioning a situation where the speaker (MacInstosh) doesn't know nor does he have any reason to believe that it's raining outside. — Pierre-Normand

Only in philosophy would someone think that there is anything to be gained from imagining that someone would say something that nobody would say in a situation which would not take place.

The domain of logical possibility...

Only in philosophy would someone think that there is anything to be gained from imagining that someone would say something that nobody would say in a situation which would not take place. — Ciceronianus the White

It's a thought experiment. Physicists also make use of those aplenty, not just philosophy. Their purpose is to tease out hitherto unnoticed consequences of our assumptions. This peculiar thought experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions.

Their purpose is to tease out hitherto unnoticed consequences of our assumptions. This peculiar tough experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions. — Pierre-Normand

If you say so. But it seems to me not a particularly "tough" experiment; instead a silly one. For me, addressing the question "Why is it absurd for me to say something I would never say?" doesn't strike me as useful.

This peculiar tough experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. Yet fifty-eight years later the effects are here somewhat blunt.

If you say so. But it seems to me not a particularly "tough" experiment; instead a silly one. For me, addressing the question "Why is it absurd for me to say something I would never say?" doesn't strike me as useful. — Ciceronianus the White

It's useful in making trouble for theories of language that fail to account for the absurdity of the utterance. It's not devised to instruct ordinary people what it is that they can or can't sensibly say. (Also, I meant 'thought' not 'tough', sorry).

I should mention, also, that in addition to the early post from @Pfhorrest that I already mentioned, the Wikipedia entry on Moore's paradox is concise and espacially well crafted. The approach promoted by Richard Moran at the end of the article is especially congenial to me since I like to approach problems in the philosophy of thought and of language from the standpoint of the necessary interplay of practical and theoretical reason. And the requisite interplay also presupposes a capacity for self-knowledge.

I think this is an example of treating something which isn't a problem as if it is a problem.

The sentence "I know it's raining (i.e., it's raining) but I don't think it's raining (i.e., but I think it's not raining)" isn't "true" as the thought experiment proposes. There can be no situation in which it's true. When we know something to be the case--that it's raining--we don't think that it isn't raining. As a result, there's no paradox.

The sentence "I know it's raining (i.e., it's raining) but I don't think it's raining (i.e., but I think it's not raining)" isn't "true" as the thought experiment proposes. — Ciceronianus the White

(Edited response)

You are making the assumption that the "sentences" (assertions?) "I know it's raining" and "It's raining" are equivalent. One can suppose that the second one (i.e. the sincere assertion, obviously not the sentence or sentence content) implies the first, but what is the nature of this implication? It's not implied as a matter of semantics, grammar or logic. That's in part what's at issue in the discussion of Moore's paradox. It raises issues regarding the pragmatics of language that go beyond mere semantic or logical analysis.

You are making the assumption that the "sentences" (assertions?) "I know it's raining" and "It's raining" are equivalent. — Pierre-Normand

Actually, if I'm assuming anything, I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another. In any case, there is no true statement being made. It's necessary that we pretend the statement is true for the paradox to exist. I suppose we pretend when we engage in thought experiments generally, but I doubt this is one of those experiments where we pretend something is the case.

I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another — Ciceronianus the White

Of course nobody would say it. The question is, why not?

The Moore sentence is clearly pathological. But how do you know that? What rule, principle or maxim does it violate? Or is it defective in some other way?

I can't explain it, and that bothers me.

(I think @Snakes Alive had a promising approach.)

(I think Snakes Alive had a promising approach.) — Srap Tasmaner

I appreciate @Snakes Alive's approach too. It evokes a pragmatics of entitlements and commitments à la Brandom. It's a pragmatist approach that's interestingly different from @Pfhorrest. Pfhorrest's purported solution relies on a distinction between two distinct components of the act of language of assertion, which he calls expressing and impressing. Snakes Alive's Brandomian suggestion makes the economy of any assumption regarding the speaker's intention to induce ("impress") a belief in the recipient of her language act. It replaces this intention with incurred commitments within the language game. While asserting Moore's proposition, those incurred commitments are inconsistent regardless of the speaker's hopefulness in inducing a belief in her interlocutor.

Of course nobody would say it. The question is, why not? — Srap Tasmaner

I think the questions to be addressed are--Why does Moore say/think it would be said? Why does he maintain a true statement has been made? He doesn't bother to explain. If there's no reason to accept his assumption, then there's a problem with the "thought experiment", I think.

Actually, if I'm assuming anything, I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another. In any case, there is no true statement being made. — Ciceronianus the White

If it's raining then the assertion "it's raining" is true even if the person saying it is lying.

If it's raining then the assertion "it's raining" is true even if the person saying it is lying. — Michael

If it's raining and he/she says it's raining, there is no lie. No false statement is made.

If it's raining and he/she says it's raining, there is no lie. No false statement is made. — Ciceronianus the White

I would say that I lie if I assert something I believe to be false.

Regardless, this is the situation:

1. It is raining
2. Tom believes that it is not raining
3. Tom asserts "it is raining"

For whatever reason, Tom is asserting something he believes to be false, but his assertion is true. This is the situation that Moore is imagining.

Why does he maintain a true statement has been made? — Ciceronianus the White

Regardless of the statement being true or false, Moore acknowledges that it is defective in some respect. But he points out that it's not defective or false by dint of its being logically inconsistent (since the expressed propositional content isn't self-contradictory and it is identical to the content unproblematically asserted by the speaker's friend). The defect must be found elsewhere.

For whatever reason, Tom is asserting something he believes to be false, but his assertion is true. This is the situation that Moore is imagining. — Michael

Tom's assertion "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is Moore-paradoxical regardless of the truth of the component proposition "It is raining". Moore only envisioned the component proposition being true in order to highlight the fact that the same propositional content being asserted by Tom can be truly and unproblematically asserted by Tom's friend (about Tom). It is therefore tempting to conclude that there isn't anything wrong with the propositional content of Tom's assertion. There must be something more to the evaluation of a speech act of assertion beyond the evaluation of the truth of its content. By now, that may seem to be obvious that it must be so, but there is considerable disagreement regarding the characterization of the missing ingredient.

Tom's assertion "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is Moore-paradoxical regardless of the truth of the component proposition "It is raining". — Pierre-Normand

Sure. I was just addressing Ciceronianus' comment:

In any case, there is no true statement being made. It's necessary that we pretend the statement is true for the paradox to exist. — Ciceronianus the White

I thought showing him that it can be true would dismiss him of this criticism.