"The life of the dead is placed in the memory of the living."
--Marcus Tullius Cicero

The Truth will make you rich, saith...Rich.

If God is not of the universe, God can't be known, yes. If we're frank with ourselves, though, we must acknowledge that God can't be known at all. All that we can know--all that we can guess at, all that we can think, all that we can believe--is restricted to the universe just as we are; we can't think of anything without ascribing to it some feature or characteristic of the universe or which we can experience as a part of the universe.

Now, if you are inclined to believe in something you can't know, something you can't describe, something which is unlike anything in the universe because it isn't in the universe, you are free at least say you do, of course. But I'm not sure how you would go about describing it or saying anything intelligible about it beyond that it's located--somehow, somewhere--outside the universe. And, since what we call "existence" is something we define only by reference to what's in the universe, I'm uncertain you could even make any claim it exists or that you believe it exists. So, I have difficulty accepting that such a belief can be called "reasonable" or "rational."

A traditional way of addressing this difficulty is to claim that God is both outside and inside the universe in some mysterious sense, or to opt for pantheism or some variant of pantheism.

Ah, I think I see your position now; or at least understand it better than I did before.

I tend to think the ancient concept of natural law (and Roman jurisprudence) owes a great deal to the Stoics. I should say, though, that I may be less than objective in this as I'm an admirer of Stoicism. Although Cicero claimed he wasn't a Stoic, I think he sided with them on many things and was very successful in promulgating Stoicism in Rome and we see the Stoic philosophy influenced the great Roman jurists.

The Stoics didn't believe in a personal god, but thought of the universe as infused with an intelligence that was divine, in which we partake as having the ability to reason. The Stoic injunction to live in accordance with nature was essentially to live consistent with our peculiar nature as rational beings, understanding what is and what is not in our control and doing the best we can with what we have. So, although it may be that Stoicism can be said to base right conduct on a conception of the divine, the pantheistic character of the Divine Reason requires we look to nature itself and our nature in determining right and wrong, what is just and what is unjust.

I agree that the concept of natural law changed with the assimilation of the empire by Christianity, with its personal god dictating what is right and wrong, and that this was an unfortunate development.

i again have to point out that I am not particularly concerned with distinctions of secular and divine law. It seems I cant say that often enough. I merely state that law must be based on the human condition. — ernestm

It's odd, then, that you keep referring to what you seem to think is incursion of religious ideas into the law (apparently through Aquinas) to our detriment, presumably because it led to the diminishment of the Code Justinian (a Christian emperor of a Christian Roman Empire) had compiled.

The law, being something we humans made and make still to govern our affairs, naturally (pun intended) has its basis in our characteristics and our interrelation with each other and our environment. But I think your conception of law and legal history is erroneous. It should be obvious since I call myself a ciceronian that I'm an admirer of Cicero, and I'm a student of Roman history as best I can be. But although Roman law after the dissolution of the Western empire was intermixed with the law of the barbarians, the Vandals, Goths, Franks and others formed what might be called Roman successor states in that they borrowed heavily from Roman culture and law when they could, looking back to Rome even as we still do now.

Roman law never vanished to be replaced by something wholly different on the European continent, nor did it even vanish in England, thanks in part to the Norman conquest.

Well, Justinian's Code was, as it were, resurrected during the High Middle Ages, and still influences the civil law jurisdictions of Europe, as modified sometimes by the Napoleonic Code. So I don't think Roman law has vanished to quite the degree you think it has.

As for marriage, it's treated in most American jurisdictions as similar to a partnership, subject to dissolution on the same basis when it comes to assets of the marriage. Secular law governs them regardless of the religions to which the partners may belong.

Well, you seem to be trying to cover a lot of ground. I'm uncertain where to begin.

The ancient Greek philosophers, alas, were not lawyers--or perhaps more accurately were not jurists. That is to say, they for the most part never were concerned with and didn't seem to have any practical encounters with the law as an operating system, with the possible exception of Socrates, and that didn't end well. That lack of experience with the practical application of the law resulted (I think) in such horrors as Plato's Republic. I don't think we see much in the way of thought regarding the law as it actually applies (rather than in the abstract) until the Romans came along.

Roman law was quite sophisticated centuries before the time of Justinian (an emperor who I believe thought very little about the law or anything but himself but was fortunate to have a wife who thought for him and able generals to fight for him), and in many respects had been committed to writing long before the Corpus Juris Civilis was put together, from the time of The Twelve Tablets onward. Jurists like Ulpian wrote extensively regarding the law and were consulted when decisions were rendered. Decisions of magistrates and praetors at various levels were available for consideration, as case law is today.

The Stoic dictum that we should live according to nature greatly influenced Roman law, and did so since republican times, but I doubt any Roman would claim that law was necessarily based on divine edict, or derived from anything resembling the modern conception of a "social contract." The Romans were aware that certain laws were contrary to nature (which is how Ulpian described slavery), but they were laws regardless. Cicero the advocate, the lawyer, was different from Cicero the jurist, the philosopher.

The law was, and is, a vast system which exists and operates apart from morality and, I think, shouldn't be confused with morality.

So I am here questioning just as this mysterious concious thinking self can come into existence seemingly magically why cannot it equally disappear? What reasons is there to justify that this mysetrious concious thinking self will still exist — Ephrium

Now I'm uncertain what you're addressing. Are you asking whether there is any reason to know (believe?) that we will exist after we die? I think that's different from asking whether there is any reason to know we'll exist tomorrow.

If you're asking whether there is any reason to know that we will exist after we die, I'm not aware of any such reason. I think there's good reason to believe that our bodies won't exist after we die, except perhaps as a kind of husk or decaying object, for a time, depending on what is done with them. I'm not sure what "we" would be without our bodies, but assuming there is a "we" in that case, I don't think it can be established it survives, though many believe it does.

Well, I'm not sure about that. As C.S. Peirce noted: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." We doubt in life when we encounter circumstances which raise doubts, i.e. render us puzzled, unsettled in our beliefs and lead us to question them. We pretend to doubt in philosophy when we have no reason to doubt but purport to do so. Such faux doubt serves no purpose and is contrary to what we actually do when we think about real problems.

We all have good reason to know that some day we'll die. Do we have good reason to know that we will die tomorrow? Unless we're scheduled for execution then, or are or will be in some grave danger, we have no reason to know that. Absent such circumstances, do we have good reason to doubt that we will be alive tomorrow? I would say no. If we have no reason to doubt that we'll be alive tomorrow, what could possibly prompt us to demand a reason not to doubt that we'll be alive tomorrow?

A "thought experiment":

You're walking east on Adams St. in downtown Chicago, towards Russian Tea Time, consumed by a longing for the horseradish flavored vodka shots served there. Do you:

A. Wonder whether there is any reason to know you will continue to exist long enough to drink a shot?
B. Wonder why anyone would wonder whether there is any reason to know you will continue to exist long enough to drink a shot?
C. Continue walking towards Russian Tea Time, consumed by a longing for the horseradish flavored vodka shots served there?

If you choose C. you, like me, enjoy drinking horseradish flavored vodka while munching on black bread and pickles. But you would also, like me, think you should have a reason to think you would not exist long enough to drink a shot before thinking there is a need for you to determine whether there is reason to think you need a reason to think you will exist long enough to drink a shot.

Many of the medieval European philosophers were first-rate thinkers, in my opinion, e.g. Abelard, Anselm, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Aquinas. I think it would do them an injustice to say that their work was solely in the service of the Church (which wasn't exactly unified in doctrine at the time, in any case). But I think we have to recognize that the reintroduction of Aristotle in Europe in the 12th century had a staggering impact on the learned monks and the universities of the time. They found his work so compelling, so persuasive, that he became known as "The Philosopher"--quite simply, the best authority on most any subject, since he, the Relentless Categorizer, wrote on most anything he could while he could.

As a result I think regard for him was so high and extensive at that time that it was thought important to harmonize his work with the essential doctrines of the Church and justify those doctrines based on the authoritative opinions of The Philosopher. I think there was a real effort to do so, by Aquinas and others. To that extent, it might be said that Scholasticism in its incorporation of Aristotle had as one of its concerns the use of his thought and his way of thinking to buttress Church doctrine.

H E I D E G G E R!!! Well, I couldn't resist.

Yes, I see. And certainly it had its limitations. But it was quite the rage in my college days, even to the extent that most history of philosophy courses were routinely shuffled onto the newest professor; the old being considered mostly unimportant in light of the new. Happily, I worked also under a Jesuit trained pragmatist who enjoyed ancient philosophy, and so learned something about other views as well.

The banality of OLP, etc. is an English phenomenon through and through and found a congenial environment at Oxford. — The Great Whatever

For all I know, Oxford may have been and might still be the very center of banality, its axis mundi. But it seems to me peculiar to speak of OLP as banal. It was quite extraordinary in its time. Russell couldn't understand it (Wittgenstein of course thought he didn't understand the Tractatus, either), the pragmatists largely ignored it. Then consider the Continentals, Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, etc.; the idealism of Royce and Green; before them Hegel and then down the line to Plato. OLP was something new in philosophy I think, quite original to it, though consistent with the anti-metaphysical tenor of a large part of the 20th century.

In the increasingly far off time when I attended college, we philosophy majors and others read Lovely, Lovely Ludwig's Philosophical Investigations and what were called and for all I know may still be called The Blue and Brown Books. We were also bombarded with works of the "Oxford School" ordinary language philosophers, e.g. Austin, Ryle and Strawson.

I don't know if this reading "changed my life", but would say that Wittgenstein and Austin, especially, influenced the way I read and think in certain cases. You may be surprised to hear that I've found the techniques employed by them and others helpful in practicing law; especially when analyzing and writing briefs and making oral argument.

As for "ending philosophy" I don't think Wittgenstein ended it, perhaps because I have a broader view of philosophy than he did, at least in his Tractatus phase. I would agree that Wittgenstein, Austin and others did useful work in establishing that certain problems of philosophy and answers to them were flawed--even in some cases that they were not problems at all, properly speaking. But there's quite a bit to think about in philosophy; none of the philosophers I've read including Wittgenstein can be said to have "ended" ethics, for example, in my opinion.

The doctrine of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church on this is relatively simple. Human life is sacred from its beginning because, you may be surprised to learn, from its beginning it involves the creative action of God. It isn't merely a man and a woman, sperm and egg, that are involved in conception; God is in on it too, somehow. Thus, we're creatures of God from the get-go and properly God is the Lord of our lives. Nobody but God may end the lives of his creatures except, of course, in certain defined circumstances in accordance with God's law. Q.E.D.

An every time Rand is mentioned, I expect slurs and misrepresentations, and am never disappointed — tom

Well, come now. How is the comparison a slur or misrepresentation? Both were writers of preposterous fiction and little-known screenplays, both were contributors to pulp magazines, both sought and achieved cult status and founded what may be called cults, one by creating a hodgepodge called Objectivism by paraphrasing Aristotle, Mencken, Hazlitt, classical liberalism, with a dash of Nietzsche and the Stoics thrown in for good measure; the other by combining occult views derived primarily from Aleister Crowley with various psychological theories to create something called Dianetics, later transformed into a religion.

Regardless of whether you agree with those characterizations of Objectivism and Dianetics/Scientology, Rand was a writer of screenplays and fiction who created a supposedly "new" philosophy, and Hubbard was a writer of screenplays and fiction who created a supposedly new "religion."

I'm compelled to repeat this every time Rand is mentioned:

Ayn Rand is to philosophy what L. Ron Hubbard is to religion.

In this, it's the law that matters, and nothing but the law. Behold, the law of South Carolina:

SECTION 17-24-10. Affirmative defense.

(A) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a crime that, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the capacity to distinguish moral or legal right from moral or legal wrong or to recognize the particular act charged as morally or legally wrong.

(B) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

(C) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity.

HISTORY: 1984 Act No. 396, Section 1; 1988 Act No. 323, Section 1; 1989 Act No. 93, Section 1.

SECTION 17-24-20. Guilty but mentally ill; general requirements for verdict.

(A) A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong as defined in Section 17-24-10(A), but because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

(B) To return a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" the burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact that the defendant committed the crime, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence that when he committed the crime he was mentally ill as defined in subsection (A).

(C) The verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be rendered only during the phase of a trial which determines guilt or innocence and is not a form of verdict which may be rendered in the penalty phase.

(D) A court may not accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill unless, after a hearing, the court makes a finding upon the record that the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that when he committed the crime he was mentally ill as provided in Section 17-24-20(A).

As you may guess from this, what constitutes insanity or mental illness of such magnitude as to impact on guilt is defined rather narrowly in the law. One can be stupid, uneducated, have a frightful childhood, and even have delusions, and still it will be no defense nor will it constitute mental illness.

Note that what is required is that the defendant lack the capacity to distinguish between what is morally or legally right from what is morally or legally wrong.

I haven't followed the case, but only note that the test in the law is not what you might expect.

In any case, whatever has been discovered by science is not incompatible with the possibility that life-as-we-know-it is a grand illusion. It only has to be a perfectly consistent illusion for science to function as it does. There are speculative ideas in science, such as the 'holographic universe' or the notion of the Universe as a computer emulation, which scientifically-inclined people are quite happy to contemplate. But heaven forbid if it is suggested that the universe is an illusion in the sense of it being māyā, a cosmic drama in which we are unwitting players. That doesn't 'sound scientific' at all, where other kinds of speculative metaphysics might.

Wayfarer — Wayfarer

I prefer to have a good reason to doubt the existence of the universe, myself, and the mere possibility it's an illusion doesn't strike me as a good reason. I think it's reasonable to assume we have much yet to learn about the universe, however. Absolute knowledge may not be possible, but I think we can function perfectly well accepting the more probable explanation.

Definition of absolute reality
1: ultimate reality as it is in itself unaffected by the perception or knowledge of any finite being — Lower Case NUMBERS

Two things about that.

"Absolute reality" would, in that case, not be real. It would be something different from reality, because we're a part of reality.

Regardless of the veracity of that statement, if there is an absolute reality, or things in themselves, different in some unknowable way from what we regularly interact with, that's a difference which makes no difference.

I'm uncertain what you mean by "absolute reality." For me, we're a part of the world; we're not mere observers of the world. We interact with other parts of the world. We watch movies, and sometimes are surprised to learn that what we thought was the case is not the case regarding a character the movie. That's all part of reality as far as I'm concerned.

Are you asking about epistemology? I'm not sure. I like the pragmatism of Dewey when it comes to epistemology (not to be confused with that of Rorty, who I think misunderstood Dewey. Regardless, I don't like "constructivism" as it seems to me to that it proposes that we "create" something when we interact with our environment. We can create many things, but we don't create merely by existing, and thereby seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. We simply live as a human being does. We no more create reality than does any other creature. We live, interact, as parts of the world.

It isn't clear to me how the fact that a viewer may be "taken in" by a movie tells us anything at all beyond the fact that the result sought by the film-maker was successful in that case. People are fooled all the time. In this case, they would be fooled by an artifice created to fool them. This seems unsurprising.

I confess I've always been suspicious of Confessions of the kind written by such as Augustine and Rousseau. Suspicious in the sense that that I suspect their confessions are exaggerated in certain respects, for rhetorical reasons or reasons less purposeful. Some of us take a weird delight in confessing our sins--mea maxima culpa as we were required to say when the Church was somewhat less jolly than It is today.

There's a kind of exhibitionism involved in it, I think. Also, I believe, a sort of perverse self-aggrandizement. "See how wicked I was, and now by the Grace of God and my own efforts and by acknowledging my sins, I'm the Bishop of Hippo!" I'd have found Coleridge's Ancient Mariner very annoying if he confronted me, especially if he did so while I was on the way to a wedding, and wouldn't have stayed to listen to his tale of sin and redemption.

But philosophers are still unable to determine whether life is worth living or not. — lambda

In what sense, and to whom? This isn't a question to which there is no one, absolute and universally applicable answer. You require too much from philosophy if you seek such an answer; too much from most things I think, including science, which in many cases can't determine things absolutely. There are circumstances where life isn't worth living or where one's death will be of more benefit than one's life.

"Natural morality" (as I conceive it) doesn't have its basis in religion as it is and has been commonly practiced. Religion, sometimes and in some ways, incorporates natural morality. Social conservatives are not religious because of an adherence to natural morality, but because they accept the tenets of organized, institutional religion. To the extent those tenets include natural morality, they accept natural morality. To the extent they don't, social conservatives reject natural morality.

Organized religion in the West is fundamentally dependent on revelation and faith. Reason is a secondary concern. Many in the Church hierarchy were greatly concerned when the works of Aristotle became available again in Europe and were widely admired, because those works indicated revelation and faith were in most cases unnecessary; reason, instead, would serve to explain the world; certainly, Christian faith and revelation were unknown and unnecessary to the man they called "the Philosopher."

I suspect that if social conservatives are mostly religious it's due to the fact that religion disregards reason and the results of the application of reason when it conflicts with doctrine or cherished views and customs. This is not to say that all social conservatives are against reason and science all the time, but that they think they may disregard them when they conflict with what they believe to be true and proper regardless of them. In other words, with what they believe to be true and proper on grounds which can't be arrived at through the application of reason; which are in effect beyond reason.

The absolute failure of philosophy is a great example of how unaided human reasoning leads to nothing but absurdity. — lambda

Well then, perhaps we're dreaming, perhaps there is no "external world," perhaps there are no "other minds," and perhaps there is no free will. And now, back to living.

The Dutch were the primary colonial power for about 50 years and before that it was the Spanish and Portuguese and after that the English (for a lot longer). The British empire was definitely larger and longer lasting in the end. The rest seems pretty accurate. — Benkei

Well, the Dutch through their East India Company held various parts of what we call Indonesia for quite some time. It may be that they dominated Indonesia for a shorter time, however.

My comment about stories in the press of Perfidious Albion refer to this sort of thing from the Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/colonial-atrocities-explode-myth-of-dutch-tolerance-1439153.html

That being said, is this turn of the thread supposed to to invigorate "white saviour complex / white guilt" or something? — Gooseone

The "turn of the thread" came about because I responded to a post in which it was asked whether the French colonized Indonesia. Then, probably because I recalled a Dutch woman of my acquaintance and her astonishment in learning the Boers were of Dutch extraction, it grew from there. Black Pete may have popped into my mind as well. Sorry.

I knew a Dutch woman who was amazed to learn the Boers were of Dutch extraction. I thought this odd, as "Boer" is a Dutch word (meaning farmer).

The Dutch were a colonial power since the 1600s. But like the Belgians (who were late to imperialism and oppression, concentrated in the Congo) certain of their atrocities against native peoples in Indonesia took place in the 20th century, particularly in the years 1945-50.

I've read that the Dutch aren't forthcoming about the history of their treatment of native peoples, and have taken legal action against those who have published accounts related to their rule in Indonesia. There have been articles in the English press about it. Those articles seem to take some pleasure in noting that the Dutch, though quick to condemn the violation of human rights by other nations, try to silence those who refer to their own conduct in that area. Perhaps the English are exaggerating.

Wasn't Indonesia dominated by the French? There is no culture on the planet that is further from American sensibilities about food than the French. — Mongrel

The Dutch were the primary European colonial power. Not many seem to be aware of it, but the Dutch were unusually contemptuous of and cruel to the people of the regions they colonized, even by European standards. The Boers were Dutch settlers.

To repeat: to talk about 'a war with Islam' is indeed 'controversial' rhetoric. To talk about it in public in that way in my community would align you with the extreme right-wing. Evidently you live among people who are happiter to talk in such an inflammatory way about the beliefs of their neighbours and friends than the people I know. — mcdoodle

But we call virtually anything a war, you know. There's the War against Christmas, the War against Christianity, the good ole War against Poverty, the War against Drugs, the War against Crime. How can we know, any longer, that we're against something unless we acknowledge there's a war against it? How can we express our outrage against criticism of something we value unless we maintain there's a war against it? Nobody would understand unless we say there's a war.

The death or not others is surely a trivial difference compared to my own death. My own death is in my language an act of identification. Rome, as the secular power is being invited to 'ratify' the identification by performing the office of executor and thus promoting the mere faithful to the status of martyr.

It's not even really a matter of what God wants, since He can doubtless shift for himself, it's more a badge of identification. Which of course is why jumping off a cliff will not do at all. For mass suicides you need something extra in the way of collective hubris. — unenlightened

I think the injunction against suicide may have been in play as well when these particular Christians confronted the doubtless bewildered proconsul. Does a person kill himself/herself when they ask a person to kill them and they do so? I'm not sure.

But I feel that the belief God would think it good that they died and honor them for it, granting them a special place in heaven must have been a factor. I suppose that by dying and seeking death they would became part of a kind of elect, though, so you may be right.

I can't help but find this event amusing, though. I can imagine Monty Python doing a skit about it.

I find Balrogs and the Ringwraiths interesting, myself.

It's interesting Tolkien and Lewis knew each other and both chose to flaunt, as it were, their Christianity in realms of fantasy. But I credit Tolkien for being far more subtle about it than Lewis.

I delved into this a bit in a post on my blog, and for those curious (and in a fit of shameless self-promotion; and because I'm too lazy to repeat myself) my unworthy speculations may be found here:
https://theblogofciceronianus.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-curious-belief-that-its-good-thing.html

Then how would you suggest they go around helping people? Isn't social organisation - which takes both money and influence - the place where the greatest good can be done? I mean if that was properly done, we'd surely have a lot less troubles - both economic and social - than we do today. — Agustino

Ideally? By doing the best we can with what we have, to paraphrase Epictetus, and not seeking power over others and to possess things we don't have. By living in accordance with nature, which is to say reason. Ideally, none of us would be consumed by envy, ambition, hate, fear, anger, etc., because what causes us to feel those emotions would no longer be of significant concern to any of us.

But we won't ever all be Stoic Sages, of course. So, we do what we can to counter those negative emotions and the havoc they cause. That may well include acting together in pursuit of that goal in various respects, but I don't think it would include doing what generally causes them in ourselves and others.

I hadn't noticed this thread earlier. I was too busy waging the war against Christmas, in my case on behalf of Sol Invictus whose feast day, Dies Natalis Solis Invicti (also his birthday, of course) is likewise December 25. The same is also said regarding Mithras by the way, whose birth was witnessed by shepherds. I have my tauroctony scene set up already, complete with Mithras, the bull and the torchbearers, Cautes and Cautopates. It's a festive time of year indeed.

It isn't clear to me that the Left, to the extent it exists, has sanctioned the excesses of certain proponents of Islam. But it has seemed to be excessive in its efforts to object to criticisms of Islam. Christopher Hitchens found himself abandoned and reviled by his friends on the Left because of his stand against what he called Islamo-fascism; but he was against all forms of theocracy. The Left seems to have lost itself in a kind of fog of smugness brought about by its adherence to the view that we of the West are incapable of judging those different from us, and have no business doing so in light of our own excesses. Indeed, the whole idea of judging especially when matters of customs and morals are involved seems to be objectionable to some.

But what if someone were to need money, status, power and so forth in order to be able to better help his society? After all, the service we can render to our society is limited by the resources we have on the one side, and by our will to do good on the other. — Agustino

I aspire to be a Stoic, but may be something of a cynic as I think it's very unlikely anyone has ever needed or ever will need to acquire money, status and power in order to help others or society in general. People don't become rich and powerful in order to help others let alone feel the need to do so for that purpose. Or, at least, the likelihood of that happening I so small that it can't be deemed a possibility which would sanction such a desire to acquire riches and power.

Okay, but why shouldn't a Stoic be concerned about money for example? I agree such a concern shouldn't overpower their concern for virtuous living, but why should there be no concern at all? What's wrong with the concern so long as it doesn't get in the way of virtuous living, and so long as it doesn't become an obsession or a source of worry? — Agustino

I think that for a Stoic there is nothing admirable about making money or possessing it; one should be indifferent to it in that sense. It isn't something to be desired or pursued, because normally we do so to acquire things, property, power and status, regarding which we should also be indifferent. Note that I'm not referring to need here. I'm not aware of any Stoic who was critical of doing what we must do to survive. But I think for a Stoic seeking money or property or possessing them has nothing to do with virtuous living and generally would be contrary to it.