The Roman Empire developed a significant and extensive bureaucracy commencing in the second century C.E. The various crises of the third century resulted in its dramatic increase. By the time of Diocletian, many thousands were in imperial service (not including the military). I've seen estimates of the size of the imperial bureaucracy as high as 35,000 in the fifth century. I think bureaucracy wasn't entirely a modern development.

"There is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it."

And, just for the sake of balance, one for the lawyers:

"When you have no basis for an argument, abuse the plaintiff."

Both quotations from Marcus Tullius Cicero

The purpose of my life is to crush my enemies, to see them driven before me and hear the lamentations of their women.

Did you know Cicero was a conservative Ciceronianus? ;)

I disagree with you about Burke - whose favorite philosopher was none other than Cicero in fact. Burke supported the French monarchy because replacing it by force and all of a sudden instead of gradually would cause more chaos and suffering than anything else. And it did - it gave rise to Napoleon Bonaparte who re-established it, as Trump said, bigger and better than ever before - he made Monarchy into Imperial Dictatorship. Burke prevented the same thing from happening in England by fighting against both Monarchy, AND the revolutionaries who wanted to do away with religion and traditions, and yes monarchy.

And thanks for the suggestion of Aristophanes - I wasn't aware he was a conservative — Agustino

I was reacting to Burke's comment about philosophers, not to conservatism or his status as a conservative icon. Aristophanes famously made similar criticism of Socrates and others in his play The Clouds. Later, in Roman times, Lucian wrote a satire against philosophers as well. Criticism of philosophers for undermining morality has been around a long time, and was old long before Burke. Whether Cicero is properly considered a "conservative" according to current definitions, I don't know, nor do I think it's very useful to indulge in that speculation. I'm fairly comfortable with the claim that we have nobody of Cicero's quality around these days, though.

Burke had an unfortunate tendency to be sentimental, as evidenced by his rapture over Marie Antoinette and his excessive reaction to her death as the death of chivalry. Even his friends told him he made a fool of himself.

Alas, poor Burke. He could be perceptive, but his creepy infatuation with Marie Antoinette, so extravagantly expressed, makes him appear, ultimately, to be a ridiculous figure.

As for this bit, Aristophanes did this sort of thing much better, but Aristophanes had a sense of humor and it's unclear whether Burke did. This complaint has a long, long history. As a result, I think it's more tedious than insightful.

I am a cowboy on the boat of Ra.

Also the walrus, when not on the boat of Ra.

I imagine that it's a similar feeling to what happens when the uninitiated read some of some of Heidegger or Derrida for the first time. — StreetlightX

In speaking of Heidegger, it's of course entirely appropriate to refer to those initiated and those uninitiated. The same was the case with the ancient mystery religions; only those who had been initiated could claim to understand their rites and rituals, as they couldn't be disclosed to the uninitiated.

But Heidegger could write clearly enough when he wanted to--for example in his essay The Question Concerning Technology, and of course in his extravagant praise of Adolf Hitler.

Ah, it's been some time since I could indulge myself in that fashion. I confess I didn't have the strength to resist the opportunity.

Heidegger notwithstanding, though, I suspect that what Dennett says regarding academic philosophy might also apply, accurately enough, to other academic disciplines.

Don't forget Dewey, dammit.

'The world' is intelligible enough for me. — mcdoodle

For all of us, really, unless we've committed ourselves (perversely) to inhuman standards of intelligibility. Many of us have unreasonable expectations regarding the world, sad to say.

They're similar in some respects. Roman Stoicism, though, encouraged participation in public life while Epicureanism does not. And as has been noted, the Stoics believed in an immanent God necessarily involved in the universe, and that we partake in God.

Well, there's nothing wrong with poetry, and poetry can evoke insights which may be considered philosophical and metaphysical. Philosophy is prosaic by nature, though. Philosophers who try to be poetic in their philosophy necessarily fail as a result. They write something which is neither philosophy nor poetry. Poets can be philosophical, however; Wallace Stevens for example.

To understand Trump supporters it is only necessary to consider what it is to be envious, jealous and xenophobic.

There is something about Chicago and it's might that calls me home. (L) — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Me as well. In fact, I bet my bottom dollar I'll lose the blues there.

Hey Ciceronianus! It's good to see you on the boards!
How has life been treating you? — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Not as well as it should, but well enough. Getting back to Chicago at all? I'll be wandering around the Loop and River North in a few weeks.

Post when the mood strikes you, when you see something you find interesting; nothing more. Pay no attention to those men, and women, behind the curtain that is the Web.

I'm not sure I understand the force of your seeming criticism here. It's not that esoteric. There's the act of running to the store, running to the finish line, running to get out of the rain, etc, and then there's running in general. We use and understand the language of X qua X all the time — Thorongil

The question I have is: What is it I will in general? I never "run in general" as I when I run I do so for a reason. I know what running is, true; however, I don't maintain that I run in general "outside of time" and for no reason, without any ground. I don't accept the idea of a kind of Platonic Form of running or "to run." Is the Will something similar?

No, he doesn't. There is only one will that gets broken up into distinct acts by the form of time. The latter (which, being in time, are quasi-representational) are grounded in the former. — Thorongil

Well, he refers to "individual acts of will" which will always have a ground or reason outside themselves, and distinguishes them from what "I will in general"; but fine. It would still seem to me, however, that there is a distinction between the "individual acts of will" and what "I will in general." That distinction, presumably, is wrought by "time." So, what "I will in general" is outside time in some manner, I suppose, though it would seem to me that I am not. I rather doubt that there is anything "I will in general" so I don't need to struggle with how that is "groundless" as he says. "The Will" is starting to sound more and more like some kind of supernatural force.

Judging from your quote, Schopenhauer effectively disregards what we want and do in his analysis. Instead, he presumes that there is a "Will" distinct from the ordinary "acts of will." Apparently, he thinks there must be something which induces us to act which is not what actually motivates us to act in a given situation, and this something is not motivated by anything. However, it is because of this something that we engage in "acts of will" which are motivated by "a ground or reason outside themselves." Sorry, but this makes no sense to me.

Certainly the Schopenhauer's Will can be found in our own striving nature which is hard to simply deny by fiat. Our own striving is something immediate to us. Try stopping it.. — schopenhauer1

I don't think Schopenhauer's Will, if I understand it correctly, is something that can be inferred from the fact that we have wants, needs, or desires we try to satisfy. And in fact, if we focus on the contexts in which we want something or to do something, we find instances when we can regulate our desire or refrain from indulging it.

This brings me to a larger point: You assume what is "true" is what is goal-oriented. That in itself could be false. What is useful to "achieve" a a goal, might be good if that is your goal, but then you must argue why being goal-oriented should be the goal, and when you start arguing for the basis of this without any a priori appeal, you will be begging the question and then what happens is you can only use snark and smugness to assert your claim, which would be sad and annoying. — schopenhauer1

I would say, instead, that what we would be justified in calling "true" or provisionally "true" or probably "true" is that which the best available evidence indicates is the case. That evidence can be gained only through observation, investigation, experiment, life experience--living and interacting with the rest of the world, trying and failing or succeeding, seeking solutions to problems, answers to questions, and finding out what happens when we do.

Ciceronianus gets a bit busy now and then; no doubt due to the Will which underlies him, the law, his clients, the court system, and everything else.

I like Dewey better than Peirce, but agree with Peirce about such things as Kant's "thing in itself." Peirce admired Kant, but thought the "thing in itself" was meaningless surplusage, as must be anything the nature and existence and nature of which cannot be determined, located, found, investigated, known, and regarding which propositions cannot be made and analyzed--propositions which cannot be said to be true or false, likely or unlikely. The same, I think, can be said of the Will. Certainly we can speculate if we wish, but that is all we do in that case, but when our speculation is unable to be judged correct or incorrect, or even probably correct or incorrect, that speculation is idle.

So how is it idle? You just explained the theory and framed it in a negative way. — schopenhauer1

I tried to note that what I've read of Schopenhauer's Will may be incorrect in some way. If what I've read is correct, though, I think it would be idle in that it would be a mere assertion along the lines of the claim that God is the impulse that makes everything happen. It tells us nothing, explains nothing.

You should really thank Peirce for the pragmatic maxim, not me. I don't know what other methodologies you refer to.

I'm afraid the only work of Schopenhauer I've read (that I can recall; I may have had to read something of his in college in a history of philosophy course) is his little book on wisdom of life, which I wasn't impressed by as I thought it entirely derivative, but may have been an eye-opener when written for all I know. He seems to have been somewhat lacking in that wisdom since he assaulted that poor woman for talking too loudly outside his door. It appears he had a poor opinion of women in general, though.

The Will, from what I heard/read is some mindless, non-rational force or urge that is the foundation of everything in the universe; but this understanding is second-hand. If that understanding is correct, I'm inclined to think that the application of the pragmatic maxim would indicate the concept is idle, as it would seem to be the case that the Will either is everything or some unverifiable, perhaps unknowable, impulse that makes everything happen which Schopenhauer chooses to call "Will."

As for the mind being an illusion, I think we have to determine what the mind is before we can make such a statement, and I think the pragmatic maxim would mandate that we do so by considering what it is that we say "the mind" does that influences our lives. It would seem that in a broad sense, it can be said that what the mind does is pretty much everything that we do, except perhaps or in most cases what we do of necessity as a living organism, e.g. breath, excrete.

So, we think, we feel, we dream, etc. It would seem unnecessary at best to say that our minds do such things. That doesn't mean "the mind" is an illusion, though. It just means that there is no basis on which to distinguish our minds from ourselves.

The hope is that in applying the pragmatic maxim, one might achieve some sort of clarity regarding concepts. But it has a negative function as well, as a tool of criticism.

I think application of the pragmatic maxim would suggest that it's inappropriate to speak of "the mind" or "the self" or "consciousness" or "the Will" in the abstract, without context; in other words, without consideration of what is meant by them when applied to actual situations arising in life, If I'm right, its application would thus indicate that we should stop speaking of them in that manner, and so get on with life.

Now, is it "troll-y" (I think "trollish" is better) to make such a comment in the august, sublime confines of a philosophy forum? I would hope not.

When it comes to such as "mind" and "self" and "consciousness" I think we're best off applying Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and then getting on with life. But I'm no philosopher.

whether the criminal feels sorry or not for the actions he has done, and apologises or doesn't for them - you think that plays no role? — Agustino

You used the word "repent" which I associated with acknowledgement of sin and commitment to "sin no more." But if you're speaking of feeling sorry for what was done, or remorse, courts will sometimes take that into account in sentencing by my understanding. It's unclear how we go about determining remorse is genuine, though, and I don't know whether the consideration of remorse in sentencing has had any beneficial effect, i.e. whether those claiming they're remorseful haven't engaged in subsequent criminal conduct.

I suspect that those facing the alternative of being tortured in some hideous fashion would declare themselves to be very, very sorry; as sorry as anyone would wish them to be. If they didn't, they would arguably be lunatics. So, I think it's likely the threat of torture would merely compel the convicted to "repent" whether they were remorseful or not, and I doubt that is something you'd find satisfactory.

Of course torture would be considered cruel and unusual punishment, so absent a constitutional amendment I doubt we'd see it in practice. But I think torture debases the torturer as well as cause terrible pain in the tortured. I don't think requiring the convicted to recite mea culpas in order to avoid torture is an outcome worth becoming torturers.

Should unrelenting torture of the worst kind be a punishment for such a person UNTIL and IF they repent and feel sorry for what they have done? Why or why not? — Agustino

If we're talking about what the law should be, it's not clear to me that whether or not the killer repents should be a factor. That may be good for his immortal soul, but the courts have no jurisdiction over it.

Hmmm this depends though on the terms on which a partnership was founded. I'm not a lawyer, but having run my own business in the past, I know that many times it's not easy to terminate an existing contract. Would you not agree that the terms on which the partnership, in this case marriage, are founded, must determine when and in what conditions it can be dissolved? — Agustino

An agreement isn't required to establish a partnership. When there is no agreement, the law governs disassociation. In that case, a partner by his/her "express will" may cease to be a partner, and may also cease to be one under other circumstances. Also in that case, the law addresses what results from the disassociation.

A partnership agreement may indicate how disassociation may take place and address the results of disassociation. If it does not, the law will control (I'm referring to the Uniform Partnership Act). However, partnership agreements may alter the statutory law only in certain respects. The scope of partnership agreements is limited by the law.

Marriage where I practice is a partnership which is governed in large part by the law, not by agreement. It's considered to be a civil contract, formed by the issuance of a marriage license and declarations to be husband and wife made before an authorized person. The law sets forth how it can be dissolved, and I know of nothing which allows the married couple to vary the law in that respect.

Marital property agreements may be made and entered into, characterizing particular property as belonging to one spouse or the other, and also addressing division of property on divorce.

The common law action for breach of promise was abolished where I practice quite some time ago, and I think that's the case with many other states. I don't know how many states still recognize such a claim or how often it's made.

How does one legally differentiate the kind of pain that merits criminal penalties and the one that doesn't? — Agustino

Pain and harm. By legislative act, practically speaking. Legislatures must determine what is or is not criminal conduct. A policy decision must be made--should or should not sexual infidelity be criminalized? Is it desirable to assign to law enforcement, the court system and jails the task of monitoring the sexual activity of those married and, if they are sexually active with those outside the marriage, arrest and prosecute and on conviction incarcerate them or assess a criminal penalty? I would say no.

As to civil remedies, I had in mind the impact on court decisions related to property division and custody. Where breach of promise actions are allowed, it's my understanding that compensatory damages (financial damages for losses incurred and personal damages to reputation and injury to feelings and health) are allowed.

Do you think adultery should be legally punished? Why or why not? (I know you're a lawyer (are you not?) and so I'm curious what you think!) — Agustino

Yes, for good or ill, or perhaps for both, I'm a lawyer.

Adultery according to Merriam-Webster Online is (I paraphrase) voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and someone who is not his/her spouse. Adultery is still "on the books" as a crime in many states here in the U.S.A., though these laws are very seldom enforced. My guess is that if they were the courts would be significantly more busy then they are even now, which is very busy indeed.

I don't think adultery should be a crime. Marriage is treated as a kind of partnership in the law in most states by my understanding; it certainly is where I practice. Those partnerships may be dissolved for most any reason, now, just as other partnerships. It used to be the case that adultery or some other conduct would have to be established as a prerequisite for a divorce. In those days, people wanting to be divorced would have to resort to manufacturing evidence of adultery. For example, the husband would arrange to have his photograph taken while he was in bed with a woman not his wife. They could be doing nothing at all but laying in the bed, wearing pajamas, and could be complete strangers meeting just for the purpose of having their picture taken while in bed, but that was deemed adequate by sympathetic courts.

Eventually, it seems a policy decision was made to allow people miserable with each other to part ways without the need to establish or fabricate heinous conduct, and the law focused exclusively on allocating the property of the marriage-partnership and arranging for custody and protection of minor children of the marriage. That is a difficult enough task in many cases. I, personally, don't practice divorce law, thankfully; but this is my informed understanding.

As marriage can now be dissolved in the law without established immorality or fault (though those factors may impact property division and custody of children), imposing criminal penalties for the failure to honor marriage related sexual commitments strikes me as unreasonable. But I don't think the law should impose criminal penalties for adultery in any case. It may cause pain or harm to a spouse or children, but I don't think it's the kind of pain or harm that merits the imposition of criminal penalties. It is, as you might say, a question of priorities. Law enforcement resources are more usefully devoted to punishing other kinds of conduct. Civil remedies may be appropriate, however.

Marriage in the law is something different from marriage in religion. A religious institution may insist that marriage cannot be dissolved, that divorce is not allowed and except in limited circumstances and adultery a sin requiring punishment, but the law is no longer in the service of religious institutions. I think that's a good thing.

Sex isn't the only important thing in morality, BUT in today's world, it is SURELY the most neglected — Agustino

I would say, instead, that the problem is sexual conduct has become preeminent in today's world. It is accorded a value exceeding its significance (which is nonetheless great). It is too important to too many.

This is reflected not only in prevalence of the depiction of sexual conduct and desire in all media and the importance ascribed to being sexually active, but in the efforts made to condemn it (or rather certain kinds of sexual conduct) and prohibit or restrict it in law. It should not be a concern of the law except in limited circumstances. In my opinion, it should not be condemned in and of itself. There's nothing inherently or a priori morally objectionable about adults having sex even if not for reproduction or physical and spiritual "intimacy" (it isn't clear to me what is meant by that). The consequences of it (the harm caused by it) may render it reprehensible. If there is behind it an intent to harm, that intent may render a person reprehensible.

As a result, I don't think sexual acts are wrong unless they're engaged in for a particular purpose. You seem to think they are wrong unless engaged in for reproduction and (or is it "or"?) physical and spiritual "intimacy."

Sexual urges can make fools or worse of all or most of us, but where no harm results from them it seems unreasonable to condemn them.

There comes a point where standards of morality become so absolute, so detached from what is sensible and just, as to render those who uphold them irrational in their application. Take the case of Cardinal Newman, who in his Apologia Pro Vita Sua repeated, with great satisfaction, the following statement he'd made earlier:

"The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one poor farthing without excuse."

Very interesting that you call me a Pharisee, using Jesus' own language. How Jesus would find this - that you try to keep his wine bottles, but replace the wine. What a sly snake you are. Please cite to me the passage of the Bible where Jesus thinks that so long as sexual activity is consensual it is right, and the only moral question in sex is consent. Then we will see who the fucking Pharisee is. Go on. Common. I'm waiting. Let's hear it. Bring it. Bring it.

"Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry; But if he be found, he shall restore sevenfold; he shall give all the substance of his house. But whoso committeth adultery with a woman lacketh understanding: he that doeth it destroyeth his own soul." - Proverbs 6:30-32.

"The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female, And said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery" Matthew 19:3-9

Truth is you simply do not care about the millions and hundreds of millions of people who had their trust broken, who have decieved themselves about sex and have misused it and are now left alone, never having known true intimacy, who have used sex to hurt others and themselves, etc. You simply don't. For you, this is how life is, and you think it should be that way. Their suffering doesn't matter to you. Fine. But these people, as well as all other suffering people, do matter to me, and I will do my best to take care of them. — Agustino

"The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican." Luke 18:11. KIng James version.

This was, as you'll recall, a parable Jesus told to those who held themselves righteous and others in contempt for their failings. It seems a pertinent parable in these circumstances.

It's interesting that according to the Gospels Jesus speaks merely of divorce and adultery. He says nothing about sexual conduct--the act of having sex. He says nothing about homosexuality, even. There is of course that bit about lusting in the heart being adultery, but even that doesn't address physical sexual conduct. And as to adultery, let's not forget the woman caught in it, and his statement that those without sin should throw the first stone.

The concern about divorce and adultery seem a bit odd given the statement that those who leave their families and follow him will be rewarded. Apparently, abandonment is appropriate at least in some instances, although adultery and divorce generally are not.

Regardless, it would seem Jesus didn't share your fascination with sexual activity and wasn't so eager to lecture those listening to him on its ills as you are to lecture us. He had no occasion to address sexual assault or rape, as far as we can know, and so the concept of consent to sex didn't arise, also as far as we can tell. I think he may have had other things in mind beyond the sexual habits of humanity, which he considered more important. Sadly, many calling themselves Christians think of those sexual habits almost exclusively.

I think the problems you refer to and so nobly promise to do your best to banish from the earth are caused by many things, not merely by the act of having sex. Some people may have sex only to reproduce and in order to have physical and spiritual intimacy and yet still be untrustworthy, jealous, vindictive, intolerant, cruel, confused, irresponsible, and even self-righteous. All these can cause a relationship or marriage to go sour, and many other things which don't involve sexual conduct. We hurt each other for many reasons.

Lies lies lies... my comment makes sense so long as sexual conduct affects well-being; it does not have to be equivalent to well-being contrary to your misreading of my comments. You don't care about the well-being of people, because you don't care about at least one factor which affects it. In fact, if you had bothered to read my reply in context, you would have realised that your misrepresentation makes no sense. To wit:

Desire for sex in and of itself, if by that we understand the physical act, is an obsession because sex in and of itself does not deserve that attachement and/or love. — Agustino

But I do care about sex; obviously, we all do. I merely don't care about it in the remarkable manner you do. I don't feel it to be taboo, as it seems you do. You seem to think it's something to be avoided in all but certain, limited circumstances, rather as the Catholic Church and other institutions did and perhaps still do. You think It's something sacred (as opposed to accursed; you appear to think it's permissible in some cases). Are you a priest, by the way?

Most of us desire sex. This is something that shouldn't surprise you, but perhaps it does. The mere existence of desire hardly constitutes an obsession, however.

I personally feel that love is something distinct from sexual activity. The people I love are, for the most part, people I haven't had sex with and would not have sex with. I don't think it's necessary to have sex with someone in order to love him/her. Neither do I think it's necessary to love someone in order to have sex. One is not a prerequisite of the other. For me, love has very little to do with sex.

Though sexual activity isn't a prerequisite to love or the equivalent of it, it is a matter of responsibility, as are other things which don't require the involvement of love. I don't presume to condemn others' sexual conduct, let alone maintain it should be regulated by the state, unless it is irresponsible, which usually means that it is not consensual and so would cause harm. I don't think having sex in and of itself causes harm, nor do I think having sex is harmful even though if it offends your sensibilities. You, though, obviously do condemn others' sexual conduct. I don't think that by doing so you evidence a concern for well being, and not simply because I don't think it's necessary to have sex in order to be well. I think you're just being sanctimonious, Pharisee.

Then you don't care about the well-being of others, pure and simple. Consent is not sufficient to make something moral/virtuous/ethical - in fact it has no necessary tie to morality at all. For example, if I gain someone's consent to kill them, does it follow that I should? Clearly not.

Since I referenced sexual conduct specifically, your comment makes sense only if equate sexual activity to well being. It may contribute to a person's well being, but to I suggest that sexual conduct is well being is to have a peculiarly exaggerated regard for it. You should broaden your horizons, I think. Really, there's more to life than sex.

The North Carolina law itself says next to nothing regarding its purpose, or the need for it. Generally, where it's anticipated that a law will be controversial, staff lawyers will try to make the legislative intent clear and defensible in recitals to the law. Perhaps there is a legislative history that would explain its purpose or reasons for it (committee minutes, etc.).

I'm against parades of all kinds. I used to march in them, alternately carrying and playing a trombone. They aren't worth seeing.

But they also aren't worth worrying about, nor is sexual orientation or gender preference in themselves. I think we're unduly concerned with sex here in our Great Republic. I don't care how adults choose to disport themselves sexually, or with whom they do so, provided their frolic is consensual. Neither do I wish to hear of it or see it, however.

Happily, one can always turn away from parades or take pains to avoid them. If people feel compelled to express their pride in their sexual orientation, I don't think they should be prohibited from doing so, except in certain non-parade circumstances, I suppose.

As to the great public bathroom controversy, I'm reached the age where the need to urinate is sometimes--too often--urgent. So I have no concern about being uncomfortable if there should be anyone of any kind around when I have to relieve myself. I must do so and most certainly will. Others, of course, may be uncomfortable and in more than this way.

The question, it seems to me, is to what extent our comfort should determine access to public bathrooms. it would seem that if comfort is the determining factor, the comfort of most should have priority. I don't think there is such a thing as a right to urinate or defecate in comfortable circumstances.

So, the legal basis for these laws escapes me at this time; I haven't looked into it.

Whether instances of rape or assault or molestation will increase if certain people are allowed to use certain bathrooms cannot be determined before the fact. Maybe one could be for use by children and those who are taking care of them and one for use by adults. Maybe we can in the future apportion public bathrooms into various areas, one for Xs, one for those who identify as Xs, one for those who are Ys, etc. That may be costly, but perhaps cheap partitions can be used. It all seems a bit silly, but we can do such things if need be.

I suppose I must check the law. Sigh. I can't think of any legal basis on which to prohibit access to public bathrooms, though.

I believe that all people should have the privilege of watching me urinate, and to at least hear me defecate, if they wish to do so.

I must admit that now and then I think it's possible that some, at least, of my dislike of Heidegger may be due to poor translations--a terrifying thought. If he really never mentions "Being" in his work, I can't help feel unnerved,

But I think it's quite true that for the most part we live our lives without reflecting, thinking, at all. As Dewey once said, we only think when faced with problems (broadly defined as including any situation we find unsatisfactory and want to correct). Otherwise, we act out of habit and otherwise exist and experience in an unreflecting manner, and no doubt our attention is unfocused. So if that's what MP is getting at, then I think he has a point.

You're right. I have wondered whether problems with translation result in confusion and misunderstanding, but perhaps not often enough.

A person's use of the royal "we" always worries me. It strikes me as particularly worrying when used by someone to respond to criticism.

I would hope that the paragraph's meaning can be explained by a review of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, because it doesn't make much sense to me standing alone. How he--or is the they?--discovers the un-reflected is unclear to me, nor do I understand how the un-reflected is prior to reflection and also understood by and conquered by reflection (the un-reflected being required to exist, it would seem, before being understood and conquered, and so necessarily existent before it is reflected upon). We can speak of perception forgetting itself and being ignorant of its own accomplishments only if we likewise forget that perception isn't something that can forget or are ignorant of that fact.

Perhaps he means something along these lines: For much of the time, we don't think in the manner we do when we are reflecting about something. This doesn't mean we shouldn't reflect, however. In fact, we should.

That seems a very sensible position to take.

We here in God's favorite country are busy proving that Mencken was right about our version of democracy. The rogues gallery of this crop of presidential aspirants provides us with no reasonable option, and that's largely our fault. But I think I'd ultimately vote to put the venal, self-regarding, pandering Clintons back into the White House in the hope that we would avoid electing the purblind, infantile Trump or the fanatically ignorant liar, Cruz.