Black people in low class society should rise up against themselves and really show the world that they're ready to make a change and be left out of the typical "afro american" stereotype that you see in movies, that would be beautiful and remarkable human feat to see. — EpicTyrant

Should white people in the US rise up against themselves and really show the world they are ready to make a change and be left out of typical "white privilege" stereotype that you see on real footage of the real world? Would that be a remarkable human feat to see? If so, what would it look like to you?

But why would Trump ever do that? — Marchesk

Aie, there's the rub.

With so many instances of being able to (re)consider his actions during those 8 minutes and 46 seconds and the possibility of asking for help from fellow officers or moving Floyd to the car, the continued stranglehold using his knees became premeditated during the course of those 8 minutes and 46 seconds. — Benkei

I have also been reflecting on what we are actually seeing.

Though your reasoning I think is completely adequate to establish first degree murder, it is an unsatisfactory explanation on the whole.

What I mean by that is that if we conclude we are seeing a premeditated murder, it seems completely implausible for such a desire to be formulated spontaneously. Though such a hypothesis maybe true, it is the least psychologically plausible.

If we entertain the hypothesis that the murder was planned before arrival on the scene, both the will to murder and the complicity of the other police, the events make much more sense. The accomplices are there to ensure the murder takes place without interference from bystanders nor other officers, not part of the conspiracy, that may arrive by accident (off-duty, other law enforcement agencies, other responders etc.).

The evidence for this is exactly consistent with what you describe in that there is otherwise no explanations for the actions we are seeing. It explains why there is no other plan pursued other than to wait for an ambulance, and explains why the suffocation was carried out for minutes after the victim is unresponsive (which is obvious to witnesses and can only be more obvious to someone in intimate contact with the victim).

We know that the victim and the murderer knew each other over an extended period of time.

However, in formulating this more plausible theory of why cold and deliberate actions would be carried out to murder George Floyd, there are further questions.

Although we have evidence that point towards a conspiracy by police officers involved, we do not have good evidence that the conspiracy was somehow contained to these officers to resolve a private dispute or retribution with George Floyd. The fact that the murder is carried out in daylight in front of witnesses and video and the fact that the "covering for" the murderers is institutionally pervasive (from the prosecutor, the judges, the coroner, without any meaningful intervention by higher levels of the judiciary or law enforcement), leads to the only intellectually satisfactory conclusion: that if we are witnessing a plan and not some bizarre series of coincidences, that the conspiracy involves the key elements of the justice system to ensure the murders are treated as lightly as possible, and therefore key elements of the justice system are also involved in the crime.

Since George Floyd has no institutional relevance (and again, if he did have some specific institutional relevance there are better ways to murder a specific person), the only motivation available of a larger conspiracy is to carry out a murder for the purposes of starting a race war.

If we entertain this possibility we notice an immediate congruency with several facts of the case that otherwise seem benign. First, the crime George Floyd is accused of is of using counterfeit currency: A crime easy to setup (just give him a counterfeit bill, or then give the shop owner the counterfeit, or just never have any counterfeit and just tell the shop owner to make such a call) and so it is entirely compatible with plan to setup the situation in which the murder can take place (if we had actual proof of George Floyd engaging in a crime or altercation under his own direction, it is of course then much more implausible that anyone could engineer that to happen or then design a plan predicated on the mere possibility that George Floyd "might" get himself involved with police; rather, if there is a setup it must therefore be for a crime that cannot, at the end of the day, be proved to have actually happened), but, furthermore, the nature of the crime renders it the jurisdiction of the secret service (who could take steps to guarantee the circumstances of the originating event would not be investigated), whom, within the span of three years, we may reasonably assume the President has selected, at least for his immediate entourage, the most fanatical, loyal and devoted members willing to carry out illegal actions if they are either ordered to or then come to the spontaneous conclusion themselves of what sorts of national events may play favorably to the reelection, or continued power by other means, of their employer. If such an enterprise was embarked upon, whether spontaneously or by some direction (or then the perception of an order that could also be categorized as incomprehensible speech although communicates a fundamental feeling and desire), we can reasonably assume that secret service members would have connections within the law enforcement community in which to identify the people and the department that could be entrusted with the task, the kinds of people required and the institutional setting within which they could know the legal consequences to themselves would be as minimal as possible (and, in any case, would be worthwhile for the good of the white race).

For, otherwise, it is simply bizarre that a 20 dollar note would motivate a murderer and several accomplices to murder in broad daylight (why would they decide to spontaneously kill, or then stand idly by, this particular black man for this particular crime), but for purposes of jurisdiction management within a wider law enforcement conspiracy it is entirely reasonable and fully consistent with such actions.

The presence of the counterfeit bill in the events places what we are seeing in 2 degree separation to the President and other white house officials.

Such a theory, though more evidence would be needed to prove it, satisfactorily establishes the motivation and the institutional means to explain the crime and transparently obvious cover up as it appears to us. George Floyd may have therefore been selected because of his heart condition as I posit in a previous post, and the exact plan of the murder designed to ensure that there is a strategy to minimize or avoid the consequences while also ensuring it is an obvious murder carried out in broad daylight with multiple camera angles that would be more than sufficient to insight violent and sustained protest.

If there were other motivations, private to the murders, to kill George Floyd, it seems unreasonable that they would decide to carry out the murder in broad daylight without even attempting to provoke some chaotic series of events difficult to or impossible to interpret clearly.

We know the President has the desire and the motivation to implement martial law, and we can reasonably surmise the secret police have both the intellectual and covert means to organize a crime convenient for the purposes.

Furthermore, as the protests unfolded (which is completely reasonable to assume in the formulation of such a plot) we have evidence (though again not proof) of police or otherwise intelligence or professional agent provocateurs that started the initial violence as well as completely unreasonable delay in any political actions that might calm the protesters (therefore, we have evidence that response to the crisis was already organized in such a way as to ensure a descent into the violence necessary for a race war for the purposes of rallying the white supremacy base as well as put soldiers in the streets as a necessary step towards suspending civilian rule).

I am of course open to analyse other theories, including that the will to murder was entirely spontaneous, however, given the wider context of: failed policies with regard to the pandemic and economic survival of ordinary people, the rise of organized white supremacist groups infiltrating law enforcement (which @StreetlightX points out is admitted to by the FBI and US Marshals), the prospect of electoral loss, it is not outside the bounds of reasonable historical analysis to consider the possibility of a Reichstag type event (knowing full well the truth of such events may never fully come to light). The purposes of considering such a possibility being that there maybe non-corrupt elements of law enforcement that may have the means to prove or disprove it and to do something meaningful with the information if it is the case, before it is too late to do so.

So what is so different in: Norway, Netherlands,
Finland. — ssu

The difference is that political protest as a means to effect political process is viable. Laws can be changed through political action, which may or may not include protest.

You have pictures of police dealing with protesters.

You don't have pictures and video of Nordic police murdering people in the streets, drive by pepper spraying protesters, running them over with police vans, shooting people on their porch, arresting and shooting at journalists.

People protesting in Nordic countries know they won't be killed and they're message will be seriously considered by politicians and the public in general, the state can be negotiated with effectively (union strikes), and elections can be affected by the protests.

Sure, Nordic countries aren't perfect and you can find flaws, crimes, racists and police managing protests as best they can, but the idea that Nordic states aren't viewed as a result of legitimate political process by the large majority of people that live in them is silly.

True, lot's of reasons to protest about, but the difference with the situation in the US is that there's genuine elections to look forward to; protest and civil disobedience are an effective tool of communication in a legitimate state and genuine democratic process. Protest and civil disobedience are not effective tools of political power. If the dialogue breaks down, only power remains.

I think it's very difficult to assess the value of the rioting if what followed was organised armed violence, i.e. war. Unless we're in a position where we intend to follow the rioting up with outright war, if necessary, the example has a flaw. — Echarmion

I completely agree it is very difficult to assess.

Definitely most riots throughout most of history were mostly irrelevant in terms of political change.

But most means not all, so the question is if this is in the "few exceptions category". Certainly the case can plausibly be made.

However, viewed as a political tool (which most rioters won't likely have any clear idea of, other than the intuitive expression of rejection of state legitimacy and "things be like this now"), the purpose of rioting is for the legitimate components of the state to overthrow the illegitimate components and leadership. The situation in the US is not a colonial occupation that would, as you suggest, require the organized armed violence followup. The "riot bet" is that agents of the state will be unwilling to fire on their own people at a scale large enough to restore order (the only surefire way to regain control once riots are at this scale); which is of course not an issue in
a foreign occupation context. If there's no political solution in sight, then the "good cops / soldiers" turn on their superiors rather than follow orders to shoot their fellow citizens (if things go well of course, and the revolution succeeds). This is the template of an effective riot based political change and there are lot's of historical examples of exactly this playing out.

Of course, that's not the only potential outcome.

A political solution is possible, or then the military and police could effectively end the riots through sustained mass arrests in a way that "good cops and soldiers" can live with (the status quo is maintained; not "enough" shots needed to be fired), or then a tyrannical government emerges with agents willing to "do what it takes" to maintain control.

These "good cops and soldiers" are, in an illegitimate state, carefully selected to be noble and competent enough to find murderers of the privileged class, protect property with their lives and track down thieves, and to carry out wars with discipline and courage ... but not have so much nobleness and competence as to be a "trouble maker" willing to make a principled stand (why oligarchs would say "well, I don't like Trump, but he has no principles! He's not so bad, we can deal with him" whereas Bernie was truly "unacceptable"). History shows that sometimes these "goodish" agents of the state act to reestablish plausible state legitimacy when it is clear their entire identity is not plausible without it, and the state is not plausibly legitimate. Sometimes they don't and after they are sufficiently purged and/or managed just go "oh, phooey, now things are even worse; I liked the old democracy days". In terms of political strategy of rioting, the hope is that riots get large enough to force political leaders to order the shooting of citizens, and in that moment "good state agents" stage an effective coup.

Definitely not a guaranteed outcome, but that's the idea.

I dwell on this option to make clear what the political idea behind rioting would be from a historical perspective, as a counterpoint to the idea rioting "cannot be effective".

The other options, political solutions, tyranny, botched coups, status quo maintained despite sustained civil unrest over a long duration (the riots don't get "big enough" but never really go away, transitioning to de facto gang rule in many areas, as we see in Mexican), can all be analysed as well.

Only "political solution" lacks an obvious meaning of what that would look like.

The current situation is bad, in particular, because the only leader with widespread legitimacy to (at least not be corrupt) is Bernie Sanders, but the Democratic party not only defeated him but made him bend then knee in a humiliating way that essentially disposed of his legitimacy (why no one cares what Bernie is saying about the situation today). However, "unhumiliating" Bernie (which would require making him the Democratic leader) would be the first easiest step to some sort of effective dialogue to reach a political solution. The police state and white supremacists have maintained a policy (whether centrally planned or just intuitively executed) of simply killing black, union and socialist leaders; the problem with this policy is that when people are pushed to the brink there's no leadership (people adapt by creating leaderless movements) with widespread legitimacy that can negotiate a settlement with the state. We can verify this to be the case in that there simply is no person we can name who could go to the white house and talk on behalf of the black and poor communities that anyone would give a damn about (Oprah? Will Smith? Obamas? Snoop Dog?). There is no MLK today that can intermediate between the oppressor and the oppressed. Bernie is, in my view, the closest to a legitimate representative that has widespread legitimacy (a big maybe though), and complete enough understanding of politics, although pathetically naive in implementation, to "achieve" something politically (if the state was willing to negotiate ... which is equally unlikely). So, it's very unclear what politically could happen that's relevant, partly because the Democrats already threw Bernie under the bus not realizing he is the useful idiot smart enough to be useful in the situation; that as problems get worse one needs smarter useful idiots to deal with them (i.e. Bernie is the idiot America needs, rather than the idiot America deserves, which is Trump), and it's equally unclear that even if Bernie or someone "crafted demands to end systemic racism " that Trump would agree to them; so, no one's even talking about some sort of political process at the moment other than "vote for Biden in November".

No, because a lot of people will die, regardless of the outcome. — Marchesk

The same can be said for most creation events of legitimate government.

A lot of people died so that I enjoy freedoms in my country today; a lot of people died defending the freedoms you enjoy today. It is simply hypocritical to tell non-free people "the historical time of winning freedom has past, if you didn't win it then don't try it now, it is now the time of politeness and freedom is taking no further orders".

Either explain to them they are free or explain how more effective ways exist to gain their freedom. To point out people die in the game of politics so you shouldn't play is simply patronizing.

Do you hold the same opinion about the US military? Any war to accomplish a political objective will result in a process where "a lot of people will die, regardless of the outcome" therefore there shouldn't be a US military, and all US soldiers are criminal thugs?

The privileged saying "say no violence" at only the moment they need to actually contemplate that privilege being taken away, is not simply an empty platitude but completely absurd line of reasoning if one benefits from, much less promotes, the right of state violence. At least say "I like the current violence situation the way it is"; there's no use pretending there's some pacifist belief about all violence; it's just silly if you have no track record of radical pacifism.

Fighting a literal war of secession is a patently absurd suggestion. — Echarmion

The question was "when has rioting ever been effective?" Plenty examples throughout history of rioting achieving a political goal. Of course, the goal can change; that rioting was effective part of fighting a literal war of secession against the British today does not mean that fighting a war of secession against the British is the only available purpose of rioting.

I am not saying they must be condemned because they are violent. I am saying they are likely to be ineffective. Waxing poetically about their "right to be angry" doesn't change the facts on the ground. — Echarmion

I'm not arguing against this point; you maybe right that rioting is not effective. Perhaps nothing can be effective, or perhaps there's more effective options available. I am open to hear answers to "well, what would change things?" as many are open, including national news broadcasters.

But, insofar as there's riots now, we will see how the "facts on the ground" develop.

The argument that rioting will provoke a military coup of one form or another (as generally happens in third world countries in this sort of situation), is that this time there is a pandemic and a great depression and, as I argue in the other thread, serious risk of hyper inflation. There's also a federal government unable to fix any problem at all, but makes all problems worse; so, all these things will get more unstable, not less unstable.

People will not only riot because they are fedup with double standards of justice, but because they are hungry, because they are homeless, because they are bankrupt, because they have no visible future ("that the child who is not warmed by the village will burn it down to feel the warmth of the fire"); and centrists clutching their pearls today, aghast and disoriented by the scenes they are watching on the television, will be clutching for looting as soon as those pearls are taken away (i.e. as more and more people drop out of the middle class, the ranks of the rioting class are replenished, and the strategy of mass arrests does not work in with the expected attrition).

The argument that it's preferable to provoke a military coup in the first place (if someone was motivated by political strategy, not just immediate anger, or hunger, or basic economic survival in a depression), and to risk a totalitarian military takeover instead of a benevolent one, is that, after centuries of oppression, you may as well flip that coin.

Those things are not justifiable . Most black people in America get on with their lives with no more problems than white people. It may be the case that black people are more likely to engage in illegal activity and that is why the police have more "run-ins" with them. I also notice, from the UK, that many US cops are black... — Chester

Yes, you can argue that systemic "racism" isn't really a thing, but I believe the OP states that's not the subject here.

What you're missing is the fact that such uprisings need public support...most normal people think these rioters are cunts. Your revolution ain't going to work. — Chester

It's no my revolution.

However, my argument above was not that the looting is effective, only justifiable (if you conclude the state is no longer legitimate).

If we agree the rioting and looting and arson and violence is justifiable in principle, then the next point to debate is if it's effective.

This is actually two questions in one.

First, indeed, is the question of "will the violence be effective in producing a legitimate (enough) state?"

However, there is a second question of whether "any pathways are available at all?".

If the argument against the practical effect of the riots is "they won't work because nothing will work", then maybe you may as well riot anyways while the military state organizes to crush all resistance; going down fighting is perhaps more dignified.

However, if the argument is that other pathways are available, then that argument must be made in a plausible way.

The purpose of more riots to achieve a practical political goal, is the "bet" that agents of the state will, at some point, stage a coup; a "coup of the colonels". Though rioters generally don't have such a plan, they have simply "had enough" with the current state and will simply riot until real appeasement (for instance, mass arrest and trials of associates of Epstein would probably do the trick), the consequence of continued and overwhelming riots is, historically, a military takeover (one way or another).

For, even in a illegitimate state, there is a tension between corruption and noble competence. Even corrupt leaders require, somewhere down the line, state agents that genuinely agree with the ideal of the state; the whole state cannot be corrupt all at once, corrupt elements rely on non-corrupt elements to keep enough order for the fruits of corruption to be enjoyed.

By rioting enough, the non-corrupt elements of the state are forced to recognize there is only one way to re-establish state legitimacy, which is to stage a coup and basically restart the state apparatus in a plausibly way.

However, this is not inevitable, corrupt state agents may create a new ideal for the state, purging legitimate representatives of the previous concept of justice and enlisting supporters to form a new state structure dedicated to a new concept of justice: i.e. a descent into tyranny.

Likewise, a military takeover may simply reestablish the same or a new kind of corrupt state, leading to another revolution of the historical wheel.

Of course, if the democratic process is "working enough" then the riots are just counter productive, too small to get meaningful traction anyway, and just senseless violence leading to the arrest of the rioters (and removal from the political scene and so ability to contribute to their cause).

Which violent protests have? Just saying what doesn't work isn't enough. — Echarmion

I wrote the example of the violent riots, looting and then revolution against the British, seemed to be enough.

Indeed, most political changes against a government no longer viewed as legitimate are violent. I owe the freedoms I enjoy right now to lot's and lot's of violence in the past.

The point of democracy is to avoid the need of such violence. My point here is that this is what's under consideration; you can argue the state is legitimate, democratic processes are working as intended, any grievances should be pursued primarily through existing state processes. However, if you concede the point that the state no longer functions correctly, then the idea that "regardless of the issue, property riots and looting must be condemned" is no longer based on anything. Agents of the state and their real masters loot the treasury, people on the street loot Nike and Starbucks; there's no longer democracy, only who's side are you on will determine "who is in the wrong" as in any battle history has observed.

If there still is legitimate democracy in the US, I'm all ears to hear the case be made.

Twitter has just suspended antifa's US account lol...you leftists still love Twitter now? — Chester

We're not having this discussion on Twitter, maybe pause for thought a moment and wonder why is that?

I don't fully agree with Baden (or yourself), but he wasn't turning this into a revolution against capitalism. — Marchesk

Is this true @Baden?

But, regardless of @Baden's view of capitalism's roll in this, I did not mention the word capitalism in my analysis.

The question, in the context of riots, is about state legitimacy.

You can have a legitimate state that we could agree is an example of "capitalism". Ok, maybe I don't like it and you do; but insofar as the state is legitimate in terms of genuine democratic standard of fair laws and effective political process, there's no need to riot. If people were looting where I live, I would indeed view it as a crime; the difference is that where I live in Northern Europe I simply can't arrive, from any direction I take it, at the conclusion that the state has lost legitimacy and that people have good reason to pursue their own idea of justice rather than participate in the common idea of justice that is (well enough) expressed through the state intellectual structure and it's agents. I live here precisely because nothing the state does inspires within me any desire for my own re-appropriation of violence I, at the moment, entrust to state agents; and as a conscript I am also an agent of the state.

I am not a "statist" but I am willing to live in a state based society insofar as it genuinely reflects what its people think a state should be; ok, people here don't agree with my stateless dream right now, my task is to talk about it because if I can convince them then I'm confident the laws would change according to this new, and in my view better, understanding.

Baden was making a more reasonable argument. — Marchesk

Ok, so you agree with this analysis:

That sums it up for me and why most of the objections to what's happening are ill-founded. In a situation where there is no justice, there can be no legitimate appeal to some neutral foundation of law. The law itself and its enforcers are agents of violence, both overt and systemic. The system that allows Target to exploit workers by paying them less than a living wage (half the minimum wage of most western European countries) is far more nefarious than anything a few rioters can do to their physical property. In fact, there is a good argument to be made that looting such businesses is fair reappropriation if not full recompense for the looting they've done of the labour of those under their control. (And with no good alternative options provided so will it remain).

So, regardless of specific rights and wrongs, the imposition of a skewed perspective that makes the perpetrators of major systemic violence into victims where only minor instances of localised violence forms the 'crime' against them turns the conversation into a worthless back and forth where the forest is missed for the trees. Yes, some of the localised violence is uncalled for and counterproductive and even carried out for completely the wrong reasons but that does not negate the justification for fighting back and fighting back hard against a system that wants its victims forever on their knees feeding its greed and cruelty. — Baden

I'm not quite sure where I differ in my analysis, but please point it out.

They have been successful before. That doesn't mean everything can be fixed at once. So more are needed. — Marchesk

This is debatable interpretation of history.

The justification of MLK's non-violent resistance (which is not peaceful protesting) was a strategic observation that violent resistance, alone (though justifiable), is not effective. MLK's logic was that civil disobedience (which is not peaceful protesting) forces the state to do it's violence in broad daylight for all to see. The goal was to get most white people to snap out of the denialism of state violence against black people. Whereas attacking the police, though justified, would strengthen white resolve to "win".

So, it was not peaceful protesting to begin with, and the reasoning is not applicable today because we can just see video of the police violence MLK was trying to bring to light, and most white people in America today really do condemn the police violence, but they are as unable to do anything about it as the black people due to political processes that are fairly easy to conclude are no longer legitimate (the democratic process is not working).

The idea that MLK was about "peaceful protesting" is simply delusions of the privileged class. For, obviously, if systemic injustice and corruption really is the case, and recourse through the justice and political system is not actually an effective option, then "peaceful protesting" is not a political threat; let them walk around with signs, who cares. Therefore, the idea that peaceful protesting is the "moral high ground" is simply propaganda meant to uphold the power of the privileged class; it is not good faith advice as to how politics works.

So, which peaceful protests have actually succeeded in the past in an American context? In particular, about issues of justice and state powers. Just weeks ago, many on the right were praising the heros violently threatening their politicians and fellow citizens with a show of arms inside government buildings; the same people arguing that "only peaceful protests" isn't sufficient are now arguing "woe, woe, peaceful protest, peaceful protest". What's changed, the understanding of politics or simply who's side is using violence to pursue their idea of justice and legitimate state power?

Fuck you assholes who justify this shit. — Marchesk

You haven't bothered to read and understand @Baden or @StreetlightX.

If you just want to shout and insult, you can do that in youtube comments.

The relevant issue of political philosophy, as has been said here and elsewhere, is the legitimacy of the state.

For most people (in particular in the West), state legitimacy is founded on a fair application of justice. The "rule of law" is a term in political philosophy coined to distinguish with the previous theory of the divine right of monarchs to decide what they want.

For instance, you seem to think the looting and burning things down is a crime and perpetrators should be arrested for that. Ok, now if I ask you how you know it's a crime? You'll certainly shout: Because it's on video!!! But does that establish it's a crime? Maybe all the looters are co-owners of the places they're looting and have had a share-holders meeting and decided to liquidate their stock in a disorganized manner?

The cover-up of the murder of George Floyd is at the same intellectual absurd level as someone now trying to argue epistemological edge cases that have not been ruled out "100%".

There is simply no way to even plausibly argue what we see is not a murder, at least in the second degree, in broad daylight by 1 police officer and 3 accomplices protecting the first.

You may say, "sure, fine, it's a murder and a cover up by the police, the prosecutor, the coroner, the local, state level, and federal level law enforcement, but that doesn't justify looting! Oh the humanity!", along the same lines as privileged news broadcasters and privileged commentators on the internet are trying to make.

But they cannot be dissociated; the murder and the coverup of the murder is simply proof positive there is no equal application of the law. Heart disease has never protected strangulation before. If you were bullying a kid, got them in a choke hold, and continued a choke hold for 9 minutes while the person you're choking said they were unable to breath, while onlookers told you you're choking and killing them but they couldn't intervene due to your 3 friends shielding you, "underlying conditions" is totally irrelevant. Heart disease would only be a defense if the death was genuinely by surprise in an otherwise normal wrestling match. The murderer in this case also knows the victim and may know of the prior condition, in which case the prior condition may actually increase the evidence of premeditated murder (moving it from 2nd to 1st as the choice of tactic to "restrain a cuffed man on the ground" is evidence of a thought out plan to murder, targeting a weak spot), not decrease it. Indeed, it is evidence (though evidence is not proof) that these police officers were enlisted to carry out a murder in broad daylight as part of a political plan to create race riots and a new national narrative more favourable to those in power than a great depression. Whatever the truth is, it is simply conclusive from the video itself that a murder had taken place, and any other person would be immediately arrested with their accomplices and charged with murder.

The idea that arrests only happen after a total and thorough investigation to know "all the facts" that the prosecutor offered as plausible deniability for his actions, and the actions of every level of law enforcement above and below him, to coverup of a murder, is laughably absurd.

Similarly, if you chased down a white jogger in the middle of the day and shot them, you'd be immediately arrested; if you argued that "they might be a robber" and "anyways, it was self defense as they went for my friends shut gun" it would be simply dismissed as lunacy by police, prosecutors, judges and your own defense council, because obviously the person being chased by people with guns is in the position of self defense. Such a defense would be even more absurd, so absurd no one would every even dream it up, if the scenario was black men chasing down a white jogger (obviously the white jogger would be completely justified in immediately assuming it's a gang robbery or abduction).

So, if the law is not equally applied, then the law has no basis of legitimacy in Western political theory.

What is who's property is a legal definition, if there is no justifiable legal reference frame, then there is no basis upon which to condemn looting and arson.

As Baden points out, it becomes group against group, each with their own idea of legitimacy and their actions can only be evaluated in terms of effectiveness in pursuing their own idea of legitimate political power.

The same American's condemning the looting as "unjustifiable in principle" are the same American's that completely disregard the relevance of laws of other countries when American soldiers bomb, raid and kill. If you think through the political theory that justifies disregarding the Taliban's law, or Sadam's law, and categorizing it as illegitimate, you will see that the exact same chain of reasoning can be used to conclude America's laws are no longer legitimate; if so, all agents of the state become criminals from this perspective, and all acts of violence against them are in principle justifiable; only what tactics are effective is the analytically relevant question from arriving at such a conclusion (just as American generals wonder whether bombing a school or a wedding is effective even if they are sure in their heart of hearts it's in principle justified).

Now, true, the looters, for the most part, do not carry out such politically philosophic reflections, they have mostly not the time nor the education. However, this philosophical rendering of things is also an intuitive visceral experience. One does not need to be a philosopher to feel the pain and humiliation of double standards; it is simply an obvious lived experience. Likewise, one does not need to be a philosopher to conclude society is not providing a dignified future for oneself and one's community, one need simply observe no such options available. When one sees a murder on video in broad daylight carried out over 9 calmly excruciating minutes, and then see the double standard of justice spring to the defense of the murderers, one does not need to be a philosopher to simply lose all respect for the state, agents of the state and the property the agents of the state are enlisted to protect. Once that respect is gone completely, one simply follows one's own idea of what is justified: to take from the shops what one cannot buy.

The peaceful protesters are laudible only insofar as their belief in peaceful protesting ability to influence a fair (enough) political process is actually true. If the mechanisms by which peaceful protesting was effective in the past, which is debatable as otherwise why would society come to such a point, then peaceful protesters are less laudible than the looters and indeed the police; for at least the looters and police have some sort of realistic political understanding. American's today do not condemn the Boston riots and looting that birthed America, but the privileged classes that owned the tea did so at the time; so, from a moral perspective, this maybe all that we are seeing, and nothing else.

Well then, may all of your experiences be harsh. Of course not the Kantian kind, that's not harsh. As to your understanding of the psychology of the thing, that's equally bizarre. At the very least, harshness is a kind of noise that detracts or impairs or inhibits. That is, the only thing harshness facilitates is harshness. And btw, harshness not to be confused with all the things in the world that are not harsh nor harshness. — tim wood

You do realize the obvious hypocrisy here? Trying to curse me to a life of harshness in the name of "not-harsh" discussion.

And why would I confuse harsh with things in the world that are not harsh?

Harsh, if you will, though it's not the word I would choose. But as he describes the subject of his criticism, such a person would not be interested in his efforts, assuming it is not indeed an entirely straw- subject.

"To all the people ignoring me, you are wrong to ignore me." It is close to a performative contradiction to address 'the worthy gentleman' who is not interested. And Kant avoids that. One is left therefore with the backhanded compliment that flatters the actual reader who is 'not like them'. — unenlightened

Have you even bothered reading my posts here?

And how does Kant avoid that? He berates the people who use the expression "true in theory and not in practice" and completely demolishes any argumentative basis for such a saying.

Yes, he is simply saying "you are wrong to ignore me" (the academic working on better theories), and considering people are still using this "true in theory and not in practice" fallacy centuries later, it seems Kant did not avoid being ignored.

However, what Kant did do is provide an extremely harsh criticism of such a position (doesn't apologize or try to empathize or try to "soften the blow" of his critique in anyway). People who are interested can benefit from the critique, people who are not interested do not benefit.

Harsh critique does not persuade those that aren't interested, or are mildly interested; the objective of harsh critique is to try to actually get to the truth; it is of interest only to those actually willing to do what it takes to get more truth than they currently have.

When PhD's submit their dissertation, the ideas is not only that it is critiqued harshly, so that there is some basis to assume it has merit (if it withstands harsh critique) but that the PhD student, so motivated by the truth, is able to accept and process harsh criticism (for instance, to then address that harsh criticism before the final submission). The critical method is a harsh process, not a soft process.

Once one has a truth one considers actionable, then a followup question maybe "how do I persuade people to participate in my objective?" and in such a pursuit, I completely agree, harshly criticizing everyone one meets is not a good way to go about.

However, my goal here is the intellectual activity that precedes "one has a truth one considers actionable", how can I be sure, or at least more confident in my beliefs?

My method, and I am not trying to persuade you to use it, is to subject both my own beliefs to harsh criticism (by writing what I actually believe as clear as I am able to write, without truncation or dilutions engaged in for the purposes of being able to simply dodge all criticism by saying nothing substantive at the end of the day; and, more importantly, reading and responding to the criticism I encounter as far as I can, no matter how harsh it is), and, likewise, to provide my own harsh criticism of incompatible view points to see if my belief that I have a criticism is valid. If I do my best to criticize an alternative belief and fail, I have something to think about; if I do not try my best, and I fail, then I have accomplished nothing and can simply assume "I, like, totally could have taken them down, if I wanted to".

Connected to the broader sphere of social discourse; society really does need places such as this philosophy forum where opposing views can meet on an equal footing and subject each other to the harshest possible criticism each side can muster. Without such a process, then society cannot get to better truths than it currently has, and will flounder around in the morass of "every opinion is as good as another", "that maybe true in theory but not in practice", "my truth", "it's not factual but it represents a true feeling", "false balance", etc. that support echo chambers that lead to social division.

No one is forced to be here, and the rules here allow for the kind of harsh criticism I describe.

I have provided harsh criticism, but I have also received harsh criticism. You don't seem to defend me when harsh words are aimed at me, why is that?

Kant harsh? Someone does not know what "harsh" means.

Just for a point of reference:
"harsh
/härSH/
adjective
1.
unpleasantly rough or jarring to the senses.
2.
cruel or severe.
3.
excessively critical or negative." — tim wood

If you bothered to copy paste the whole thing:

1.
unpleasantly rough or jarring to the senses.

"drenched in a harsh white neon light"

2.
cruel or severe.

"a time of harsh military discipline"

(of a climate or conditions) difficult to survive in; hostile.
"the harsh environment of the desert"

(of reality or a fact) grim and unpalatable.
"the harsh realities of the world news"

having an undesirably strong effect.
"she finds soap too harsh and drying" — google definition

Please explain your point again with the context added to your cherry picking definition game.

That when Kant says:

Now if an empirical engineer tried to disparage general mechanics, or an artilleryman the mathematical doctrine of ballistics, by saying that whereas the theory of it is nicely thought out it is not valid in practice since, when it comes to application, experience yields quite different results than theory, one would merely laugh at him — Kant

And:

Yet it is easier to put up with an ignorant man who declares that theory is unnecessary and dispensable in his supposed practice than with a would-be expert who concedes it and its value in schools (perhaps only to exercise the mind) but at the same time maintains that matters are quite different in practice — Kant

That the word "harsh" is simply inaccurate, and rather these words are closer to being a good description:

Harsh
1.
[...] Opposite: soft, dulcet, subdued
2.
[...] Opposite: enlightened, kind, lenient, comfortable
[...] Opposite: balmy
[...] Opposite: mild smooth — "google

Seeing the context of your own citation, do you believe now the statement:

Someone does not know what "harsh" means. — tim wood

Is better applied to me (who does bother to read context) or yourself (who it seems does not bother with context, yet is ready to castigate others for their diction choice).

I never said I had the truth. Read more carefully if understanding is a goal of yours.

I said when I persuade, only then do I presume to have the truth, for why else would I presume to be justified in persuading. And, indeed, often I make such a presumption: that team members should follow a plan, that a client should purchase a service, etc. I maybe wrong in these instances, but I take the risk.

But, when I have the luxury to check if what I believe is true, then harsh criticism is the only method I have found that yields any advancement.

I am curious, however, would you say Kant's criticism I cited wasn't harsh? But that he puts on the kitten gloves; please point out where? If he is harsh, and right, why not emulate him? If he's wrong, where is he wrong?

Please, teach me.

Yes, Wittgenstein even met Freud in Vienna, didn't agree as I suspected.

I don't know why I didn't consider he would have just directly commented on Freud at some point.

Freud in his analysis provides explanations which many people are inclined to accept. He emphasizes that people are dis-inclined to accept them. But if the explanation is one which people are disinclined to accept, it is highly probable that it is also one which they are inclined to accept. And this is what Freud had actually brought out. Take Freud’s view that anxiety is always a repetition in some way of the anxiety we felt at birth. [...] It is an idea which has a marked attraction. It has the attraction which mythological explanations have, explanations which say that this is all a repetition of something that has happened before. And when people do accept or adopt this, then certain things seem much clearer and easier for them. — Wittgenstein 1966, p. 43

Freud has not given a scientific explanation of the ancient myth—what he has done is to propound a new myth.” — Wittgenstein (1966, p. 47)

Quotes I lifted from this essay (in a journal-psychoanalysis.eu, which seems to be making some sort of psycho-analytic apologetic of some sort in view of this criticism). There seems to be a whole tiny cottage industry discussing Wittgenstein's views on Freud; revolving around to what extent Freud is useful even if obviously untrue. However, it's quite clear Wittgenstein rejects all forms of scientism and pscychologization of belief, as is implied in Tractacus, but there's varying opinion to the extent he rejects the new symbolic language game of psycho-analysis as inherently useless (that it is not a science but "being good at it" could be a form of practical knowledge, in a sense).

I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about. — Sam26

I will look into your summary, but here's also a summary:

Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Psychologizing philosophy in the sense I am using is exactly to explain, and even to judge "really true or false" (i.e. that our foundational beliefs are more valid), what someone believes is their ethic, aesthetic and/or metaphysics. For instance, "Republicans like authority and so want family values and a strong leader etc. and prefer negative rights over positive" is a sort of pseudo-aesthetic psychologization of what kind of ethic and metaphysic they gravitate to resulting in what they believe; I reject such kinds of meta-theories offering new knowledge about what people believe and why, and I would assume Wittgenstein would say similarly (as I assume, so would you).

I don't see Wittgenstein abandoning this basic idea, and it's clearly incompatible with scientism in general and in particular psychologizing forms of scientism.

(Also, in the same summary, "Other writings of the same period, though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, as it is applied, e.g., to the philosophy of mathematics or to philosophical psychology." so I will try to find these writing and see how he directly addresses psychology, which I wasn't aware he did, but can't imagine he'd be suddenly promoting dogmatic psychologization of belief, presuming to know the true nature of the noumena that is other people in themselves, of exactly what they believe and why.)

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. — Sam26

Wittgenstein doesn't abandon his early philosophy, only mellows out a bit about it; maybe backing away from his claim "every philosophical problem is a language problem" and that he's literally solved every philosophical problem and can go garden. But, insofar as he's looking at philosophical problems as language problems, he is saying all we can hope to do is express what we already believe. "This is the general form of a proposition. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." is to me a profound rebuke to pschologizing belief which was a total rage when he's writing, which I assume he was knowledgeable of what's going on in philosophy and psychology and smart enough to be aware of the implication of what he's saying (you cannot go deeper, you cannot psychologize the proposition, you must be silent). But I maybe wrong about what he thought, as I mention above.

You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. — Sam26

Yes, but you can give justification to what you already believe without contradiction. It is knowledge in this sense, it is not "new knowledge", reasons to believe it apart from already believing it, nor "more reasons" to believe it.

I've been pretty clear that ordinary use of language does not address this issue, therefore if someone makes an ordinary statement to express their belief I have no issue. If you want to bait and switch the ordinary meaning for a technical philosophical one, that's not my problem.

If we specify knowledge as only conclusions distinct from foundational beliefs, then, sure, foundational beliefs aren't knowledge, but this distinction is not given to us in the ordinary word knowledge. It makes sense to me if someone says "I know I have two hands".

Where did you get this idea from? — Sam26

I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true.

When it comes to bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs, my point has been consistently that they are not beliefs that can be known, i.e., they are not epistemological. They are beliefs that are shown in our actions. The best way to understand this, is to think of them nonlinguistically, as I have already pointed out in other posts. The difference is connected with Wittgenstein's saying and showing. — Sam26

I'm not disagreeing with this.

We know what we foundationally believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning.

Since we cannot make a meta-theory that results in new knowledge content, I will agree with any meta-theory that simply reiterates what is already believed.

Wittgenstein was addressing the various psychological scientisms that was the rage of his day; pointing out it's mostly just confusing and new knowledge beyond ordinary understanding of these things is impossible.

Aristotle was addressing Plato and the theory of forms. Yes, we have first principles from which we reason; no we can't therefore conclude there is a world of true forms and we "re-remember everything we learn" precisely because we believe what we already believe and therefore cannot come to new knowledge without extending our existing beliefs which mean we already believed it and it isn't new.

As a reminder, it is widely held that the law of non-contradiction cannot be justified on account of being a first principle. Again though, if it can, why would it not then be a known? — javra

Yes, it's a foundational belief. You can try to justify it without first using the law of non-contradiction. What's widely held is that no one ever has nor anyone ever will; first principle is again just another word for foundational belief (in this context).

Have to go soon, however: If a so deemed bedrock belief - such as that of experiencing two hands - can be justified, why do you then object to it being termed a known? — javra

I don't.

"Belief" and "knowledge" and "justified" are applicable to our "foundational belief"; our ordinary language has no normal utility to name what we won't normally ever inspect.

Wittgenstein was pointing out it's not knowledge in the sense of resulting in a chain of reasoning nor ever could result from a chain of reasoning. He would not object to say "I know it" in the sense of "I super believe it". He's focused on the word knowledge to emphasize we can't create new knowledge using a theory about our knowledge (that of believing we can justify what we already believe and make it new knowledge is the path to confusion).

However, as to so termed bedrock beliefs such as that of experiencing having two hands, I gave an example of how such may be justified. — javra

This is the tricky part in all this; there's no problem in conceiving of a justification for our foundational beliefs. It is not incoherent to add to a system in which A is true a justification that A is true (insofar as it does nothing else); we can add as many such justifications as we want. What those justifications don't do is give reason or "more reason" to believe what we already believe.

If I start with a proposition A in a system, and later on I prove that A is true using other propositions; I have created a justification of A which (can be, but is not necessarily) true. But, I haven't created new reasons to believe A, "nor more reasons to believe it", it was already there, I've just re-extracted it from other propositions it was already contained within.

Our foundational beliefs contain all the attributes of knowledge and justification. It doesn't matter whether we say "I foundationally believe it", "I have complete justification for believing it", "I know it and can't conceive it's wrong", "this is just really, actually true", "it's the real reality", "I am totally committed to this axiom", "this is me". One or another expression may clarify our ordinary language in one situation or another, but they can all be the same behind the linguistic expressions (if there is difference, it's because it's not foundational belief, just expression of high degree of confidence we haven't made a mistake; that we engage in such hyperbole is why we need to clarify our language on occasion: "I'm absolutely certain I will win the game" is obviously not an expression of absolute certainty; the beliefs we would use to recognize a mistake are the "real foundational beliefs").

Also tricky, that we cannot access a meta-theory which explains our beliefs does not mean such a meta-theory does not exist and is not true and does not explain all our beliefs; indeed, we must assume such a thing must exist. That we cannot access the noumena (know it's true-true) does not mean the noumena does not exist in a true form.

Which I attribute to Scalia, in service of what or whom I do not know, but nothing or anyone good. — tim wood

In agreement here, but not that the other judges would have supported the malitia interpretation. The SCOTUS and all the Western elites are statists, so goes without saying that they wouldn't promote the idea of real local political power. The dissenting judges would have simply given the state more leeway to control arms, not ruled that local groups can have as many arms as they can justifiably "well regulate" for the purposes of defending freedom against a tyrannical government.

I don't know enough to say for sure, but my guess it that none of the judges understood what they were doing; that they were engaging in active cognitive dissonance; that their state of mind is "of course it goes without saying that we're statists who claim not to be statists".

So, I don't think that they conceived of themselves as ruling primarily the "militia" content out of the constitution, as to recognize that is to recognize that they are themselves outside it's bounds from which they draw legitimacy and so exercising tyrannical power. They simply erased that part from their understanding and conceived themselves to be ruling about the extent the state can regulate personal weapons, with "fighting tyranny" being meaningless empty rhetoric (no tyranny here, nor will there ever be).

Can anyone make sense of Scalia's Heller decision without tearing the 2d amendment to pieces? — tim wood

This would be interesting to see.

We might abstract the term truth in multiple ways, going even so far as to say there is no truth, but in all these cases there will remain our psychological dependency on what is existentially real. — javra

This kind of process as not creating any knew knowledge, just potential confusion, is exactly what Wittgenstein is talking about from what I understand. Certainly what I'm talking about.

Not that it's false, that's the key to understand, it can be a trivial true extension of what we already believe. However, it is easy to make a false analytic step and enter confusion -- we cannot abstract our concept of truth away without our current concept at every step and at the end: a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time and with the same respect.

That it's enticing to try to "make" new knowledge with the sort of meta-theory you describe is what's to be guarded against. Our meta-theory about belief cannot but confirm what we already believe, the reasons for believing our meta-theory is "actually true" are trivial extensions of what we believe without the meta theory; we cannot find new knowledge there, we only risk confusion by extending trivial implication beyond what we are able to properly analyse.

My emphasis, however, was on bedrock beliefs holding the capacity of being justified to be true. — javra

That there cannot be a justification is the concept of bedrock beliefs.

I'll argue that we are psychologically incapable, even in principle, of forsaking the notion of truth as that which is in accordance with what is real. — javra

Sure, but this adds no content to our idea of truth. Real is just another word for truth to add to our list; useful in certain situations to clarify ordinary language but adding no new content.

As a caveat: Being a fallibilist, I could come up with a general argument for why this belief is not infallible. — javra

This is not really an issue. There is no problem in knowing that the noumena maybe otherwise than what we are inclined to imagine about it, that whatever my hands are "in themselves" maybe different to what I naturally assume (a Cartesian Demon induced hallucination or the modern ersatz equivalent of a simulation); the "foundational belief" is that, whatever society calls them or I call them and whatever it is in itself that I don't really know: I experience having two hands and this is a foundational belief.

Yes, I can't conceive of believing I don't have two hands right now, but this isn't a meta-theory explaining why I believe I have two hands, it is simply the definition of believing I have two hands and nothing else.

A scenario that would lead me to believe I don't have two hands wouldn't invalidate my foundational belief I was experiencing having two hands before (assuming I remember so experiencing), it would just reveal I have other foundational beliefs that allow me to interpret the experience of not having two hands and the experience of realizing I was under such intense hallucination that I previously experienced something else. The truth value is not about the noumena of the hands, but about the phenomena of experiencing and believing those experiences in a foundational sense. I can conceive of new experience, including hallucination and simulation, but I cannot conceive of new experience that would not be the new foundational belief of what I would then be experiencing: I think with the category of time and I conceive of every experience at every moment as foundationally informative.

The point Wittgenstein, and Kant before him and Aristotle before him, are all making is that our foundational beliefs (our categories of thought) cannot be analysed beyond a simple clarification of ordinary language. To say something "is true", "is actually true", "is the case", "is the case that's it's true", "corresponds to a state of affairs that exists", "obtains", "a valid and sound conclusion", "coheres to everything else I know and the alternatives would be incompatible with every other thing I believe or know", and so on, do not create new philosophical content; they may usefully clarify ordinary language on occasion, but are just different ways of saying "it's true", and our foundational belief that some things are true and what that means has no further analytic content.

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." — tim wood

The only contradiction involved is the SCOTUS ruling that the first part of the sentence is logically independent of the second (contradicting the basic idea that words make sense, which is not explicitly stated in the constitution but presumably was intended by the founders).

A well regulated militia must be able to buy any arms it can afford to make sense as "necessary to the security of a free State", but must also keep those arms in secure locations to be "well regulated". A well regulated militia is a collectivist project that, as the name suggests, requires regulation to create, and SCOTUS ruling along these lines would have forced congress to make a plausible "this is how you defeat us" pathway to local militia based arms possession (which would easily unite both the right and left freedom lovers, by the way).

Ironically, the great "individual rights" victory of personal gun ownership (which we can interpret to some extent as part of a well regulated militia; but not a very far extent), was made by the SCOTUS precisely to avoid the obvious "militia" interpretation that people really should position themselves to overthrow the state if it no longer functions democratically (in case, oh I don't know, the advice of all information security experts is thrown in the trash and machines are enlisted to count votes for some unexplainable reason that is too crazy to ever happen, but hypothetically we could consider it), because SCOTUS knows its place. In the name of freedom, the individual gun owner advocate takes the position more compatible with their own subjugation; they also advocate against the far more powerful weapon of unions, again in the name of their own freedom to associate with whom they like and come to mutual collaborative agreement as they are want to define. In other words, they want to feel and appear fierce but be as tame as well trained dog.

Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out. — Sam26

Yes, Wittgenstein is simply correct. "I know I have a hand" or then more basic sense experience that makeup that "knowledge" if you prefer (i.e. I know there's something I grab things with that people call "a hand"), is not knowledge but belief. It's simply the axioms that makeup our knowledge framework. It's knowledge in the sense that we believe it to be true, but it's not knowledge in the sense that we have prior knowledge to justify it. It's a confusion that results from simply having no practical need to distinguish between what is fundamental and we believe true and everyone agrees with what we believe is true that is not fundamental.

We can also criticize the word belief because we only "use" the word belief when a choice is involved. For instance "I believe the witness" implies there's a plausible choice not be believe, just as "I believe in Christ" implies there's a plausible choice not to believe. Foundational beliefs aren't this type of belief either, they are closer to knowledge as is colloquially used. "I know I have a hand" makes more sense in common situations than "I believe I have a hand".

What Wittgenstein found interesting about Moore's propositions is that they seem to play a peculiar role in our epistemological framework. Bedrock beliefs fulfill a special logical role in epistemology. They support the structure of epistemology. Understanding this, solves two problems, 1) the infinite regress problem, and 2) the problem of circularity. — Sam26

Obviously this is true, but it's not a new analysis (it's just the categories of Aristotle), rather (I would argue) it's rediscovered analysis after descriptive historical-psychological theories of our beliefs created a philosophical paradox that we need beliefs to understand those psychological theories of one sort or another. In an age where foundational beliefs are no longer widely agreed (philosophers before didn't have this issue because they had enough foundational beliefs that everyone did actually agree on to have constructive debates) a meta-explanation of people's beliefs and even our own becomes tempting (I don't know what's true, but I am comforted by a feeling that at least I know why people believe incompatible things and my own beliefs are at least explained by this same meta-theory even if I don't feel my own beliefs are really true).

However, we can't actually get to a meta understanding of how our beliefs emerge personally, psychologically, dialectically or historically without beliefs that make sense of those theories. The attempt at a meta understanding of ourselves as a "true theory" is useless as we already need foundational beliefs for a theory about foundational beliefs to be intelligible (therefore it resolves nothing other than that our foundational beliefs imply our foundational beliefs; which we should expect, it would only be a concern if this wasn't the case, and therefore our beliefs about how foundational beliefs emerge cannot be knowledge as there is no option for analysis to lead to different conclusions that chains of reasoning will resolve; we can already know we are going to believe what we already believe at the start of the knowledge process (i.e. we already foundationally believe the beliefs and that our meta-analysis will conform to these beliefs; it is to claim otherwise, that I have meta-knowledge that leave my own foundational beliefs open, as any meta theory would need to actually do to be a meta theory, that is the analytical mistake that we can know we shouldn't ever believe); I believe a key point of Wittgenstein, though I don't foundationally believe it to be so, as I could be wrong about what I think I know about him).

Wittgenstein also clearly understood that you can make as many symbolic substitutes for foundational beliefs as you want, but that never creates new knowledge, just mostly new philosophical sounding babbling (coming up with new words to replace old words), nor does it ever create new options of different foundational belief, only new options to confuse ourselves (about what we think we know and why, including what we think we know about ourselves).

I'm not sure if Wittgenstein or Moore ever placed things in the context of culturally what goes wrong if you try to prove or deny foundational beliefs (as happens in every scientism), but After Virtue is a good discussion of what happens culturally when foundational beliefs are no longer in sufficient agreement to have constructive debate.

In simpler terms, a meta theory of beliefs we can know exists, but is to us an intellectual noumena of which our self-justification is the phenomena we observe (including our speculation about the belief process thing in itself).

Anyone wanting to continue the debate, after 1 minute of searching on youtube I found this lecture series: 10-week course for non-science majors focuses on a single problem: assessing the risk of human-caused climate change.

This was made 10 years ago, and I'd draw attention to Lecture 11: Six Degrees, that reviews a book "Six Degrees" that was written in 2007 by a journalist going through decades of research.

But if you want the state of knowledge from over 40 years ago from a "leader in climate change science", look no further than Exxon:

From the late 1970s and through the 1980s, Exxon, one of predecessors of ExxonMobil, had a public reputation as a pioneer in climate change research.[1] Exxon funded internal and university collaborations, broadly in line with the developing public scientific approach, and developed a reputation for expertise in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO
2).[2] Between the 1970s and 2015, Exxon and ExxonMobil researchers and academic collaborators published dozens of research papers.[3] ExxonMobil provided a list of over 50 article citations from that period.[4][5]

In July 1977, a senior scientist of Exxon James Black reported to the company's executives that there was a general scientific agreement at that time that the burning of fossil fuels was the most likely manner in which mankind was influencing global climate change.[6][7][8] In 1979–1982, Exxon conducted a research program of climate change and climate modeling, including a research project of equipping their largest supertanker Esso Atlantic with a laboratory and sensors to measure the absorption of carbon dioxide by the oceans.[9][10] In 1980, Exxon analyzed in one of their documents that if instead of synthetic fuels such as coal liquefaction, oil shale, and oil sands the demand for fuels to be met by petroleum, it delays the atmospheric CO
2 doubling time by about five years to 2065.[11][12] Exxon also studied ways of avoiding CO
2 emissions if the East Natuna gas field (Natuna D-Alpha block) off Indonesia was to be developed.[13]

In 1981, Exxon shifted its research focus to climate modelling.[14] In 1982, Exxon's environmental affairs office circulated an internal report to Exxon's management which said that the consequences of climate change could be catastrophic, and that a significant reduction in fossil fuel consumption would be necessary to curtail future climate change. It also said that "there is concern among some scientific groups that once the effects are measurable, they might not be reversible."[15]

[...]

In 1989, shortly after the presentation by the Exxon's manager of science and strategy development Duane LeVine to the board of directors which reiterated that introducing public policy to combat climate change "can lead to irreversible and costly Draconian steps," the company shifted its position on the climate change to publicly questioning it.[1][24] This shift was caused by concerns about the potential impact of the climate policy measures to the oil industry.[1] A study published in Nature Climate Change in 2015 found that ExxonMobil "may have played a particularly important role as corporate benefactors" in the production and diffusion of contrarian information.[25]
— wikipedia - ExxonMobil climate change controversy

The key phrase is "there is concern among some scientific groups that once the effects are measurable, they might not be reversible."

Now that climate change is measurable and noticeable in our lives, catastrophic consequences may very well not be reversible. This is why environmentalism today is dominated by depression and the debate is about whether anything of significance is now doable or whether we missed our chance and if so how bad will it be (extinction or some polar communities).

People that stayed on the sidelines assuming "we'll certainly figure out all the science and the correct policy response at some point" were lulled by propaganda into believing it's static problem that once we build up "enough understanding" we can solve. But it's not, it's a dynamic risk management problem that gets harder and harder to solve the longer we wait to solve it, until a tipping point is reached where feasible actions are no longer available. We may already be passed this tipping point, we don't know; the basis for action is the "maybe" part, and now people are all confused that there are not clear and constructive policy plans available that are politically feasible (they were available in the 70s, the 80s, the 90s, and now are no longer available).

However, doesn't mean serious environmentalists were making wrong recommendations this whole time like the film "Planet of the Humans" suggests; they were outplayed by the fossil fuel lobby. True, they could have done even better and maybe succeeded, but there wasn't incomplete analysis as the film suggests. The analysis has been available and completely actionable from a risk management and technological point of view since the 70s, but the environmental movement has been too small and too weak to compete in public awareness and political access. Whatever "environmental" steps have been taken have been insufficient, but it is not the failure of "environmentalists": it is humanity's failure.

Now that we are passing the political feasibility window, environmental groups have a choice between presenting something politically infeasible and be dismissed or then presenting the problem but no politically feasible solution and be dismissed, or present fantasy and be welcome with open arms. The environmental groups and startups that do the former and the latter get funding, but not the middle. The latter are not even environmentalists but trying to make some edgy marketing and be "mission driven"; they know what the media wants and they oblige. The former are zombie organizations stumbling along, they may know internally that what they're proposing is no longer credible but they still need to eat. 350.org was created at the end of the "we can still do something fairly easy that is likely to succeed" window with a plan that was feasible at the time; the "Paris Climate Agreement" was the potential "we're turning this around!" moment and environmental groups going into those discussions had a clear message "make these measures ambitious (with peak emissions in the short term) and binding (tariffs for countries that don't meet targets) or we're headed for disaster: this maybe the last chance". This "last chance" was not hyperbole, but simply what all the analysis concludes. The targets were not ambitious and not binding; ok, now the chance maybe gone, but it wasn't the environmental organizations in those negotiations that were pushing for failure.

Environmentalists had no backup plan to the Paris Climate Agreement, it was nearly universally agreed among environmentalists that "this is it". The opportunity passed, there really was no plan B for environmentalists; that was totally honest assessment. The negotiators representing environmental organizations that came back from the Paris negotiations largely gave up and started exploring the intellectual space of giving up. There was not a rally around the next plan (as happened after previous failures) since there was no longer a credible next plan. Yes, people continue to work in those organizations because they still need a job, but, no, they do not believe what they are proposing is feasible, but it's unfair to not consider that their plan was politically and environmentally feasible when those organizations were founded. If you find rotten food in your fridge it doesn't imply you bought rotten food in the first place; maybe you din't make use of it in the long time you had to do so.

Why did Gretta become famous? Because the adults in the environmental movement no longer know what to say or do, nor what to say to the younger generation. Gretta figured out her generation is being served a nihilistic project that there's no rational reason to participate in. A good and brave story, the media paid attention for a bit (the analysis of a child is cute but not threatening to business as usual) while giving equal or more time to useful idiots as always, like every previous time someone broke through the denialism and managed to make a serious moral point which propaganda didn't already exist to neutralize (a small amount of time; propaganda quickly smooths things out and the story gets old anyway). Gretta represents the failure of the environmental movement -- that the consequences are now unthinkable and seemingly unsolvable and there is no credible project and even a child can figure it out now -- not a success.

I continue working on edge-case alternative plan's not because there's any reason to assume Exxon scientists were wrong when they said "that once the effects are measurable, they might not be reversible" nearly a half century ago, but because I am a Kantian and I am concerned with acting according to Maxim's that can be made universal regardless of consequential analysis of what is likely to happen, and you can't get a much more universal principle than preservation of the basic living conditions of humanity. It's a mystery to me why humanity has chosen this path, but that's not a reason to not try my best.

Then maybe you weren't interested enough in these topics as to be well informed to have a serious discussion to begin with.

To be frank, the earth is unsaveable. Even if we would find a way to create efficient fusion reactors and invent amazing new eco friendly tech, the earth will still crash into the sun eventually. And even if we would create great high tech interstellar space ship to go to a new planet, the whole universe is heading towards a heat death. So, in other words, this world is screwed. — Arvid M

You'll die eventually, does that mean you should take no actions to sustain your existence?

All the Jews would have died anyways, is therefore the Nazi's not morally responsible for their actions making those deaths sooner rather than later?

If you're not defending genocide in this way, then why is genocide of everyone by ecological collapse exempt in your moral system?

And, even if you did make some moral argument that the human species needs to last eternally, a mere 100 trillion years until heat death doesn't cut it, you haven't proved that case. Heat death of the universe is not entirely provable; within 100 trillion years maybe we discover our current cosmological theory is incomplete. So, even if you had some moral foundation, which I'm going to predict you are too cowardly to even attempt, you clearly lack the imagination to realize your empirical claim is not certain and the only way to be more certain is for humanity to continue.

Gapminder does pretty much show how raising GDP helps everyone in many ways. — I like sushi

No it does not help everyone. Being a slave in a factory or in a mine or being murdered by poachers or ranchers doesn't help you.

It also drives environmental destruction far higher than if that dirty development didn't happen.

It's entirely possible to develop cleanly and inclusively, but it's also possible to develop dirtily and oppressively and there's no evidence that if you develop dirtily and opressively long enough ... Poof! freedom and clean air.

And, in the long term, even merely local clean and inclusive development does not matter one way or another if global ecosystems collapse. It is also just a short term benefit and part of the problem if getting products and resources from those dirty and oppressive places; a geographically segregated middle class that leaves the hands-on work of exploitation and oppression to others.

Gapminder is an extension of Hans Rosling’s work, which I agree with, but it's responding to a false population dichotomy to begin with (that "African's are the problem" not white people). So great, false dichotomy deconstructed! I'm happy about that, but this does not establish that the technological and affluence part of the Impact equation is solved, just that the risks are in those areas and not population and if you look closely the risks are existential for the human species and most other specieis.

Of course, population still needs to be high for our systems and affluence to cause major problems, but if we look at our technological and affluence systems and there are orders of magnitude scale potential improvements with existing technology then we know already anyone primarily concerned about population (such as Bill Gates) is a useful idiot at best or simply protecting their privilege at worst.

The point about biofuels was not that the fuel made couldn’t meet demands it was that due to land clearance and planting the crops the net effect was to raise carbon emissions 6 fold (for this ‘green fuel’). — I like sushi

In other words, it cannot meet demand in a sustainable way, not even close.

If it can't even get even close to meeting demand, it's a completely irrelevant policy action. If even the tiny part that it can provide has a high and unsustainable environmental cost, it's not even a token measure; it's straight-up counter productive. This case was made at the time by ecological experts and the environmentalists that are concerned with correct analysis. The environmentalists that promoted biofuels did not have any environmental reasons for doing so; it was being hyped and they either joined the hype or they had convoluted incrementalists theories that yes it doesn't matter but somehow it does. Mostly, it was corporations (including the oil companies) and politicians that promoted biofuels when they saw the hype made an easy "eco win" (just as the lobbyists intended).

I’ve the figures. — I like sushi

Present the figures then.

What I was actually saying was an international body did a global survey of how environmental issues were being funded and tackled by governing bodies and organizations. I’ll have another look for it later. — I like sushi

Environmental policy is a disaster, that's why we have environmental problems so severe that studying the mechanisms and probability of a short-term (within the century) world-wide ecological collapse is now the cutting edge of ecological research.

However, it is not the case that "environmentalists" did not have a correct analysis since decades that has been continuously refined and continuously proven to be the best body of analysis available.

If you're a billionaire you can fund whatever you want and call it environmental and get lot's of press, it is only a label however.