It should be noted that Russia has voiced concerns about Ukraine joining the EU as well, because the EU features a military dimension such as a mutual defense clause (making it function, on paper, in a similar way to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty). — Tzeentch

This is just meant as an example of what Ukraine could try to get from the West using the leverage of ending the war (which some parties wanted, such as German industrialists) as well as the leverage of threatening to make peace with Russia that maximizes Western embarrassment rather than have some form of spin available for the West to pretend it is a "defeat" for Putin in some sense.

I.e. offer to make peace with Russia in a way that now claims would be "obviously" a Russian defeat:

Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory". — Echarmion

And threaten to make peace with Russia in a way that maximizes Western embarrassment, going so far as to threaten "publicly admitting" Russian talking points such as Maidan was a coup and so on.

This is simply an example of the leverage Ukraine had at the time over the West and things the West has that could be good for Ukraine to get, but I am not arguing it would be trivial to get those things.

The counter-offer of the West could easily be: we'll murder you within an hour if you keep talking this way.

By explaining the leverage Ukraine has, it does not meant to be taken in a vacuum and that other parties have no leverage.

The West's leverage over Ukraine since the beginning of the war is that finance can be pulled at any time and Ukrainian government would entirely collapse, which is a far bigger threat than not sending arms.

However, this leverage was at a minimum at the very start of the war, and so when Ukraine would have had the most room to try to deploy its own leverage in negotiations.

If Ukraine tried to pull what I describe was possible at the start of the war now, his Western counterparts would just laugh in his face.

Another big point of leverage Ukraine had at the start of the war was a functioning economy that did not depend on continuous Western finance (maybe not a "great" economy, but it was functioning), so this is leverage in terms making an economic deal with the EU (which does not need to be full EU membership, there's a large spectrum of possibilities such as status similar to Norway or Switzerland) and likewise threatening (if there is nothing offered by the EU) economic rapprochement with Russia.

Now that the Ukrainian economy is completely wrecked, that leverage is also gone.

Moral condemnation requires analyzing all these things to be sure the condemnation is justified.

Why do I say so? Because I would wish for myself a thorough analysis before I am condemned.

What does not take much analysis is to conclude that ending the war through talking, in some workable solution for everyone, is better than continued warfare.

If Zelensky wins, ok, another intrepid and committed war leader willing to sacrifice any number of his own citizens for glorious victory.

If Zelensky eventually accepts terms that were on offer before and at the start of the war, then it's difficult to justify the lives lost. — boethius

That's not a fact, it's a wild flight of fantasy. — Echarmion

I am in the midst of writing a response to your previous comments, which also contains this same denialism:

The russian offer which we ultimately know very little about. — Echarmion

Which is just so preposterously bad faith that I went all the way back to when we (by which I mean myself and other people, not yourself, actually concerned about the war and Ukrainian lives, regardless of our respective positions, when the war first broke out and a settlement is easiest to reached).

Russia's conditions for a peace settlement were made public, so we do in fact know a lot about Russia's peace offerings, and calling this knowledge "fantasy" is just ludicrous attempt to rewrite history to make the Ukrainian war effort and the West clearly doing everything possible to both start and maintain the war, as less evil and less stupid.

LONDON, March 7 (Reuters) - Russia has told Ukraine it is ready to halt military operations "in a moment" if Kyiv meets a list of conditions, the Kremlin spokesman said on Monday.

Dmitry Peskov said Moscow was demanding that Ukraine cease military action, change its constitution to enshrine neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognise the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states.
— Reuters

There's zero reason to assume this offer isn't genuine.

Unless Ukraine has some way to "win", then Russia will simply implement these conditions by force. — boethius

This is literally March 7th, 2022 (both the publication by Reuters and my comment citing Reuters in the context of the debate at the time).

Of course, Russia camped his force on Ukraine's border for months, then invades, looses men and materiel, gets absolutely nothing in return but the US blocks it because it'd "be seen as a russian victory". — Echarmion

Again, just inventing whatever that makes Western policy sound better.

This is exactly what "the West" (officials, mainstream media, zillions of commenters on social media) was insisting on, that any peace (in which Putin keeps Crimea and Ukraine accepts neutrality, which was the only deal the Russians would consider accepting) would be a win for Russia: they wanted Ukraine neutral, they want recognition of Crimea by Ukraine, so if they get that then they "win".

You're debate technique is just to think backwards to what would be convenient to be true in order to defend Western prestige (make Western policy look less stupid and evil) and just state it like it was fact.

My diagnosis of your philosophical disease is that you've, until now, happily swallowed what Western media was selling you about this war so could comfortably ignore taking a closer look, confident that certainly if the Western media and social media is so pro-Ukraine their cause and our support for their cause must be just and reasonable and going towards a good result—perhaps some are hurt, even sacrificed but it is all worthwhile, and certainly "casualties are low"—, and now that the war has clearly "gone wrong" as evidenced by radically different facts and opinions appearing in even the Western media (Ukraine can't win, casualties are high, Russia's economy is doing well actually), the cognitive dissonance has pierced your ears and arrived at your brain, and you come here to try to quell your uneasiness and retroactively prove (or then at least throw some shade on the posters who have stated since the beginning of the war the very things the Western media are now admitting, couldn't have been "really right" but just lucky guesses, nothing could have been prevented by wiser decision making, the West meant well and so on) Ukraine and Western decisions made some sort of sense and had good intentions at least, that "maybe" a preferable peace was achievable at different moments but we have little "knowledge" about it.

But feel free to provide a different narrative, personal mythology if you prefer, of why you suddenly take interest in the war now that Ukraine is clearly on the verge "not winning" with the very real risk of total collapse (especially if the dollars stop flowing).

However, the main issue is not "what exactly" Russia was offering, but that Ukraine walks away from negotiating, makes absurd ultimatums public and so on, rather than strive to get the best deal they can when they have maximum leverage.

Now, if you are in a weak position, negotiating when you have maximum leverage doesn't guarantee you get what you want (maybe there was a way to get into the EU, maybe not; maybe Donbas could be fully recovered, "autonomy" watered down, or maybe not), but not getting everything you want (like keeping "the right to join NATO" without actually joining NATO) is not a reason to refuse a deal, even less a reason to refuse continuing to negotiate.

If Russia's offer was "not quite good enough" ... then why don't we have a Reuters citation of Ukraine's counter-offer, such as neutrality and keeping the Donbas with more limited cultural protections for Russian speakers (since that's important for "some reason")?

The reason is that Zelensky is a moron and willing to destroy his country and get hundreds of thousands of his comrades killed to be on vogue ... and have a finger in billions of dollars of currency and arms flowing into the country that he has since said it's insulting to Ukraine for anyone to ask any accounting of.

Now, there is lots of philosophical nuance to analyze but as I said at the time (March 21st, 2022):

What does not take much analysis is to conclude that ending the war through talking, in some workable solution for everyone, is better than continued warfare.

If Zelensky wins, ok, another intrepid and committed war leader willing to sacrifice any number of his own citizens for glorious victory.

If Zelensky eventually accepts terms that were on offer before and at the start of the war, then it's difficult to justify the lives lost. — boethius

It of course goes without saying that if Zelensky eventually accepts terms that are far worse than what was on offer at the start of the war, that is called ruining his country to be on the cover of vogue magazine while Western leaders blow smoke up his ass to do what's in their interest and not Ukraine's interest.

BTW how many rubles do I owe you, prof? — neomac

Me, you owe nothing.

If you have been paying attention, I have already explained several times the basics of negotiation. Attempting to redefine the terms after the deal is concluded is called reneging and an insult to anyone whose word means anything to them.

For example, when Merkel et. al. brag about the Minsk accords being agreed to in bad faith without any intention to implement it in order to "buy time" for Ukraine, it is called reneging. Hopefully that will help you remember the definition.

Had I wanted anything from you in exchange for my services, I would have negotiated that before delivering the goods, because I am a man of honour.

Your reasoning looks rather out of historical circumstances.
First, Ukrainians didn’t refuse negotiation BY DEFAULT. There have been several attempts for negotiations for a ceasefire, all of them ultimately failed. Add to that a long history of failed agreements and reviving historical tensions between Ukraine and Russia. So the refusal of negotiation can very likely be a consequence of past failed negotiation attempts and failed agreements. — neomac

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was asked by a reporter if he would join negotiations mediated by Turkey if Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the table, and Zelensky said, "I don't accept it."

Erdogan "knows my view," Zelensky said. "We discussed this before the war. I told him to put Putin at the table for negotiations. 'Can we please do that? We must avert a full-scale war.' But [Erdogan] was not able to do that. Not only him — he is powerful — but he is not able to do it. And now he thinks that he is? Now we can't," Zelensky said Friday.

Zelensky explained why he cannot speak to Putin anymore.

"It is not the same man. There is nobody to talk to there," he said. — CNN

This is called repudiating negotiations.

To try to reinterpret what I say as claiming there was never any negotiations is foolish.

I clearly explain that there was a negotiation, nearly successful by some accounts (but clearly happened, was in the news and everything), and then Zelensky rejected the Russian offer and repudiated further negotiations with statements like the above.

Since even normal people intuit there's something wrong with walking away entirely from the negotiation table (the US is in continuous negotiation with Hamas as we speak), some pressure is put on Zelensky about it so he changes his position to he'll negotiation but only after Russia leaves Ukraine, including Crimea, entirely ... which is not how negotiation works. You negotiate the points of contention before an agreement is made and the exchange value actually occurs; simply demanding the counter-party does whatever you want before negotiating is another way of saying one refuses any negotiation.

In diplomatic parlance it's called the "cry baby move of unhinged, immature and reckless politicians that wish to see their own country burn".

Second, hand-weaving at hypothetical compensations for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses while abstracting from relevant historical and geopolitical circumstances is a rather weak argument. — neomac

First, it's not hand waiving, it's what negotiation is about: you seek as much compensation as possible from the parties involved in exchange for whatever you're giving up (money, time, apologies, legal claims, paintings, diamonds, leaving town etc.).

So, if there was a deal on the table that was "sufficient" in terms of being preferable to continued warfare, then the only thing to do is attempt to negotiate an even better formulation of the deal but with the aim of ultimately accepting anyways.

Furthermore, I am not abstracting away from anything, I have routinely and diligently analyzed the battlefield situation using both my own soldiering experience and training (including training specifically designed for a fight with the Russians and exactly the kind of warfare we've seen play out in Ukraine) as well as analysis available elsewhere, to evaluate Ukraine's chance of a battlefield victory.

My conclusion is basically no chance, due to the specifics on the ground (Ukraine lack of capacities the Russians have and Ukraine lack of quantity, such as artillery, where Ukraine does have comparable capacity: how can anyone expect soldiers to prevail in such circumstances?!).

Therefore, if Ukraine has no chance of a battlefield victory then it should strive to negotiate a peace, using the leverage of being able to do further damage to Russia (when you are a weaker party to a conflict, you're leverage is the ability to inflict damage even with little threat of victory; of course, being able to threaten actually victory is better leverage, but people seek to avoid damage if they can so generally offer concessions to terminate the war sooner rather than later; and even when no concessions are offered, such as unconditional surrender, it is still usually better, for real people under your command, to surrender unconditionally than to fight to the death).

Indeed, the idea that the US and European allies would compensate for the Ukrainian territorial, economic, security losses is geopolitically questionable if that implies burdening the US as the hegemon (which has been explicitly and repeatedly antagonised by Russia) and its allies (which can’t easily make concessions to Russia without irritating the hegemon) for the Ukrainian losses (which, notice, would be also Western losses if Ukraine was meant to be more integrated into the Western sphere of influence!), the costs of compensating such losses, and the additional strategic risks (by emboldening Russia, China and Iran witnessing Western weakness) while, at the same time, condoning everything to an anti-Western Russia. And historically questionable: appeasing Hitler just emboldened his hegemonic ambitions (and also encouraged a nasty alliance with the Soviet Union before their great patriotic war, right prof?). — neomac

My oh my oh my oh my.

You've said a lot there from various different perspectives that are not the same.

When I say Ukraine should seek compensation from the West in any peace deal for loss of territory, it is because they have the leverage to get that. If they can get compensation from Russia and from the West in a peace deal, that is clearly better than simply compensation from Russia.

Of course now, Ukraine has very little leverage.

But at the start of the war, for example, in exchange for accepting a peace along the lines of what Russia proposing, Zelensky could have sought various compensation from the West, in particular Europe that has the most to lose from a larger and longer war: such as a fast track into the EU (which Russia explicitly said they did not oppose, only NATO).

True, it would be a compromise where Russia is "appeased".

But as I've explained numerous times, the appeasement argument is totally fallacious and demonstrates a total lack of understanding of history.

The appeasement analogy applied to Ukraine would only be remotely similar if it was about chastising Poland for not fighting to the last Polander.

The criticism of appeasement is not levied at the smaller and weaker countries Hitler gobbled up, accusing them of surrendering or cutting deals rather than fighting to their last man and even worman, but rather the criticism of appeasement is levied at the far larger and stronger countries (UK, France, US) that had an actual chance of defeating Hitler.

Avoiding "appeasement" has nothing to do with smaller countries stuck in the middle of the great powers. It is always the same: the strong do as they will, the weak suffer what they must. And so weaker countries can only strive to suffer as little as possible in navigating the rivalry and clashes of the great powers.

A situation I do not approve of, but is created out of the system of international relations—in which the key word is "national" and the nationalism from which those nations spring—and insofar as we have a system of nations then we have more and less powerful nations and among them the "great powers" who do great things – terrible, yes, but great.

Great things generally aimed at each other but sometimes also space.

The smaller powers stuck in the middle have no interest in fighting to the death for one side or another; one needs really extreme circumstances for that option to be viable.

Now, that such a peace would be potentially "bad" for the West is from a US and Western perspective, not Ukraine's perspective. You are basically giving up the ghost of your position. You are simply taking it as assumed that Ukraine should do whatever the West wants it to do and is in the interest of the West, with no consideration for Ukraine.

And indeed, even if you are correct (which I don't think you are) in assuming any peace between Ukraine and Russia would be good for Russia and bad for the West, that's not an argument that Ukraine shouldn't make peace with Russia; only an argument that the West should not want Ukraine to make peace with Russia.

Now, whether this is inherently true or not, that any deal that is or was remotely feasible between Ukraine and Russia is "bad for the West", certainly, depending on the details, a peace deal would be better or worse for the West, and this is exactly the leverage Ukraine has, or at least had at one point.

How Ukraine could get concessions from the West is in threatening to go and make sure of doing exactly what you say would be bad for the West: i.e. threaten to make peace with the Russians in a way that embarrasses and weakens the West the most.

For example, Zelensky could have gone to the US, NATO, the EU, and said "look, you've slow played us into this disastrous war, if you don't give me some additional compensation (such as fast track EU membership), in addition to what the Russians are offering, so that I can do right by the Ukrainian people and we get something for giving up claim to Crimea, then I'm going to declare the West has abandoned us, no Western soldiers are coming, no no-fly zone is coming, we are alone, abandoned by our Western friends, arms and thoughts and prayers won't defeat the Russians, and therefore we will make peace with the Russians (and then imply a bunch of terms even more embarrassing for the West, such as allowing Russia to have military bases in Ukraine, station missiles, or just further economic cooperation with the Russians etc.).

At this stage of negotiation, the West would need to decide whether to play ball or not and participate in negotiations in order to be able to negotiate terms they can better spin as some sort of "victory" for the West (such as "security guarantees" for Ukraine, integrating Ukraine into other Western institutions such as the EU, and so on). If the West refuses to offer anything, well the Russian deal is still better than a disastrous war, and there's nothing to lose in trying to go get concessions also from other parties concerned.

Third, whatever the Russian initial demands were circumstances for peace negotiation worsened within a month: the failure of the Russian special operation in Kiev (if the objective was Ukrainian capitulation) and the genocidal massacres (like in Bucha) became public (as much Russian state media support of Russian genocidal intents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Russia_Should_Do_with_Ukraine). Later, the deal-breaker demands included also the new annexed oblasts. So I’m not surprised that Ukrainians would be compelled to refuse negotiation. — neomac

Ukraine's leverage was likely the highest before the war even started, as it's a big expense and a big risk to even start the war. Now, Russia wanted more a deal with the West, a new European security architecture, which the West refused saying it's between Russia and Ukraine (exactly because neo-cons at least believe that Ukraine fighting Russia, even if irrational for Ukraine, is better than any peace; no a surprise there), that was more comprehensive, but again Zelensky (if he wasn't an idiot) could have gone and threatened the West with peace into agreeing to negotiate with Russia a new framework in which Ukraine is neutral.

Then there is the first weeks of the war where an offer was on the table, Zelensky could have closed a deal had he wanted.

War crimes are definitely usual in any war, and their investigation can be part of a peace deal; it is simply another point to negotiation, and not a reason to refuse to negotiate (even if we are assuming it was indeed the Russians and not elements in Ukraine that don't want any peace).

Another strong reason is that Ukrainians would like to keep the Western alliance and they could likely count on the decades-long support of the US: Ukraine is on the border of Europe, the historical core of the US’s sphere of influence. — neomac

Yeah, sure, and I'd like a toilet of solid gold.

Simply wanting something is not a rational basis to fight a long and costly war that you are very, very likely to lose.

The relevant question here is whether war is a reasonable way of getting what you want. Maybe it is reasonable for Ukraine to "like to keep the Western alliance" (that Ukraine is not apart of), but it does not follow from that to fight a long and costly war to join the alliance of which the purpose would be ... deter said long and costly war?!?!

While Russia explicitly antagonizes the US hegemony and solicits anti-Western regimes to join Russia in this effort, so both the US and its enemies are compelled to see the war in Ukraine as a critical step to establish a new World Order at the expense of the US. So it is reasonable to expect this be of particular concern for the US. — neomac

Sure, maybe it's reasonable for the US to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ...

If you are right about your manipulative interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said, that proves at best he shares your views of what is rational. — neomac

I am right that the US is manipulating Ukraine. For example "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" are both obviously manipulative lies. Likewise, the billions and billions and billions (and many more billions until you've said billions at least 50 times, assuming each billion stands for at least 2 billions) in hard currency and arms the US sends to Ukraine without any tracing or auditing etc. is also a de facto area of affect bribe to all parties in Ukraine who stand to benefit from billion and billion and billions of untraceable currency and arms. That is not only clear manipulation without even attempting to avoid a situation where the money and arms are de facto bribes, but it was well known ahead of times those arms would find themselves in "the wrong hands" (to use RAND's phrasing) and would supercharge terrorism and organized crime around the world.

However, how this would "prove" Graham shares the same definition of rational as me, and what the point would be, I honestly don't see what that argument is or would be, so you'll have to explain it.

Whatever you're trying to say, rationality does not mean "good" only lacking in self-contradiction, and "self" is a key word as a rational position does not imply a universal position.

People who want to cause as much harm as possible and do as much evil as possible in their limited time, can be perfectly rational in such a pursuit. That they may lack self contradiction in pursuing their purpose to murder, rape and torture, does not make those actions good on account of being rational nor lend any weight to the position that such purposes should be universal and adopted by all rational agents.

It may very well be that it is rational for Senator Graham, relative his neo-con ideology and evil purposes, or even just plain-ol' US imperialism in general, to want Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. That being true would not somehow make it true that is rational for Ukraine to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.

But I find questionable your concept of “rationality” roughly for the same reason I find questionable your interpretation of what Sen. Lindsey Graham said. — neomac

How is my interpretation questionable?

If you find something questionable, moreoverso in a philosophical debate, you should explain what's questionable about it and, in the case of interpretation, provide your position on the matter.

How do you interpret Senator Graham's statement?

Before rebutting the rest of your post, I think it is wise to take a hiatus here and see if you even have an alternative interpretation.

For, if you don't (which your failure to support your "questioning" my interpretation by providing an alternative one, very strongly implies that you don't), then your thrashing about in the void is far more easily dealt with as obvious denialism (that even you clearly see in simply denying my interpretation without providing your own) of what Senator Graham obviously has stated (the "quiet part out loud"), and that equally obvious it is a direct and clear statement of US government policy (reinforced further by the lack of anyone from the White House even bothering to contradict Senator Graham, even just for appearance sake ... as it's so obvious an admission of what is so obviously actually happening that it's easier for everyone if the mainstream media simply never cites Graham in full on the US position in the war, much less discuss it).

Exactly. But it’s fun to watch people use sarcasm in such a ridiculous way. No one serious denies US power in world affairs, but in order to feel a fake sense of superiority it’s necessary to reduce this fact to absurdity: “That guy slipped on a banana peel— must be the US, ay guys? Har-har-har.” — Mikie

Agreed.

Western policy has been a complete disaster, it's now becoming obvious, so denialists must retreat into the safety of thought terminating clichés:

A thought-terminating cliché (also known as a semantic stop-sign, a thought-stopper, bumper sticker logic, or cliché thinking) is a form of loaded language, often passing as folk wisdom, intended to end an argument and quell cognitive dissonance.[1][2][3] Its function is to stop an argument from proceeding further, ending the debate with a cliché rather than a point.[1] Some such clichés are not inherently terminating; they only become so when used to intentionally dismiss dissent or justify fallacious logic.[4]

The term was popularized by Robert Jay Lifton in his 1961 book Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, who referred to the use of the cliché, along with "loading the language", as "the language of non-thought".[5]

The earliest recorded definition of the term was published in Robert Jay Lifton's book Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism in 1961 wherein he was describing the structure of language used by the Chinese Communist Party, defining the term as "the start and finish of any ideological analysis". — Thought-terminating cliché - Wikipedia

Meanwhile, our defense industry is loving it to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. But I’m sure that has no “major” influence here either.

Anyway, thanks for taking the time to rehash it all again in detail. I really can’t do it anymore. (That’s why I could never be a teacher.) — Mikie

Thanks!

If it is of any use, I write mainly for people who maybe following the discussion and are genuinely curious what arguments can stand up to scrutiny and who can see something as propaganda or the clichés mentioned above but can't quite see the full structure of how it works.

In this light my opponents are very helpful and obliging foils.

My principle project here on the forum is to develop strategies of dealing with bad faith debaters. The first tactic of a bad faith debater is of course to try to both confuse and render the debate tiresome; so rehashing is one such counter-tactic. Most importantly is to call out and clearly explain the ulterior motives; conceding "good intentions" to a bad faith interlocutor is to concede defeat and motivated only by either cowardice or one's own ulterior motive to fraternize with, rather than confront, evil.

I think it's implied. How could it be anything else when US imperialism is the singular force that determines events around the world.

Well maybe only the bad ones. — Echarmion

Why even bother replying if all you're going to do is demonstrate that you really don't want to answer? — Echarmion

may simply not have the time to unpack the obvious, but fortunately I do so I'm happy to dissect all the myths that cloud and manipulate your judgement.

Not only for your own benefit, but also for those following and feel there's been something deeply wrong in the West's policies in Ukraine and are wondering what exactly.

Anyways assuming that Russia views any US support as hostile interference, what is the proper course to take? — Echarmion

Since you're fairly new to the conversation, you are perhaps unaware we've spent significant effort over the 529 pages, 20 comments each, of elaborating the different policy options.

Throughout the first phase of the war—which you seem to agree, however tentatively, that Ukraine's leverage was perhaps higher than it was now and would have gotten a better deal in terms of territory than what's available now while also avoiding all the death and destruction and depopulation that has happened since—, we discussed at length why Ukraine should negotiate (rather than repudiate any negotiation) and why the Russian offer was a reasonable one for Ukraine to take (of course trying to negotiate as many further concessions as possible, and not only from Russia but the EU as well).

So, you seem to already have agreed in this proper course of action, only adding the caveat that there would need to confidence a deal does not simply post-pone the same war. To my caveat to your caveat that you can't possibly evaluate if a deal would be a durable peace or not if you refuse to negotiate but also that having a war now rather than later nevertheless requires confidence one can win the war.

Now, when a war starts it's of course common sense to negotiate and see if it can be ended on acceptable terms, exactly what the West is doing with regard to the Gaza conflict; but with regard to Ukraine, the West (in particular the US and UK) did everything possible to encourage Zelensky to not only reject the Russian's offer but refuse to negotiate entirely.

To make matters worse, Western officials, and particularly the US, do not even hide the logic that Ukraine fighting Russia is a "good investment" as it's a chance to damage Russia without losing any American or other NATO lives. There isn't even any hesitation to simply embrace what they are accused of, manipulating Ukraine into fighting to the last Ukrainian, but rather simply embrace it whole heartedly:

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate

Again, note that I cite Aaron Mate (not that I have a problem with that), because I have found no main stream outlet that has a single article that cites Sen. Lindsey Graham's statement in full.

Now, from time to time in this conflict it has become quite apparent that Ukraine isn't winning, does not even have a scenario in which it could "win", and the Western talking heads and legions of posters on social media rush to explain exactly the policy explained by Lindsey Graham (he is not explaining what he would like to do but is not policy as far as we know, such as assassinating Putin or providing Ukraine with nuclear weapons as has been suggested by others, but he's explaining the "structural path we're on here", in other words what the policy is and why he supports the policy).

So, to dress up US involvement in Ukraine leading up to the war as simply naive do-gooding, and the policy since the war started to arm Ukraine (but in a drip feed manner that avoids "escalation") and encourage Ukraine to continue fighting and repudiate negotiations and make absurd ultimatums (such as the negotiation can happen after Russia leaves all of Ukraine), as somehow good for Ukraine, is simply living in a delusional mythical echo chamber (that you so happily fill with noise with your fellow US sycophants whenever critical voices are absent from the thread for even a day).

I post RAND's report explaining that support for Ukraine fighting the separatists is "bleeding" Russia (their words) and that further support could "extend" Russia further (notice they don't use the word "defeat") and explicitly say this policy is at the expense of Ukraine (they don't explain how this benefits Ukraine or protects some categorical imperative and just "has to be done" for moral reasons) and furthermore state the obvious that Russia has significant military advantages in the region and warns that such a policy would need to be "calibrated" to avoid escalating into further Russian incursions into Ukraine where Ukraine would lose territory and likely be forced into a "disadvantageous peace". Most interestingly, RAND analysis does not then conclude "oh, but we'll have harmed Russia a bunch so that would be a good thing ... just at the expense of Ukraine so we can feel a bit bad about that, but we get what we wanted! USA! USA! USA" but rather views escalation into a large conflict in which Ukraine loses as a significant strategic defeat for the US and loss of prestige.

The report does explain that supporting Ukraine in escalating the conflict with Russia could be good for US strategy (again, in the context that this is at the expense of Ukraine) ... but only if Ukraine "won"—if Ukraine won there would be wider geopolitical benefits of shoring up US allies, giving confidence that US can and will defend them— but the report goes into some detail of why that is not so possible. Basically this whole business of supporting Ukraine is framed as one additional threat that the US could use in negotiation, not actually do. The RAND report does not even include arming Ukraine in its concluding list of recommended actions.

So, not only do you have US senators explaining exactly what US policy is (fight Russia to the last Ukrainian) but you have in depth analysis by the US "go-to" policy analysis group that explains pretty clearly that Ukraine cannot win a war with Russia and further military support that leads exactly to this war would be at the expense of Ukraine.

Now, other pro-Western policy posters here have often simply explicitly stated that yes this is a war to benefit US hegemony, US hegemony is better than the alternatives and if Ukraine is completely destroyed to advance US interests, then so be it.

You do not seem to have this view, but rather share my view that policy should be based on (in not entirely, then with strong consideration for) reduction of harm, in which case avoiding war is best and once the war starts then negotiating a peace sooner rather than later is also better than continued death and destruction, and that seeking to harm Russia at the expense of Ukrainians is not morally justifiable (I would also argue that this doesn't even seem to be happening, so a "careful what you wish for" warning to the pro-more-war proponents, but rather the war is strengthening Russia, but this is a secondary debate to the issue of whether it is morally acceptable to seek to harm Russia "somewhat" at the expense of near total destruction of Ukraine).

Now, if we agree on the moral fundamentals, then it doesn't seem even up for debate of what the purpose of Western policy has been leading up to the war ("extend" Russia at great risk and peril to Ukraine) and what the Western policy has been during the war (fight Russia to the last Ukrainian ... but not escalate more than that and risk Russia using Nukes).

What would be up for debate is 1. why does such a disastrous policy (at least for Ukraine, if not for the West) get put into place in the first place despite warnings directly from RAND that Ukraine have little chance of "winning" and that their losing will be a significant loss of US prestige and power, 2. how best to end the war now, and 3. understanding how the myth building works and fools people such as yourself into believing that disastrous policy is either somehow necessary or then at least "hearts were in the right place". For example, what exactly is wrong with fighting a geo-political adversary to the last citizen of a non-allied country?

Case in point:

I think it's implied. How could it be anything else when US imperialism is the singular force that determines events around the world.

Well maybe only the bad ones. — Echarmion

Which is simply masterbating with a fellow US sycophant with more myth and propaganda.

If you took interest enough in this war and the plight of the Ukrainians to be discussing here since the beginning, you'd know we've gone over this subject multiple times.

The focus on criticizing Western policy by us critical Westerners in this thread, is because we are Westerners and citizens of countries that are part of the Western institutions organizing the policies in question as well as directly participating in sending arms and thoughts and payers.

As citizens of Western countries we not only feel more responsible for what our governments do, rather than other countries, but we are in a better position to affect the policies of our own countries compared to other countries.

No one here has framed the "US imperialism" as "the singular force that determines events around the world". However, if we look at bad things other countries do—such as Saudi Arabia literally cutting the heads off people in the town square oh and starving the Yemenis, or Ukraine tolerating and arming literal Nazi's, China creating a truly dystopian techno-police state and poised to export that around the world, or indeed Russia invading Ukraine—then again the question for us humanist critical thinkers is what can the countries and the alliances and institutions our countries participate in (i.e. the policies we affect as citizens) do about these problems.

However, if we debated these other "bad things" other countries do, what is the response from US mini-"hegemons" out here on the web? Is the answer "oh, we should definitely implement policies to try to deal with those bad things" or is it "well US power needs the Saudi's as an ally, certainly not an enemy, so we sort of need to arm Saudi Arabia and tolerate whatever bad things they do in their own country and in other countries. You know, US interests, oil, hegemony, it's all very clever. And for the Nazi's in Ukraine, that's ok if they want to fight Russians, and maybe they aren't so many or aren't so bad after all. And of course we need China to make our stuff and profits for US corporations!! So we may disapprove and China does things and maybe China is also a rival in Asia that we try to contain, but there was zero problem in transferring all the means of production to Communist china in order to depress wages and 'socialist' activity at home and make corporations tons of money being able to leverage environmental, working conditions and humans rights arbitrage in any country willing to do business that way ... not our problem if they do bad things to their own citizens!!!."

So where would that conversation go exactly? A total focus on Uzbekistan? With a human rights situation described by Wikipedia as:

Non-governmental human rights organisations, such as IHF, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, as well as United States Department of State and Council of the European Union, define Uzbekistan as "an authoritarian state with limited civil rights"[14] and express profound concern about "wide-scale violation of virtually all basic human rights".[70] According to the reports, the most widespread violations are torture, arbitrary arrests, and various restrictions of freedoms: of religion, of speech and press, of free association and assembly. — Uzbekistan, Human Rights - Wikipedia

Which, as far as I know, is a human rights situation that may indeed have little to do with US imperialism.

So, please, link to where you've been discussing and working towards reducing the bad things being done by the Uzbekistan government, or then if you've "missed it" in your humanitarian mission, then what do you feel about it now and what is to be done about it? The "proper course of action" to use your words.

Personally I think this war was going to happen no matter what. Many presidents, including Trump and Obama, tried to change the course of US foreign policy, but were unable to fight 'the Blob'. — Tzeentch

Well I agree the war was extremely likely and it's definitely a testament to the power of the neo-cons that they can simply continue the policy without presidents having much say in it.

Nevertheless, I have no problem recognizing Ukrainian "agency" in parallel to the US policy.

It may certainly be true that Zelensky is Nuland's "our man" and the leverage and compromat Nuland has on Zelensky essentially guaranteed rejecting any peace or negotiation before the war.

However, not only are there other actors in Ukrainian society, once the war started and the stakes were clear I think Zelensky did have real agency. In extreme circumstances many previous obligation, pressures and considerations that seemed important before are swept away in force majeur. Had he wanted, Zelensky could have chosen to be something other than be a patsy and instead play an astute diplomatic game playing the sides off each other and making use of his leverage to cut a deal, playing the Americans and the Europeans, while keeping a step ahead of hardliners (aka. literal Nazi's) in Ukraine.

Of course, you may retort that Zelensky is an idiot and could not possibly come up with some sophisticated play that would have shoved a peace down the throats of Nuland and fellow patsies in the EU. And for myself, personally, I would not care much to defend more than the agency of an idiot.

However, it is a common refrain from apologists for US foreign policy that the disasters are co-created with "agency" of local players. It may not seem too relevant to you that the US is "invited in" to get a bunch of people killed, poisoned, maimed and tortured, but it is very important in the foundation of psychopathic analysis that victims "want it", or then at least had hypothetical chance to prevent it. So, for the sake of these fragile souls I have no problem admitting the agency of American agents does in fact exist—yeah, sure, why not I say—, but I would still leave it to them to argue what kind of agency we're talking about. The agency of a moron like Zelensky maybe little more than hypothetical and seen as Nuland elects the Ukrainian leader since 2014 then it would follow that Ukrainians have little say in the matter.

In my view, it is thinkable that they knew the Russians were going to invade, and also knew the Russians would eventually prevail, since the decision not to put NATO boots on the ground was obviously made in advance of the conflict. — Tzeentch

Agreed.

To add to your observation, there's no actual rush to make Ukrainians as effective as possible. Drip feed theory, the centre piece of my analysis here, of only supplying the next weapons system when the previous weapon system fails to deliver any sort of victory for Ukraine, I would argue definitive proof there's no real intention to even try to defeat the Russians.

US officials have managed to impress upon the fungible minds of even the most ardent war zealot that there's some rational reason for holding back weapons all while "doing whatever it takes" to win ... but this is clearly untrue given that they can send the very weapons one day they presented as simply common sense they could not possibly send the day before. What changes as time passes is not some reevaluation of these "of course not" arguments for not sending more sophisticated weapons, but rather the destruction of Ukrainian's war fighting capability.

As the RAND paper insists upon multiple times, support to Ukraine must be "Calibrated" to avoid any real inconvenience to Russia that risks escalation, which isn't good for anyone.

Maybe the goal of project Ukraine really was to incorporate Ukraine into NATO/EU, but perhaps this was just the red herring to provoke Russia, and the actual goal of project Ukraine lies elsewhere - perhaps the goal was a forever war between Russia and Europe. — Tzeentch

Well, I'm sure if Russia just "let it happen" then Ukraine and Georgia would be in NATO already, but since Russia didn't the neo-cons saw the opportunity for a new war that would be good as far as war making is concerned. The gas and destroying the Euro as a competitor the USD as well as making European states essential permanent vassals without the possibility of "playing off both sides" anymore were additional benefits. However, I'm pretty sure the neo-cons just like killing as many people as bureaucratically possible (they can't just launch nukes at random and live out their fetish of rebuilding civilization in a bunker, for example, because other bureaucrats would stop them ... for now).

So, I certainly agree with your point:

For example, European energy dependency has been a thorn in the United States' side for at least a decade, and it ties in nicely with the US blowing up Nord Stream. — Tzeentch

But that's just dirty money business, Tim Cook has money for god's sake; no, money isn't the main motivation, you really know you're powerful when you get a lot of people killed due to your creative engagement with the world. Money is only a tool, not an end in itself you know.

Apologies, it seems I have mixed up our discussions with someone else's. — Jabberwock

That's good to know.

It wasn't intended as a complaint. — Echarmion

Well then it seems we are of one mind on the matter and Zelensky disagrees with what is obvious truth to us.

I haven't said anything about what I think the terms actually were, and I have already decided that it's pointless to discuss specifics with you as our views just diverge too much. — Echarmion

I agree it's mostly an academic exercise and speculation what the best deal possible was at the time, though I would not say useless; what would have been the best diplomatic strategy (what concessions were achievable not only from Russia but the US, NATO, EU) could inform similar situations in the future.

As for the subject at hand, seems we agree that Zelensky should have been willing to accept neutrality, recognizing Crimea and some degree of independence for the separatists, certainly getting as many concessions as possible from all the involved parties for agreeing to those points.

Whether the Russian offer was "bad faith" or would result in some future war seems also now of academic interest.

Though, as I mention, if an offer is in bad faith it is still good to accept it. Likewise, even if you think a war would only be postponed for later one still needs to be confident of winning a sooner war.
[/quote]

Clearly we do not inhabit a shared reality (mentally, that is). — Echarmion

We seem to agree on the major points.

Whether the Northern operation was worth the cost (which we actually know Russia casualties), and whether there was a better strategy available, it made military sense to undertake and did help achieve the military gains in the South.

Of course, geo-politically, economically, in terms domestic politics, the whole war certainly has many consequences. On these issues my position is that it is not a given that Russia is being harmed by the war, or then being more harmed than NATO as a whole (even if there is relative benefit to the US relative Europe), and of course the big winner is China (and whether Russia is a relative loser vis-a-vis China, strengthening the China block is not necessarily productive for the West). The latter point even US mainstream analysts seem to be adopting as well.

Mostly all the fighting in 2022 after the first couple of weeks. — Echarmion

Then we are in agreement, by start of the war I mean the general period from before the fighting even starts to then the first weeks of fighting.

My point being that period of time Ukraine had more leverage than now. At what point it had maximum leverage is again a somewhat academic speculative exercise. The Kremlin may have been willing to make more concessions to avoid the war entirely, in which case maximum leverage was before the war. Once fighting begins then "exact leverage levels" I would argue are pretty volatile as a lot depends on perceptions and worries of decision makers.

There's huge risks in military operations of this size so as days go by the major risks may seem to be radically bigger or smaller.

What military leaders, the Kremlin and Putin are most worried about and would motivate them the most to settle the conflict so as to be sure to avoid, are potentially things that Ukraine doesn't even have the capacity to do or then doesn't ever attempt to do even if they could.

To give an extreme example, a major invasion and/or missile attacks on undisputed Russian territory is certainly something Ukraine could do, and even if doing so would likely solicit Russia responding with massive military call up (not only "unlocking that ability" in the Russian legal code but the Kremlin may feel obliged for international prestige to react as hard as possible), Russia still needs to deal with the sanctions and so such events, even if terrible for Ukraine, risk also havoc in Russia that the Kremlin legitimately believes maybe overwhelming. Maybe the Russian people band together to crush the insolent Ukrainians or maybe things start falling apart militarily or economically.

So, at the start of the war, Ukraine has this theatre level chaotic wildcard sort of leverage over Russia as well as simply the costs and risks of the fighting itself.

If it interests you, or then anyone following, to evaluate risks and stakes on this level you need to keep in mind all the possibilities. By committing to the defence Kiev and re-posturing forces for that, Russia anxiety may significantly decrease as the possibility of Ukraine actually invading Russia decreases.

The Russian plan is to prosecute the first phases of the war with 200 000 troops supplemented by mercenaries, so, at minimum, Ukraine invading Russia would cause a problem to the Kremlins preferred strategy.

I use this example not simply because it's extreme to illustrate the point of risk perception, but also Ukrainians and neo-cons have (after nearly 2 years) realized this themselves that forbidding Ukraine from invading Russia was a significant strategic weakness.

But for the subject at hand, Russia could not know for certain in any case at the start of the war that the US would forbid Ukraine from invading Russia nor that Ukraine would head such limitations; it is the risk, not what actually happens in the future (that is not known at the time), that is leverage at the negotiating table. Of course, Zelensky having zero experience was likely clueless about anything and just a snow flake on spring breeze blowing higher and tither in his understanding of the situation.

Making irrational ultimatums in public to close the door on negotiation entirely, is a sign of a weak mind that is unable to deal with complexity so seeks to simplify the situation by making the choice of the day (or hour or minute) permanent and so not need to think about the options anymore; certainly serves no diplomatic or military purpose.

Yeah, at least in terms of relative battlefield advantage. You can of course argue that the russian losses will make it harder for Russia to justify any kind of settlement, but psychological effects like this are hard to measure.

It's possible that Ukraine has passed it's peak and the war of attrition will slowly accumulate russian battlefield advantage, as well as erode Ukrainian will to fight. Certainly the very public show of disunity recently is not a good sign. — Echarmion

Well I think it's more than possible Ukraine has passed its peak, but for the sake of completeness "we don't know for certain" relative casualties.

We will see how the war unfolds.

But there doesn't seem to be a reason to assume either side will collapse any time soon and a lot can happen in a long war. — Echarmion

A war of attrition at this scale of intensity leads to sudden collapse of the one side if it continues.

This is not an insurgency where the insurgents mostly hang out among the civilian population, in well hidden and remote bases, as well as other countries entirely and can sustain a low level conflict indefinitely.

At this intensity of fighting, continuous supply of munitions is required, continuous replacement of casualties adequate enough to hold the entire front.

It's only difficult for either side to advance insofar as they must penetrate heavy fortifications and mine fields into artillery bombardment and under risk / pressure of counter attack and degradation by suicide drones, and if you manage to advance despite all that it's simply all redeployed and rebuilt 5 or 10 km further away and you need to do it all over again.

A total collapse of one part of the line would allow deep penetration where none of these things exist anymore likely leading to a cascade of collapse along the entire front.

Now, Ukraine is massive so they can always retreat far enough that they are simply out of range of Russian logistics to chase them, but it would be a massive win for Russia. If Russian history is anything to go by, collapse of the front results in political changes in the capital.

Even so, as has been discussed at length with @ssu, Ukraine could still hold plenty of defendable positions (such as the giant river in the middle of the country) as well as sustain an insurgency for years if Russia did occupy the whole country (which is unlikely for this reason), but collapse of the front would mean Russia could take more territory, possibly significantly more.

Collapse of one side of the other is essentially guaranteed at this level of intensity.

"Freeze theory" depends on the Russians giving up on advancing and so lowering the intensity to a sustainable level. Why I think this is unlikely is due to there being too many standoff munitions and drones being too effective and Russia being now totally committed to doing whatever it takes to win the war (Russia started the war with significant self-limitations clearly to make a way back to peace with the West easier' progressive deescalation was perhaps feasible before Nord Stream was blown up).

In principle, Ukraine could hold out and the Russians exhaust their offensive capability (what Western media keeps saying), but as it stands my own view is that Russia has simply too many advantages, in particular artillery and in the air with heavy standoff munitions.

Fair enough. I was just reminded of the phenomenon that, in the proxy wars of the 20th century, junior partners often acquire outsized influence, because the prestige of either the US or the USSR was bound up with their fate. So both powers ended up much deeper in wars than they really wanted. — Echarmion

We're in agreement here. If you read carefully the RAND report cited above, they emphasize repeatedly that escalation of the conflict is not good for the US and advise resolving the Donbas conflict, using arms support only in the context of essentially a negotiating tactic to achieve the best resolution.

There's certainly forces in Ukraine that wanted a war and played the part exactly as you say.

However, a bigger factor I think is that the war festers during the Trump presidency and Russia gate was an overriding US political game that prevented the Trump administration from doing what RAND suggests for domestic political reasons.

What I notice about your view, and this also goes for Tzeentch to a different extent, is that in your "myth", or perhaps we should use a more neutral term like "narrative", noone has any agency. Decisions are ultimately just reactions to the shadowy machinations of an abstraction like "US imperialism" or "the neocons". Hence why Zelensky must be manipulated by a myth. Perhaps he is even entirely a puppet. The russian actions, too are ultimately just a reaction to the actions of the masterminds. — Echarmion

You obviously didn't read what I wrote.

I explicitly stated I disagree with the narrative that the US forced Zelensky to abandon negotiating but needed to persuade him. I even go so far as use the word seduce.

The reason I use myth instead of narrative for things like Putin wanting to conquer all of Ukraine, or Russian military incompetence and Zelensky as the modern Churchill, is because there's not enough elements in these ideas to even constitute a narrative.

The other reason I use the word myth is that there's an epic dimension to these ideas; heroic defence of freedom and so on.

I wouldn't have much of a problem with the use of the word narrative but I feel myth building is more appropriate in this case.

Now, the US not being able to literally force Zelensky to do or not do things doesn't mean they didn't do their best to convince him. Where they did clearly intervene is in the coup of 2014, so that was more US agency than Ukrainian but Ukrainians had 8 years to make peace with Russia if they wanted to.

What is also of note is that all the imperialists in the Kremlin also want this war as well. Imperialists look at a map and ask why this part here isn't ours, and wars as the opportunity to make it theirs.

The US and Russian imperialists are more freinemies then actual adversaries when it comes to this particular war.

This is almost a truism, isn't it? If the deal is good enough to avoid fighting then the deal is good enough to avoid fighting. — Echarmion

It's a truism that you state.

I agree with your truism and then you complain about me agreeing with your truism.

What is not a truism is that we agree that the Russian terms on offer, at least as they appeared to be and were interpreted by diplomats and the West's own media, were reasonable, you even go so far as to say generous (a term I would hesitate to use; generous would be just leaving all the occupied territory).

Now, what is notable, is who doesn't accept this truism is Zelensky. He rejects further negotiation until his demands are met, rather than negotiate and see if there's a deal good enough to take and thus he should take it.

But it's an additional truism that you negotiate before an agreement not after your counter-party accepts your terms.

So maybe it is an obvious truism that you should negotiate and take a good enough deal if it's on offer, but it's clearly not so obvious as to be accepted by Zelensky nor his cheerleaders in the Western media.

Ukraine rejects the terms before the war and also, we are told, the whole Minsk process of diplomacy before was just a ruse and those previous settlements to the conflict were agreed to in bad faith.

And further fighting did improve Ukraine's position. Whether that will be be the case going forward is another question. — Echarmion

What further fighting improved Ukraine's position?

You think now Ukraine is in a better negotiation position than it was at the start of the war? And only going forward from now their negotiation position might decrease?

That is particularly apparent in their complete misunderstanding how and why Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries have joined NATO. — Jabberwock

What misunderstanding?

Can you even cite where we've even discussed Poland, the Baltics and other EE countries joining NATO?

You're literally making up conversation that has not occurred, but please cite where we even discuss other countries joining NATO and explain again what we don't understand about the reasons for doing so.

The reasons Ukraine would want to join NATO before or even now are obvious: not only direct military protection but nuclear deterrence.

The problem is that, if you haven't noticed, Ukraine isn't in NATO. NATO could have flown to Kiev and made Ukraine apart of the club one night by surprise anytime in the last 8 years, or even right now. The explanation of why that doesn't happen by explaining that plenty of countries (including the US) doesn't want Ukraine in NATO simply expounds the obvious reason why Ukraine isn't in NATO as we speak.

If there are "rules" that would prevent NATO allowing Ukraine to join, those rules could be changed if NATO was so motivated to help their friend Ukraine. If there are common sense reasons why no one would change the rules for Ukraine, that is simply another way of saying NATO (and its parts) does not want Ukraine in NATO.

The whole point of being in NATO is to avoid exactly the war that is happening now.

So, if NATO isn't going to do you the favour of rushing over and making you apart of the club and defending you, fighting the war that you want NATO to protect you from to defend the principle of "having the right" to join NATO, is dumb.

And that was the argument for a while, that Ukraine has the "right to join NATO" and so Russia does not have the right to ask neutrality as part of a peace agreement and so Zelensky is right to reject negotiation.

Russians never got into position to shell the city itself with artillery, so all they could shell were the far outskirts of the city and even those were sporadic. That is why there was no massive shelling reported and that is why the number of victims is low and most of those are attributed not to shelling, but to missiles. So if massive shelling of Kiyv was one of the goals of the Northern operation, it failed. — Jabberwock

But I did not assert anything of that kind. I have claimed that Russian shelling had a negilgible effect. Given that you were able to produce evidence for only two targets, I fully support my claim. — Jabberwock

Your first claim was literally:

All i can find are residential areas on the outskirst of the city. — Jabberwock

So for the benefit of anyone following that does not already think you are a complete fool, that is called moving the goal posts.

You literally "can't find", despite an honest search, anything other than residential areas on the outskirts of the city being shelled.

I explain the "outskirts" is exactly where industrial zones are situated, provide the most reported shelling on an entire industrial zone, then literal "military facilities" being shelled.

Anyways, here's more evidence:

Unlike on Monday, Russia did not shell central Kyiv in the first weeks of its invasion. Instead, it primarily targeted the city’s outskirts and a military plant where advanced weaponry is manufactured. — Aljazeera

Casualties would be low if Russian focus is on shelling industrial facilities, such as factories for advanced weapons manufacture mentioned above, rather than residential areas.

It's called propaganda. Western propaganda only reported when shells landed on residential areas, but since there wasn't all that many civilian casualties you then conclude that therefore Russia must not have shelled all that much after all.

Truly marvellous specimen of someone who is willing to believe anything that fuels their preferred narrative.

No, the road traffic was not disrupted, as Russians did not get into range, as I wrote repeatedly (the rail travel was suspended in a larger area due to the risk of air attacks). And people were hiding in subways because of air/missile strikes, which was unrelated to the ground operations. — Jabberwock

Road traffic was not disrupted on the roads Russia literally occupied?

Anyways, it was widely reported when Russia got into artillery range of the remaining Southern road, and as you note yourself rail was suspended due to the risk of air attacks.

In other words, Russia is significantly hampering supply roots into Kiev, also known as blockading the city, also known as a siege.

No, the Northern campaign played mostly a negative role. Had those same troops stood at the border of Belarus, the fixing effect would be the same, because Ukrainians would still have to commit forces to the North and Russians would not sustain such losses. — Jabberwock

This is so stupid it is almost not worth responding to at all.

Actual fighting is going to absorb more troops, more resources, more amunition, more C&C reaction and planning capacity, than just sitting on the other side of a border and there being no fighting.

No, the Russian plan most likely assumed that there would be resistance, but it would not be able to react and hold against the blitz movement from the North. That is why there was an attempt to take Hostomel and Vasylkiv. — Jabberwock

Again, as actual experts have already informed you, Russia did not have the troops to effectively occupy a large city such as Kiev, much less the other major urban centres, and even if Russia took major urban centres without costly and long Urban combat (which unlikely) that would not end the war due to there being zero reason to believe Ukrainian partisans won't continue fighting from elsewhere in Ukraine.

The Northern operation obviously had the military effect of aiding Russia's conquest of the South, because that is what literally happens. Certainly the Kremlin would have preferred the pressure was enough to pressure Kiev into a peace agreement, but if that doesn't happen the Russians take also shell targets of industrial and military value while they are there.

Even if you don't believe Wikipedia's estimate that 15 000 to 30 000 Russian troops took part in the siege of Kiev (7 - 15 % of the overall force), the entire 200 000 Russian force is not enough to occupy major Ukrainian urban centres, likely not even sufficient to occupy only Kiev, especially if the population is extremely hostile to the Russians (which plenty of Ukrainians are).

The alternative view is, instead of attempting to do something that is basically unfeasible, the Northern operation puts pressure on Kiev, keeps Ukrainian resources and operational focus there instead of in the South, shells a bunch of valuable targets, and when the South is secure and it becomes clear peace is unlikely, the Russians retreat (as expected in a fixing operation once the principle objective is accomplished elsewhere).

So you claim that the Russian diversion was so cunning that they have knowingly sent their elite troops to be massacred, just to pretend they want to take an airport? — Jabberwock

First, there is zero evidence that the battle at the airport was some sort of "massacre".

Conversely, CNN described the airport's fall as "the first major victory notched by the Russians" in the invasion.[48] The Washington Post also stated that "still, the Russians had their bridgehead" after capturing the airport on 24 February. — Battle of Antonov Airport - Wikipedia

All the analysis that concludes the battle was a failure for the Russians presumes their goal of capturing Kiev, which doesn't happen so the argument goes that failing to completely secure Hostomel is the critical event that prevents taking Kiev.

Now, if the Northern operation was a fixing operation, makes sense anyways to attack the airport to destroy the AA and other assets that are there, which Wikipedia informs us were destroyed in precision strikes, prevent Ukraine from making use of the airport, but also make it seem right off the bat that Russia is committing to taking Kiev, which the whole narrative around Hostomel definitely served to establish.

As for sending special forces on special missions ... that's pretty much what they are for in conventional warfare. What you want to avoid is throwing in special forces into a large infantry formation doing conventional manoeuvres where there's little or no difference between special and regular infantry.

Whether they suffered greater than expected losses or not, an air assault on an airbase to both destroy assets there as well as make the enemy believe "the real goal" is Kiev is exactly a mission where special forces can do their special thing and have an disproportionate effect on the theatre.

So, the use of special forces in a special mission is entirely expected.

Furthermore, your objection that this would be too cunning for the Russians to try to solicit over commitment from Ukraine to defending Kiev, while the entire South is conquered, is just bizarre. These are extremely banal and standard military ideas that are literally thousands of years old. If you want to take position A then if you can you will try to get your enemy to be at not-A.

If we are discussing the allies in WWII deceiving the Nazi's as to where they plan to land in Normandy it goes without saying that this this is both a good military idea as well as there are officers that can plan and execute a deceptive campaign.

However, if we consider the idea that the Russians deceived the Ukrainians as to their primary military goal and getting Ukraine to overcommit to defending Kiev, suddenly its ludicrous that Russian officers have even read a single book on military tactics and strategies.

The sticking point is of course what you consider "neutrality" to mean. If it just means "don't join NATO but you get some multilateral security arrangement" then yeah that sounds like a pretty good deal that I would definetly take over fighting. — Echarmion

We seem then to be on agreement of the principle point that if there was a suitable peace available based on an "acceptable neutrality", before or at the beginning of the war, then that was far better for Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as living breathing people compared to the situation now.

If we furthermore agree that using the Ukrainians to their detriment simply to harm Russia some is immoral, which I assume if you agree peace is preferable you'd agree with this additional point, then the West rejecting peace on such a basis rather than the interest of Ukrainians was certainly an immoral decision, whether it succeeds in some grand geopolitical strategic sense or not (which I have my serious doubts, countries generally getting stronger militarily, rather than weaker, from this kind of war).

Of course if "neutrality" is understood to mean that Ukraine ends up internationally isolated, with no ability to, for example, join the EU or make security arrangements with anyone but Russia, then that's a far worse deal, and would likely just be postponing the conflict. I would only accept that if I had some plan to make sure I don't just end up invaded 5 years later in a much worse situation. — Echarmion

Yes, certainly if a deal would likely end up in a worse situation later, then it's better to reject it.

Nevertheless, the logic of "better to fight now than later" still requires the expectation of winning. For example, the criticism of appeasement is levied against the great powers of the time - France, UK and the United States - who have reasonable chance of stopping Nazi Germany and completely defeating if need be. We do not direct the criticism towards Poland for not fighting to the last Polish.

What deal would have been attainable at the time we can never know for sure now, but what I think is clear is that Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, believed further fighting would improve their position; my argument of why Zelensky believed further fighting to be a better course is the various myths quickly built up around the war: Russia was incompetent and easy to beat, Putin an irrational actor as well as some sort of nostalgic reenactment of WWII Western allied solidarity ... just without anyone coming to actually help.

And we have evidence that they have shelled ONE FACTORY. Given that your initial argument was LITERAL QUOTE: 'shelling targets of military value for 2 months', giving evidence for shelling one factory is coming up a bit short, I would say. Even if you do it twice. — Jabberwock

This was the most widely reported and only one example is required to disprove your assertion that Russia did not shell anything of military / industrial value.

Here's another example of shelling something of military value:

A military facility in Brovary, outside Kyiv, was destroyed in recent shelling. (Genya Savilov/AFP/Getty Images) — Another example of shelling stuff - CBC

But let me get this straight, shelling is cheaper than missiles, Russia has artillery with a range of up to 30km, Russia is in position around Kiev where we now agree much of the industrial capacity will be outside the city ... but you are arguing Russian forces elect not to use this opportunity to shell targets of military value, such as industrial zones and literal military facilities?

Your argument is Russia didn't shell much of anything? Or only shelled residential areas of no military value?

In any case, my point that the Northern operation allows Russia to shell targets of military value and that's one advantage of undertaking such an operation is obviously true even in a bizarre scenario where Russian forces simply elect not to shell anything of military value.

It WOULD be a siege, if, as the colonel said it, if Russians did manage to 'isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure'. The obvious issue is that they never did that. They shelled one factory and a few residential suburbs and they were never close to blockading the city, as most of the roads were outside of their range. — Jabberwock

A siege, how the word is usually employed, starts when an army gets to a city or fortification and starts the process of assaulting it or then starts the process of blockading it.

There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful, the defenders manage to prevent complete encirclement, or then were always partial with supply roots in and out of the city (for example a coastal city being under siege from the land) but nevertheless the siege succeeds.

Even the term blockade does not require the blockading force to "isolate and completely detain" the defending force, but simply disrupting supply roots is still a blockade. Indeed, most sieges and most blockades in history are not perfect for obvious resource reasons that perfecting something takes exponentially more resources and resources are needed for other things; restricting most supplies to a city is perhaps sufficient and obviously still blockading said city; likewise attacking a city, aka. besieging the city, does not require a perfect blockade of the city nor any blockade of the entire city at all.

It's honestly bizarre your fixation on not only me using the word siege but as you admit yourself the mainstream media.

Saying a city is under siege is conjures up a different idea than saying a battle took place near a city, a much better idea to describe Russia's approach to and process of encircling Kiev. Obviously the siege of Kiev is not successful in terms of taking the city by force or then pressuring a peace deal, but no where in the definition of a siege is need be successful. There are plenty of sieges throughout history that were not successful and the attacker failed to completely encircle the city, failed to starve the city into submission or then failed to storm and take the city by force.

You seem to be living in a world where we should only use the word siege if the attacker perfectly implements a blockade. That is not how the word is used.

No, they were not. That is obviously false and repeating that will not make it any more true. If you have trouble finding the map in the very article you quote, I will provide it here for you: — Jabberwock

That map you post shows Russians blockading, to use your definition, essentially half of Kiev and due to the range of artillery able to significantly disrupt traffic on the remaining roads and rail into Kiev, which is a perfectly sensible siege of a city. People are literally living in subways at this time and you're telling me that if you were there you'd be willing to go down into the subway system and explain to them that Kiev is not under siege?

Sure, but I do not question that. The point of the discussion were the planned purposes of the northern campaign and assessment of their successes. — Jabberwock

As I've stated several times, insofar as the purpose was to compel a peace deal, the Northern campaign failed to do that.

Insofar as the purpose was to absorb focus and resources in the North so as to contribute to success in the South, the Northern campaign was a success.

The Russians do conquer the strategically critical land bridge to Crimea so overall the initial invasion is a military success and the Northern campaign played a critical military role.

Did Russia commit the troops necessary to conquer Kherson in siege and urban combat? And yet they have taken it. Did Russians commit enough troops for a siege of Melitopol? And yet they have taken it. Not to mention that forces required for a siege also typically need to be larger than the defending forces, for the simple fact that they need to be spread around a large area, while the defenders can attempt to break the blockade at any given point, not to mention to defend the blockade ring from the outside attemps at rescue. So if the siege was the supposed plan, Russians would need even more troops. — Jabberwock

Where cities simply capitulated obviously Russia did not have to besiege the city and take it by force. If there was fierce resistance in Kherson then either Russia would have needed to commit the troops required to take the city or then not take it.

I'm not sure what your point here is, that the Russian plan was based on assuming Kiev would just capitulate without a fight?

The only issue with the theory that the northern campaign was just a diversion and a fixing operation is that it is complete nonsense contradicting all the basic facts of the campaign. You do not send your best VDV troops to get massacred in Hostomel in a 'fixing operation'. — Jabberwock

Actually you often do send your best troops on the fixing operation since it is a more difficult mission that requires greater skill and discipline and military wisdom and also greater bravery knowing one is in fact facing superior numbers. It is a much more sophisticated operation than just busting through with overwhelming force. If you send your worst troops they risk just getting completely destroyed or captured immediately and then the enemy can anyways reinforce where you are actually attacking.

Indeed, that is exactly one purpose of elite forces in conventional warfare, is to go and deceive the enemy of where the main attack will take place.

So if indeed elite troops were committed to the North that is not unusual.

Attacking Hostomel with elite troops and making it appear that the plan is to take the airport and then fly in reinforcements to take Kiev is exactly the kind of plan special forces would come up with if they are tasked with a fixing operation.

In fact we can be sure of this because it happened. In 2014. — Echarmion

Yes, obviously the separatists cannot prevail by themselves and already required support in 2014 and support would inevitably require escalation to either a peaceful settlement of the Donbas conflict or then a full blown war.

So the evidence we do in fact have that Russia offered some extremely generous terms to Ukraine and the west prohibited Ukrain from taking the deal are: Schröders vague allusion and the statements of Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg (who provides no further justification). I guess we could also count the coincidence of Boris Johnsons visit and the end of the negotiations as evidence that Boris Johnson somehow did it, as the article does. — Echarmion

Interesting that you describe the alleged deal as extremely generous.

Are you agreeing that assuming such terms were on offer (neutrality, recognizing Crimea, Russian speaker protections in the Donbas) that, at least in hindsight, that was a far better deal at that time than continued fighting turned out to be?

The main point of issue in the present debate is whether (since all present seem to agree a peace agreement is the only viable end to the conflict) Ukraine's leverage increased or decreased since the first phase of the war. Whatever Russia was offering, if Ukraine's leverage was higher in the past then they had the best chance of getting the best deal at that time in the past along with avoiding further loss of Ukrainian lives.

What a deal would have actually looked like is subordinate to whether it was a better deal than whatever Ukraine can ultimately negotiate from here.

As for what the terms actually were, Russia made the offer and key points publicly so Ukraine could have accepted publicly. One topsy-turvy narrative is that Russia was making the offer in bad faith and therefore Ukraine was right to reject the offer and insist on a military defeat of Ukraine; however, the correct negotiation move when a good offer is made in bad faith is to simply accept it and if the counter-party renegs then one's position is improved by clearly demonstrating the bad faith of the opposing party.

One issue I think is important to address is the framing are statements such as "the west prohibited Ukraine from taking the deal". US / NATO I do not think had any hard leverage that essentially means they were deciding for Zelensky / other Ukrainian leaders, but they needed to persuade Zelensky et. al. and absolutely essential to this was the mythology that was rapidly constructed to portray the Russian invasion as somehow a complete failure, Ukrainians fiercer fighters that are more motivated, Zelensky himself a brazen war hero and so on.

In short, Ukrainian decision makers, and in particular Zelensky, needed to be seduced to the neo-con world view that what actually matters is what Western people can be made to think and somehow reality will flow from such beliefs, whether they be true or false initially or at any point in the future. The promise of military aid, "whatever it takes", and tens of billions of dollars certainly helped.

If these are the deal-breaker conditions for a peace negotiation, is it completely irrational for Ukraine and its Western allies (like the United States) to resist peace talks, even assuming a COMPETENT and HARD TO BEAT Russia? Teach me your theory of rationality, I'm eager to learn from you. — neomac

No problem, I am happy to teach you.

First as I've already explained, it's completely irrational to refuse negotiating as the weaker party to a conflict. Not only are Russia's demands maybe their starting position and through negotiation you "talk them down" but Ukraine was also in a position to get concessions also from both Europe and the United States.

So if you don't negotiate you can't know what exactly is on offer. Perhaps Russia is offering some compensation for Crimea that makes a peace more palpable and so forth. Perhaps other European states that do not want a protracted war with Russia would also offer compensation that would make life better in Ukraine.

As for your point about deal breakers, if you mean giving up claim to Crimea or declaring neutrality are deal breakers, those are irrational deal breakers. If Ukraine has not military option to retake Crimea then maintaining that as a deal breaker is simply irrational, it is much more rational to seek to get as much compensation for recognizing reality that you have no hope of changing through military intervention. Likewise, if Ukraine has no hope of joining NATO anyways and no hope of defeating Russia in military terms, then the rational course of action is to seek as much compensation as possible for accepting neutrality.

The justification for Ukraine's refusal to negotiate and declaring delusional objectives and ultimatums, such as only being willing to negotiate once Russia leaves all of Ukraine, was the theory of victory that Russia would fall apart under the pressure of the war, Western sanctions and domestic opposition to the war.

None of that I would argue was rational for Ukraine to believe, but the US made quite clear that their theory was a protracted war with Ukraine, sanctions, blowing the up the pipelines, would weaken Russia long term. This is made quite clear by

“I like the structural path we’re on here,” Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham declared in July 2022. “As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person.” — Aaron Mate

Which makes clear the US does not view Ukraine's choice as a rational one, but a good path for the US (what "we" refers to in this context).

And this is nothing new, using fanatical fighters as a proxy force to weaken a rival is post-WWII great-power conflict 101.

For Ukraine, the point of maximum leverage was in the initial phase of the war (or even before the war) and the rational thing to do is negotiate when you are strongest.

The myth building undertaken by the United States that the time to negotiate is not at the start of the war but Russia is incompetent and weak and can be pushed back, was to encourage Zelensky to reject peace as well as reassure European allies that supporting Ukraine militarily is a worthwhile endeavor (rather than forcing Ukraine to accept a peace deal, which the Europeans could have done even without the United States). Some parties in Europe were of course as enthusiastic for Ukraine to fight the Russians as you could possibly be, but many people in Europe were skeptical.

Now, certainly your reply is that Ukraine really wants Crimea back and really wants to be in NATO, perhaps agreeing already with:

It's beyond me how anyone can take this seriously.

Not only was there no way for Ukraine to join NATO with the Donbas conflict unresolved.

Launching a demonstrative attack on your neighbours capital to get them to not join a defensive alliance with your enemies must be the dumbest plan I've ever heard. "Hey look how easily we can threaten your capital and take your land. Better not get any protection, that'd be bad. Also we're going to retreat after loosing some of our best troops and a bunch of equipment, so you'll know we mean business". — Echarmion

Of which the answer is literally right there in these statements.

Ukraine has no hope of actually joining NATO as @Echarmion literally states. Obviously it would have been nice for Ukraine to join NATO anytime before the war or even now and have other countries come and fight your battles.

... However since Ukraine has essentially zero hope of joining NATO, then what is rational is to try to seek compensation for recognizing what you can't have anyway. What is totally irrational is to fight a costly war to defend "the right to join NATO" even if you can't actually join NATO.

To answer the question of why Russia invades to try to force Ukraine to give-up it's goal of joining NATO when Ukraine has essentially no hope of joining NATO, again the answer is right there in @Echarmion explanation of the situation.

Ukraine can't join NATO due to the war in the Donbas, but continuing that war indefinitely is not a reasonable solution for Russia. Just like Ukraine is clearly at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with Russia, the Donbas separatists were at a massive disadvantage in a war of attrition with the rest of Ukraine. There is clear limitations of sending "volunteers" and other covert actions to help the separatists rather than formal military formations. Eventually Donbas would be attritted away (or just leave or die of old age) and Ukraine would prevail without direct intervention of the Russian army.

Therefore, the plan of keeping the Donbas conflict alive in order to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO essentially necessitates an eventual escalation of direct intervention of Russian forces to prevent the collapse of the separatists.

The conflict in the Donbas and the cutting of fresh water to Crimea were also serious political problems. Ordinary Russians expected the Russian government to "solve" those issues one way or another.

Again, the portrayal of the invasion as some some sort of whimsical irrational act on the part of an obsessed imperialist in the Kremlin was again myth building to portray Ukraine as an innocent victim, rather than creating problems for Russia that would inevitably lead to escalating the de facto war with Russia in the Donbas since 2014.

The reason so much effort was spent by the Western media to assert there was no "provocation" was that there was obvious provocations that are easy to understand (such as cutting off fresh water supply and killing ethnic Russians, in one case locking them in a building and lighting it on fire, as well as going around with Swastikas and espousing Nazi ideology), and accepting the reality of these provocations significantly reduces a feeling of moral imperative to help a victim that provokes aggression.

If you recognize the obvious reasons for Russia seeking a military solution to obvious problems, then corollary is that Russia is a rational actor with reasonable concerns and perhaps a peace can be negotiated that is better for everyone, and likewise greatly diminishes a feeling of obligation to send free money and arms to Ukraine.

The myths required are founded on mostly just ignoring obvious facts but also just Western ignorance. Since the Western media mostly ignored the conflict in the Donbas and ordinary Westerners mostly ignore the Western media anyways, the Russian invasion came as a surprise (to them) so it is easy to build on that and portray the invasion as irrational and unprovoked, just sort of out of the blue.

You can of course argue Lindsey Graham's point that it was good for the US to create the myths required to encourage Ukraine to give up their leverage through fanatical fighting as that will "damage" Russia, but it's difficult to argue that it was rational for Ukraine to do so.

Once it started to become clear that Russia was not weak and would not be easily beaten, the new justification was that the war was existential for Ukraine, again based on the myth that Russia wants to conquer all of Ukraine: therefore it is reasonable to fight even "to the last Ukrainian" because the battle is existential. However, that argument is not only simply wrong (Russia doesn't have the force necessary to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine and there's no gain in doing so) it is also a fallacy anyways confusing what is existential for a state and what is existential for a people. The only time it is reasonable to fight to death against impossible odds is if the aggressor anyways plans to murder you if you surrender.

If I am attacked by a larger and more skilled opponent that I am convinced is trying to murder me (not coerce me into giving him my watch) then it's reasonable to fight back even if I am fairly certain I will lose, as there is always some chance, no matter how small, of prevailing due to luck in fighting or then the lucky intervention of external forces.

However, not only is there zero evidence Russia plans to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine, there is even less evidence Russia wishes to do so in order to murder every Ukrainian.

The war maybe existential for Zelesnky, but it is not existential for the average Ukrainian and there is no rational basis to fight a losing war.

If you are losing a war then your leverage decreases over time and does not increase. The closer the war comes to a military termination (where you lose) the less reason the opposing side has to offer any concessions and of course the more people and infrastructure you lose due to continuing to fight; and to make matters even worse, the more you lose a war the faster you lose the war in the future as the destruction of your fighting capacity means further disadvantage and asymmetry of losses.

For people interested in actual reality, the second most basic of all military strategies immediately following the use of force, is deceiving the enemy.

If your objective is A you want your enemy to believe your objective is B.

If you want to break through at a point at A, let's call is A1, then you want to trick your enemy into reinforcing other points other than A1, ideally not even in the vicinity of A but to move forces to B and C and so on.

This is called "Defeat in Detail" or more popularly "Divide and Conquer" described by Wikipedia as:

Defeat in detail, or divide and conquer, is a military tactic of bringing a large portion of one's own force to bear on small enemy units in sequence, rather than engaging the bulk of the enemy force all at once. — Defeat in detail - wikipedia

The end result of all these deliberations is that Russia divides Ukrainian forces between defending the North and the South, allowing Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders in the South and conquer critically strategic terriroty.

The opposition here wants us to believe that this happened accidentally or then as a "consolation prize" to Russia's actual plan of defeating and occupying the North and installing a puppet regime, dedicating about 10% of their overall force in Ukraine to this primary objective.

This latter narrative has so little support that proponents are reduced to simply refusing to accept the common use of words like "siege".

What is more interesting than debating what "siege" means, is why the myth is developed that Russia has completely failed, incompetent, irrational, in disarray, in comparison to a standard of performance expected from the Russians (easily defeat all of Ukrainian forces in a few days, as little as 3, and occupy Kiev) that no expert expected before the war, is that it supports refusing negotiations, which is what the West, in particular the US, wants Ukraine to do.

That's not what happened. — Echarmion

That's exactly what happens.

The "limited excursion" into South-Eastern Ukraine refers to establishing a land bridge to Crimea.

Literally called by the author "Sub-COA 1c: Create a Land Bridge from Rostov to Crimea".

Which is the third "Courses of Action Subordinate to COA 1" in an order of likelihood, following the most likely in the authors opinion:

1. Sub-COA 1a: Deploy Forces to Belarus

and 2. Sub-COA 1b: Overt Deployment in Donbas

Both of which also happen.

The situation on the ground at the moment is that Russia implemented exactly this reports top 3 likely things.

The options to view actions in the North that were abandoned are:

A. Putin and his generals also believed he could waltz in and take Kiev with 20 000 troops.

B. The northern operation was primarily representing a little thing in military parlance called "deception", to divert focus and resources in the North, while more feasible military objectives are achieved in the South.

The evidence for B is that Russia does not commit the troops remotely necessary to take a city of 3 million people, bypasses all urban centres (which are critical to capture for the purposes of long term occupation, but better to avoid if the operation is ephemeral) and does not engage in any Urban combat at all, whereas in the South fierce Urban combat takes place, particular in Mariupol, as the author predicts is necessary:

Securing a land route from Rostov to Crimea would require taking the heavily defended city of Mariupol — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine - Institute for the Study of War

So, what is more probable? That Russia tried and failed to conquer and occupy Northern Ukraine with 20 000 troops ... or that the plan to do what Institute of the Study of War finds feasible with Russia's available forces involves a tiny bit of subterfuge and making the Ukrainians believe, at least at the very onset of the war, there is a full scale invasion with the purpose of taking the capital. Subterfuge perhaps aided by the West repeating at face value a "leaked plan" where Russia would take Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, and all of Ukraine in one blow.

What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

I was pointing out that the article specifically described missile attacks as 'shelling'. — Jabberwock

Well, considering the shelling I was referring to is explicitly described as artillery shelling by the primary source for the information (the municipality of Kiev) in Ukrainian based publications, your issue with the article is totally irrelevant to our debate.

Yes, that is one target of shelling which we have already mentioned. Russians were able to target it, because it was far on the outskirts of Kiyv. — Jabberwock

As I already pointed out, industrial zones are usually beyond the residential zones, and artillery can have up to 30 km, so your point that Russia gets to the residential zone of Kiev should indicate to anyone familiar with "cities" generally speaking that the Russians would have a position to shell industrial zones (that have military value in terms of producing, or being retooled to produce, military hardware), that it would be one thing the Russians might do ... and indeed the Russians do shell industrial targets and so that it one positive (for the Russians) of their Northern operation.

Except the military expert himself never used that word... And yes, encirclement of Kiyv was one of the expected scenarios. — Jabberwock

You are correct, as far as the original source goes, the citation is:

If the Russian troops move forward at the same pace, it will be two days before they reach the suburbs of Kiev, followed by an operation to isolate and completely detain Kiev and start applying pressure. — Col. Margo Grosberg

Which Wikipedia correctly paraphrases as "siege".

All of which is a response to your claim that:

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Which is even more directly contradicted by the Wikipedia authors themselves paraphrasing the colonel with the word "siege" as it is at their discretion to describe the situation as a siege, which it obviously is.

Another appearance of the word "siege" in the Wikipedia page is a source, The Washington Post, who publishes an article literally called:

European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues — European leaders travel to Kyiv as Russian siege of Ukrainian capital continues - The Washington Post

But I guess this is the "sensationalist press" that wants to sensationalist an army encircling most of a city as "a siege".

Sure, but it does not apply to the battle of Kiyv in any way. As you see, the necessary condition for a siege is a 'blockade'. — Jabberwock

The Russians are definitely blockading Kiev by the process of encircling it and cutting off most roads to Kiev.

Your complaint is that the siege is not entirely complete or not entirely successful, which is fine, a siege does not require perfection or then a siege must be successful to be a siege. Which is simply not the case.

It's honestly a strange obsession of yours to refuse to characterize something that is so obviously a siege as a siege.

I am sure you have no problem watering down your arguments to the point that they do not resemble what you have previously argued for, in order to maintain the illusion you were somehow right. — Jabberwock

The issues of contention in this particular part of the debate is:

1. Incompetence, as expressed by Jabberwock explicitly stating:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

2. Whether the intention of the Russians was to take and occupy Kiev, as expressed by you stating:

It needs to be pointed out that the whole theory of 'just threatening Kiyv' with an army that was supposedly obviously and clearly incapable of threatening Kiyv, is simply incoherent. — Jabberwock

I, and also @Tzeentch, explain why the Russian actions are neither incompetent nor incoherent, that they make sense and achieve plenty of military objectives while also applying pressure on Kiev to accept peace terms (which clearly does not happen), to which you reply to these points with the straw man that:

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. — Jabberwock

No where do I say the Northern operation is some "kind of cunning Russian plan".

What are the obvious facts:

1. The Russian military operation as a whole secures the land bridge to Crimea and the Northern operation clearly contributes to the military success in the South by diverting Ukrainian resources and attention.

2. Russia does not commit the troops necessary to conquer Kiev in Urban combat and occupy the city.

From this we can conclude that insofar as the Northern operation was designed as a fixing operation to be sure to take critical strategic targets in the South, it is a success.

Insofar as it is designed to pressure Kiev into accepting a quick peace, it is a failure.

Nowhere do I say the Northern operation is entirely successful. When I explain one purpose of the Northern operation is to pressure Kiev into accepting peace terms, I am very well aware that did not happen and the war continues.

Likewise, no where do I state that the Russian actions represent the best possible strategy. Perhaps things would have gone better for the Russians without the Northern operation, or then perhaps they would have been bogged down in trench warfare trying to break through the Donbas and their columns would have never left Crimea as Ukraine would have done the obvious thing of blowing up the bridges and digging in to prevent that from happening if they were free to focus on what is happening in the South.

The position I am defending is that the Russian plan makes sense and achieves some critical military objectives.

I state clearly that I do not know what probability the Kremlin assigned to Kiev completely capitulating or then accepting peace terms early on, but what is clear is that preparations are made for that not happening and the major military focus is placed on securing critical gains to have "something to show for it" if there is no peace agreement.

The key paragraph to understand the report is on page 14:

Unless the United States and some NATO states actively participate in the fighting, the major variables are the time it takes the Russian military to achieve these aims and the cost it will have to pay in blood and equipment. The outcome of the initial fighting itself is not in doubt.

Reports of the plan and most discussions of the invasion stop at this point. — Report in question

The report explains the narrative in the media of what Putin is allegedly planning to do, and notes that the analysis then just stops at "Russia wins".

However, the author then explain how the alleged plan makes absolutely no sense if it were to be executed. Russia does not have enough troops to occupy all of Ukraine, nor the troops for massive urban combat in multiple cities, and even if cities would surrender as desired (which the author finds exceedingly unlikely), Ukrainians would very likely then conduct an insurgency and trying to do this thing of full scale conquest, even if initially successful, would not achieve any political objectives; it would be just attempting to conquer Ukraine for the sake of it and then have massive problems to deal with.

So either Putin is irrational or then whether intentional or not, Western media plays into what the actual plan is: a fixing operation in the North while the South-East (a feasible objective that serves a strategic purpose and conquers Russian speakers that are easier to pacify) is achieved, which is what happens. Also of note, many parts of the alleged plan do not ever happen, such as an amphibious assault on Odessa.

If the report is read carefully, the only military objective that is feasible with the forces under consideration is taking the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson ... which is what ultimately happens.

For example:

However, the deployment of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) at scale would pose a considerable challenge to Russia’s ability to flow supplies and reinforcements in by air until they established a wide perimeter around the airfield and along the landing approaches to it. — the report

To explain (one of many reasons) why taking Odessa in an amphibious assault would be exceedingly difficult.

Furthermore, the noted effect of MANPADS is what happens in the actual war, forcing Russian air power to stand-off positions, and so would have basically stranded any landing party trying to take Odessa in a full scale invasion as explained ... which maybe explains why that didn't happen, but ultimately only feasible military objectives were taken and occupied long term.

Russia conducts no urban combat in the North (essential for long term occupation) again: because there is no intention to occupy the North long term is the reasonable explanation.

Yeah, and if you'd continue reading rather than take out of context the one paragraph that seemingly agrees with you, you'd notice that the report is laying out exactly the plan Jabberwock and me consider to have been the likely intent. — Echarmion

What are you talking about? Are you unable to read??

The report literally starts by stating that conquering all of Ukraine is basically impossible if you take a closer look but Putin may conquer South East Ukraine ... which is what happens.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is amassing a large force near the Ukrainian border and reportedly has a military plan to invade and conquer most of unoccupied Ukraine. Western leaders are rightly taking the threat of such an invasion very seriously, and we cannot dismiss the possibility that Putin will order his military to execute it. However, the close look at what such an invasion would entail presented in this report and the risks and costs Putin would have to accept in ordering it leads us to forecast that he is very unlikely to launch an invasion of unoccupied Ukraine this winter. Putin is much more likely to send Russian forces into Belarus and possibly overtly into Russian-occupied Donbas. He might launch a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion. — Literally the first paragraph of the report in question

Now, the report uses the term "invasion" to mean intent to fully conquer Ukraine, and "limited incursion" for doing something like take a land bridge to Crimea.

I would not use this terminology as clearly invading anywhere in a country is still an invasion, but the paper is meant for other experts and the "invasion / incursion" distinction is made clear.

It analyses what an invasion would entail and that it's basically impossible with the forces Russia has so concludes it's exceedingly unlikely ... but what Putin "might" do is "a limited incursion into unoccupied southeastern Ukraine that falls short of a full-scale invasion".

Which, if you haven't noticed, is what Putin ultimately does.

So, is 20 000 troops in Norther Ukraine really Putin ignoring the "risks and costs" and believing he can completely conquer Kiev and all of Ukraine with 20 000 troops from the North ... or is the purpose of the Northern operation something that makes sense and is feasible to achieve with 20 000 troops of a fixing operation so focus is on Kiev and away from the South-East?

The end result is rational and achievable (limited incursion to establish a land bridge to Crimea) and accomplishes critical strategic objectives such as securing a long term defence of Crimea and something as trivial (in your analysis) as fresh water ... but somehow the start is irrational and the plan is to fully conquer Ukraine with 200 000 troops and only 10% of that force committed to the capital?

Why would irrational actors have rational results in a process as chaotic and complicated as a war?

What was RAND corporation saying before the war:

Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre- empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace.

Some analysts maintain that Russia lacks the resources to escalate the conflict. Ivan Medynskyi of the Kyiv-based Institute for World Policy argued, “War is expensive. Falling oil prices, economic decline, sanctions, and a campaign in Syria (all of which are likely to continue in 2016) leave little room for another large-scale military maneuver by Russia.”22 According to this view, Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a proxy war in Ukraine, although, given Russia’s size and the importance it places on Ukraine, this might be an overly optimistic assumption.

There is also some risk of weapons supplied to the Ukrainians winding up in the wrong hands. A RAND study conducted for the President of Ukraine found reasons for concern about the potential misuse of Western military aid. While Ukraine has been tarred by Russian propaganda claims that it mishandled Western military aid, the RAND team also found that “Ukraine’s paper systems for tracking equipment are outdated and vulnerable to corruption.”23 Moreover, the RAND team also expressed concern that, absent reforms to Ukraine’s defense industry, Western military equipment might be reverse- engineered and enter the international market in competition with U.S. suppliers. — Extending Russia - RAND Corporation

RAND essentially argues against what the US policy ultimately does:

The conclusion of the brief of their report on extending Russia is:

Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation. — Overextending and Unbalancing Russia, Brief - RAND corporation

The whole idea that Russia was expected to easily win is total mythical fabrication that was created after Russias initial success that saw some of the fastest armour advances in all of history so did seem (to lay people who have no clue) that Ukraine was collapsing and Russia was easily going to take the whole country.

However, anyone who has experience of soldiery or done honest study of war could easily point out that sustaining such advances at the same rate is logistically impossible, that Ukraine is huge and cannot possibly be overrun entirely in a matter of days or weeks, that one part of the Ukraine built up defences in the South collapsed but other parts didn't move at all, and that US intelligence capabilities is a massive advantage in coordinating a defence, Ukraine has hundreds of thousands of troops and many hundreds of thousands more that can be mobilized etc.

Therefore, when Ukraine arrests the initial invasion / Russia reaches logistical limits, it seems like a great and unforeseen victory and we can all enter magical thinking land where it will be easy to defeat the Russians and no need to ever negotiate!! Hurrah!!

Of course, arresting the initial invasion does not mean being poised to win the war, even if completely uncontested Russia could not occupy all of Ukraine with 200 000 troops.

What ultimately occurs was not unexpected. Ukrainians will likely fight back; that's what they've been preparing for and training for and what soldiers are conditioned to do. Ukraine can resist ... for a time. Russia has certainly the capacity to achieve some objectives (such as the land bridge to Crimea), but not all. The war could last but Russia has a heavy advantage.

We've discussed this already at length, what experts were saying before the war:

Likewise, article also gets right:
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

"The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case."

— PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS — boethius

This is from conversation here nearly two years ago.

Of course, boethius knows, but people for example in the White House had "zero clue". :roll: — ssu

He is saying the same thing as I just said, that Ukraine can put up fierce resistance but

The Ukrainians have learned an enormous amount, but the advantage is still heavily in Russia's favor,

So you're talking about a scenario where there could be heavier casualties, but the outcome doesn't really change. — what SSU literally just cited

Their helicopter and jet fleet could be essentially "wiped out quickly" (which is essentially what happens and the West needs to scrounge up MIGs from elsewhere).

The author is not explaining how Ukraine will collapse in a matter of days but that Ukraine has "learned a lot" and does have fighting potential, just that Russia has a heave advantage and fighting the Russians will result in heavy casualties that does not ultimately change the outcome.

This is pretty much what all the analysts were saying before the war: that Ukraine can put up a fight, they do have hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a lot of equipment, and an immense territory.

Now, where analysts said Ukraine would lose relatively soon was in the context of zero support from the West, which I think we all agree here that if the West did not intervene Ukraine could not have lasted this long (at least in terms of conventional military fighting).

Hence you are simply wrong in saying that "people who have no clue" making these pessimistic predictions. People simply thought that the Russian army was way more better than it was in 2022. — ssu

The average public indeed have zero clue, the Russian invasion was ultimately arrested by massive support from the West.

This is the mythology, that somehow the small country of Ukraine that has basically no army and should be easy for Russia to simply knock over in a few days, somehow beat the odds and it therefore must be due to Russian incompetence and weakness, rather than massive support and intervention from the West (weapons systems, intelligence capabilities, finance of the entire Ukrainian military and government).

Of course, the West did not intervene enough to actually threaten a Russian defeat, and therefore, like the author you cite notes, the outcome does not ultimately change.

What is interesting here is that despite the Russian military clearly not being incompetent, achieving and then securing against Ukraine's much advertised offensive, critical strategic ground, effectively destroying not only Ukraines Soviet equipment but a large part of the entire regions, and now destroying Western armour in large quantities, there is still this adherence to what should by now be obvious propaganda.

Propaganda that was critical to justify Ukraine repudiating any negotiation and promising the World victory over the Russians.

Which now we're told was never "really a thing" just something people say to motivate the troops to fight to a better negotiation position that no one can explain how Ukraine's current negotiation position is remotely improved in anyway compared to the start of the war.

My god you have completely lost it. — Echarmion

Russia has now more soldiers and more experienced and battle hardened soldiers and have learned how to effectively employ combined arms at scale (which they did not have experience with until this war, but only on a much more limited scale) as well as integration with drones. This kind of war makes an army (especially the one that wins) far more dangerous than at the start.

In parallel, Russia has greatly increased arms production.

Of course, a lot of capacity is continuously destroyed in Ukraine, but as soon as the war ends there will be a significant arms built up as well as availability for export.

I think the total destruction of Ukraine is out of the question now. — ssu

I agree that Russia does not intend to conquer all of Ukraine in any case, and "losing the war" for Ukraine means losing significant territory.

hat Ukraine would defend itself like this wasn't before anticipated, after all the US offered Zelensky a way out (meaning they estimated Kyiv would fall in days). Now that has changed. — ssu

Not anticipated by anyone who doesn't follow the analysis of this kind of thing, but there was plenty of analysis made before the war that the maximalist war aims of Russia would be taking the land bridge all the way to the Dnieper and Russia did not have the forces available to conquer all of Ukraine and also noting Ukraine has a sizeable army, battle hardened by 8 years of war in the Donbas, has advantage in defending, and is not a trivial army to defeat.

Since most people have zero clue about anything, the Western media quickly took advantage of people's perception of Ukraine as some small and backward Eastern European state that should be easy for "the Red army" (the term even being used from time to time, but I mean here to refer to people's perceptions) to topple over. Creating the myth of Russian incompetence was absolutely essential to establish the logic of refusing all negotiation. If analysts and officials admitted that Russia clearly had a sensible plan and conquered a lot of territory in the South that would be extremely difficult for Ukraine to re-conquer if the Russians had a minimum of sense and experience in warfare (which it turns out they do), then this would have severely undermined the momentum for fighting without any clear end state or viable path to victory.

Now that has changed. I think the Western aid will be to at least enough for Ukraine to defend, it won't be enough to push Russia totally out. What basically Putin can do is sit behind the Suvorov-line and the make limited counterattacks. — ssu

I would agree Ukraine could have certainly been able to defend had they been on the defensive and pulling back whenever positions got compromised.

However, since Ukraine defends political symbols and then even more foolishly attacks Russian fortifications, it's possible Ukraine has expended also its capacity for defence and may experience total military collapse.

In my view Russia does not want to conquer all of Ukraine, but total collapse of the front lines would mean Russia taking whatever it does want.

So I agree Ukraine won't be destroyed, but the main reason for this in my view is that Russia does not intend to completely conquer Ukraine (would be simply a long term liability, rather than Russian speaking regions with valuable resources which are long term assets).

Yet basically after the Ukraine war either halts or goes truly to the frozen conflict mode, then in few years Russia will have built back it's capability. — ssu

Russia's war fighting capability is likely far higher now than at the start of the war.

Since this war and now the war in Gaza and general instability has made the world a far dangerous place, as soon as the war ends my prediction is not only will the Russian military be at essentially a climax of war fighting capability but it will find a hungry market to absorb the massive arms manufacturing pace the war has created.

Not everyone is a friend of the US, as surprising as that may seem to some, and everyone else will be buying battle tested arms from Russia at the high levels of production Russia has built up: this will fuel more wars around the globe.

As our environment degrades and the world starts to feel the pain, the cure for our woes will be the traditional one. Modernity, I would wager, was but a brief delirium between our fits of trembling and fever.

Where you are wrong:

Let's start with the shelling industrial targets which was widely reported but you seem to want to deny:

Note though that this particular article unfortunately labels most air and missile attacks as 'shelling', which is rather misleading. — Jabberwock

The article in question reported both shelling and missile attacks ... perhaps because there was both shelling and missile attacks.

Here is a Ukrainian publication citing directly the original source of the municipal government:

Russian artillery has struck the Antonov factory in Kyiv, the municipal government said in a message on the Telegram messaging service on March 14.

Antonov is a state-owned aerospace and defense concern, famous for producing the AN-225 Mriya aircraft, the largest in the world prior to its destruction by Russian shelling. — Russia shells Antonov factory in Kyiv

Clearly the Russians shelled industrially valuable targets during their Northern operation and this would clearly be one positive outcome for the Russians in conducting said operation. Shelling is much cheaper than standoff air attacks, cruise missiles or drones.

No, the Wikipedia does not say the 'siege' lasted in that period, in fact it did not use that term at all (only you and the sensationalist press insist on using that term, clearly not understanding what it actually means). — Jabberwock

Directly from the Wikipedia article:

Estonian Defence Forces intelligence chief Margo Grosberg estimated that the advancing Russian convoy would arrive to Kyiv's outer suburbs in at least two days, after which they would try to lay siege to the city. — Battle of Kyiv

You have the wikipedia article citing a military expert (assuming intelligence chiefs have some expertise) using the word siege to describe Russias operation.

Now, if you want to say the siege is not entirely successful and not very long, I have no issue with that, but the word siege is still perfectly suitable to describe Russia getting to and then attempting to surround the city. They are sieging the city.

Since you are happy to use Wikipedia as an authority, under the heading "Post-World War II":

The siege of Khe Sanh displays typical features of modern sieges, as the defender has greater capacity to withstand the siege, the attacker's main aim is to bottle operational forces or create a strategic distraction, rather than take the siege to a conclusion. — Siege - Wikipedia

It is not sensationalist to describe an army getting to and nearly entirely encircling a city as "a siege", which the same Wikipedia article defines as:

A siege is a military blockade of a city, or fortress, with the intent of conquering by attrition, or by well-prepared assault. — Siege

Which, ironically, you are making exactly he point that the intention of the Russians is to conquer Kiev by "well prepared assault".

Point is, an army gets to a city, starts to surround the city, people living in the subway: fits the definition of a siege.

If the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal, then running away in the middle of negotiations might not be the best way to do it, in my personal opinion. To cite Peskov: — Jabberwock

I'd have no problem accepting that the Ukrainian resistance is indeed more effective than the Russians expect, and especially the impact of the most advanced Western shoulder launched missiles flooding into the country that equip extremely effective harassing units, and they retreat due to being unable to maintain the siege with the forces they commit.

They achieve key objectives in the meanwhile in the South, so cut their losses and evacuate the North.

As I mention, one con of this strategy is that if there is no quick peace deal and the Norther operation can't be sustained, then retreating will simply encourage the Ukrainians to fight more. So in terms of achieving a quick peace it is a gamble, but if it allows taking the South nearly uncontested (what happens) then if the peace gamble fails then at least there is something to show for the war effort as a whole.

I am not arguing the push to Kiev is some brilliant move that has only positive consequences. There are clearly pros and cons.

However, there are pros and cons, risks and advantages, to every strategy. If Russia only focused on the South, maybe Ukraine would have put up much fiercer resistance, broken the siege at Mariupol at least long enough to heroically evacuate Azov battalion, and the Russian military position would be much worse and that would simply encourage Ukraine to keep fighting.

The logic behind the multi-front war knowing ahead of time there is only resources to sustain the Southern front I would speculate has two foundations:

First, chaos and focus in the North will indeed allow conquering the south to be far easier and so if there's no peace then at least the critical strategic objective is achieved of the land bridge to Crimea and the Kremlin has "something to show for it" even if retreating in the North will be embarrassing on the moment.

Second, historically peace agreements are arrived at very quickly after fighting starts or then wars drag on for quite some time. So, based on historical precedent, if peace is not achieved in the first days and weeks of fighting, probably it won't happen in the short term, so the Russian actions apply maximum pressure at the start and if it does work then they'll fight the long war in the South.

So either Russians cunningly planned to weaken their position in the middle of negotiations or simply had no other choice, because their blitz attempt to take the city failed and they have outstreched their GLOC to the extent that further holding them was untenable. There are many facts that point toward the latter. — Jabberwock

They may have received intelligence or otherwise concluded that Ukraine will not be accepting peace a deal. As I say above, Ukraine may have simply been effective at arresting Russias advance and harassing the Russian supply lines and they are unable to sustain their positions.

Additionally, once Russia has what they want in the South, it maybe perfectly acceptable to the Kremlin that the war continue and they keep their gains. Anyone with an imperialist mindset in the Kremlin will rather the war continue than Ukraine accept the peace deal on offer and be given back all the territory.

If critical positions are achieved in the South, the it would be reasonable to argue that pulling back in the North is militarily the right move, and if Ukraine does not want peace then they shall have war.

Things can be quite complicated, but overall, clearly the Russian military achieves critical objectives with their plan and execution, so they are neither irrational nor incompetent.

This seems less a prediction and more an unshakeable conviction, which is why any discussion with you about reality on the ground just runs in circles. — Echarmion

No, it's called a prediction. Being confident in a prediction, such as the sun will rise tomorrow as it did today, does not take away from its predictive essence.

If the war ends with a deal better than what the Russians were offering both before and immediately following the invasion, then indeed Ukraine has at least achieved better terms of land or other things for all the blood sacrificed.

If the war ends with Russia retaining, even expanding upon, the territory it already occupies then I don't see how anyone could argue Ukraine fought to a superior negotiating position.

Or do you disagree with this diagnostic procedure?

I am perfectly aware of what you were arguing for. You have claimed that the nothern campaign was successful two-month siege of Kiyv that was supposed only to exert political pressure and never intended to take Kiyv, so it was deliberately concluded by Russians when the talks fell through. — Jabberwock

The siege lasted "lasted from 25 February 2022 to 2 April 2022" (to cite Wikipedia), so lasted more than the entire month of March, but true it is closer to 1 month than 2, however the context of the point was simply that the incursion allows Russia to shell many things around the capital and is one "pro" of the operation.

As important to my argument as negotiations obviously not succeeding and pretty bad signs such as negotiators being shot:

Clashing reports emerged Saturday surrounding the death of a Ukrainian identified by media as a member of the country’s negotiating team with Russia.

First, widespread reports in local media and social media throughout the day claimed Denis Kireev, who had been photographed taking part in negotiations in Belarus in recent days, had been killed by Ukrainian security forces during an attempt to arrest him.

Kireev, the reports asserted, had been suspected of treason. — Reports claim Ukraine negotiator shot for treason - Times of Israel

Is that Mariupol was effectively occupied by the end of March:

On 28 March, Mayor Vadym Boychenko said "we are in the hands of the occupiers today" in a televised interview,[182] and a spokesman for the Mariupol mayor's office announced that "nearly 5,000 people" had been killed in the city since the start of the siege.[183][184][185] The Ukrainian government estimated that "from 20,000 to 30,000" Mariupol residents had been forcibly sent[186] to camps in Russia[163] under Russian military control.[186] During the day, Russian forces seized the administrative building in the northern Kalmiuskyi District[13] and the military headquarters of the Azov Regiment.[187] The next day, Russian forces were reported to have likely divided Ukrainian troops in the city into two and possibly even three pockets.[188] — Siege of Mariupol - Wikipedia

And therefore, if the purpose of the Northern operation was to apply political pressure for a peace deal as well as divert Ukrainian forces while the South is being taken, then the time line of the Russians retreating from the North essentially immediately following the largest Urban centre in the South falling is pretty good support for my argument.

What Russian military commanders would have feared is an operation to relieve the forces in Mariupol either by reaching Mariupol or then allowing for the Ukrainian forces to break out and reach some Ukrainian Salient coming towards them (heroic deeds for the Ukrainians and an embarrassment for the Russians, and also losing the value of capturing a bunch of Azov guys).

So, once critical milestone is reached such as effectively securing the largest Ukrainian Urban centre in the south, then it makes sense to withdraw from the North (which is in anywise undermanned in a fixing operation and cannot last indefinitely) to solidify gains in the South: exactly what the Russians do.

If Russia intended to take and occupy Kiev then they would have committed far more troops and engaged in the kind of urban combat they do in Mariupol.

It's pretty common sense along with the fact that entire 200 000 troops Russia devotes to invading Ukraine could all be insufficient to occupy and pacify a hostile population the size of Kiev; so your theory involves the Russians trying to accomplish something that is commonly accepted wisdom in military schools to be impossible to do with the numbers the Russians have (and that's assuming they have zero losses, their entire force may still be insufficient to occupy and pacify Kiev ... and there would still be Ukrainian "resistance" throughout the rest of the country "doing stuff").

I think it all depends on what assumptions the planners were making. — Echarmion

I agree that Putin et. al. may have believed in a quick and easy victory, either confident in their cunning or then underestimating both the Ukrainians and the CIA. However, the plan the implement clearly prepares for things taking longer and being more difficult and more expensive: otherwise you don't amass hundreds of billions of USD worth of reserves and bullion and you don't put so much effort into being sure to take the land bridge (such as a sophisticated signals and intelligence operation resulting in uncontested advances; Kherson being the most notable in not only taking the city uncontested but bridges across the Dnieper).

Clearly Russia had an immense geographical and political advantage, being able to attack Ukraine at will from several directions with zero fear of a preliminary disruption.

Clearly also Russia had the clear material advantage, and could reasonably assume to have air supremacy as well as a significant advantage in armored vehicles and an overwhelming advantage in artillery pieces. — Echarmion

Despite these advantages, Ukraine still has hundreds of thousands of troops and hundreds thousands more that can be mobilized and a huge area to operate on.

If Russia takes advantage of the massive border to make essentially uncontested advances (what happens) that creates deep salients that are vulnerable to harassment or even being cut off once Ukraine organizes to arrest the advances; to prevent harassment would require widening the salient significantly which in turn requires significantly more troops to take urban centres in difficult Urban combat and then effectively occupy and pacify these regions. To accomplish this in Northern Ukraine would require hundreds of thousands of additional troops; likely more troops than Russia has in its standing army (as the region is intensely hostile; it's far easier to accomplish in Russian speaking regions in the South, which may explain Russias decision to occupy there, in addition to the land bridge to Crimea and securing fresh water to Crimea being of critical strategic importance, in addition to the mineral resources and industrial capacity).

Russia simply does not have the numbers to occupy all of Ukraine or even a relatively small hostile part of it. A basic rule of thumb to be sure to pacify a population is requiring between 10 and 20 soldiers per 100 inhabitants; 10 being probably certain to achieve pacification and 20 being probably insufficient if the population is hostile (these numbers are often cited to explain why the US fails to pacify Iraq and Afghanistan).

Based on such received wisdom, Russia would need millions of troops to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine. Russia could do it, but it would be incredibly costly in terms of direct costs and consequence for the Russian economy as well as not be worth much. The land bridge to Crimea, the entirety of the Azov sea, securing fresh water to Crimea and an additional defensive buffer zone, all the resources there (from an imperial perspective) are "worth" a cost to pay. As it stands, the Russian plan has secured plenty of valuable assets, whereas occupying all of Ukraine would be an immense liability and be completely unworkable long term.

@Tzeentch has explained this several times but above is further elaboration of why Russia likely has no interest in occupying Kiev much less all of Ukraine.

Overambitious military campaigns have been waged with far less obvious advantages. Indeed if you read military history, the amount of people who have been killed by overconfidence and wishful thinking is staggering. — Echarmion

My prediction is this statement will prove to be far more truth for the Ukrainians than the Russians. We'll see how the war ends which side died more on the strength of wishes than sober analysis.

There was never any doubt that the war could only end in some negotiated peace. But the conditions of said peace will always depend on the situation on the ground. — Echarmion

Well the situation on the ground is that Ukraine has not taken back any significant territory for essentially a year in which to affect the negotiation table, and if Ukraine is losing the war of attrition and reaching its limits in terms of man power then their position is even worse as they cannot credibly threaten to prolong the war and credibly threaten significant damage to the Russians (the major leverage a smaller power has in fighting a larger power: that continued may damage themselves but will be costly to the larger power also).

Since we're on a philosophy forum, perhaps we should ask the question in terms of moral philosophy: Is the moral choice to give up and negotiate a peace immediately? How much of a chance of success do you need to morally send soldiers to their deaths in a war? — Echarmion

It depends what the peace deal is.

What I would argue is immoral is simply throwing your hands in the air and refusing to negotiate at all. If the war must end in a negotiated peace at one point or another, then at every point in time there is a deal that exists that is reasonable to take. Ok, perhaps it is not on offer, but you cannot know what deal you can achieve if you don't make an honest effort to negotiate. If the initial offer is too high to accept, well maybe your counter party is starting high to then settle somewhere in the middle; you have to actually make counter proposals that are acceptable to yourself in order to see where your counterparty is willing to meet you: this is what Ukraine does not do, the Russians propose something and Ukraine does not bother to even make a counter proposal.

The point of maximum leverage for a smaller power is at the start of the war and being able to credibly threaten a long and costly war as well as all sorts of unknowns not only in the war itself but external events (some other crisis may emerge for the larger power, so all these risks need to be priced into the situation). Of course, the point of maximum leverage does not mean your counter party sees it that leverage and responds accordinly, but it's when you have maximum leverage that you want to push for the best deal you can easily achieve.

Of course, any peace deal would involve compromise and the West immediately framed things as any compromise would be a "win" for Putin, rather than a rational framework where there is some acceptable compromise that is not a win for Putin but as much a compromise for the Russians as for the West and Ukraine, and most importantly avoids immense and prolonged bloodshed, suffering, global food price increases and a global schism in economic and political cooperation.

Russia could have mounted a tidal wave offensive and rolled through had it the momentum of morale and purpose on their side. — Vaskane

You're very late to the discussion, all these points have been discussed already at length, but the 200 000 troops Russia committed to invading Ukraine are not remotely enough for some sort of total wave offensive.

Russia could have mobilized millions of troops and done what you say, but that would have very likely been both a social and economic disaster and result in years of insurgency and inability to occupy and pacify all of Ukraine.

Russia's war aims are clearly what is achievable without sacrificing the entire economy by mobilizing millions of people to dedicate to years of occupation, which is occupying the areas of Ukraine that are Russian speaking and partial to Russian rule. Crimea has been occupied by Russia since 2014 and there has not been any insurgency because Crimeans are the large majority Russian speakers that all evidence we have genuinely wanted to reunite with Russia.

The idea that Russia could have easily just "tidal waved" Ukraine (the largest country in Europe with the largest army, supported by US / NATO training and intelligence, preparing for exactly this war for 8 years) is just foolish.

It's a foolish mythology that was required to justify refusing peace talks altogether which was completely irrational without the belief that Russia was somehow incompetent and easy to beat. Any rational actor who cannot simply impose their will by force, will at least see what the other side is offering and try to negotiate an acceptable deal (now, maybe no acceptable deal would have been reached if negotiations continued, but you cannot know that if you don't try).

Now that it is revealed Russia is not easy to beat, suddenly even the Western media is reporting Ukraine has "pressure" to negotiate. Which is the obvious end to this and extremely tragic (at least for Ukraine) as there is no way to get a better deal than what they could have negotiated at the start of the war and there's no way to get the hundreds of thousands of dead back to life.

The thing is that nobody denies that Russians got a lot of territory and put Ukrainians in difficult situation. — Jabberwock

... People definitely seem to be denying exactly that:

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality. — Echarmion

But if we agree the Russian plan isn't incompetent then that's progress in the debate.

Yes, the southern campaign was much more successful. What is remarkable, and rather ridiculous, is the need of some people to paint any Russian failure (because the northern WAS a failure, by any reasonable means) as some kind of cunning Russian plan, in spite of quite obvious facts. In arguing for that some people even go as far as make up their own 'facts', such as 'two-month shelling of Kiyv' or 'siege of Kiyv lasting longer than the siege of Mariupol'. Unfortunately for them, such facts are quite easy to check and correct. — Jabberwock

Neither I nor @Tzeentch are arguing it's some brilliant military move, but rather a very ordinary military move. Occupying the enemy with an attack in one place in order to advance in another place is extremely banal military tactic.

And you miss entirely the point, Russia does not need to brilliantly out maneuver or out perform Ukraine, they only need to be remotely close to parity.

Russia has won some battles, Ukraine has won some battles, if it's remotely close to parity then Russia is on the path to victory as they can absorb more losses.

If having capabilities Ukraine lacks entirely, such as significant air power and electronic warfare, gives Russia a better than parity performance (on the whole) then Russian victory is even easier.

Of course, one can argue the Russian population will turn against the war before some sort of military victory emerges. This was the theory at the start of the war, but few people argue it now.

Likewise, one can argue that perhaps Russia will win but the cost is not worth it on some given scale of evaluation.

As several have argued, Ukraine losing is ok as the war damages Russia. Of course, that's terrible for Ukraine and not morally acceptable Western policy for me personally; I also have my doubts whether the war is actually weakening Russia.

What is of interest in the debate about the "Russian competence" in attacking Kiev or retreating from Kherson / Kharkiv (from my point of view) is the mythological role this idea played in encouraging Ukraine to refuse peace negotiations, which if Ukraine cannot "win" (which seems common wisdom now) was a foolish decision (if you care about lives and even Ukrainian territory as Russia was offering to give it back in exchange for a quick termination of the war).

However, if we agree Russia's plan makes sense and was executed with basic competence, I am not trying to argue they are brilliant or over-performing the Ukrainians.

For the purpose of understanding the current situation, one need only believe performance is somewhat close to parity to conclude, as you say, Ukraine is in a difficult position as, by definition, the smaller party will lose a war of attrition at parity.

I strongly suspect Russia has been able to inflict several factors greater losses on the Ukrainians due to their having significant air power and electronic warfare, but I'm not trying to convince anyone of that and we'll have a better idea of losses on both sides after the war. Rather, my basic point, is that very strong evidence would be needed to believe that despite significant air superiority and having more of essentially every kind of capability, that somehow Ukraine is inflicting several factors greater losses on Russian forces.

Accepting such basic facts, how long Ukraine (and Western supporters) can last, and will Russian be able to match that in resolve, and if Russia does have an advantage (now or at some point) due can it translate that into decisive manoeuvres (encircling large Ukrainian formation, taking bridges etc.), are all questions open for debate.

@ssu is confident Ukraine can last many years. I have serious doubts that's possible at the current intensity, but is possible by retreating to more easily defendable positions or then simply territory Russia doesn't want to occupy, and then you'd have an actual frozen conflict. However, if the conflict is actually frozen with few attacks and casualties on each side, Russia would have no reason to randomly go home either. This would be the "rump state" Mearsheimer talks about.

Wars of attrition are not fought to the last man standing, they are fought till one side loses the will to fight and disengages — RogueAI

Well if we agree that the current fighting is attritional, then tiring out the Russians is a much better strategy than throwing battalions at heavily fortified positions based on the entirely delusional belief that it was possible to push the Russians out of Southern Ukraine.

Certainly larger armies have simply tired out and gone home in the past.

However, unlike the US in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan ... or the US in Afghanistan, there are far more reasons for Russians to fight in Ukraine. There's also some critical structural differences between those wars, mainly that it requires far more finance to support Ukraine than the Taliban or the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Insurgency is also common to these examples but not so present in South Ukraine.

I would definitely agree that Russia tiring out would be certainly a possibility after years and years of fighting, but I'm arguing here Ukraine (and Western supporters) can't sustain years at this level of intensity.

This is also a suitable time to remind everyone here that as I predicted at the start of the war, the advanced hand held missile systems supplied to Ukraine will go straight into the hands of terrorists.

On October 27th a number of Middle East outlets reported that during anti-HAMAS operations in and around Gaza IDF uncovered caches of European and US-made military hardware (АТ-4, NLAW rocket launchers) supposedly originated from Ukraine.

Several sources have confirmed that around 2022 HAMAS and Hezbollah have established a clandestine supply line from Ukraine to Lebanon, Iraq and supposedly Syria to deliver shipments of weapons from Ukrainian military warehouses in Lviv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv regions. This supply line is operational since 2022. For the past year thanks to this supply line HAMAS obtained an unidentified number of MG3 machineguns, M72 LAW grenade launchers, at least 50 units of Javelin FGM-148 ATGM, several dozens of MILAN ATGM, 20 units of Stinger FIM-92 MANPADS, 20 units of L118 towed howitzers, 30 unites of Switchblade drones, about 100 of Phoenix Ghost Drones and approx 50 Black Hornet Nano reconnaissance drones. — Hamas sourcing weapons in Ukraine

The next Pikachu face moment will be when these advanced compact missile systems are used on European soil both for terrorist and criminal purposes.

And we may even experience actual undesired terrorism, not just terrorism that "just so happens" to serve existing Western policy objectives.

Here are the key points from the latest Time update on the war, just without a paywall:

Yet Zelensky’s belief in ultimate victory over Russia has only “hardened into a form that worries some of his advisors,” according to Shuster, who describes Zelensky’s faith as “immovable, verging on the messianic.” One of Zelensky’s closest aides tells Shuster that, “He is delusional. We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” This of course runs counter to all the propaganda pumped out by Ukraine and repeated by Western media sources. But increasingly it’s only Zelensky who still believes his own press clippings. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Staggering casualties have decimated the Ukrainian army. Ukraine has refused to disclose casualty counts throughout the war, dismissing the increasingly-credible reports of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties as Russian propaganda. But another close aide to Zelensky tells Shuster that casualties are so horrific that “even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them.’” — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Conscription policies are draconian. Another fact dismissed as a “Putin talking point” is that Ukrainians have had to resort to ever-more draconian conscription policies to replenish their military’s ranks. Shuster lays out the unpleasant reality: “New recruitment is way down. As conscription efforts have intensified across the country, stories are spreading on social media of draft officers pulling men off trains and buses and sending them to the front. Those with means sometimes bribe their way out of service, often by paying for a medical exemption.” The corruption became so widespread that Zelensky fired the heads of all the regional draft offices in August, but the move backfired as lack of leadership brought new recruitment nearly to a halt. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Morale is collapsing. Even patriots don’t want to die serving as canon fodder for a doomed military strategy. Within the officer ranks, there is growing dissension bordering on mutiny. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

Corruption is uncontrollable. It has long been a “Putin talking point” that Ukraine’s government was shot through with corruption. And yet Zelensky has been getting an earful about exactly that from its U.S. and NATO allies, who don’t want to see their billions of dollars in aid disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials. — Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't Zelensky: TIME may be on his side, but real time, isn't

In particular the point about casualties is the main determining factor.

To win a war of attrition with the Russians, Ukraine would need to inflict several times more casualties than it incurs; a central myth justifying rejecting peace talks but of which there was never any evidence and plenty of reason to believe it is in fact Russia inflicting heavier casualties due to having superior air power and more artillery.

That's all I'm saying, they went for a quick decapitation of the government alongside a push for a land bridge and as much coast line as they could, including Odessa which would have given them control of the 'breadbasket', a powerful lever in international relations. — unenlightened

Well we agree that Putin would have preferred total unconditional surrender, but there's really zero reason to believe Putin or anyone in Russia thought that likely. Rather, the Kremlin publicly pushes for their peace proposal of giving back the entirety of the Donbas to Ukraine, in exchange for recognizing Crimea, Ukraine staying out of NATO, and some autonomy and language protections for Russian speakers in the Donbas.

But again, that Russia prepares for 8 years and amasses a large war chest and clearly had a feasible plan to deal with "the nuclear option" of massive sanctions (as their plan clearly has worked so far) is really strong evidence the Russians don't think the task easy (else they would have done it sooner) nor that they are confident task will be quick (why prepare such a large amount of finance and gold; indeed, analysts before the war were pointing out the obvious fact that Russia was amassing large reserves precisely to be in the position to fight a big, long war, or then at least credibly threaten to in order to get the deal they want).

Without that regime change, it looks like they are now resigned to at best a frozen conflict for the indefinite future, because they still don't seem to have the numbers to occupy and subdue the whole country. — unenlightened

I guess you can use the terms "resigned to" if you want, but the conflict is not frozen for the indefinite future.

A frozen conflict is one where significant fighting ceases, such as in Korea, and there is a standoff: neither a peace agreement nor fighting and so the military conflict, in terms of fighting, is frozen.

That is not the case in Ukraine, there is intense fighting everyday, and unsustainable rates of casualties and equipment losses on both sides.

The difference is, of course, Russia is a far larger country than Ukraine and so at loss rates even somewhat close to parity, Russia will win the war of attrition.

The media doesn't stop comparing things to the trench warfare of WWI, which is a somewhat good enough analogy, but then simply jumps to the conclusion that therefore it is a frozen conflict. The front line in WWI was immobile for most of the war and most of the front, but WWI was hardly a frozen conflict and the unsustainable rates of attrition meant one side was going to win and one side was going to lose. The United States entering the war made the massive difference of available resources to one side.

What's incoherent about applying political pressure, a fixing operation, shelling targets of military value for 2 months as well as causing a flood of refugees out of Ukraine? — boethius

I literally state:

So it was not 'two-month shelling of military targets' and 'Russia sieges Kiev until Mariupol is fully taken', just two of your claims that were patently false, now it turns out it was never those things you have claimed they were! It was a 'fixing operation'! A 'diversion'! — Jabberwock

It's quite usual that large military operations accomplish several things.

It's honestly remarkable how committed people are to believing the initial Russian invasion that conquered 15% of Ukrainian territory of critical strategic importance to the long term security of Crimea, itself of critical strategic importance to the Black Sea and already housing a large Russian military base, as some sort of military catastrophe for the Russians and brilliant victory for the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians won some battles but on the whole lost significant territory.

All nations are lands stolen and lies of the people who steal it, who cares which cat-funt of a nation is taking turns pretending they own the very nature they will eventually return to in death. — Vaskane

This is the argument in a nutshel that Kiev should have taken Russia's peace terms before or then after the war broke out: where the border is exactly has relatively little consequence on the lives of the people living in the Donbas (who no one really disputes are Russian speakers that are largely partial to Russia) whereas the war has had quite a large consequence on many people's lives far removed from the Donbas.

Except they did not commit enough resources, that is why they could not maintain the positions they took around Kiyv and had to leave quite soon after they have arrived. — Jabberwock

Again, in a fixing operation, your goal is to commit the least amount of forces needed to tie up a maximum of the opponents forces.

Even if there's no fog of war and your enemy knows you have relatively few troops in the area, they can nevertheless not be certain you will not divert more troops at any moment in a surprise push; therefore, especially is the target is critical such as the capital, sufficient resources are likely to be devoted to make a proper defence (it would be a massive gamble to bet otherwise, and even if you bet right, your enemy may see you're undermanning the defence and take advatnage). So, even if Ukraine / US intelligence, knows Russia's Northern operation is mostly about diverting the bulk of Kiev's attention and reserves to its defence, they may easily have little choice but to do so in any case (which is what actually happens).

Because in Putin's view, Zelensky is an effeminate westerner. A comedian, a joke. — Echarmion

In Putin's view Zelensky is an actor and so perhaps Putin expects it's entirely possible Zelensky plays whatever part the US wants him to play.

For example, maybe

He'd never put his life on the line. When shit hits the fan he'd turn tail and flee. Even the US apparently did not expect him to stay put, as evidenced by the "I need ammunition, not a ride" episode. — Echarmion

Is maybe called "a script" written by Western propagandists to create such a good "episode" as you call it in the Zelensky mythology.

But even if Zelensky fled, the rest of the Zelensky government (especially anything to do with defence) are right wing extremists, so there would be no reason to expect Zelensky fleeing would somehow mean Ukraine capitulating.

What troops exactly? — Echarmion

Russia could have mobilized before the war and committed literally millions of troops to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine, or then simply built up a larger standing army over the 8 years of fighting in the Donbas where it is clear a military resolution maybe required.

Russia doesn't do either of these things, but rather prepares a force that can feasibly take and hold the land bridge to Crimea, which is obviously proven by the fact that are there right now as we speak. Further military goals, such as taking Kiev, would have required far more troops or then dedicating essentially their entire force to that one objective in hopes that it ends the war.

Now, why would Russia not mobilize millions of soldiers has the obvious answer of that being disastrous economically, therefore war aims in Ukraine are limited by manpower and resources.

You're kinda answering your own question here.

Furthermore it doesn't seem like either the russian industrial base or the military establishment had actually prepared for a long war. Nor was the information space prepared. Perhaps the best example is the use of "special military operation" which certainly does not suggest a years long battle of attrition. — Echarmion

I'm answering the question of whether Putin expected a quick and easy war or then prepared for a long war, which is the topic of discussion at the moment. Building up a large war chest is a pretty strong signal of preparing for a pretty large war.

I don't know about that. After all the russian troop buildup was anything but subtle. Secrecy was clearly not the concern. I rather think that the calculus was that the constant pressure would undermine morale and lead to the planned collapse. — Echarmion

The Russian troop build up was clearly subtle enough to prevent Ukraine mobilizing and digging North of Kiev and North of Crimea.

Russia would stage a large exercise every year around Ukraine not simply to prepare for an eventual war but to make it unclear if they were actually invading or not. Many commentators were calling it mere sabre rattling and a show of force. You even had Boris Johnson assuring everyone that there wouldn't be tanks rolling across the plains of Europe, that's not going to happen.

Now, the US did publicly say Russia would invade, but this was pretty close to the actual invasion date and it may not have been feasible to mobilize, and, in anywise, Ukraine chooses not to.

As far as I can see the common charge is incompetence, not irrationality.

There's two possibilities: either Russia really planned a sweeping takeover of the country, at least to the Dnieper. In that case the plan clearly failed.

Or Russia simply made an elaborate multi front assault to have an easier time capturing a land bridge to Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk. In which case they should have had a far easier time and far less losses than they did. — Echarmion

200 000 troops is simply far too little to achieve the first objective, so if they aren't irrational then that was not their objective.

For the second objective, they achieve it, mostly uncontested in the first couple of weeks, and we have little idea of Russia's actual losses and we have even less idea of what their toleration for losses is.

Certainly it's possible that they expected less losses to achieve more. Or it maybe just the cost of doing business from the Russian command's point of view.

What is clear is that the initial priority is to keep losses to professional soldiers and mercenaries in the first phases of the war, and they do achieve that at least for quite some time.

No one here is is arguing that either, at least not any more than any human group is fundamentally irrational at any time. — unenlightened

This has been argued many times, I can cite previous conversation if you want.

But good to know you aren't arguing this, in which case it should be pretty easy to see Russia's strategy does make sense and has worked well in terms of securing the land bridge to Crimea. Of course, there have been pros and cons to every decision which can be debated.

I'm not a military expert, but what happened looks to me to be modelled on the WW2 German invasion of France, a high speed blitz takeover of the Capital avoiding the main defensive forces to remove the government and replace it with a Vichy style government of the strategically unimportant regions, and annexation of, in this case, the entire south coast. — unenlightened

Well that's clearly not the Russian strategy or they would not have bothered advancing in the South at all, they would have only fought in the South insofar as it fixes Ukrainian troops there, so as to dedicate the majority of their resources to take Kiev.

Of course, I have zero issue believing the preferred outcome for the Russians is that Ukraine completely capitulates, and failing that Zelensky accepting their peace deal would be second best.

The Russians military plan, however, is clearly to take the land bridge to Crimea, which is what they do in essentially a week, and then pacify the cities involved, and their operation in the North serves to keep Kiev's main focus there.

Now, both taking land in the South and pressuring Kiev is certainly significant leverage in negotiating a peace deal, especially if Russia was offering to give that land back (which they were) and it was clear after the outbreak of the war that Ukraine was not in NATO and was not going to be. It was certainly the "rational thing to do" from the Russian point of view, but I would have hard time believing the Kremlin doesn't have the experience required to know people don't always do the rational thing as you see it and did not prepare accordingly (which they clearly did, amassing hundreds of billions of USD, hoarding gold, preparing an alternative payment system and so on).

Zelensky removed has no chance to dance to anyone's tune. Given an ex comedian with no political pedigree in charge, that is not an irrational plan. That obviously didn't happen, and then there was a strange pause before the withdrawal and regrouping. It looked like a winning plan until it didn't, which was when the airport couldn't be secured.
There was even a Pro-Russian faction with support from oligarchs and security services waiting to step into the breach. — unenlightened

You seem to think it would be easy for the Russians to replace Zelensky without lengthy and costly urban warfare in Kiev.

The scenario where what you describe is possible (with the forces Russia commits to Kiev) is one where Ukraine forces essentially don't put up a fight and Russian tanks can roll into Kiev uncontested. Again, that would certainly be the ideal scenario for the Russians and they certainly would have done that if there was no resistance.

However, Russian actions are completely inconsistent with some sort of blind belief that taking Kiev and replacing Zelensky would be easy, and as @Tzeentch points out the Ukraine military and government is filled with right with extremists who would just stage a coup if you did somehow manage to put in place a Russian puppet.

Ukraine has been preparing with support of the US for precisely this war for 8 years, there's CIA all over Ukraine, there's Nuland's famous "he's our man" and "fuck the EU" (yet the EU doesn't mind at all; indeed, "please commence with the Fucking" is the EU diplomatic position).

This whole idea that conquering all of Ukraine should have been easy is totally baseless: Ukraine is huge and difficult to sustain logistics even without resistance (it's not trivial to move tens of thousands of men and equipment and supplies), Ukraine has the largest army in Europe with the largest gaggle of armour, and their military is full of fanatical anti-Russian extremists (there are also moderates, and I'd agree that Zelensky isn't a right wing extremists, but there would be zero reason to expect moderates to dominate decision making).