They are still better than nothing. — Olivier5

How do you know they are better than nothing? How do you know without the West first making the entirely false promises and expectation that Ukraine would one day join NATO in a useful period of time (say anytime before Russia invaded) and also encouraging total war rather than a negotiated settlement early on, Ukrainians would not be far better off?

How many allies does Russia have, again? — Olivier5

Ukraine does not have allies. Ukraine has arms suppliers.

There's a big difference. Allies would be in Ukraine right now fighting on behalf of their ally.

Because we are stingy and reactive rather than proactive. — Olivier5

Behold Ukraine's friends / liabilities: stingy and reactive.

Oh, you lost the plot again! You can evaluate or criticise everything you want. Even Putin, if you ever wanted to…. Ha ha ha. It’s no skin off my nose. You keep on trying to make it personal, trying to hurt. But the war is not fought here on TPF and there is no point in using violence against other posters. Go fight in Dombass if you want to kill other human beings. Here, you will not succeed. You can yell at me at the top of your lungs, I don’t care and I won’t mind. I’m not the one calling the shots. — Olivier5

What violence?

But anyways, again, excellent demonstration of the incapability of understanding a position other than pro-Zelensky or pro-Putin.

I'm not going to go fight for Russia, nor Ukraine, and I'm not going to support my country going to fight for Ukraine and I recognise the obvious reality that the West isn't going to go do any actual fighting, actual "defending Ukraine". Ukraine is not our ally, not our friend, but a tool for Western policy.

I do not view much difference between Ukraine and Russia. Neither represent "freedom".

What can the West do?

The West could try to broker a peace, which will take compromise and if the West wants a good outcome for Ukraine it would use the leverage it has.

Since the West has dug itself into a propaganda whole of Russia ending up even with Crimea would be a "win" for Putin, compared to this delusional position any peace agreement is essentially by definition a win for Putin. But that's purely a consequence of Zelensky and the West's delusional approach to basic features of reality.

The alternative is more war.

After 8 months it's now clear what more war means. Russian soldiers are harmed, but the harm to Ukrainian society is orders of magnitudes worse.

Compared to the offer Zelensky rejected early in the war (independent Dombas still part of Ukraine, recognising Crimea as part of Russia, neutral Ukraine), the price Ukraine has since paid to accomplish nothing remotely close to a better situation than this deal ... it's obviously a regrettable to any common sense person that doesn't actually want Ukrainians to suffer.

So you think NATO countries should hand over tanks to Ukraine? They’ve taken thousands of them from Russians already. Ukraine now boasts the largest panzer army in Europe. What they really need is an airforce. — Olivier5

Ah, so we've gone from modern Western tanks would obviously be useful for Ukraine ... to Ukraine is totally fine just capturing Russian tanks. Not that your figure is remotely credible, but even if it was true what happens when all those tanks are destroyed; would it not by definition be useful militarily to be conducting the training and setting up the logistics of Western tanks "just in case"?

Likewise for the anti-air. Why didn't the West send in sophisticated anti-air systems "just in case" the Russians attack critical infrastructure? There was 8 months to prepare to deal with the US own playbook of Shock and Awe.

Why didn't we?

I am the only poster to actually describe how an actual Western military intervention (in particular before the war) could have worked, why very likely it would have worked (send in troops, offer economic benefits like Nord Stream 2 going ahead: probability of war very low, mutual beneficial outcome for Russian and Europe ... but no new gas market for the US so of course we can't have a common sense peace).

You are arguing against this sort of actual support for Ukraine.

Why? Because any peace before or during the war would be "not-bad" for Russia. That it would be orders of magnitude better for Ukraine is not even part of your thinking.

You and the other Zelenskyites are not pro-Ukraine. You are simply war horny Russophobes and so reject any peace plan or even military plan that does not result in continuing this mode of warfare with Russia.

Now that you see the cost of your position, it creates cognitive dissonance neatly resolved by "it's the Ukrainian decision" and the West and citizens of the West can wash their hands of it.

Have you guys discussed this article yet? It argues that the war in Ukraine amounts to genocide. I am hard pressed to disagree. Yet it doesn't even go into the destruction of power infrastructure, which I am worried will lead to mass civilian casualties. — hypericin

The problem is that what the Russians are doing is simply Shock and Awe, which is a US military doctrine and involves targeting civilian infrastructure.

Of course, when the West does it then it's because that infrastructure is required by the opposing military and for society to "function" and also we "don't count bodies".

Although Ullman and Wade claim that the need to "[m]inimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage" is a "political sensitivity [which needs] to be understood up front", their doctrine of rapid dominance requires the capability to disrupt "means of communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure",[8] and, in practice, "the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause ... the threat and fear of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical destruction." — Shock and Awe, wikipedia

Is a brief description.

Anything the US also does, such as Shock and Awe as well as torture, the Western media isn't all that concerned about. Nothing wrong with a little "enhanced interrogation". Obviously if you have a thing, you'd want an enhanced version of the same thing.

People in the West have been very convinced that Russia shouldn't do these things since the beginning of the war, but is there any feasible way to actually stop a nuclear power?

In the words of Zelensky:

We expect the reaction of friends — not just observers — Zelensky

Apparently your arms dealer isn't your friend after all, as otherwise he wouldn't say this sort of things but just thank his friends the arms dealers.

And so we're back to the truth of the matter: It mattered/matters less than what you can make people believe. — jorndoe

You're talking about everyone here?

And that's your preferred form of government, what actually matters, and you're just a loyal patriot willing to believe?

But otherwise, I fail to see your point.

Things changed between the Poles and Ukrainians ... for now ... so presumably they could also change back? Or things change between the Poles and Ukrainians so presumably will change with the Russians too ... they'll remake the USSR after all?

↪boethius I don’t know what the Ukrainians would be willing to endure. My country sacrificed 2 millions men in WW1. The USSR sacrificed 9 million men in WW2. — Olivier5

That's what we're discussing.

However, you're only argument here is "Ukraine business!", and it would be Ukraine business and mere academic interest for us, if we weren't sending them weapons.

First, if we're sending them weapons knowing it is not enough to win anyways would that be a price worth paying (or telling Zelensky to pay)? Having Ukrainian sacrifice so much and still lose?

And if you're talking about France as an example maybe honest to mention ... France capitulated in WWII, precisely to avoid damages once it seemed the war could not be won.

So, if your position is "courage les gas, mais si vous abondonne ... c'est la vie!!" That would be more coherent as following the French example.

But I get it, you won't actually take a position, just defer to the Ukrainians, deny any criticism of the freedom of that choice they are apparently fighting for, and evaluating our arms shipments is off limits, how confident we should be it can and will result in an good outcome for the "common good", or then if it's not enough, certainly tanks are in short supply ... can't spare them at the moment, sorry Ukraine, but we thank you for your sacrifice.

Is there a better way to paraphrase your position?

We can say so, of course. We must. An enormous sacrifice is being paid by Ukraine for the common good, which must be recognised. — Olivier5

Ok, there you go, price is worth it so far.

Assuming it's 100 000 lives to get this far, would you sacrifice (or support Zelensky sacrificing) 300 000 more lives to complete their mission for the common good?

In this context, common good being the reconquering of the territory in question.

Decency? — Olivier5

The decency of supporting a policy (or supporting other people with those policies) that results in thousands of people dying but ... shhh ... we do not say so?

We focus only on the glory.

That's what I was missing? The "decorum" of the elites?

I compare it with the alternative, which is Russia getting its way in Ukraine, which would result in attrocious consequences for both Ukrainians and Russians. — Olivier5

... Therefore Ukrainian lives are a price you're willing to pay (or support Zelensky paying) as a blood price to retake the territory that Russia currently has?

Am I missing something?

For people actually interested in the topic.

What is confusing in this subject matter of international treatise, is that they are written in highly legal language and very formal, but they are of the same nature as informal and unenforceable agreements, similar to just most promises in normal life: promises of love, promises of taking out the trash, promises of being on time, and other informal promises as you may find between bros that have no standing in a court of law.

Of course, your bros may actually love you and be on time to your sick and whack party, even helping to clean up and take out the trash in the morning, but there's no legal recourse if they don't.

Normal people are like OMG the assurances weren't assurances in the Budapest Memorandum, but only because normal people are accustomed to any legal paper being a formal agreement that has legal standing (work contracts, insurance policies, sale terms, and so on) and, almost never, are the informal promises of daily life cast in a formal language.

But, to understand what is really going on in these international relations, just stop and imagine if you made some legal looking paper for promises that you know don't need to be kept. It's fun and ceremonial, maybe has some useful information to note such as keep track of some important information (like who's taking out the compost and when), but it is not really a contract like your work contract is a contract.

So, maybe people do what they say, but evaluating that would have little to do with your little legal ceremony.

Since you can't quote literally any parties to support your claim, you invent your own fictional evidences. You look so dumb, bro. — neomac

You clearly just have no reading comprehension.

The claim that "security guarantees" are as meaningful as "trust us bro" is the claim that, just like between bros promising a sick and whack party, as you've already noted yourself, there's only "historical trends" in which to evaluate if the party will indeed be sick and whack. For instance, if your bros have thrown sick and whack parties previously, then stands to reason that this new party they speak of will be of a similar mintage. However, adding embellishment to the basic promise that the "party will be good" neither guarantees the party will in fact be good nor even guarantees it will happen at all. If your bros absolutely, positively, guarantee you, 100% fresh, the party is both happening and will be incredible ... we are no closer to being any more certain than we are based on the "historical trends" of these party throwers.

Compare this to a company guaranteeing your computer will turn on. If it doesn't, you have legal recourse for damages and can sue this company. Could Ukraine sue the US for not keeping a promise? No.

It doesn't matter how you dress up the promise, Ukraine will have no legal resource and have no reason other than, you put your finger on it, "historical trends" in which to decide the likelihood promises will be kept in an agreement.

Calling the promises "security guarantees" does indeed sound fancy and something you can trust from ol' country, but it's a euphemism. It is a noun in the nominal world referring to an agreement, but that agreement can completely lack any guarantee.

Just like, nominally, the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is very assuring indeed ... but if you actually read it, the actual real substance doesn't seem too assuring at all and didn't actually happen when the time came to "assure" Ukraine about the promises made.

If it was actually assuring, representing some sort of real assuring substance of some kind, there would be no need for talk of any new security guarantees now, mighty fine nations have already committed to making sure Ukraine's borders are respected, so let them do that as they said they would.

Of course they'll have to consult first, but that's just the first step of a much bigger plan they are clearly committed to.

So, considering the Security Assurances were ornamental addition to what amounted to "trust us bro", why would just renaming what is in essence the same thing to "security guarantees" be a single gram of coke lighter than "trust us bro".

The only reason they left Kherson was the suffering they went through. — Olivier5

What is it with your obsession with little me? This war is not about me. I pay no price for it, or very little. — Olivier5

You're the one debating here. Why would I join a discussion to discuss with people that are absent?

But, if you don't have the courage of your convictions to lay out a reasonable price to pay for reconquering all of Ukraine, seems indeed you no longer have any position at all in this discussion. I'll note that down.

You’ve been saying that for 8 month. — Olivier5

This process has been happening for 8 months.

For example, media believed man-portable systems were enough to "beat the Russians", gushed unending praise ... eventually caught up with the reality that wasn't the case.

In the summer Ukraine, the war was all but declared over aft the Russians withdrew from the North, and Ukraine was declared "winning" even if they were steadily losing ground, and eventually the media caught up with that reality.

Right now, while Ukraine has been making advances, media has been gushing praise on Zelensky's uncompromising diplomatic positions, but is slowly catching up to the reality that we have not witnessed decisive battles, collapse of Russian forces and / or the economy and / or the political system, and the media is slowly catching up this reality.

Always weeks and weeks after it is obvious.

What is fallacious in your reasoning is that we are compelled to consider with "zero meaning" the "security guarantee" just because the word "guarantee" suggests to you certainty. This reasoning is utterly dumb and has no ground in geopolitical rationality. Indeed you are incapable of providing any parties (Russian or Ukrainian or Western) that understand the word "guarantee" the way you suggest.
So you built a fictitious "straw man" to argue against. That's how intellectually desperate you are. — neomac

You are literally describing how the word "guarantee" doesn't literally mean "guarantee" ... as why would it be a guarantee in any sense of certainty.

In other words, according to your own explanation, guarantee in this context is ornamental and a euphemism for "trust us bro".

Can we count on these "guarantees": of course not! Don't be silly! is your new position.

Again, you may have "bro trends" or bro leverage or other broformation particular to the broverse in which you base your decision to trust your bros. But is the bro code 100% reliable, "guaranteed" in any meaningful sense. Alas, t'is not.

It’s not my position. You’re very easily confused. I just tried to provide you with an answer to your question, based on what I heard and what seems reasonable to me. You are welcome to address my explainations, but they are not « my position ». — Olivier5

You are really saying after hundreds of pages of arguing the situation in Ukraine, that your position is not Ukraine is fighting a just war, can will, will win and therefore should keep fighting to victory?

Or something very, very close to that ... so close, that this is an accurate and reasonable summary of your position?

Note that the suffering is mutual. Over the past few months, the evidence is that the Russians suffered the most. I wonder why you keep forgeting their sufferings… not allowed in the putinista narrative I guess. Russians ought to be depicted as victors, always. — Olivier5

First, the suffering is not mutual. Ukrainian economy is in free fall, entire cities severely damaged or abandoned, industry in disarray and now the Russians are turning off the lights. Should somebody stop them? Maybe ... but I don't see anyone going and doing that.

In simple military terms, Russians have withdrawn from one week point (West of the Dnieper) and one strategically unimportant area (around Kharkiv).

Zero questions this is not desirable for the Russians and no questions it is embarrassing, especially Kherson. I am 100% aware that annexing territory and then withdrawing from it looks dumb. But that's intense warfare. UK, France, US, Germany, Japan, Russia all had embarrassing setbacks in WWII.

However, embarrassment is not suffering.

Ukraine paid a high cost for their offensives as well as continuing to pressure Russian force. We do not know the cost exactly, obviously every estimate will be accused of bias.

What we can know is that it would be common military wisdom that if the Ukrainians are attacking and in addition the Russians are able to withdraw without being routed, that Ukrainian losses, aka. suffering, will be higher than the Russians.

In other words, if Russia is suffering more losses than Ukraine while defending, that would be unexpected.

Second, to expand on what @Isaac just explained to you, the amount of territory the Russians are occupying is pretty significant.

As I described months ago, what actually matters at this stage in the war is losses multiplied by the distance covered.

We don't know what the losses are, but what amount of losses would be worth it to you?

For example, assuming that it took 100 000 dead Ukrainians to get this far, and just "eyeballing it" at this rate it's going to take another 200 000 to 300 000 Ukrainian KIA to reconquer the rest of the territory, would you pay that price?

Still a liar, my position didn't evolve. — neomac

You went from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "considering the nuclear deterrence they both had" ... that I remind you "Ukraine doesn't have!" but apparently that had no relation to your original use of the word "pre-condition".

That you were just pointing out US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons was a precondition for "something" ... just not the kind of deals we were actually talking about that Ukraine also agreed to.

But your conjectures do not prove anything from a geopolitical point of view. What gives meaning to such agreements is the actual geopolitical and historical circumstances, and their trends. — neomac

You start by contradicting my position, that guarantees aren't ornamental ... and then just repeat my position back to me.

We engage with promises that aren't guaranteed in any sense of the word all the time: All the way to the altar. It's in fact the usual state of affairs that people can break their promises to us. Of course, there can be plenty of reasons to trust someone even if there is no real consequence to them for breaking their word to you.

There is very particular (and unusual) set of contractual promises in which guarantee is not ornamental. A company sells you something and guarantees the delivery date, quality, etc. and doesn't deliver, there is actual legal recourse to recover the damages. Of course, not guaranteed in the sense of certainty, but in this legal recourse sense.

Now, if the word "guarantee" is ornamental and basically a euphemism for "trust me bro" then we are indeed in agreement that you'd need to be evaluating other things to decide if the United States, or any other state, is actually going to keep their word.

You've basically transitioned into this euphemistic use of the word guarantee: not certain, not legal, no legal recourse ... but what's the status of such a promise with the word guarantee attached?

It's: trust me bro.

Now, maybe Biden, Sunak, Macron and the rest of them, really are Zelensky's bro's and they got his back for personal bro code reasons that are personal to them, even if it's against the interest of their respective nations. Maybe Zelensky can feel that bro spirit and knows the promises will be fulfilled when the time comes. Or, maybe Zelensky evaluates "historical trends" and determines that whatever is promised will be delivered for a bunch of reasons. Or maybe Zelensky has some leverage that would increase the cost of any party not respecting the deal, for instance we've already discussed the cost to Russia for another war would be primarily ... the cost of another war, Zelensky or a new Ukrainian presidents leverage being the fighting of another war. Zelensky could maybe have some leverage on the US, UK et. al. such as invading Poland or something, that would increase the cost of unkept promises.

I explain at some length that there can be other reasons outside of what wording is used in an agreement to believe that people, even an entire nation, will keep their word: nearly all of it is called circumstances and leverage.

However, if you want to be more certain than what amounts to futurology of historical trends, if you want a real and substantive "guarantee" from the parties, to be really sure they're keeping their word on their honour: is not on offer in international relations.

Blablabla, just to change subject while still implicitly proving that such agreements are not ornamental at all! Catastrophic!

Congrats for your epic fail, dude! — neomac

I go to some length to explain that agreements coordinate actions between willing participants, and also solve catch 22 situation where one party is willing only if another party is too.

In the case of Russia evaluating NATO-Ukraine footsie, it maybe well aware that US promises such as:

“We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO,” NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a news conference, reading from a communique agreed at a summit of the pact’s 26 leaders in Bucharest.

“That is quite something,” he added. — Reuters

Are meaningless insofar as promises go. Maybe US has zero intention of ever letting Ukraine join NATO.

However, that Russia knows what promises from a more powerful state to a less powerless state are worth, it cannot know what the US actually intends or will do if the circumstances change.

You have simply strawmanned my position with conflating the ornamental nature of guarantee with the idea no one ever does what they promise.

Promises can be kept between nations, but because the promising party believed at the time of the agreement and continues to believe that it was a reasonable promise to make and in their interests to keep it. Adding "guarantee" or other flowery language is of minor consideration.

For example:

There's been this bizarre historical revisionism that Ukraine should have held out for "guarantees" rather than settle for "assurances" in the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances".

Since these "assurances" turned out to mean nothing, the thinking is that people knew that at the time.

But what's the substantive actual meaning of "assurances" ... is it really "means nothing"? Obviously not, at the time assurances was meaningful.

It's only since these assurances turned out to be meaningless that "assurances" have become a euphemism for "nice things people say sometimes" in international political analysis.

If the assurances turned out to be meaningful in 2014 when Ukraine first started complaining about the "commitments" not being kept, then people would not go around today saying these assurances were meaningless, they would point to US and other signatory actions as clear evidence of the meaning of the assurances.

If a new agreement is struck and called "The guarantees agreement" and then the day comes where whatever is guaranteed should be fulfilled ... and it's not, then "guarantee" would be the new euphemism for what people say because it sounded nice at the time.

The last clause states: "6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments."

Which, notice the actual promise is only to "consult" ... but as far as I know these parties didn't do even that. Well what exactly is the meaning of "commitments" if all you're actually promising to do is "consult" about questions concerning them?

Any new agreement will be in the exact ontological and epistemological and legal status as the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances".

The mistake was not "ah, damn, if only we held out for the word 'guarantee', then Russia could not have invaded."

The mistake was not navigating political reality since in a competent and non-delusional way and believing NATO's promises were meaningful from Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, rather than consider the possibility that NATO may not be able to offer meaningful protection ... at least not from the destruction that has been brought to Ukraine so far.

I NEVER MADE SUCH A CLAIM, YOU LIAR, quote where I did! I just claimed that "security guarantees" (or equivalent) are neither "ornamental" nor "meaningless" and that it’s rational for Zelensky to pursue them based on the current geopolitical and historical circumstances.
That is supported by the quotations I previously reported. — neomac

I don't have time for the rest of your post just now, but I'd like to point out the reading comprehension that, perhaps, you could spend some time in the meanwhile to reflect on.

What do I say, that you literally cite just above your reaction?

Now, if you're saying Zelensky knows that security guarantees are only ornamental fluff to promises that will only be kept if it suits the promising party to keep the promise (aka. a nominal but meaningless promise), then I'd be happy to hear that Zelensky isn't delusional on this point of international relations. — boethius

Key words: "If you're saying".

It's called "if" followed by a "then".

It was honestly unclear to me what your position has evolved into with all the goal post moving around.

So, if your position is A, then B.

You can clarify that your position is "not-A", which you have done.

As for your position, you literally cite as evidence for your position ... evidence that supports my position, such as international law is a voluntary thing (so obviously guarantees also voluntary, which is the opposite of guarantees).

All you're discovering is that "guarantees" is euphemism for "trust us bro" (as I've been explaining) and, sure, it can be reasonable for Zelensky to get whatever promises and statements of trust he can in a deal, but "guarantees" are purely ornamental. If the US goes back on its word in the future (such as make certain "assurances" it doesn't give a shit about now), Ukraine will have no recourse. If Ukrainians complain "but I thought it was guaranteed" ... what's the answer going to be from the neocon appreciation brigade on reddit defending the US's position? "All is fair in love and war," or maybe "life's not fair, take care of your own security" etc.

In addition, you are discovering the nominal world can be very different to the real world of actual substance.

For example, I sell you a lemon, I guarantee you it's sour. You want to be sure so ask for that guarantee in writing, as you want it actually guaranteed and for some crazy reasons if the lemon turns out not to be sour you'll suffer incredibly high damages.

So, I go and write a contract and I call it the "Boethius lemon super promise hyper guarantee" and in this contract I write clauses that explain I am not liable for anything.

You read it and explain I'm not guaranteeing anything with this contract, and I respond "but it's got guarantee right in the title of the contract, you're crazy."

What do we learn, that simply calling something a guarantee doesn't make it a guarantee. If there's zero consequence for me delivering a non-sour lemon or even no lemon at all, it maybe a nominal guarantee as it's a contract with guarantee in the contract but in the real world of actual substance it is not a guarantee as there's nothing to keep me to my word.

Guarantee in the context of agreements refers to some actual consequence for not delivering.

In this case of US guaranteeing something to Ukraine, no such consequence would be there, so no guarantee is there in actual substance of the real things in the world.

Now, maybe US keeps it's word anyways, but maybe not.

Again, think about things for a few seconds. If you ask me for that lemon, and I say I'll get it to you but maybe not, and you say "man, I really need to be sure, can you guarantee it" and I say "zero problems guaranteeing it, I guarantee you I'll get you that lemon, but of course maybe not, things could shake out that way" and then you say "that's not a guarantee then!!!" and then I say "but I literally just said I guarantee it to you!! ... just, with the added information that maybe not, because nothing is actually guaranteed."

This is the kind of confusion you get yourself into if you mixup nominal ornamental things with real things in the world. There is a difference between calling something a "guarantee" and that thing being a guarantee in some substantive way.

More appropriate term that describes reality would be that what diplomats call "security guarantees" are actually in the real world of substance "security reasons". They maybe reasons to accept the deal, they may even actually happen, but they are not guarantees in some substantive contractual sense of guarantee.

I am struck by how quickly our good friend boethius here is prompt to lose the plot, or change the goal post. First he says Ukraine is part of no collective, then that the UN -- which includes Ukraine -- does not define itself as a collective, and when proved wrong on it, he then segues into the UN not currently operating as a collective... Well, it does and it does not, depending. — Olivier5

Proving what? A "collective" (as defined by the dictionary) has collective interests and collective actions and policies.

The UN is mainly a diplomatic tool for different actual collectives (called nation states) to meet and try negotiate opposing (rather than collective) interests. Of course, from time to time and on some issues all interests align, or sufficiently so, and there's collective action on that point. But to say the UN brings the US, Russia, Ukraine, China, Iran etc. into one "collective" one unitary political body, is absurd.

For example, contract the "United Nations" with the "United States of America". True, they both have the word "United" in their name, and, true, they both bring together different states into interaction and some shared resources and some collective actions, they even both have some sort of leader. However, the United States of America in an actual collective providing actual collective security to it's member states, and the United Nations is very much a different thing.

Collective is not a good word to describe the United Nations and even if it was is a terrible example of a "collective" in the sense of "collective security" that Ukraine is apart of ... because Russia too is apart of the United Nations.

It's almost unbelievable that that detail is lost on you guys. Bringing up the UN as a potential "collective" in which to invoke "collective security" (the topic of discussion) is just completely absurd as not only is Russia a member of the same "collective" but Russia is a far more powerful member with a veto on whatever the UN even tries to do on topics of security.

And then you accuse others of losing the plot?

Did you read my answer to that question, re. the tanks? Maybe we can stop asking queestions that have been answered already. — Olivier5

You mean:

I would think that the reasons for this are that tanks cost a lost of money, are in short supply, and you don't want the enemy to get hold of them. — Olivier5

That you believe this is sufficient explanatory power?

For the airforce support I believe an additional issue would be related to avoid escalating the war. — Olivier5

Escalating the war to what? A war Ukraine can win? And if there going to win anyways, just barely, why not have them win sooner and save plenty of lives?

Your position is that Ukraine can and will win ... but just barely after a maximum amount of preventable Ukrainian suffering, because if they won an inch faster that would be an escalation?

Just because folks have opinions and share them here, does not make those a form of "parroting" of anyone. ssu and @SophistiCat have been critical of Zelensky after the Polish missile incident, and that is evidently at a variance with Ukrainian propaganda. You guys don't like it when we disagree with you, fair enough, but we are not parroting the enemies of the folks you are parroting. — Olivier5

Anyways, just so people are aware:

If his country is attacked, it is totally logical for him to try to get as much assistance. That's the urge for a no-fly-zone earlier in the war. And because of the nuclear deterrent, that possibility was totally out of the question. Now later a gaffe that he has backtracked seems have you and Isaac all over for many pages describing the wickedness of the Ukrainians. — ssu

Is from @ssu and not my description. If you cite someone citing someone else, you should put in the effort to format things so that's clear ... at least retain the default behaviour which is still to copy the person's name and a dash, so it's clear it's a citation (just can't tell when it started without additional effort put into make your post clear).

However, as I mention previously, I will go over the entire discussion when I have time to verify if indeed pro-Zelensky proponents aren't changing their positions to just reflect or defend what Zelensky or Ukrainian intelligence is saying at the moment.

If you had spy satellites, you probably wouldn't feel manipulated. — frank

What?

So... you're saying Zelensky is just stupid enough to lie to people who would know he's lying? So it's not a lie?

... Also, I don't have spy satellites, many other parties that jumped in to support Zelensky assuming he had some basis for what he was saying, also didn't have spy satellites.

You're saying manipulating everyone else who doesn't have spy satellites ... we just don't care about them (like the Kurds ... and Afghanis ... and Iraqis ... and Georgians etc.)?

But, even if we ignore everyone else, what if the US administration, who saw what happened with their satellites as you say they would, and saw it was a lie, but felt too invested in Zelensky to contradict him, so go along with the story. That's not manipulation?

Even more alarming, what if the US administration, being the only other party with any information on what happened, decided it was a great lie that Zelensky is telling, suits US "goals", and they push the lie too. This wouldn't be manipulation on Zelensky's part because he has co-conspirators?

Robber: "I didn't steal anything, you caught me red handed! Jeesh!! It's not robbing if the people you're trying to rob can stop you! Everyone knows that!!!!"

I think you're following Isaac in doing your best not to understand that when you act to preserve your life in the face of a lethal threat, your actions can't be condemned, even if your actions result in the death of your attacker. — frank

This is not the issue. Zelensky isn't literally on the battle field kungfooing or whatever.

Forget about Ukrainians for a moment, forget even about the collateral damage that can obviously be unjustifiable, focus for a moment on a simple question: Is it in our interest to accept Zelensky lying to us?

Even if I thought it was reasonable for Zelensky (from his point of view) to manipulate me for his own benefit ... is it in my benefit to be manipulated?

Zelensky probably will use everything at his disposal to secure his goals. Since it's a matter of self-preservation, it can't be condemned. We'll all do what we have to do to survive, and for many, that extends to the political entities we're parts of. — frank

@Isaac has pointed out the basic problem with your statement.

However, I think even more revealing is the underlining self-contradiction in this sort of apologetics for Zelensky.

For, shouldn't Europeans also do what it takes to survive? Which may require throwing Ukraine under the bus in a deal for Russian gas?

Now, imagine this was the self-interested and self-preserving action, for the sake of argument, would you maintain your position that it cannot be condemned? even the most viscous stab in the back (we can even go wild and imagine Ukrainians literally falling off of our aircraft as we high-tail our embassy staff and special forces the fuck out of there). It's self preservation after all.

Yet ... how would this square with the West's own Churchillian ideals of defending freedoms and things? Just doing and saying whatever we need to manipulate the Ukrainians and secure our goals? Sending arms to fight the Russians when it advances our goals, cutting a deal and abandoning the Ukrainians when the circumstances change.

Do we accept the (good, Western) Afghanis and (good, Western) Iraqis, and Kurds ... and Georgians, are only allies of convenience as they are foreign enough (some of them brown!) whereas Ukraine, because they have hot woman to a noble Western sensibility?, gets special treatment and we'll even pursue their goals at the cost of our own?

First, in our exchange, you wasted all occasions to quote where Zelensky used the word "precondition" which would be relevant to your argument. — neomac

Why would this be relevant to my argument? The word precondition was already being discussed, the point of discussion was if Zelensky's precondition to negotiate were reasonable or not.

If you want a citation of Zelensky literally using the word precondition, here you go:

"We agreed that the Ukrainian delegation would meet with the Russian delegation without preconditions on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, near the Pripyat River," he said in a statement. — Reuters

Zelensky demands Russian troops leave Ukraine as precondition to diplomacy — The Times of Isreal

How does citing Zelensky using the word precondition or journalist reporting on his preconditions relevant to the argument here?

What is relevant here is that the word precondition was already being discussed, that was the whole focus of my point you were clearly trying to rebut.

"Precondition" wasn't referred to deterrence means nor nuclear weapons (this is your misunderstanding), but to considering the available deterrence means as a rational ground for pursuing any kind of security agreement by geopolitical agents. In other words, I was referring to a rational requirement. — neomac

Again, look where you've moved the goal posts.

You start off with bait-and-switch the meaning of precondition, which you were obviously using for the reason that it tied into the debate that was ongoing, not some maverick "off-book" and "I don' give a shit about your dictionary and I make my own rules, here's a new meaning for this word that server no pragmatic purpose to just randomly invent now with no explanation."

Next, what do you explain here? Exactly what I describe, that in order to remove the original meaning from your statement to not admit saying something false and foolish, you are saying nothing at all. US and Soviet Union considered "available deterrence means" in making agreements ... and so did everyone else, including Ukraine, in joining various non-proliferation treaties.

All you're saying is "agents" reason about things. Obviously they do. Moreso giant institutions that run entire countries.

But that's simply obviously not the point you were making. In using the word "pre-condition" and emphasising that Ukraine is in a different nuclear status, you were clearly rebutting my position and supporting Zelensky's intransigence.

If you were just chiming into say that people reason about things, just in a pseudo-intellectual bullshit way of speaking with "geopolitical agents" and all, then you would have made that clear: you would have said "of course, having nuclear deterrence isn't a precondition for anything, and I'd never mention the idea, but Ukraine may reason themselves to a peace deal or then reason themselves to continue fighting, both conclusion could be potentially reasonable hypothetically given everything that should be considered in making these kinds of decisions." In other words, if you were stating the obvious you would have said you were stating the obvious and then maybe explain something not obvious that follows from that.

This argument is perfectly consequential and in contradiction to the claim that the military cooperation between Ukraine and the West is "zero meaningful" from a geopolitical point of view. This war is proving exactly the opposite of such spectacularly dumb claim of yours. — neomac

What the hell are you talking about?

My point is that any promise to Ukraine by the West is meaningless in itself. The promise would be fulfilled if, later, it suits these powers to fulfil the promise. If, later, it doesn't suit these powers to fulfil the promise then it won't be fulfilled. There's alignment for now (for some arms, but "tut, tut, tut get your dirty hands of the shiny shit"), I'm just pointing out that if that alignment ever went away (such as happened with the Kurds) then no piece of paper is going to matter.

An obvious reality you seem finally to agree with.

WHO ON EARTH IS TAKING SECURITY GUARANTEES IN THE CERTAINTY SENSE? CAN YOU QUOTE HIM? — neomac

“There is only one goal (from Russia): to destroy our independence. There’s no other goal in place. That’s why we need security guarantees. … And we believe we have already demonstrated our forces’ capability to the world.” — Zelensky, quoted by CNN

Now, if you're saying Zelensky knows that security guarantees are only ornamental fluff to promises that will only be kept if it suits the promising party to keep the promise (aka. a nominal but meaningless promise), then I'd be happy to hear that Zelensky isn't delusional on this point of international relations.

RUSSIA IS CLAIMED TO SEE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT IN HAVING UKRAINE AND GEORGIA WITHIN NATO, THIS WAS NO ACTUAL NUCLEAR THREAT (BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE SUCH WEAPONS, AND THE MEMBERSHIP WASN'T IMMINENT) NOR - AS YOU COULD ARGUE - GUARANTEE IN THE SENSE OF CERTAINTY THAT RUSSIA WOULD BE NUKED AFTER UKRAINE JOINED NATO OR AFTER INVADING UKRAINE FOLLOWING THE UKRAINIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP. HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THIS BEHAVIOR IF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE JUST AN ORNAMENTAL AND NOTHING CERTAIN? — neomac

Russia doesn't only cite nuclear weapons as a threat from NATO, but forward deployed missile bases.

Tangible weapons systems in the real world owned and operated by NATO that require NATO membership to be deployed in your country.

Now, there was a de facto understanding after the ascension of the Baltic's into NATO that certain systems wouldn't be forward deployed in order to reduce tensions and the possibility of accidents.

NATO then forward deployed exactly those missile systems saying "something, something, Iran" even though that made no sense. Whether this was breaking a promise or not, clearly NATO's policy is to forward deploy threatening weapons systems.

The deployment of actual weapons systems is what matters.

If the Baltics were nominally in NATO but hosted no NATO infrastructure, then, yes, this isn't really a threat as no NATO attacks could be launched given this lack of NATO infrastructure to do so. It's a reasonable compromise to maintain a reasonable defensive posture: we won't forward deploy to the Baltics as we have no intention to attack you, but we will come to their aid if they are attacked.

Of course, once you do forward deploy military systems you are by definition threatening the people in range of those systems and the logic of a defensive posture goes away.

The apologetics logic about this is that Russia shouldn't view these forward deployed systems as a threat, even if there's no other reason for it, because in NATO's heart of hearts they're not "out to get Russia", that's paranoid delusion talk.

But, if the first reaction of the West to this war in Ukraine is that it's an opportunity to weaken Russia, a geopolitical rival ... then obviously NATO was indeed threatening Russia all along.

Now, being threatened by real weapons systems in the real world does not then justify any action, but it does make this story of "unprovoked attack" absurd propaganda. If you threaten me and I punch you in the face, I could definitely still be in the wrong and be convicted of assault, but it wasn't unprovoked.

But to focus on the central issue we've been discussing:

HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THIS BEHAVIOR IF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE JUST AN ORNAMENTAL AND NOTHING CERTAIN? — neomac

I have said adding the word "guarantee" to a promise is ornamental. The texts of international agreements still matter for what they actually do: coordinate actions of willing participants.

If there's a peace deal and Russia wants to follow it, then what the peace deal says matters a great deal as they'll need to read it to implement it, and likewise other parties will see their actions and compare it to the deal to evaluate if the Russians are indeed intending to stick to peace (rather than attack again or then just not follow some parts of the deal as they don't feel like it, perhaps motivating others to not follow their parts of the deal that they only want to follow if Russia is doing their part).

This coordination of willing participants to a deal is not ornamental.

More importantly, real weapons systems in the real world is not ornamental.

The military relevance of Ukraine joining NATO would be forward deployment of NATO weapons systems to Ukraine, which would then be there fore decades and under conditions that today we cannot predict.

An analogy is that if I point a gun at you but assure you I don't intend to fire it. Well, even if that were true, maybe the situation changes and you want to fire it later, or then someone jumps out of a giant novelty cake in surprise and it startles you into firing it.

The NATO apologetics on this issue is that NATO weapons systems aren't a threat to anyone: obviously they are.

THE MEMBERSHIP WASN'T IMMINENT — neomac

But to focus on another error in analysis. Everyone says that the footsie between NATO and Ukraine, even if we do see NATO policy is to forward deploy under stupid pretext (like "Iran" needs to be defended from the Baltics ... no closer NATO country or US / NATO base to Iran is convenient for that purpose), didn't matter because Ukraine wasn't going to join NATO anytime soon.

How would the Russians actually know what's imminent or not?

And, take a step back and think about this form of apologetics, as it is premised on the idea that it would be justified to attack Ukraine if NATO promises to Ukrainian weren't meaningless ornaments.

However, I have not described promises in international relations as meaningless ornaments, only embellishing or trying to "lock in" the promise is, and can only be, ornamental. Promises are meaningful as people may actually intend to carry out the promise, and if that is the case then the exchange of promises coordinates further cooperative action ... just in no way guarantees things stay that way nor if one's belief in other people's declared intentions turns out to be a good idea in hindsight.

But what's asked in this apology is that we must view Russia's concerns about NATO weapons systems in Ukraine as unfounded and foolish, because we must obviously know that NATO's promises to Ukraine are meaningless.

But, if NATO, UKraine, Russia, and everyone else knows the promises from NATO to Ukraine are totally meaningless (of friendship and partnership and joining NATO presumably in a useful way before and not after being invaded and significantly harmed) ... what was the purpose of those promises in the first place other than simply to provoke Russia? Promises aren't going to happen, everyone knows that, so why make the promises?

Now, what we should demand of Russia in interpreting such information is one topic, but clearly if the only explanation available is an intent to provoke a war, we can certainly all agree that the NATO-Ukraine footsie game was of criminal intent on NATO's part: would not and could not protect Ukraine, only meant to provoke a war at the expense of Ukraine.

This is a pretty ridiculous canard, even by your standards. Nobody here repeats Ukrainian intelligence service material or whatever Zelensky says. — Olivier5

I have zero problem reading the entire thread and verifying your claim. Also, keep in mind that apologising for Zelensky is also apart of it ... which we just went through an example of:

If his country is attacked, it is totally logical for him to try to get as much assistance. That's the urge for a no-fly-zone earlier in the war. And because of the nuclear deterrent, that possibility was totally out of the question. Now later a gaffe that he has backtracked seems have you and Isaac all over for many pages describing the wickedness of the Ukrainians. — ssu

If Zelensky lied or had delusional requests (like a no-fly zone) then we're asked to just understand that he's fighting a war and doing whatever, zero expectations to make sense. If he's caught in a lie ... that's just a "gaffe".

I would think that the reasons for this are that tanks cost a lost of money, are in short supply, and you don't want the enemy to get hold of them. — Olivier5

How does this make any sense whatsoever? Again, exactly the apologetics for NATO policy I just described to avoid the inconvenient truth.

First, tanks are not in short supply.

[quote="List of currently active United States military land vehicles
;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_currently_active_United_States_military_land_vehicles"]M1 Abrams – 5,000 active use. Approx. 3,000 stored[/quote]

And that's just the US tanks ... doesn't seem like tanks are in short supply.

Second, even if the tanks were in the short supply, one of the foundational justifications for arming Ukraine is so that Ukraine fights the Russians so we don't have to. So, if this was really the policy, you'd want to send tanks to do that fighting.

So you think NATO countries should support Ukraine with fighter jets and tanks? I mean, that's an option worth considering. — Olivier5

The question here is, if the support to Ukraine really is genuine, why hasn't that happened since day one of the war?

Western political leaders keep saying their objective is to support Ukraine with "whatever they need" to defeat the Russians.

If we both agree fighter jets and tanks would be useful in that effort, and training is only a temporary problem and totally irrelevant as the war could still be on years or decades from now, why hasn't NATO already started those programs to train, supply, workout the logistics for tanks and planes months ago?

Is my pointing this out anti-Ukrainian?

Or, it is just the reality that the West is using Ukraine for its own purposes, not Ukraine's purposes, and those purposes don't include actually defeating the Russians (otherwise their actions would be consistent with such a goal).

If that's the truth, objectives cannot be attained through military force (as NATO is holding back the support required to do that), then the alternative to indefinite war or a war that you lose, is compromise and make peace with the Russians.

What I have issue with is people who accept NATO isn't really supporting Ukraine enough to win (obviously we agree here jets and tanks are nice to have) ... but also support indefinite fighting or uncompromising diplomatic positions.

You can support an uncompromising diplomatic position, but that only makes sense (for Ukrainians) if you believe Ukraine can win, and therefore believe NATO is going to support that. But holding back weapons systems for no reason (if the goal is to actually defeat the Russians) is incompatible with the premise.

Thanks for the laugh. You’re the voice of Moscow here. Of course you are anti-Ukrainian. — Olivier5

Essentially your position, along with the other Zelenkyites, is that support for Ukraine means support for Ukrainian propaganda, and especially whatever Zelensky says. If he contradicts himself (which he does often) then it is incumbent upon us to understand why Zelensky would want us believing something one day and the opposite the next day. If he gets caught lying (such as making accusations without justification; such as these missiles, existence of Nazi's sporting the black sun in his entourage, or the basic historical facts leading up to the war) then we must understand that of course he was motivated to lie to us! It was to his advantage for us to believe whatever he says and he's fighting a war!

However, does just parroting whatever Zelensky or Ukrainian intelligence service say, benefit Ukraine?

Let's take an example. One "pro-Russia" view I was accused of early on, was my conclusion that Javelins and other man-portable-weapons would not be enough to win any major offensive or counter-offensive, that armour is needed for this kind of warfare. At the time, NATO had a no-armour policy, and the pro-NATO and pro-Ukrainian position was that of course Javelins are enough.

Now, many moons pass and it goes without saying that Ukraine needs armour to accomplish anything on the battlefield.

Well, what did the obvious lie (NATO certainly knew as well as I you need armour for this kind of fighting on this kind of terrain) accomplish?

Thousands of Ukrainians dead that maybe would be still alive if armour was supplied sooner.

And, despite it being now completely obvious to everyone that Ukraine needs armour to compete on the battlefield, NATO still maintains the policy of no NATO produced tanks ... well, why is that? NATO just want Ukrainians to die when superior NATO tanks could save them?

The excuse is that NATO tanks are different and it would require training ... ok, well, train them then. Considering this war could go on for years, the time it would take to train Ukrainians on NATO tanks doesn't seem all that relevant. Had things got started in February, seems to me that it would be quite easy to field several companies of Leopard 2 or M1 Abrams tanks. Sure it takes time, but it doesn't take more than 8 months to to train a tank crew, especially if they already have military and tank experience.

Of course, it doesn't feel good that NATO is holding back weapons and training, getting Ukrainians killed that could have had better protection, all while claiming to be fully supporting Ukraine's fight. But that's the obvious truth.

Worse, the substitute for NATO built tanks is Soviet built tanks, which NATO has been scrounging left and right to throw into Ukraine. Some of these tanks are incredibly outdated and basically a coffin on wheels. Of course, better than nothing, but not only is it simply hypocritical for NATO to hold back the good stuff, but what happens when Ukraine just runs out of tanks entirely?

The day Ukraine simply doesn't have tanks and Ukrainian lines start to crumble because of that, wouldn't be the optimum time for NATO to sigh and finally provide the NATO built tanks and training.

Pointing the policy is not genuine on NATO's part, is not anti-Ukrainian, it's just reality.

Now, the apologetics for this reality is that NATO doesn't want to provoke Russia too much, so can't "go crazy" and just supply anything that would be useful to fight a war and accomplish the stated objectives (we're not even going to talk about F-16s ... much less F-35s) ... but why would these weapons systems be too provocative? Obviously because it might allow Ukraine to obviously win ... so, what's the policy? Clearly not let Ukraine actually win.

What's the consequence of propping up Ukraine enough to fight but not with? A very large amount of suffering in the pursuit of objectives that cannot be accomplished.

Nonsense.

If his country is attacked, it is totally logical for him to try to get as much assistance. That's the urge for a no-fly-zone earlier in the war. And because of the nuclear deterrent, that possibility was totally out of the question. Now later a gaffe that he has backtracked seems have you and Isaac all over for many pages describing the wickedness of the Ukrainians.

It would be typical of Russian propaganda to say Zelensky has "in mind to go all the way to nuclear war". As if he was the instigator of this war. — ssu

Ah, ok, making false accusations in the context of a delusional "urge" to put the world on a path to nuclear war in order to get more assistance, is just a:

gaffe — ssu

Nothing to see here. All completely:

logical — ssu

The Nazi thing was and is a ruse. — jorndoe

Yes it was.

But notice how eagerly it was employed even on this thread by some very active participants. — ssu

Over 8 months ago I posted several reports by Western media (made before the war) investigating the Nazi's in Ukraine.

Are these Western journalists working for Putin? Just part of the ruse you're talking about?

If it's not a ruse ... well what is the ruse?

Why didn't yourselves or anyone who thinks the Nazi's aren't a problem explain why these reports aren't alarming, 8 months ago or anytime since?

At the time, the opposing view was that yes these Nazi's were a problem, there just wasn't enough of them to justify an invasion. I asked at the time, and several times since, what "enough Nazi's" would be; as to say there's not enough Nazi's with not enough power to justify invasion, implies some theory and analysis of where the line of too-many-Nazi's is and that the facts point to Ukraine being on the not-enough side of that line.

A simple question one would presumably need to answer to support Ukraine is fighting a just war, rather than using an unjust war (started in 2014 against separatist who have a right to self determination same as Ukraine) to build a fascist regime where all their political opposition is banned.

But, maybe you just forgot to respond to my comment and these reports I posted 8 months, and just require a friendly reminder to do so now:

The backlash is people getting into severe cognitive dissonance which disrupts the war horny trance like state they were in previously, when they encounter the fact the "neo-Nazi" problem isn't some fringe skinheads in some seedy bar, but a whole institution.

Which, please pay attention to the "black sun" which doesn't even have any apologist "it's just a rune" or "ancient Sanskrit symbol" whatever explanation, but literally created by the SS for the SS. — boethius

And also discover, at least the US and Canada (... maybe not other NATO members like Germany, who are the experts on neo-Nazi's after all and arbitrate whether they exist or not in today's media landscape) exposed to be breaking their own laws, which was military aid was contingent on irregular forces not doing any fighting or getting any weapons or ammunition ... which journalists could just go debunk in like, a single day's investigation? — boethius

And discover ... that when people talk about this problem going back to 2014 ... there's times and BBC reportings on this very thing: — boethius

January First, is one of the most important days in their callender. It marks the birth of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian partisan forces during the second world war.

The rally was organized by the far right Svoboda Party. Protests marched amidst a river of torches, with signs saying "Ukraine above all else".

But for many in Ukraine and abroad, Bandera's legacy is controversial. His group, the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists sided with Nazi German forces [but fortunately we have modern Germany to tell us there's no connection!] before breaking with them later in the war. Western Historians also say that his followers carried out massacres of Polish and Jewish civilians.

[... interview with a guy explaining the importance of Stepan Bandera's birthday party ]

Ukraine is a deeply divided country, however, and many in its East and South consider the party to be extremist. Many observers say rallies like today's torch light march only add to this division [really?!?! you don't say...]. — BBC

Or discover this one which interviews the FBI talking about these terrorists training with Azov ... but ... wait, "the war on terror" doesn't extend to white terrorists training "oversees".

And has the quote (recorded on video) from one of the recruiters: — boethius

We're Aryans, and we will rise again — totally not a neo-Nazi, according to the German government

But ... the president is Jewish and is allied with these forces, who don't even hate Jews all that much! So obviously you can have Nazi's if their friendly Nazi's (to your side). — boethius

This one's just adorable. — boethius

The UN is not a collective and doesn't define itself like that:

The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter.
— boethius

The UN Charter, which starts with: — Olivier5

Key word:

guided — the UN

Not "bound to" or "for sure going to happen".

Or, in other words:

The code is more what you'd call 'guidelines' than actual rules. — Captain Barbossa

It's a nice charter the UN has there, very pretty, I honestly wish I had a charter just as pretty.

But how does the UN actually work (what it actually is) in it's own words:

the one place on Earth where all the world’s nations can gather together, discuss common problems, and find shared solutions that benefit all of humanity. — UN about page

Key word is "gather", making the UN more of a "gathering" than a collective action organisation, at least how they put it.

But, for the topic at hand, the UN is the worst possible example ... for, whatever you want to call it, Russia has a Veto, so it's pretty unlikely the UN will come to Ukraine's aid of "collective security" of the UN "collective", if you insist on calling it that anyways.

And, keep in mind I am not an anti-Ukrainain advocate. I don't like Zelensky, that's for sure, but I've made my position very clear that what I have issue with is NATO supplying arms to Ukraine in a drip feed manner that results in maximum loss of life, trauma, economic destruction for Ukrainians. Now, it harms some Russian soldiers too, and this is purported as a justification for the policy, but I disagree with that justification.

I'd be a lot happier if Ukraine did actually have real allies, was actually part of this "collective security" Zelensky is talking about, that there was a giant Cuban missile crisis standoff between the US and Russia before the war and some solution worked out that avoided war, using actual NATO power as leverage.

Problem is US and company simply didn't care about Ukraine at the time, and wouldn't have A. the balls and B. the "national self interest" to carry out such a policy before the war to the benefit of Ukrainians.

It was in the "national self interest" to keep teasing Ukraine about eventual NATO membership for the West's own purposes knowing full well it would never happen and the policy was not "charity", as some may call it, to Ukraine.

Sending arms after the war starts and hiding behind the "but, but, but the nukes" as an excuse to not let our "friend" Ukraine into our little club, despite flying their flag on our lawns, avatars and prestigious buildings as if we cared, is cowardice and not "standing up to Russia". Our policy may indeed harm Russia (though this is not "guaranteed"), but whether Russia is in fact harmed or not in the long run, the costs to Ukrainians (and poor people's around the world due to the knock-on consequences) suffered for our policy is absolutely enormous.

P.S.
I re-claim all I wrote, word by word: — neomac

Yes, go ahead and read your own words:

the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

"pre-condition for the kind of agreements" and "but Ukraine doesn’t have!"

You are making a "pre-condition" difference between Ukraine and the US and Soviet Union. Why you use the word "pre-condition". You are simply so ignorant of international relations that you were simply unaware that non-nuclear powers, including Ukraine, "rationally pursued" in your pseudo-intellectual-bullshit way of speaking, the same agreements, so obviously having nuclear weapons was not a precondition for pursuing these kinds of agreements (the reality is in direct contradiction to your claim).

Any "rational agent" that was actually aware they were not describing a precondition related to the result of negotiating an agreement, would then obviously clarify that: followed by an actual meaningful point; such as: "Of course, the agreements between the US and Soviet Union weren't of a kind that having nuclear weapons was a precondition, but here's an example of such an agreement that a nuclear power would rationally pursue but a non-nuclear power like Ukraine wouldn't rationally pursue--since if I don't even have one example for my hypothetical ... I'd look pretty foolish ... almost, but not as quite as foolish as changing my position to basically describe how decisions are made generally speaking: pursuing something you want for some reason and also considering the situation and what you know about it."

You'd say "of course Ukraine and many other nations don't have nuclear weapons and pursued the same agreements, but 'thinking about it' is what I mean is a preconditon to agreeing; both the US, the Soviet Union and everyone else thought about nuclear weapons, wherever they are, before agreeing to the same kind of agreements; there's no meaningful difference I am pointing to."

But that's obviously not your point, your point is obviously that the US and the Soviet Union could enter some kinds of agreements contingent on actually having nuclear weapons and it would be irrational if they didn't have nuclear weapons, making it a precondition which is why you literally say precondition, and non-nuclear powers would therefore not pursue those kinds of agreements as they lack the precondition to pursue those kinds of agreements as rational agents, at least as they exist in your head.

As that's exactly what you say. You even emphasise this difference with an exclamation mark: "but Ukraine doesn’t have!" If what Ukraine didn't have made no difference (to the kinds of agreements it could rational pursue), you would have said "but Ukraine doesn’t have! but of course that doesn't matter for these kinds of agreements we're talking about!!"

I'm implying that if there is an unfortunate accident, let's say Russian aircraft shoots down a NATO aircraft of vice versa, things won't automatically escalate. — ssu

We agree here. If we are only considering Zelensky lying to us; I think what matters is the intention. Zelensky's intention is clearly to escalate tensions between nuclear powers in a way that he certainly has in mind may go all the way to nuclear war; either as a desirable thing or then just a risk he's willing to take.

An act of criminal defamation and fraud with intended damages.

Certainly Zelensky is so delusional as to think his words matter outside what is convenient to his backers, but I don't think we should minimise the intended consequences of his actions.

What you describe, if true, simply puts into sharp relief the extent of Zelensky's delusions, which we should take into consideration in our analysis that Ukraine is lead by an out of control maniac willing to cause extreme damages on false pretences and lying to us.

You're right, we should be very worried about what damages he can practically achieve out-of-the-blue given his unstable and delusional mental state, thinking two polish citizens killed by a missile could be anything more than raising a few eyebrows even if it was Russia. Now that he's discovered this particular plan doesn't work, and no one cares what he has to say about it, we should be worried about what reckless and damaging options are within his grasp.

- I said nowhere that I used the word precondition as Zelensky. — neomac

The thread is discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages. I write my views about it, which you then respond to in a way perfectly consistent with the discussion so far as well as what precondition means in the discussion so far and also in the dictionary.

Only after your point is wrong do you go on an endless "axchually" diatribe explaining how you use the word differently to make an empty point.

It's the most boring, bad faith, cowardly way to debate: retroactively dilute the meanings of words to most the goal posts of your claim to something so trivial and tautological it is not wrong ... but also just dumb if that was actually your original point and you're not lying about it now.

But you seem to take yourself for a clever chap, and it's far more clever to lie than to just be an idiot.

For your new story about the word to make any make sense at all, you're asking us to believe you were simply not following the discussion and just-so-happened to use the word in a different sense to make an empty point about how people generally make decisions (taking into account the situation; in this case who has nuclear weapons and who doesn't, although of course having nuclear weapons isn't an actual precondition for anything we've talking about as people without nuclear weapons do the same things).

Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential wrt what I argued since the beginning (and you misunderstood) and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.” — neomac

Do you even understand what you are reading?

This is a proposal exactly in the understanding of international relations I've described: whatever the US does, now or in the future, is because it's in the US interest and no Ukraine. There's no charity towards Ukraine now nor in the future.

So first of all, what's the corollary to his idea? Well, if his theory turns out to be wrong for whatever reason, then the US would cease supporting Ukraine, and look out for number 1 as it always does.

You can also see clearly the ornamental nature of guarantee. For, if it stopped being in the US interest to carry out this plan, maybe the dust settles and Russia offers a good deal to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to cease arming it, the basic premise of the entire proposal is the US is going to do that: the only way for Ukraine to benefit from interaction with the US is if Ukraine's interest aligns with the US' interest and here's an idea for that in the long term. Consequence? If this alignment of interest were to break down for any reason, Ukraine would not be able to rely on these "guarantees" and would discover that the word guarantee in this context is purely ornamental.

"If we get this right, the security arrangements to start and are in no way guaranteed down the line to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem," is the exact same meaning as "guaranteed" in the context. Diplomats and political analysts like calling them guarantees, as it seems nicer.

As for the theory itself ... it's just really stupid.

Even according the author, you could only finalise this plan at "a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better".

But if Russia has accepted to live within its own borders after a long and bloody war and eventual "defeat", in some sense that doesn't involve actual defeat in Ukraine v Russia, then Ukraine can be slipped into NATO as Russia will be so weak as to be unable to oppose it.

However, if Russia has accepted to live within its own border ... why would it be "in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks."

Why would a nation that has accepted to live within its own borders attack anyone?

But, I'm sure you have some new boring diatribe explaining how this proposal is self contradictory and stupid ... if words mean what they they say in the dictionary!!! But they obviously don't ever!!!

No. Even at the time there was no media panic. The out-of-the-blue engagement just raised eyebrowse. — ssu

So you would agree that Russia could employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine "out-of-the-blue" with zero fear of any US response.

... And you'd even make the stronger claim that our media wouldn't even be all too worked up about it, no worries, certainly no reason to panic, just raise some eyebrows at best?

As if?

The UN? OSCE? WTO?

Or is it that artificial countries run by neonazis aren't part of a collective? :smirk: — ssu

If also want to change the meaning of words around to make boring discussion, be my guest.

"Collective" is a strong word in political analysis, and Zelensky is clearly using it in exactly that very strong way of a collective strong enough to act in common military defence. "Collective security is under attack" is Zelensky's words.

Of course, he certainly would like to be part of the collective he's talking about, but isn't, and obviously you know that. Zelensky know's that too, so the next best thing would be being able to tell NATO what do do, which he tries in his statement.

But, even saying the obvious:

The UN is not a collective and doesn't define itself like that:

The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter.

The UN has evolved over the years to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

But one thing has stayed the same: it remains the one place on Earth where all the world’s nations can gather together, discuss common problems, and find shared solutions that benefit all of humanity. — UN about page

Certainly capable of collective action, but through this process of gathering together, discussing common problems and finding solutions.

The OSCE literally describes itself as a forum:

The OSCE is a forum for political dialogue — OSCE

And the WTO is quite clearly about trading and not any sort of collective action.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. — WTO

Your examples are far from describing themselves as "collectives", much less any kind of collective that has mutual security and it would make sense to say "attack on collective security".

Of course, you can always join the game of bait-and-switch the meaning of words in order to say nothing and try to bore other participants out of participation. Does the UN involve a "collection" of nations, yes, is that collection a "collective" connoting a pretty strong political bond, far beyond a forum of dialogue, and presumed collective action? No.

Again, Oxford languages as the first result in searching "define:collective"

collective
/kəˈlɛktɪv/
adjective
done by people acting as a group.
"a collective protest"
noun
a cooperative enterprise.
"the exhibition showcases the work of art collectives from more than 20 countries" — Search engine search for Define Collective

Quote whatever you think was my original claim so I can claim it again and then you explain its meaning to me, dude. — neomac

I have little doubts you're actually in such a self-delusion, perhaps on some level vaguely remembering your original point and thinking it was a good one, but now completely within an emotional state that you believe you're rewriting your memories of this conversation is a "good trick" and you deserve a medal or something.

It's extremely boring, but I will entertain it further as my primary purpose on this forum is to develop methods against bad faith debate. Just boringly repeating your delusions is a common bad faith debate tactic, so let continue.

To cite the point under consideration again:

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached.
— boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Now, unless you're now claiming to have zero reading comprehensions skills, of your own words or anyone else's, at this point in the debate the word "precondition" had been the focus of discussion for several pages with a clear meaning; Zelensky uses the word and everyone in the discussion was using the word in exactly the same way, exactly how the dictionary describes it.

So, if you want to say now that you didn't read any of that, just happened to drop into the discussion completely randomly to say absolutely nothing, and just "accidentally" used the word precondition but in an unusual and meaningless way without any intention to reference anything in the debate you were joining, yes, zero reading comprehension would be one explanation. But, in that case you're unlikely to be able to comprehend your lack of reading comprehension through reading. It's also unlikely as you've been engaged in this discussion for a while, and clearly know the bare minimum of "what words mean" in order to take part.

The issue under discussion is "precondition" for negotiation (such as "trusting Putin" or "security guarantees" etc.). You are clearly a partisan to Zelensky jumping in to defend his claims to require preconditions to be met to negotiate, contradicting my claims to the contrary.

Your point is clear, Zelensky's preconditions can make sense even if the deals between the US and Soviet Union are a counter example (on the issue of trust), because there is a difference between them and Ukraine. They have Nuclear Weapons "but Ukraine doesn’t have!"

Which is a meaningful argument. Would make sense (if it was true) as a rebuttal to my claim, that there is a critical difference in the counter example and the situation at hand, supporting Zelensky's insistance on "precondition".

Now, you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" all the way to a tautology that in a deal about nuclear weapons the US and the Soviet Union took into account nuclear weapons (the idea, who has them, etc.) just like every other state, nuclear power or not, would do exactly the same, and actually having nuclear weapons was obviously not a precondition to agreeing to the deals that the US, Soviet Union and most non-nuclear states also agree to.

If you didn't think you were making a meaningful point, you'd make it clear that non-nuclear states of course "rationally pursue" the same kinds of deals and "not-having" nuclear weapons is a precondition for doing so (in the way you are using term), and that your use of "pre-condition" means absolutely nothing as the contrary to the precondition in question may result in the exact same actions, which is not what a precondition is (how it's described in the dictionary, how Zelensky uses it, how we were using it in this discussion about Zelensky's use of the term, until you retroactively invented a completely unusual and bizarre meaning that is obviously a lie, and boils down to the the tautology of a "a factor under consideration").

But, anyone who is actually a fan of reading comprehension can clearly see that the structure and meaning of your original claim was that having nuclear weapons was a precondition to enter agreements with untrusted parties and, therefore, it's not "rational to pursue" doing the same if you don't have nuclear weapons.

The intended purpose of your statement is to defend Zelensky's various preconditions as "rational to pursue" given Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons. An argument you continue to make, clearly arguing Zelensky understandably is going to want guarantees in any deal and taking issue with my claim that any "guarantee" will be purely ornamental (perhaps a nice ornament to have, but ornament non the less).

The original meaning is clear and it clearly serves an important function in your overall position that security guarantees are a "rational" precondition for Zelensky to seek out in any peace deal; whereas the US and the Soviet Union didn't require such guarantees in their various peace making dealings because they already had nuclear weapons.

Your original rebuttal to my claim makes perfect sense to support your position and serves a clear roll in the argumentation structure you've developed.

The problem you've encountered is that your position is false: nuclear weapons are not a precondition to enter agreements about nuclear weapons and, more importantly, security guarantees do not exist and cannot be invented to satisfy Zelensky's desire for guarantees (even if we can easily agree he'd want them if they could and do exist and provided to him in any agreement and, even better, as a precondition to even start discussing an agreement; just as we can rationally want a lot of things that don't exist or can't happen or then so unlikely to not-happen that it is functionally the same as can't happen; impossible desires that are actually completely critical to decision making, as often we do not know what is possible or not and to check the feasibility of something, that we'd want it if it were possible, is generally a "precondition" to going and checking, otherwise why would we care? The exception being when we desire it not to be true, as it would present a risk to us, but we go check the feasibility to evaluate our risk mitigation; but this is really the exact same thing that our desire is something not-be-true even it maybe or actually is true, and we are still desiring "A" despite its impossibility, just A is best described as a "not-B" and A is impossible because B is actually true).

The reason to believe the peace deal will work is if one believes things in the real world do and will continue to motivate all the key parties to follow the deal, and will have little to do with what the deal actually says (because, as you've pointed out yourself, international law is "voluntary based" system). The wording of the deal maybe necessary to coordinate willing participants, and some plans are better than others, but what the wording of the deal will not accomplish is keep any party to their word if they decide it's better not to (such as the US, EU, Ukraine, Russia).

Now, the boring response to explaining the obvious to you again will be "Yes! both nuclear and non-nuclear states rationally pursued the exact same agreements, but I was actually talking about counter-factual agreements that didn't happen but could happen that maybe nuclear states might pursue only because they have nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states wouldn't pursue because they don't have nuclear weapons, we can imagine the difference in nuclear status resulting in difference of diplomatic outcomes! The 'pre-condition' I pointed out, although not an actual pre-condition, could nevertheless be a condition that can be different and lead to different decision making outcomes."

Aka: "people take information into account in making decisions, and different configurations of information can lead to different decisions, even under the same rational framework; I have discovered, after hundreds of pages of discussing diplomacy and warmaking, a basic description of the decision making process: people have information and make decisions, and the information, like if you have nuclear weapons or not, is taken into account in making decisions. Do I get a philosophy medal now?"

Like "pre-condition" I guess. BTW "clear" in the sense that is obvious to you or in the sense that we should really care about? — neomac

Yes, precondition is also a pretty clear meaning, just like attack.

If you say A is a precondition for B, the meaning is not-A isn't compatible with B ... it was a precondition so it should definitely be there for there to be B.

Saying A is a precondition for B but likewise not-A is also a precondition for B, that's the exact opposite of the meaning of precondition.

Lookup precondition in a search engine results in literally:

precondition
/priːkənˈdɪʃ(ə)n/
noun
a condition that must be fulfilled before other things can happen or be done.
"a precondition for peace" — search engine search for precondition

Notice the strong words like "must" ... and absence of words like "optional" or "nice to have, but not like, an actual precondition".

... Notice the example the search engine produces from Oxford Languages ... "a precondition for peace".

Try harder to explain my own words to me then. Here I claim it again: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue
What's the exact meaning of it again? — neomac

That's simply not your original claim, and if it is it means nothing.

Notice the tautological nature of your new claim, which is, seeing as you agree having nuclear weapons isn't a precondition to any agreement about nuclear weapons in anyway, that people just basically take into account information in making decisions. True for pretty much any decisions.

Ukraine doesn't deterrence means ... but also took that into account in negotiating accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There's actually a long list of countries without nuclear weapons that have agreed by accession or ratification to the NPT, that you can consult at treaties.unoda.org.

So, countries having nuclear weapons is a precondition for these other non-nuclear states taking into account the deterrence means of themselves and other parties etc. etc. etc. in order to decide to agree.

All that's saying is the existence of nuclear weapons, or then their conception, is a precondition to an agreement about nuclear weapons, and people thinking it's a good idea to agree to the treaty (for whatever reason) is a precondition for actually agreeing. I.e. the tautology that if someone agrees to something ... they at least thought they had good enough reasons to do so at the time, why else would they agree. Certainly it's tautological for the "rational agents" you like to sprinkle here and there in these little exchanges.

By definition a rational agent does not do something they are entirely convinced a terrible idea in every way and in no way serves any of their purposes. Obviously. And that's all your saying: US and Soviet Union thought the NTP was a good idea ... as did all the other states that agreed to it who didn't have nuclear weapons.

You're attempt to water down your original claim, clearly trying to rebut my claim that trusting Putin was in no way a precondition to a deal with Putin, is just really boring at this point.

However, it's instructive because it's a good example for anyone following of how the "that's not what I really meant" defence works in terms of mental gymnastics the practitioner can engage in and likely genuinely believe on some level.

I'm sure Zelensky genuinely believes his meaning was not to try to escalate military confrontation between NATO and Russia without any evidence but was all entirely reasonable at the time and still is even if we have to stretch the imagination to the point of being stupid.

I see you understand the word "rationality" as arbitrarily as you understand the word "precondition". Still waiting for you to quote who believed in security guaranties in the sense of certainty. Try harder. — neomac

Shitting gold is not an arbitrary. Gold is worth a lot of money, it's rational to want money according to every economics text book I've ever read, therefore it's rational to want to shit gold if that were possible and safe. Arbitrary would be that I'm just as willing to defend "it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions", which I'm not. I do not think it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions; seems completely irrational.

The point of this example is that stating its rational for Zelensky to want something, such as security guarantees, is not the same as stating it's a rational expectation or even possible for Zelensky to get.

We can agree that it's a rational desire on Zelensky's part, without agreeing he has any way to meaningfully get what he wants nor agreeing that anyone can even offer what he wants. Even if Biden were to swear up and down on his own son's coke, Biden may not be there in 2 years and the next US president not only care nothing for whatever Biden promised by even actively hostile to Zelensky's interests.

Your phrase "look for" is, true to form, ambiguous. It's of course rational to be on the lookout for the satisfaction of desires, even if one does not expect them. If I desire magic to actually exist (despite zero evidence) I may rationally defend being on the "look out" for ferries that have magic dust, of a coke or similar kind.

Where we can start to seriously question my rationality is if I start to put resources into attracting these ferries that I have no reason to believe exist, just would very much like the coke ferries to be an actual thing.

Likewise, if I start to make decisions, spending resources, taking risks, leading thousands of my fellow citizens to their deaths, in my quest to uncover the true magic of ferries, having zero evidence they actually exist, then, the rationality of my behaviour is, at best, highly circumspect and people may come to question my decision making process.

So, if there is no "security guarantee" that can feasibly be made for Zelensky, he may rationally rather that not be the case, but to act based on the expectation of something that cannot be offered would then fall in the irrational category.

It's only rational to make a precondition that cannot be satisfied by any party an obstacle as another way to simply say "no, I refuse to negotiate, more war please" and otherwise irrational preconditions simply a way of trolling people.

That is the issue at hand; the actual debate that is relevant to the discussion and the situation in Ukraine and Zelensky's negoitation position.

Now, if you concede the central point of contention that there is no guarantee available other than ornamentation to an agreement no one expect to be followed a week after it's signed, if circumstances emerge that render the agreement no longer in the interests of the key parties to follow, then certainly there are better and worse deals and Zelensky would want to be as confident as he can Russia won't just reinvade (or then act in his rational self interest and just be concerned about his own immediate political future and wealth, maybe take a bribe to sell Ukraine out to maximise his profits of this whole enterprise; maybe crack open an econ-101 book and look out for number 1 like a boss), but there is zero way for anyone to meaningfully guarantee they'll do what they promise or Russia will do what it promises in such a deal.

The reasons to take the deal are:

1. The alternative is losing on the battlefield and the worse conditions being imposed by force without any further leverage to negotiate conditions.

2. One genuinely believes the parties involved will follow the deal anyways, even without any guarantees (that do not and cannot exist), and that circumstances will stay that way, at least long enough that it serves your own purposes in making the deal.

3. One has no intention to follow the deal oneself, it's all part of a 5D military-diplomatic maverick statesmen move to buy time, track down the coke ferries once and for all, fly off to never-never land, track down the lost boyz and do an insane amount of coke.

4. One has been bribed to sell out ones own country for the next best thing next to magic: the fucking money.

I wasn't arguing to support Christoff's understanding of Zelensky (I find Zelensky's attitude toward the missile incident questionable). I was arguing against the claim that Christoff committed a fallacious attack ad hominem. — neomac

Sure, but this defence still requires Zelensky's words as somehow unclear.

And, if we were only talking about "action must be taken", that's ambiguous enough, but the context is incredibly clear, specifically the word "attack" is incredibly clear without alternative meaning.

There's no system of goal post shell game that can be played to turn the meaning of "attack" into "maybe it was an accident, no biggey, nothing to see here" nor "actually, we should probably investigate where the missiles came from".

There's really no other meanings available.

Now, if despite Zelensky's meaning being perfectly clear, you nevertheless see no ad hominem, I do not really care about the ad hominem in itself, wasn't directed at me and I wouldn't care if it was, but the meaning of Zelensky's words claiming Russia has directly attacked NATO does seem to me relevant to discussion.

Now, I would agree Zelensky's words wouldn't cause NATO to do anything anyways, but it is important information about Zelensky's character or if he's in control of his own forces. In Zelensky demanding the data, what is clear is that neither Zelensky nor anyone under his command has any data that indicates any Russian missile they were chasing.

Maybe Zelensky believed his own commanders "in good faith" without asking for the evidence before accusing Russia of having killed two Polish citizens (because he follows the maverick shoot from the hip play book of the league of extraordinary statesmen), but, even if this was true, the commanders in turn have no evidence for their claim.

Now you may "understand" the lying, "given the circumstances", as @Olivier5 would defend, but that is an extremely naive understanding of the circumstances.

Even if the West would never cause a stir about such lying in public, no one appreciates being lied to and that may have serious consequences, perhaps accelerating the "ally fatigue" Zelensky has already been warned about.

Even a liar only wants us to believe their lies but does not like being lied to in turn. "We're all the fucking scum of the earth" is not a team building argument.

And what holds for US and Soviet Union doesn't necessarily hold for other countries not possessing such weapons, like Ukraine. — neomac

Your exact word was "pre-condition".

Pre-condition for what? A deal concerning nuclear weapons. What's the precondition again? Having nuclear weapons, in your rebuttal to my point that the United States and Soviet Union were able to come to agreements despite not trusting each other (that "trust", such as "trusting Putin", is not a precondition to international agreements and treatise and so on).

You simply are unable to read and understand your own words.

Now you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "taking into consideration" all the way to "what holds for some parties may not hold for all parties", which is in no way an analogue for "pre-condition".

Maybe just admit you made a completely ignorant argument because in your own mind it sounded good the idea that US and Soviet Union, having nuclear weapons, don't need to trust each other due to their deterrence of actually having nuclear weapons (even underlining that "Ukraine doesn't have!" said nuclear weapons, so the pre-condition doesn't "hold" for them) and, at the time, you were completely oblivious to the easy and obvious contradiction to such an argument being other non-nuclear states entered the same agreements, so obviously it's not a pre-condition to have nuclear weapons to agree about nuclear weapons.

I totally agree with you if and only if you totally agree with me that is perfectly and pragmatically rational for Ukraine to look for "security guarantees" or equivalent to hedge against the risk of Russian adventurism at Ukrainian expenses. — neomac

It's rational to want to shit gold (in a rectally safe way and not a "careful what you wish for way"). It's rational for Zelensky to want to be king of the world. So, if by "look for" you mean "desire", sure, it's rational to desire a lot of things that won't happen, even knowing they cannot possibly happen.

If by look for you mean some actual objective ... and you are now placing "security guarantees" in quotations to emphasise the ornamental meaning of the phrase in the context we're discussing, then yes, we do agree. But all you're saying is that Ukraine (if it wanted to get a peace deal) should seek as good a deal as it can get, which is obviously true.

The basic point of international relations I have been trying to instruct you about, is that a good international deal if by "good" we mean is actually followed and implemented, is one in which the parties involved carry out their promises because they remain actions they would want to do anyways in the circumstances that follow. All an international relations agreement accomplishes in practice is coordination between willing participants and very slight resolutions of catch 22's where each party would do the actions in questions (such as reduce their weapons stockpiles for their own reasons) but only if the other party was doing so as well (solution, a system of fly over's and other inspections to see the other party is doing what they promised, in which case we'll do what we promised).

Vis-a-vis a peace deal in Ukraine, the primary factor of believing Russia would not simply reinvade is because one believes Russia would not want to, an entirely reasonable belief if one does in fact believe this war was a disaster for Russia and was premised on a total victor in 3 days. If one believed they had this current scenario in mind in launching the invasion (perhaps not as their preferred scenario, but possible and accepted), and were willing to pay the cost to achieve what they have so far, then it stands to reason they may pay a similar cost to accomplish as much in the future.

To believe the US would supply arms again in such a future invasion, again, is to assume they see that, again, as a positive cost-benefit to themselves.

All sorts of things could be in a deal that (if people kept their word) may increase or decrease the cost to Russia of another war, but none of these would be in any sense a "guarantee", except in the ornamental sense of "trust us bro" and not in a sense of certainty nor some legal sense of a court holding a party to their promise (embellishing the legal consequences to compensate the arrogance of someone who "guarantees" and doesn't deliver).

However, the biggest problem to a peace deal at the moment is that Zelensky has made a completely uncompromising position for himself, to justify further fighting at all costs, and that compromising would immediately result in the problem (for Zelensky) that it's a worse compromise than what was available before (in any deal we can imagine the Russians accepting). Of course, the West may have accomplished what it wanted in dragging out the war and damaging Russia as you point out they are want to do, but Zelensky also has constituents not only in Western parliaments but also in Ukraine who may not see the logic for them in such a resolution to the conflict.

He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious — neomac

But it is obvious.

Fist Zelensky Larps as a NATO member claiming an "attack on collective security", as if Ukraine is part of some collective.

This is the key phrase, claiming NATO is under attack.

Second he says "action must be taken", which is perfectly clear what that means in the context.

It's like me yelling "The building is on fire! Action must be taken!" (having no evidence of this), and when my actions cause damages, even lives by causing a panic, claiming that "aha! I didn't say what 'actions,' I could have meant just the situation should be investigated, my statement that was based on nothing verified, and there's no cause for alarm; it's not like I said there's a fire and people should panic or act based on that belief! Where do I say that!?!?!?!."

The only other interpretation available than Zelensky claiming Russia is attacking NATO and therefore NATO must respond with some militarily escalation of one form or another, would be that Zelensky is claiming an attack on collective security by Ukraine on NATO, because Zelensky ordered an attack on Poland that took Polish lives and, generally speaking, Ukrainian actions and reckless subterfuge is a menace to NATO and European welfare since 2014. But, I seriously doubt Zelensky meant an attack on collective security by Ukraine.

If his meaning was Russia, then everyone would understand he means Russia attacked NATO and therefore NATO must respond, at least somehow. If Zelensky does not want peace (requiring compromise and breaking all his extreme exaggerated promises of victory to the Ukrainian people and accepting a deal worse than what was on the table first week of the war), then his best option is escalation ... but he doesn't control the weapons so he can't escalate himself, he needs NATO to escalate.